The War in the Ukraine

Sinnavuuty

Captain
Registered Member
Problem with this is that.. you only destroy your enemy nuclear weapons and EW capability IF you intend to Attack them with nuclear weapons too. Conventional warfare to say, invade Russia from NATO country gonna take very long time given how vast Russia is.

Also you cannot ensure destruction of all Russian nuclear weapons as you can expect SSBN on patrol.. Super hardened C2 ensure even you killed putin by poking his skull with FPV.. there will still be retaliation.

But yeah.. maybe NATO wants to do Barbarossa 2.0 by first weakening Russia through Ukraine. Attacking their nukes without destroying them all tho.. might not be a good idea.
Not really. If Ukraine damages one or more SSBNs, it will become incapable. The same goes for nuclear bombers. It is a way to limit the launch vectors of the missiles, which affects Russia's nuclear response capability.

What Ukraine cannot do is disable the silos that need to be attacked with a nuclear cruise missile, because I believe a conventional cruise missile is not capable of piercing the Russian silo. This is still far from Ukraine's capability, but they attack with drones, so the silos are still secure enough not to have their capability compromised.
 

Sinnavuuty

Captain
Registered Member
Something that amazed me is how after this, and the way had been three + years of SMO, Gerasimov can still in General Staff. He had been sacked long time ago.

And to think to all this was named "SMO" because arrogance and hubris from Russian leadership and could be a walk - park. Well now they have to face a war in proper name.
The Russian high command has already changed a lot compared to the incompetents who started the so-called SMO. Mordvichev's rise is proof of this new reality.

But I agree with you, Gerasimov still being the chief of the general staff is unbelievable, but this is what happens when in Russia, the chances of even the most competent generals are lower than those of the incompetent ones.
 

Stealthflanker

Senior Member
Registered Member
Not really. If Ukraine damages one or more SSBNs, it will become incapable. The same goes for nuclear bombers. It is a way to limit the launch vectors of the missiles, which affects Russia's nuclear response capability.

You cannot damage one that already in Patrol tho. Those will be below the arctic circle or anywhere where their patrol is taken. There will always be SSBN on patrol.
 

votran

New Member
Registered Member
The Russian high command has already changed a lot compared to the incompetents who started the so-called SMO. Mordvichev's rise is proof of this new reality.

But I agree with you, Gerasimov still being the chief of the general staff is unbelievable, but this is what happens when in Russia, the chances of even the most competent generals are lower than those of the incompetent ones.
probably because you can't kill the very one help you protect the throne , unless you want the next day "ukraine drone" visit your helicopter for real lol
 

Sinnavuuty

Captain
Registered Member
You cannot damage one that already in Patrol tho. Those will be below the arctic circle or anywhere where their patrol is taken. There will always be SSBN on patrol.
Correct. But the nuclear response capability is compromised. You're right that Ukraine definitely can't eliminate Russia's nuclear response capability entirely, but they can compromise some of the nuclear capability and that's what they've been trying to do since the beginning of the war.
 

tamsen_ikard

Senior Member
Registered Member
Yes. It is the end of Ukraine. A war of annihilation in order to completely eliminate Ukraine so that it no longer poses any threat to the Russian state.

The question is: what will be the cost of this?

Could the cost be having 1/3 of its strategic bomber fleet compromised?

Could the cost be partially compromising its ground-based early warning capability?

Could the cost be the elimination of all its artillery, armored and tank reserves?

Could the cost be its Black Sea Fleet being compromised and no longer being the dominant naval force in the Black Sea?
If Russia can control all of Ukraine which is a huge country full of very fertile land and also a 40 million+ Russian speaking population which can be easily integrated to Russia proper with much easier effort then these costs are nothing.

Lets face it, Strategic Bombers are completely useless in a true peer war for anything other than conventional lobbing standoff missiles. And you can fire those missiles from the ground as well. No one will use Bombers to fire Nukes these days, ICBMs are simply much much better. So, losing even all of the Bombers is not a big deal for Russia.

Losing all old Soviet era tanks and Artillery? If they are not used now, they will likely never be used. They are getting too old anyway, Russia putting them to good use to get huge landmass and huge population is a big bonus.

Black Sea fleet was likely the weakest fleets that Russia has. Russia can dominate the black sea with ground based Air power alone if they need to. So, again, temporary set backs.

Getting Ukraine is the big prize. Now the question is, If Russia can pull it off.
 

Atomicfrog

Major
Registered Member
Yes. It is the end of Ukraine. A war of annihilation in order to completely eliminate Ukraine so that it no longer poses any threat to the Russian state.

The question is: what will be the cost of this?

Could the cost be having 1/3 of its strategic bomber fleet compromised?

Could the cost be partially compromising its ground-based early warning capability?

Could the cost be the elimination of all its artillery, armored and tank reserves?

Could the cost be its Black Sea Fleet being compromised and no longer being the dominant naval force in the Black Sea?
Anything that will stay still, stargazing, waiting in the open will certainly be a target... Russia will need to ramp up replacement of their Soviet era weapon systems.

The cost will be high for sure. It was the initial plan of that proxy war but it will push a rebirth of all capabilities.
 

tankphobia

Senior Member
Registered Member
I don't know why people think nuclear response is likely. Nukes haven't been used for 80 years and it's for good reason. Once the genie is out of the bottle it cannot be put back in.

Using a nuke now means any escalation with the west from here forward would invite a nuclear response from the west. You can no longer climb down once you go up the nuclear escalation ladder. China would be incredibly incensed by a nuclear strike also as it will also invite a nuclear response to Taiwan, given that a green flag has been given to make a non-nuclear conflict nuclear.
 

Sinnavuuty

Captain
Registered Member
If Russia can control all of Ukraine which is a huge country full of very fertile land and also a 40 million+ Russian speaking population which can be easily integrated to Russia proper with much easier effort then these costs are nothing.

Lets face it, Strategic Bombers are completely useless in a true peer war for anything other than conventional lobbing standoff missiles. And you can fire those missiles from the ground as well. No one will use Bombers to fire Nukes these days, ICBMs are simply much much better. So, losing even all of the Bombers is not a big deal for Russia.

Losing all old Soviet era tanks and Artillery? If they are not used now, they will likely never be used. They are getting too old anyway, Russia putting them to good use to get huge landmass and huge population is a big bonus.

Black Sea fleet was likely the weakest fleets that Russia has. Russia can dominate the black sea with ground based Air power alone if they need to. So, again, temporary set backs.

Getting Ukraine is the big prize. Now the question is, If Russia can pull it off.
It affects the capabilities of the Russian nuclear triad.

This is taken from TMB 2024:
photo_2025-06-01_10-02-42.jpg
photo_2025-06-01_10-02-42 (2).jpg
If Ukraine disabled dozens of bombers as has been alleged, then the nuclear response capability has been compromised.

The most likely scenario I have seen so far is 9 bombers destroyed.
 

Sinnavuuty

Captain
Registered Member
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Reuters publishes the full text of the document that Ukraine will take to Istanbul tomorrow.

I. Key principles of the Agreement and the negotiation process

• A complete and unconditional ceasefire in the air, on land and at sea as a necessary background and prerequisite for peace talks.

• Confidence-building measures – resolving humanitarian issues: unconditional return of all deported and illegally displaced persons, Ukrainian children. Exchange of all prisoners (on the principle of "all for all"). Release of all civilian hostages by Russia.

• Non-repetition of aggression: the goal of the negotiations is to restore a permanent basis for lasting peace and security and to ensure that aggression is not repeated.

• Security guarantees and involvement of the international community: Ukraine must receive reliable security guarantees. The parties will invite the international community to participate in the negotiations and provide guarantees to ensure the implementation of the agreements.

• Sovereignty: Ukraine is not forced into neutrality. It can become part of the Euro-Atlantic community and move towards EU membership. Ukraine’s membership in NATO depends on consensus within the Alliance. No restrictions can be imposed on the size, deployment or other parameters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, or on the deployment of troops of friendly foreign states on Ukrainian territory.

• Territorial issues: the territorial gains made by Russia since February 2014 are not recognized by the international community. The contact line is the starting point for negotiations. Territorial issues are discussed only after a complete and unconditional ceasefire.

• Sanctions: some sanctions can be lifted from Russia, but in stages and only gradually, with a mechanism for resuming sanctions if necessary (snapback). Frozen Russian sovereign assets are used for restoration or remain frozen until reparations are paid.

• Implementation: agreeing on a clear, balanced and achievable roadmap for implementation and enforcement of the agreements.

II. The next step is to agree on a ceasefire and an agenda for the leaders’ meeting

• Following the meeting in Istanbul, the parties will continue negotiations that will focus on: (1) a complete and unconditional ceasefire – mechanisms and monitoring; (2) confidence-building measures; (3) preparing and agreeing on an agenda and structure for future leaders’ talks on key topics.

• Negotiations will be held with the participation of the United States and Europe.

III. Ceasefire

• A complete and unconditional ceasefire in the skies, on land and at sea for at least 30 days (with the possibility of extension every 30 days) as a necessary background and prerequisite for peace negotiations.

• Ceasefire monitoring – led by the United States and with the support of third countries.

IV. Confidence-building measures

• Following the successful exchange of prisoners of war following the talks in Istanbul, the parties will continue the process of exchanging all prisoners of war (on the principle of “all for all”).

• Agreement on the unconditional return by the Russian Federation of all deported and displaced Ukrainian children, as well as the release by Russia of all civilian prisoners. These measures should apply to all categories of persons included in the list, starting from February 2014.

V. Meeting of the leaders

• The leaders of Ukraine and Russia will meet to agree on key aspects of the final peace settlement.

• Key topics of the peace agreement that the leaders must agree on:
1. Permanent and complete cessation of hostilities: conditions, monitoring, sanctions for violations
2. Security guarantees and non-repetition of aggression
3. Territorial issues
4. Economy, compensation, reconstruction
5. Penalties for violation of agreements
6. Conclusion of a final peace agreement
 
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