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Lethe

Lethe

Senior Member
I couldn't work out where to post this, so feel free to move it as appropriate.

I recently stumbled across
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article from the USNI 'Naval History' journal on the early (pre-1980s) PLAN and the ongoing relevance of that period today, which is well worth reading.

Looking at the footnotes, I see that the author makes extensive use of a 1983 book by US naval intelligence writer David G. Muller,
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, which I have now ordered. I lack detailed knowledge of this period and I'm sure I'm not alone in that. And as the USNI author points out, these matters are not only of historical interest, but are deeply entwined with issues that are still playing out today.
 
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grulle

grulle

Junior Member
Registered Member
is it accurate to say that a few 055 destroyers can make short work of Taiwan's entire navy?
 
grulle

grulle

Junior Member
Registered Member
Ndla2 said:
I don't think it is that straightforward. Especially with their subs in the mix.
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their WWII era subs? lol you've got to be kidding.

Taiwan's navy consists of 4 Kidd class destroyeers (very outdated) and a bunch of small frigates. I think 3 055 destroyers should be enough
 
V

voyager1

Captain
Registered Member
grulle said:
their WWII era subs? lol you've got to be kidding.

Taiwan's navy consists of 4 Kidd class destroyeers (very outdated) and a bunch of small frigates. I think 3 055 destroyers should be enough
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Destroyers are destroyers and subs are subs.

I would pick anytime in the day to have 4 destroyers visible as my opponent, than having a single "invisible" sub underseas.
 
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Volpler11

Junior Member
Registered Member
Northern, eastern, and southern theater command all got a fleet each. If the western theater command was to get a fleet of their own, where should it be based at?

Center command can get the space based fleet.
 
O

ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
Volpler11 said:
Northern, eastern, and southern theater command all got a fleet each. If the western theater command was to get a fleet of their own, where should it be based at?

Center command can get the space based fleet.
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Western theatre command is totally landlocked. Why would they want a fleet and what good is that? There is no sea and no land by the sea to defend using a fleet.

China has no desire or force projection capability to make use of a fleet in a conventional operation against India. If Indian Ocean and relevant straits are blocked for access, then that's a job for land based anti-surface capabilities and the PLAN. They also couldn't realistically do that diplomatically or economically without many other nations opposing whoever even begins to think about that. It's wildly impossible for US or India to block commercial shipping through those straits or harm Chinese shipping through Indian Ocean. It's against their own laws and international laws BUT if they were to somehow trump up some charges and do that, then it would be war. That'll be like China forcing a US customer to stop buying US exports. With them, might is right and they just need to justify it for the bleeding hearts but if they were to explore that option, western theatre would only need to launch nukes and mach 10+ projectiles around to destroy some key targets. If they escalate, they can eat a few hundred megaton warheads in retaliation. Very simple stuff.

Zero threat of Chinese shipping being comprehensively threatened in Indian Ocean. Zero threat of straits being shut (because world depends on it including Chinese shipping lol). They are getting around this by waging economic lawfare instead. Even if it came to a fight, there would be no need for a separate western theatre fleet. May as well put what would go into such a fleet into the rest of the eastern and southern ones. Don't forget that it would be China responding to aggression and attacks that threaten its wellbeing and sovereignty. It would have every moral and legal right to hit back harder than its been hit. Even the US wouldn't even imagine acting militarily aggressive for no good justification. They will need to build one to play their games in the Indian Ocean as well.
 
Lethe

Lethe

Senior Member
Lethe said:
I couldn't work out where to post this, so feel free to move it as appropriate.

I recently stumbled across
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
article from the USNI 'Naval History' journal on the early (pre-1980s) PLAN and the ongoing relevance of that period today, which is well worth reading.

Looking at the footnotes, I see that the author makes extensive use of a 1983 book by US naval intelligence writer David G. Muller,
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
, which I have now ordered. I lack detailed knowledge of this period and I'm sure I'm not alone in that. And as the USNI author points out, these matters are not only of historical interest, but are deeply entwined with issues that are still playing out today.
Click to expand...

This book has now arrived and from even a brief perusal I can observe that it is highly detailed, readable, and immensely useful. A sample:

On the night of 6 August 1965, the 1,250-ton ROC Navy patrol ship Chienmen, with Rear Admiral Hu Chia-sheng embarked and assisted by a 450-ton patrol craft, was in the process of landing commandos in rubber boats in the Fujian-Guangdong provincial border area in the southern Taiwan Strait. The area was well covered by PRC coastal surveillance radar, and the Chinese may even have had prior knowledge of the operation. The two ships were surprised by between seven and ten small PRC combatants and were both sunk in the ensuing battle. A total of 203 Nationalists were killed or captured, including Admiral Hu. (p. 125)

The battles of 1965 marked a turning point in the relationship between the navies of the PRC and ROC. PRC naval ships still avoided operating regularly in the strait, and the ROC still maintained a superior presence in the region, but the ROC Navy had developed a new respect for its adversary and after 1965 rarely engaged in any provocative actions. It was understood by both sides that Taiwan had free run of the strait only so long as the PRC chose not to contest the situation. Renewed ROC naval harassment of fishing operations, aggressive patrols, and the landing of infiltrators would invite further disastrous engagements and could ultimately result in the loss of access to the offshore island garrisons. Both sides were now content to refrain from military confrontation in the strait. By the end of 1965, the PRC Navy can be said to have achieved one of its primary goals: the security of the East China coast from ROC incursions and harassment. (pp. 127-8)
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Akame

Akame

Junior Member
Registered Member
What is the realm of unmanned marine vehicles? Why isn't it produced? It would be great for the pacific
 
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