China and India relationship

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plawolf

Lieutenant General
India was let to have control.
The south Tibet region was taken over by China but the PLA was called back from beyond the other slopes of Himalayas by the leaders in Beijing.

Why? No answer that'd convince everyone (or me). One among the long list of things that I'd like to think as a pointer towards China leader's "long strategic vision". Maybe that's naive of me. But certainly it was a gamble. Did the leaders of China predict that India would remain as wobbly and lackluster regarding development and comprehensive power till 2020? It seems like it.

The rational for pull back was multi-levelled.

At the long term strategic level, at the time China very much hoped/expected India to turn back from its path of idiocy and embrace China as a friend and maybe even ally eventually. Pulling back creates the necessary pre-requisite to allow that detente.

Also, you need to appreciate that at the time, both China and India had newly emerged after long term armed subjugation and predation by foreigners. As such, China was keen to show India that it was not more of the same. It was hoped that by leading through example, China might have taught India a new, more mature and civilised way to handle disputes rather than reaching for the gun as the first response as their British colonial masters were used to doing. It was ultimately proven to be a false hope, but it was worthy of trying at the time, without the knowledge of hindsight.

At the medium/long term strategic level, China’s withdraw utterly obliterated all the propaganda BS the Indian government and media were heaping on China, and the impact was both immediately profound and long lasting. That, coupled with the utterly crushing nature of the military defeat China dealt India completely obliterated any and all Indian will to come back for round 2. Instead all of the nationalist fury that was whipped up in preparation of being directed at China instead turn inwards. And India was too scared to even think about making trouble for a whole 3 generations.

Its only now that almost all people who had first hand experience of the magnitude of that mental trauma had passed that India is once again having delusions of grandeur with a heavy dose of revisionist rewriting of history. But that’s more India’s fault for squandering all those years to normalise relations with China than China’s fault.

In the short term, there was also the tactical consideration in that the new positions China took were hard to garrison and defend.

This was way before China had decent infrastructure or powerful economy, and the logistical costs of maintaining a large garrison on the other side of the Himalayas would have been prohibitive.

Had China tried to hold onto its gains, the Indians would almost certainly have used that as a rallying call to unite against Chinese aggression and it would have basically been the same as the Indian-Pakistan situation of endless clashes, and China didn’t want any of that nonsense.
 

Xizor

Captain
Registered Member
The rational for pull back was multi-levelled.

At the long term strategic level, at the time China very much hoped/expected India to turn back from its path of idiocy and embrace China as a friend and maybe even ally eventually. Pulling back creates the necessary pre-requisite to allow that detente.

Also, you need to appreciate that at the time, both China and India had newly emerged after long term armed subjugation and predation by foreigners. As such, China was keen to show India that it was not more of the same. It was hoped that by leading through example, China might have taught India a new, more mature and civilised way to handle disputes rather than reaching for the gun as the first response as their British colonial masters were used to doing. It was ultimately proven to be a false hope, but it was worthy of trying at the time, without the knowledge of hindsight.

At the medium/long term strategic level, China’s withdraw utterly obliterated all the propaganda BS the Indian government and media were heaping on China, and the impact was both immediately profound and long lasting. That, coupled with the utterly crushing nature of the military defeat China dealt India completely obliterated any and all Indian will to come back for round 2. Instead all of the nationalist fury that was whipped up in preparation of being directed at China instead turn inwards. And India was too scared to even think about making trouble for a whole 3 generations.

Its only now that almost all people who had first hand experience of the magnitude of that mental trauma had passed that India is once again having delusions of grandeur with a heavy dose of revisionist rewriting of history. But that’s more India’s fault for squandering all those years to normalise relations with China than China’s fault.

In the short term, there was also the tactical consideration in that the new positions China took were hard to garrison and defend.

This was way before China had decent infrastructure or powerful economy, and the logistical costs of maintaining a large garrison on the other side of the Himalayas would have been prohibitive.

Had China tried to hold onto its gains, the Indians would almost certainly have used that as a rallying call to unite against Chinese aggression and it would have basically been the same as the Indian-Pakistan situation of endless clashes, and China didn’t want any of that nonsense.
But then this is the same China that clashed with USSR for some small islands. The treatment towards India regarding huge tracts of land is quite odd. Isn't China backtracking on its own "red lines" regarding territorial integrity here?


We can all see how a settlement with USSR has created peace. But here in India's case, China and India hasn't settled for peace. I buy wholeheartedly the assertion that the territory in question is hard to defend and the PLA was then not optimally primed for war.

But the long and medium term strategic level reasonings that you explained ( and is known to many here) seems quite wafer thin at many places, don't you agree? The kind of gamble aside, the booty itself - huge tracts of land 40,000 sq km and more - is too big.
 

ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
The rational for pull back was multi-levelled.

At the long term strategic level, at the time China very much hoped/expected India to turn back from its path of idiocy and embrace China as a friend and maybe even ally eventually. Pulling back creates the necessary pre-requisite to allow that detente.

Also, you need to appreciate that at the time, both China and India had newly emerged after long term armed subjugation and predation by foreigners. As such, China was keen to show India that it was not more of the same. It was hoped that by leading through example, China might have taught India a new, more mature and civilised way to handle disputes rather than reaching for the gun as the first response as their British colonial masters were used to doing. It was ultimately proven to be a false hope, but it was worthy of trying at the time, without the knowledge of hindsight.

At the medium/long term strategic level, China’s withdraw utterly obliterated all the propaganda BS the Indian government and media were heaping on China, and the impact was both immediately profound and long lasting. That, coupled with the utterly crushing nature of the military defeat China dealt India completely obliterated any and all Indian will to come back for round 2. Instead all of the nationalist fury that was whipped up in preparation of being directed at China instead turn inwards. And India was too scared to even think about making trouble for a whole 3 generations.

Its only now that almost all people who had first hand experience of the magnitude of that mental trauma had passed that India is once again having delusions of grandeur with a heavy dose of revisionist rewriting of history. But that’s more India’s fault for squandering all those years to normalise relations with China than China’s fault.

In the short term, there was also the tactical consideration in that the new positions China took were hard to garrison and defend.

This was way before China had decent infrastructure or powerful economy, and the logistical costs of maintaining a large garrison on the other side of the Himalayas would have been prohibitive.

Had China tried to hold onto its gains, the Indians would almost certainly have used that as a rallying call to unite against Chinese aggression and it would have basically been the same as the Indian-Pakistan situation of endless clashes, and China didn’t want any of that nonsense.

Well said except for the preservation of potential mending of relations. That did seem like it would be the path for a tiny window of time but China's support of Pakistan throughout the decades means that what you mentioned is totally impossible. Ceasefire however was the right move. Going to war was less than ideal though and came at the cost of kicking the can down the road. The Chinese side could not resolve these disputes for good and could not deal with the situation in any other way. They knew the forward positions were untenable during that period of China's development and the available resources. So the net effect was just to give the Indians their war as price of claiming Chinese land because the Brits essentially drew it on a map for them and unilaterally declared that for the newly formed nation of India.

But then this is the same China that clashed with USSR for some small islands. The treatment towards India regarding huge tracts of land is quite odd. Isn't China backtracking on its own "red lines" regarding territorial integrity here?

Because Aksai Chin is Chinese and Arunachal Pradesh is Indian. I have so far only seen people tell me I listen to Indian propaganda too much but have yet to see evidence proving AP was ever Chinese or Tibetan. I've given my reasons for why it is Indian.

China fought the border war with India over Aksai Chin not Arunachal Pradesh. China fought for what is actually Chinese land and used AP as a claim. Claiming an Indian stretch of land as Chinese was done because the Indians claimed a Chinese stretch of land as Indian - Aksai Chin. That was the limit of AP's strategic usefulness then.

The treatment towards India is no different. Clashed over sovereignty. With India it was over Aksai Chin and AP was used.

We can all see how a settlement with USSR has created peace. But here in India's case, China and India hasn't settled for peace. I buy wholeheartedly the assertion that the territory in question is hard to defend and the PLA was then not optimally primed for war.

But the long and medium term strategic level reasonings that you explained ( and is known to many here) seems quite wafer thin at many places, don't you agree? The kind of gamble aside, the booty itself - huge tracts of land 40,000 sq km and more - is too big.

USSR is no more. Russia and China eventually settled their disputes as the former became a different nation and both wanted refreshed relations. Having said that Russia and Japan have not resolved their disputes. Some politics obviously at play. China having an opportunity to forge new relations with an extremely valuable partner. With India it sees no value and Aksai Chin is considered strategically important enough.
 

Xizor

Captain
Registered Member
China fought the border war with India over Aksai Chin not Arunachal Pradesh. China fought for what is actually Chinese land and used AP as a claim. Claiming an Indian stretch of land as Chinese was done because the Indians claimed a Chinese stretch of land as Indian - Aksai Chin. That was the limit of AP's strategic usefulness then.

The treatment towards India is no different. Clashed over sovereignty. With India it was over Aksai Chin and AP was used.



USSR is no more. Russia and China eventually settled their disputes as the former became a different nation and both wanted refreshed relations. Having said that Russia and Japan have not resolved their disputes. Some politics obviously at play. China having an opportunity to forge new relations with an extremely valuable partner. With India it sees no value and Aksai Chin is considered strategically important enough.
I don't think AP/ South Tibet was ever expendable or a claim ( even though in reality it indeed exists as such).

India has as much claim to South Tibet as China. Culturally, ethnically etc the people of South Tibet are Tibetan ethnic groups and forest tribes. It is true that strategically Aksai Chin is more valuable than South Tibet.

Considering the enmity between both countries, it is only definite that the South Tibet region will never come under China's hold.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
Well said except for the preservation of potential mending of relations. That did seem like it would be the path for a tiny window of time but China's support of Pakistan throughout the decades means that what you mentioned is totally impossible.

Not at the time. China had not picked a side in 1962. Indeed, at the time Pakistan was very much in America’s pocket.

It was only after the 1965 Pakistan-India war and the subsequent US sanctions that China saw an opening to approach Pakistan. And a huge part of its strategic thinking in making that move was because of the continued hostility from India.

Had India accepted China’s olive branch following 1962 and re-approached relations with China in a mature and reasonable way, it is entirely possible, likely even, that China would have taken a largely neutral position in relations to Pakistan-India, much like how it has managed to steer clear of declaring for any side in the Middle East and managed to establish and maintain good relations with all parties.
 

ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
Not at the time. China had not picked a side in 1962. Indeed, at the time Pakistan was very much in America’s pocket.

It was only after the 1965 Pakistan-India war and the subsequent US sanctions that China saw an opening to approach Pakistan. And a huge part of its strategic thinking in making that move was because of the continued hostility from India.

Had India accepted China’s olive branch following 1962 and re-approached relations with China in a mature and reasonable way, it is entirely possible, likely even, that China would have taken a largely neutral position in relations to Pakistan-India, much like how it has managed to steer clear of declaring for any side in the Middle East and managed to establish and maintain good relations with all parties.

You're right about Pakistan not being so close with China back in the 1960s but I was referring to the only phase in India China relations at their peak between the 1980s and early 2000s. Despite Pakistan being close to China during this period, it didn't stop India and China forming improving ties. By no means were they good but certainly an improvement over the border war era and skirmishes which followed.

Ultimately I think Pakistan and China's close ties will always prevent India China ties from improving beyond a point. That point historically has been at its "highest" in the 1980s and 1990s. So unless Pakistan and China somehow fall into enmity status or Pakistan and India resolve issues and become friendly, there will never be any improvement beyond those "high" points between India and China. Border disputes have fewer reasons for resolution and India's value to China is incomparable to Russia's to China.

India refused to see things from China's pov back in the 1960s because it regarded itself as a superior power. Indian leaders did falter, blunder, and miscalculate. Chinese leaders had one choice, to relent to India or give India its war. The ceasefire wasn't entirely due to untenable positions beyond Himalayas or entirely due to a desire to form reparable relations for future. Although it seems to have shown a hint of in the 1980s but uncertain whether ceasefire agreements had anything to do with those. One thing is currently certain and that is the Pakistan factor as described above. So given these conditions, it is a tricky problem with no good solution in sight. India is either aggressive and adversarial or it is friendly but China loses Pakistan from its orbit (unless those two make good).
 

Jono

Junior Member
Registered Member
guys, we are now looking back from a position of prosperity and strength at something that happened 50 years ago when China was poor, weak and relatively isolated diplomatically then. She also faced the enormous challenge of Soviet Union at the north and had to maintain close to a million soldiers at the northern border. so we have to be fair in our views and judgement.
China at that time simply could not afford and also not wise to pursue a protracted war with India economically, militarily and diplomatically. All the conditions were not favourable to her.
Given the highly unfavourable circumstances China found herself in at that time, what China did manage to score across the Himalayas against a much better equipped and supported opponent (by western powers) was nothing short of spectacular, and probably beyond the wildest imagination / expectation of the decision-makers at Beijing too. I personally feel that Mao, whatever motives and reasonings he might have considered, did a thorough and shrewd calculation and very wisely halted the Chinese advancement towards New Delhi while having the upper hand.
a brilliant strategist always considers the exit plan, and I think Mao made a brilliant move in pulling back the troops, even in hindsight today, all things considered.
If a war was to break out today between China and India, of course China would have different calculations because the situations have vastly improved in her favour. Exit plan may include taking back South Tibet (and I dare say the locals would welcome that too), and the balkanization of India back to the pre British raj days.
just my humble 2 cents.
 

Mohsin77

Senior Member
Registered Member
China had not picked a side in 1962. Indeed, at the time Pakistan was very much in America’s pocket.

China had already picked Pakistan before 1962, but Pakistan was too stupid to capitalize on it. Most people today don't know that China invited Pakistan to join the 1962 War, but Pakistan was a complete idiot at the time and refused. I've heard Pakistani generals on TV, when they are (rarely) questioned on this point, they respond by saying that the Pakistani Army wasn't expecting war in 1962 and wasn't operationally prepared. But that's a ridiculous excuse on every level. Why wasn't the Army "prepared"? That's literally their entire job. And if you're not prepared for a joint-campaign in 1962, why bother starting a war alone 3 years later? The correct answer is that they were idiots.

Here's a couple of other examples of our stupidity: General Ayub (the idiot we had in charge) refused to start Pakistan's nuclear program in the 60s, when the Nobel Prize winning physicist Abdus Salam advised him to do so. (Ayub didn't think Pakistan would ever need nuclear weapons lolz.) Ayub was the same guy who in the 1965 War recalled the front-line general leading the armored offensive in the Chamb sector, right as we were about to cut off Kashmir from India, because he didn't like him, so he put his best friend in charge (who later also headed the 1971 debacle.) This delay stalled the entire offensive in 1965 (which up to that point was resulting in a decisive victory). This was the quality of our "generals" at the time.

Given all of the above, the question arises, why did China "pick" Pakistan? I think it's because of some key factors right after Independence which influenced Mao and Zhou Enlai's calculus. 1) Pakistan had accepted China's territorial claims right from the beginning and even gave away territory to China which we captured from India in 1947, without asking for anything in return. 2) Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize PRC as the rightful government of China and ended relations with Taiwan. These two factors, I think, led China to the same conclusion early on, that Nixon-Kissinger reached later: Pakistanis may be childishly stupid at times, but we aren't duplicitous (well, at least not until we get backstabbed first, e.g. by America in the 90s, at which point, we will find a way to f*ck you over somehow lolz.)

In any case, it seems like the scale of stupidity is starting to tilt in our favor finally. As Pakistan has gotten smarter over time, India has gotten dumber. Case in point:

 
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Bellum_Romanum

Brigadier
Registered Member
China had already picked Pakistan before 1962, but Pakistan was too stupid to capitalize on it. Most people today don't know that China invited Pakistan to join the 1962 War, but Pakistan was a complete idiot at the time and refused. I've heard Pakistani generals on TV, when they are (rarely) questioned on this point, they respond by saying that the Pakistani Army wasn't expecting war in 1962 and wasn't operationally prepared. But that's a ridiculous excuse on every level. Why wasn't the Army "prepared"? That's literally their entire job. And if you're not prepared for a joint-campaign in 1962, why bother starting a war alone 3 years later? The correct answer is that they were idiots.

Here's a couple of other examples of our stupidity: General Ayub (the idiot we had in charge) refused to start Pakistan's nuclear program in the 60s, when the Nobel Prize winning physicist Abdus Salam advised him to do so. (Ayub didn't think Pakistan would ever need nuclear weapons lolz.) Ayub was the same guy who in the 1965 War recalled the front-line general leading the armored offensive in the Chamb sector, right as we were about to cut off Kashmir from India, because he didn't like him, so he put his best friend in charge (who later also headed the 1971 debacle.) This delay stalled the entire offensive in 1965 (which up to that point was resulting in a decisive victory). This was the quality of our "generals" at the time.

Given all of the above, the question arises, why did China "pick" Pakistan? I think it's because of some key factors right after Independence which influenced Mao and Zhou Enlai's calculus. 1) Pakistan had accepted China's territorial claims right from the beginning and even gave away territory to China which we captured from India in 1947, without asking for anything in return. 2) Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize PRC as the rightful government of China and ended relations with Taiwan. These two factors, I think, led China to the same conclusion early on, that Nixon-Kissinger reached later: Pakistanis may be childishly stupid at times, but we aren't duplicitous (well, at least not until we get backstabbed first, e.g. by America in the 90s, at which point, we will find a way to f*ck you over somehow lolz.)

In any case, it seems like that the scale of stupidity is starting to tilt in our favor finally. As Pakistan has gotten smarter over time, India has gotten dumber. Case in point:

That's something I never thought to consider before reading your post. As an aside, what do you think of Christine Fair. In all the interviews I have seen of her she seems hell bent on trashing Pakistan every chance she gets like she's a wounded lover or something. I just don't understand her unhinged comments at times since she's supposedly a gifted academic but I guess it's true what they say that hell knows no fury like a woman scorned.
 

Mohsin77

Senior Member
Registered Member
what do you think of Christine Fair. In all the interviews I have seen of her she seems hell bent on trashing Pakistan every chance she gets like she's a wounded lover or something.

After the 2019 Balakot episode, Christine Fair told Indians that they lost, and they lost badly. She said India's claims of success were BS, and that the PAF shocked India with its response and dominated. Ever since then, she gets a free pass from me lolz.
 
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