Despite failure to modernize the land forces Turkey uses its arms industry to extend influence in the domain that produces indirect results. Recent efforts to gain contracts in Kazakhstan along contracts in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan effectively put "Turkish arms" on the other side of Caspian Sea even though they are manned by non-Turk
ish (but Turk
ic) personnel.
Weapons are followed by sustainment and training which can, and often is, followed by opening of infrastructure. That easily leads to military deployment.
Kazahstan is crucial because it will provide a necessary territorial buffer for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan which are not members of CTSO ( Uzbekistan since 2012, Turkmeninstan never joined). While both Armenia and Kazakhstan remain members of CSTO it is evident that they are pursuing gradual withdrawal as permitted by political circumstances. Any direct link between Turkey and Azerbaijan proper would provide additional motivation as
Turkey could provide security to Kazakhstan through indirect means by forcing Russia to expend resources in Syria and Armenia and at the same time direct land route provides economic incentive for energy exports. With Kazakhstan serving as buffer Turkey can deploy assets to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Again the focus on the aerial branch yields best results as the most efficient way to project power and influence in the region is through air power and enhancing of information domain. In short Turkey can say "you provide the army and we will provide the air force" which will be the most optimal solution since Central Asian states have small and obsolete air forces using Su-27, MiG-29s and Su-25s while their ground forces are technologically comparable with Russian ground force potential. Similarly Iran will be most easily deterred by deployment of air assets.
This likely provides the best justification for Turkey's pursuit of autonomy and independence in aerial domain, especially Kaan, high payload drones, domestic AESA radars and missiles as only with sovereign capabilities - independent of US, China, Russia or the EU - can Turkey employ this strategy effectively since all these four actors will be competing in the region and will restrict Turkey's options.
In the meantime however even F-16V or equivalent can be of use against Su-35S/30SM2 or Su-34M. Only Su-57 will be problematic, but Russia will need them to counter growing numbers of F-35 in neighbouring NATO countries: 165 by ~2030 shared between Norway, Finland, Denmark and Poland.
----
A very likely long-term fallout of the Russo-Ukrainian war may be reignition of separatism in the Caucasus.
| republic | population | Russians | ~GRP (bn. EUR 2021) | ~GDP p.c. (EUR 2021) |
| Kalmykia | 267k | 25,7% | 1 | 4000 |
| Dagestan | 3187k | 3,3% | 9 | 3000 |
| Chechnya | 1510k | 1,2% | 3 | 2000 |
| Ingushetia | 509k | 0,7% | 1 | 2000 |
| North Ossetia-Alania | 687k | 18,9% | 2 | 3000 |
| Kabardino-Balkaria | 904k | 19,8% | 2 | 3000 |
| Karchay-Cherkassia | 470k | 27,5% | 1 | 3000 |
These seven ethnic republics with combined population of 7,5 million - of which approx 0,6m Russians - have combined economy of less than 20bn EUR (2021). It will be trivial to contribute funds necessary as economic rationale for separation since the political and cultural already exist.
With those republics separated from Russian Federation only Astrakhan Oblast (49k km2, 960k pop. 57% Russian) will provide access to Caspian Sea.
As long as territorial issues in Ukraine remain unresolved and Russia is forced to commit military assets to securing territory it remains incapable of effectively countering any organised separatist effort.
Those efforts will emerge as soon as a non-Russian power projection is logistically sustainable in the theater. Considering the mountainous terrain deployment of heavy forces will be constrained and air power will be crucial to protect logistics supporting the separatist forces.
Another crucial factor is water - Middle East is one of the most water-stressed regions of the world while Caucasus has very high levels of water per capita, allowing them to trade the excess across the region.
Turkey's ability to project power independently of US/EU will also allow it to extend - if necessary or useful - guarantees of protection for the current independent status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. These can prove crucial to supporting energy infrastructure across Zangezur corridor and would allow to directly influence Georgia's position vs EU and NATO. With the separation of Caucasus republics from Russia, membership in NATO and EU may be no longer seen as crucial to Georgia's security which will allow Turkey to influence attitudes of various political groups in Georgia.
All of the above relies on Turkey's ability to project air and information power across the theater. It will be obviously much more viable with Kaan & Kizilema and other new technologies but even with upgraded F-16s Turkey will have a number of options against a deeply weakened Russia considering that Russia would be forced to project power offensively.
What becomes especially interesting is the possibility to transfer "woefully obsolete" equipment to newly formed separatist forces which can thus be sustained at low cost in materiel and training provided by Turkish Land Forces. Hundreds of tanks and personnel carriers as well as artillery can be made available without significant reduction to TAF capabilities. The force doesn't need to be large, it only needs to be large enough for Russia to find itself incapable of redirecting proportionally larger amount of woefully obsolete equipment from their reserve stocks which are running low due to the ongoing war in Ukraine.
----
And that all ties in to something I've touched upon:
I am not sure China wants to start AR according to America’s timetable just to relieve pressure on the Russians. That would be a total inversion of China’s priorities. Indeed, China may well see an Europe theatre as a prime opportunity to bleed the US and force it to shift forces and resource...
www.sinodefenceforum.com
That's not my argument. Read again 2nd to 5th paragraph but not as separate statements but as single continuous line of reasoning. It's the problem of troop morale like when you order an infantry charge at enemy positions defended by artillery but have no artillery of your own. The...
www.sinodefenceforum.com
Russia and its sphere of influence is an artificial creation sustained by force alone. As soon as that force is invalidated the creation must dissolve but it will happen at its own pace because nobody likes big things suddenly falling on their head. But if I can see the connections with such limited effort, people who have a vested interest have seen and acted on it. We may be simply seeing the signs of things changing. And I would expect that of all the countries Turkey is most interested in causing said change to happen faster (or at all) simply because
unlike primary geopolitical actors (US, China, EU) Turkey can't rely on natural advantages of resource base and economic potential to achieve its goals. Moreover all three primary actors have an
interest in preserving Russia as a political entity for their own purposes and
will only push for deconstruction if rivals gain control over Russia.
In contrast Turkey can achieve its aims
only through decontruction of Russian sphere of influence and parts of Russian state beacuse otherwise it risks allowing primary actors to gain influence through the Russian state used instrumentally. Turkey benefits most from that deconstruction and will largely avoid any direct fallout. Collapse of Russia will scattershot the periphery i.e. Europe in the west, China in the east and the US in the west, east and north. But Central Asia is a "dead" zone for primary powers so Turkey can consistently prod right into the very geographical center of Russia at relatively low cost with a relatively high payout for a country of Turkey's potential. A culturally-aligned sphere of influence with population equal to Turkey's, natural resources and geographic position to contain a rival neighbour?
All that at the cost of no costly expasion of ground forces or navy and instead technological modernisation of existing air force structures - by updating manned aircraft, expanding unmanned fleet and modernising ground-based air defenses with domestic solutions (S-400 sale may yet return to haunt Russia).
Central Asia is a steppe. It is home for the fast, mobile and ranged
horse archer but
the horse archer of today is the aircraft. Normally I would point to helicopters first but in Central Asia distances are too great even for tiltrotors to play that role reliably and logistical burden makes rotorcraft vulnerable to longer-ranged jets. Caucasus and other mountains also benefit from aerial presence. What is needed is bases and bases require people. Turkey seems to have the right tool to get them to their side it seems.
This strategy is
exceedingly ambitious in geopolitical sense and so I am forced to stop the thought experiment and return to a position of skepticism. Still... it seems too logical.
What do you think?
----
I did not expect the rabbit hole to be this deep but it was an interesting tumble. And now I'm through and out. Hopefully I did not bore anyone too much and this lengthy essay will be helpful some day.
