I couldn't work out where to post this, so feel free to move it as appropriate.
I recently stumbled across
Looking at the footnotes, I see that the author makes extensive use of a 1983 book by US naval intelligence writer David G. Muller,
This book has now arrived and from even a brief perusal I can observe that it is highly detailed, readable, and immensely useful. A sample:
On the night of 6 August 1965, the 1,250-ton ROC Navy patrol ship Chienmen, with Rear Admiral Hu Chia-sheng embarked and assisted by a 450-ton patrol craft, was in the process of landing commandos in rubber boats in the Fujian-Guangdong provincial border area in the southern Taiwan Strait. The area was well covered by PRC coastal surveillance radar, and the Chinese may even have had prior knowledge of the operation. The two ships were surprised by between seven and ten small PRC combatants and were both sunk in the ensuing battle. A total of 203 Nationalists were killed or captured, including Admiral Hu. (p. 125)
The battles of 1965 marked a turning point in the relationship between the navies of the PRC and ROC. PRC naval ships still avoided operating regularly in the strait, and the ROC still maintained a superior presence in the region, but the ROC Navy had developed a new respect for its adversary and after 1965 rarely engaged in any provocative actions. It was understood by both sides that Taiwan had free run of the strait only so long as the PRC chose not to contest the situation. Renewed ROC naval harassment of fishing operations, aggressive patrols, and the landing of infiltrators would invite further disastrous engagements and could ultimately result in the loss of access to the offshore island garrisons. Both sides were now content to refrain from military confrontation in the strait. By the end of 1965, the PRC Navy can be said to have achieved one of its primary goals: the security of the East China coast from ROC incursions and harassment. (pp. 127-8)