I entirely expect H-20 to be built close to B-21 numbers over its life time.
Which is irrelevant to my reasoning as I'm still continuing the original line of argument that seeks to rationalize a
5-year delay to introduction of H-20 in favour of greater production of J-20, Y-20, YY-20 and starting development of C-5 clone as suggested by one of Deino's followers. I'm considering this particular case
only and attempting to ground it in data to see if it's plausible.
It seems like you are arguing for the need to procure large number of H-6s.
I'm not. The number of H-6 is sufficient. ~200 airframes carrying 4 to 6 missiles is 800-1200 missiles total. This is an equivalent of
67-100 Tu-160s.
This can greatly benefit from systemic multipliers of range extension and better ground target recon. Those will expand the capabilities of
all H-6 while
fast introduction of H-20 will create a two-tier fleet with small number of high-end platforms and large number of low-ends. Even later integration of H-20 as a C4 node for the H-6 formation will be more productive with range and recon multipliers being already in service.
I also do expect H-20 to play a great role in C4 since it will be expected to do bombing runs into Darwin, Diego Garcia & Alaska. It will also be expect to fly over Japan (after hypersonic missiles overcome initial air defense) and keep Japanese defenses off line.
It will absolutely not. Using a VLO bomber to maintain SEAD is the exact opposite of correct employment of such asset.
There is a
significant difference between how air operations are conducted and how the public thinks they're conducted due to the influence of propaganda and industry PR. The employment of F-117 in Iraq and Serbia is also commonly misunderstood. Public perception of how and why they were used is very different from reality.
In comparison, if the US gives up Japan, Korea, Taiwan to a Chinese sphere of influence - that is roughly equivalent to half or two-thirds of an entire USA, and the vast majority of the world's semiconductor production.
"
Trade" didn't imply "
peacefully" and that assumes possible destruction of industrial potential for which alternatives are already being prepared. Korea is not building weapons factories in Poland because of
export opportunities. It's a backup.
The US would also primarily extend projection through existing routes like Alaska to Chukotka, Japan to Sakhalin etc. so not all of WestPac would be lost just like not all of Siberia would be gained. Instead both would become destabilized zones.
3. On "dismantling the Russia Federation as China's strategic long-term interest", I would point to the Canadian example.
Canada and US are former British colonies turned decentralized democratic states with common law and English as main language. Canada is not a nuclear power with a centralized authoritarian state. It has also functioned since WW2 as de facto US protectorate.
For Russians that would be return to Mongol yoke and the entire Russian (Muscovite) identity is built around overthrowing it and conquering their former oppressors. The myth of Great Patriotic War is a re-enactment of that foundational myth but you won't know this unless you know Soviet art which I do because I grew up in communist Poland. Russia is
not the Soviet Union but it wants people to think that it is and that confuses you about what type of identity you're dealing with.
Russia never stops invoking Mongol yoke because it explains the historical purpose of the Russian state. It is the continuation of the Byzantine empire, a Christian/Orthodox state that defends the faithful against heathen invaders and is led by a leader/head of church/saint in the Byzantine tradition. If you want to know how that is reconciled with current relations with China look to German-Soviet cooperation between the wars.
Therefore, unless China is willing to reactivate the Third Front project once again (or, invade and occupy Siberia + Russian Far East + Central Asia in case of Russia's collapse), the only way left for Beijing to deal with such existential threat is to help Moscow directly in a WW3 against NATO.
To paraphrase the classic adage:
The amateur reads the social media, the professional reads the encyclopedia.
Third Front made sense at the time because in 1960 USSR had population of 200 million and China had 650 million. USSR had 1600 nuclear warheads and just launched Sputnik while China didn't even perform its first nuclear test which came in 1964. Et caetera.
And let's not forget about why Third Front became necessary. Sino-Soviet split was caused by Mao and his faction who feared what a shift in ideological thinking could mean for their position inside the CPC especially after the Great Leap Forward. USSR wouldn't invade China any more than NATO would invade Russia but Mao needed the threat to distract away from himself - including in history books.
The same type of thinking informs the notion that China should help Russia in some imaginary war against NATO.
Here's the most important map of Russia - the location of Strategic Missile Troops units.
Everything east of Urals needs to be secured and there will be no war. Except that NATO will have to deal with a quagmire of 100m people in European Russia while China will be viewed as a protector.
I agree that the argument for China's security is fundamental. However due to shift in technology it now must extend beyond the historical borders of China. This is why I said that in the long term China's sphere of influence and security buffer
must extend all the way to the Arctic and Urals. It's not a political argument against Russia but a
geographical one
for China. Russia is simply in the way and sooner or later that will become an obstacle because Russia won't be able to deliver what China needs. Canada is not a problem because it is a US protectorate under NORAD. Moscow will never agree to that. But the people of Siberia - including Russians - may have another opinion.
Below is a map of expansion of Muscovy renamed after fall of Constantinople as Tsardom of Russia (in 1547) by Ivan IV (died in 1584)
Muscovy's expansion into Siberia was a historical aberration that was largely unchecked because there was no reason to do so. The importance of Siberia only changed with the oil and gas industry after WW2 and even then it's largely under-developed with the main areas of exploration lying further west.
Example of historical population beyond Urals:
| location | 1897 | 1939 | 2021 |
| Vladivostok | 28 933 | 206 432 | 603 519 |
| Khabarovsk | 14 971 | 199 172 | 617 441 |
| Ulan-Ude | 8 086 | 125 690 | 437 565 |
| Yakutsk | 6 535 | 52 882 | 355 443 |
| Krasnoyarsk | 26 700 | 189 977 | 1 187 771 |
| Novosibirsk | 8 000 | 405 297 | 1 633 595 |
| Omsk | 37 400 | 288 855 | 1 125 695 |
| Chelyabinsk | 20 000 | 273 116 | 1 189 525 |
| Yekaterinburg | 37 399 | 425 533 | 1 544 376 |
| Russia / USSR | 73 000 000 | 107 000 000 | 144 700 000 |
The Russians who live in Siberia do so over a weak sociocultural substrate and in poor economic conditions. Their families moved there during WW2 and their "country" is more USSR than Russia. Tell them that they get to keep resource wealth and that you will build them modern infrastructure and they will forget Moscow. The reason why Russia has an authoritarian system under Putin is because the population is seen as
not sufficiently loyal to the regime.
By 2050 Russia is projected to shrink from 150m to 130m while all Central Asian republics retain growth. Uzbekistan will have 35m, Kazakhstan 22m, Tajikistan 12m. Pakistan will grow to almost 500m. Iran to over 100m. Afghanistan to 65m. The potential that China can activate by shifting part of global south northward is the key to geopolitical change.
The "decolonization of Russia" is therefore
historically inevitable and it will be likely the pivotal conflict of this century that will also involve China as the only power capable of introducing structure and stability primarily due to economic power and expanding infrastructure, less so due to military power. In fact it is a historical necessity because the regime in Moscow has demonstrated its inability to rule competently and responsibly. And that is not a security gain for China but a security cost because of the nuclear potential that should not exist in a client state. Ever.
This scenario should really have a thread of its own. This one is for WestPac. So I will end it here because it's become an obvious
OT.
One more thing:
Yet, the people and the support system are equally if not more important to operational success than anything pointy.
No need to be politically correct when it's polite to be correct.
