PLAN Carrier Strike Group and Airwing
- Thread starter Jeff Head
- Start date
Re: What will the 1st PLAN Carrier Battle Group (CBG) look like?
Well, under the Clinton administration I know there were quite a few. But I do not recall hearing of any under the Bush administration.
With the rapidly advancing capabilities of the PLAN, both quantitatively and qualitatively, I do not believe there wil be any in the near future.
But even if there were, the only way to gain this type of experience, meaning efficient and effective 24 hour a day carrier air ops, is learning them through years of actually doing it.
Well, under the Clinton administration I know there were quite a few. But I do not recall hearing of any under the Bush administration.
With the rapidly advancing capabilities of the PLAN, both quantitatively and qualitatively, I do not believe there wil be any in the near future.
But even if there were, the only way to gain this type of experience, meaning efficient and effective 24 hour a day carrier air ops, is learning them through years of actually doing it.
Re: My trip to the US Navy Reserve Fleet in Bremerton, WA
Sorry, I do not buy that. If that were so, there would have been no reason for the NVA to come to the peace table in 1972. And yet they did.
Why did they, then? Because they were being abjectly defeated militarily at the time and knew they had to. Two years later, after rearming and reprovisioning without constant US attacks, they invaded and won when the US was no longer there.
The price paid in lives and loss of equipment (as related to the ability to keep on fighting a war) were completely lopsided in terms of US vs NVA and VC. The other side (NVA and VC) lost a LOT more.
The US lost the political will and therefore simply left.
Totoro said:
Sorry, I do not buy that. If that were so, there would have been no reason for the NVA to come to the peace table in 1972. And yet they did.
Why did they, then? Because they were being abjectly defeated militarily at the time and knew they had to. Two years later, after rearming and reprovisioning without constant US attacks, they invaded and won when the US was no longer there.
The price paid in lives and loss of equipment (as related to the ability to keep on fighting a war) were completely lopsided in terms of US vs NVA and VC. The other side (NVA and VC) lost a LOT more.
The US lost the political will and therefore simply left.
Re: Anti-Carrier Trump Card
I second that. Right now, without proper replacement, US would be better off with those S3s. All those aircraft (planes and helos) can't be in the air the whole time, be that for long endurance flights with sonar detection or short hunting flights once a sub has been targeted. On average that will mean a CBG has around 10-12 helos to be used for ASW at one time, simultaneously. add two hunter subs and that's still not that awesome force to guarantee a large scale sub ambush would fail. (I guess i am saying asrock would be not as effective as subs/helos - so shoot me.
) That is partly why US would never send a lone carrier group to war w china, even if it could, objectively, help taiwanese. You look after your own butt first, right? With surface ship PLAN and PLAAF threat i'd say even a two CBGs force would not be sent. In my opinion US would wait till it can assemble a 4 CBG force with apropriate USAF cover from jap/guam for the first waves of attack. Does anyone know how much time would that take, from the moment of decision to do so? (which itself would be probably only after there's clear signs of imminent attack, not more than days/day before taiwan invasion)
I second that. Right now, without proper replacement, US would be better off with those S3s. All those aircraft (planes and helos) can't be in the air the whole time, be that for long endurance flights with sonar detection or short hunting flights once a sub has been targeted. On average that will mean a CBG has around 10-12 helos to be used for ASW at one time, simultaneously. add two hunter subs and that's still not that awesome force to guarantee a large scale sub ambush would fail. (I guess i am saying asrock would be not as effective as subs/helos - so shoot me.
) That is partly why US would never send a lone carrier group to war w china, even if it could, objectively, help taiwanese. You look after your own butt first, right? With surface ship PLAN and PLAAF threat i'd say even a two CBGs force would not be sent. In my opinion US would wait till it can assemble a 4 CBG force with apropriate USAF cover from jap/guam for the first waves of attack. Does anyone know how much time would that take, from the moment of decision to do so? (which itself would be probably only after there's clear signs of imminent attack, not more than days/day before taiwan invasion)Re: My trip to the US Navy Reserve Fleet in Bremerton, WA
I'm sorry, I do not buy that. If you, after 10 years of pain and suffering, lives lost and billions spent, finally get a chance to win since you finally managed to exhaust your enemy, then you don't just 'lose' political will. If anything, that'd strengthen it and give it another boost of energy for a last push to destroy the enemy. It is my opinion that US saw no end to losses for no clear gain, after 10 years of trying, and decided to bite the bullet and cut its lossses.
North vietnamese were coming to the peace table years before 1972. The only difference in '72 was that US was already lowering the numbers of its forces by then and north vietnam saw it was about to retreat. So it lied and said 'sure, we wont attack'. Yet they did, in two years time like you said. (large scale offensive operations need much more preparation that defending from US attacks)
War policy is made according to your ability to wage war. And there is where the failure was. First the US intelligence, in opening stages, where it underestimated north vietnams strength to wage the war and it underestimated the extent of russian help. But then even us military itself just consistently failed, years after years, to make significant blows to NV, at the whole time suffering far greater losses it predicted, let alone what US govt was told to predict. And no, i don't believe US military could have put more forces to the fight, short of ww2 scale mobilisation which was impossible/impractical for obvious reasons.
I'm sorry, I do not buy that. If you, after 10 years of pain and suffering, lives lost and billions spent, finally get a chance to win since you finally managed to exhaust your enemy, then you don't just 'lose' political will. If anything, that'd strengthen it and give it another boost of energy for a last push to destroy the enemy. It is my opinion that US saw no end to losses for no clear gain, after 10 years of trying, and decided to bite the bullet and cut its lossses.
North vietnamese were coming to the peace table years before 1972. The only difference in '72 was that US was already lowering the numbers of its forces by then and north vietnam saw it was about to retreat. So it lied and said 'sure, we wont attack'. Yet they did, in two years time like you said. (large scale offensive operations need much more preparation that defending from US attacks)
War policy is made according to your ability to wage war. And there is where the failure was. First the US intelligence, in opening stages, where it underestimated north vietnams strength to wage the war and it underestimated the extent of russian help. But then even us military itself just consistently failed, years after years, to make significant blows to NV, at the whole time suffering far greater losses it predicted, let alone what US govt was told to predict. And no, i don't believe US military could have put more forces to the fight, short of ww2 scale mobilisation which was impossible/impractical for obvious reasons.