Next Generation DDG and FFG thread (after 055, 052D, 054B)

Gloire_bb

Colonel
Registered Member
My understanding is that the Type-052D, given that it has very long-range AESA panels, shouldn't suffer from a lack of radar power for self-defence/close-in capability against LO ACSMs.
C/S band etc suffers strong interference over water surface. It is nowhere near complete "nay", but performance is degraded by a lot; this is clearly a loophole US are aiming at right now at scale(NSM, LRASM).
Furthermore, full performance for powerful AESA is a lot of power - ship can't do it all the time it is at sea.
This is in fact a problem addressed by PLAN - if you pay close attention to 052D class, you'd remember new small X-band 3D multirole AESA radar, replacing old surfase search set. It's its exact role.
But this is only on latest ships, rather ad hoc, and clearly supporting rather than integrated(with bands working to support each other). Are there limitations? I like nice tea, but tbh i like it at home. So here we should probably stop at just registering that this is an issue.

As for C-UAS, the Chinese Navy doesn't really face a UAS threat.

We also see the Type-045 installing a 50KW laser for C-UAS. Call it a power draw of 150KW overall, which does sound manageable for a Type-052D.
US are getting into the game, this has to be reassessed. So do the others(esp. ROCN) - Ukraine shown, that this is the way of an underdog, and it's a capability that can be procured fast, at will, and it more or less breaks normal AAW.
Furthermore, 150kw is already a lot of additional power - which is not universal, as it works only v closing in aircraft in good weather conditions. You still need more.

How many fast antiship ballistic missiles will a Type-052D face? Realistically zero.
Well, SM-6 IB(and AIM-174), PrSM, CPS.
All high profile systems. Some of the highest.

Let me expand on this one in fact, as it's important for mission statement.

What is historical USN ASuW threat profile?
Surface/air: stand off. All aerodynamic. Key threats: Harpoon, JSOW, HARM; LRASM added relatively recently. Stand in: paveway.
Submarines: Mark 48(LA, Virginia).
Basically, not that much of specialised threat, as it was good enough anyway. Most is air breathing (or outright planes), other than torpedo. Single most likely asuw weapon - harpoon - is active radar homing.

On the other hand, emerging USN profile:
Battle: SM-6 IA/B; AIM-174, PrSM, CPS. All ballistic, meant to break through active AD. +AARGM-ER (aerodynamic)
Ambush: NSM, LRASM, Mark 48(Virginia, SSN(X), UUSV). Come suddenly - not too dangerous if you're alert, but easy to miss, and absolutely deadly if you missed them.
Stand in/finishers: SDB II, JSOW, Quicksink, Tomahawk IV; LUCAS. Finishers. Normally aren't dangerous, but come in numbers if your AD is compromised.
+priority ECCM upgrade, b/c 2020s will see entire range of USN EW(NGJ) updated.

Yes, the Type-052D hullform won't be as good in ASW. But remember the primary ASW weapon is the helicopter. The job of the ASW ship is to screen and physically block the submarine.
Helicopter is indeed weapon, means of prosecution, it is not single stop ASW solution. It is cued by the ship. Helicopter can't find submarine by itself, nor it can even be flying for most of the time.
Which means that both ships in close escort and ships on ASW duty have full requirement for ASW fit.
PrSM and SM-6 are too slow and too easy to shoot down.
That is, if you are ABM capable. Also, SM-6 comes in numbers, i.e. apart from usual ABM requirements(long range high power volume scan), you also get the issue of ABM magazine depth. But sensor problems come first, as they aren't solvable via adding new weapons into VLS. RIght now China will be reliant on presense of 055. But going forward, given that US are visibly shifting their threat portfolio, this should come down to all AD ships. "Just" a floating HQ-9B battery is no longer enough.
 
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AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
C/S band etc suffers strong interference over water surface. It is nowhere near complete "nay", but performance is degraded by a lot; this is clearly a loophole US are aiming at right now at scale(NSM, LRASM).
Furthermore, full performance for powerful AESA is a lot of power - ship can't do it all the time it is at sea.
This is in fact a problem addressed by PLAN - if you pay close attention to 052D class, you'd remember new small X-band 3D multirole AESA radar, replacing old surfase search set. It's its exact role.
But this is only on latest ships, rather ad hoc, and clearly supporting rather than integrated(with bands working to support each other). Are there limitations? I like nice tea, but tbh i like it at home. So here we should probably stop at just registering that this is an issue.

I would expect that X-band radar to be integrated with the other radars by the Battle Management System.
(They already have to integrate a UHF radar anyway)

Note that the Sampson X-Band radar has a similar role on the Type-45, but only uses 25kW


US are getting into the game, this has to be reassessed. So do the others(esp. ROCN) - Ukraine shown, that this is the way of an underdog, and it's a capability that can be procured fast, at will, and it more or less breaks normal AAW.
Furthermore, 150kw is already a lot of additional power - which is not universal, as it works only v closing in aircraft in good weather conditions. You still need more.

If the ROCN is involved, China isn't going to be using its Navy.

China will simply use land-based aircraft and go for air superiority over Seoul, which accounts for half of South Korea's population and is only 400km away.


Well, SM-6 IB(and AIM-174), PrSM, CPS.
All high profile systems. Some of the highest.

Let me expand on this one in fact, as it's important for mission statement.

What is historical USN ASuW threat profile?
Surface/air: stand off. All aerodynamic. Key threats: Harpoon, JSOW, HARM; LRASM added relatively recently. Stand in: paveway.
Submarines: Mark 48(LA, Virginia).
Basically, not that much of specialised threat, as it was good enough anyway. Most is air breathing (or outright planes), other than torpedo. Single most likely asuw weapon - harpoon - is active radar homing.

On the other hand, emerging USN profile:
Battle: SM-6 IA/B; AIM-174, PrSM, CPS. All ballistic, meant to break through active AD. +AARGM-ER (aerodynamic)
Ambush: NSM, LRASM, Mark 48(Virginia, SSN(X), UUSV). Come suddenly - not too dangerous if you're alert, but easy to miss, and absolutely deadly if you missed them.
Stand in/finishers: SDB II, JSOW, Quicksink, Tomahawk IV; LUCAS. Finishers. Normally aren't dangerous, but come in numbers if your AD is compromised.
+priority ECCM upgrade, b/c 2020s will see entire range of USN EW(NGJ) updated.


Helicopter is indeed weapon, means of prosecution, it is not single stop ASW solution. It is cued by the ship. Helicopter can't find submarine by itself, nor it can even be flying for most of the time.
Which means that both ships in close escort and ships on ASW duty have full requirement for ASW fit.

That is, if you are ABM capable. Also, SM-6 comes in numbers, i.e. apart from usual ABM requirements(long range high power volume scan), you also get the issue of ABM magazine depth. But sensor problems come first, as they aren't solvable via adding new weapons into VLS. RIght now China will be reliant on presense of 055. But going forward, given that US are visibly shifting their threat portfolio, this should come down to all AD ships. "Just" a floating HQ-9B battery is no longer enough.

Can the latest Type-052D conduct ballistic missile defence?

The Sampson supposedly has some capability, even though it wasn't designed for this.
I also note that the SPY-1D PESA radars are capable of BMD. The replacement SPY-6 radars are AESA with vastly greater performance and they've upgraded the Arleigh Burke electricity generators to accommodate.

We know that the Type-052D already has AESA S-Band panels, but there's very little information on Type-052D electricity generation, although upgraded generators on the Type-052D is an obvious improvement. We can also see they are upgrading the gas turbines on the Type-052D for more power.
 
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Gloire_bb

Colonel
Registered Member
Note that the Sampson X-Band radar has a similar role on the Type-45, but only uses 25kW
On type 45 this was the main optimization point (sea skimmers), which is why x band is it's FCS bad(far higher both band and height over seq level).
On aegises, not really, primary work is done via rather low S band.
(P.s. and yes, Sampson is just weak, you have to be a Brit to call that destroyer).
If the ROCN is involved, China isn't going to be using its Navy.

China will simply use land-based aircraft and go for air superiority over Seoul, which accounts for half of South Korea's population and is only 400km away.
C, not K.
C is Wanwan.
But anyway, regardless of, air is air, sea is sea. aircraft fly over Tehran, but Hormuz is closed.
Can the latest Type-052D conduct ballistic missile defence?

The Sampson supposedly has some capability, even though it wasn't designed for this.
I also note that the SPY-1D PESA radars are capable of BMD. The replacement SPY-6 radars are AESA with vastly greater performance and they've upgraded the Arleigh Burke electricity generators to accommodate.

We know that the Type-052D already has AESA S-Band panels, but there's very little information on Type-052D electricity generation, although upgraded generators on the Type-052D is an obvious improvement. We can also see they are upgrading the gas turbines on the Type-052D for more power.
I think all of them can be made to do it in principle. The question is how well.
ABM usually requires:
-Very powerful scan at stand off, to get timely tracks on very fast and very low RCS targets, which you also will have to classify (decoys are a thing).
-Suitable armament, with enough intercept attempts to provide protection, and ideally not for a quotation/production tempo of a fighter per attempt.

Yes, Burke can do ABM - but it's the SM-3 problem. SM-2/6 series have limited window and efficiency of intercept.
HQ-9B probably faces exact same problems (much like, say, S-400, which also does some ABM).
Systems need to be designed for ABM(S-300V, THAAD, HQ-19), or at least be thoroughly adapted to it(PAC-3, SAMP/T NG, S-400 "full", HQ-9C - to deliver).
 

douglaxd

New Member
Registered Member
On type 45 this was the main optimization point (sea skimmers), which is why x band is it's FCS bad(far higher both band and height over seq level).
On aegises, not really, primary work is done via rather low S band.
(P.s. and yes, Sampson is just weak, you have to be a Brit to call that destroyer).

C, not K.
C is Wanwan.
But anyway, regardless of, air is air, sea is sea. aircraft fly over Tehran, but Hormuz is closed.

I think all of them can be made to do it in principle. The question is how well.
ABM usually requires:
-Very powerful scan at stand off, to get timely tracks on very fast and very low RCS targets, which you also will have to classify (decoys are a thing).
-Suitable armament, with enough intercept attempts to provide protection, and ideally not for a quotation/production tempo of a fighter per attempt.

Yes, Burke can do ABM - but it's the SM-3 problem. SM-2/6 series have limited window and efficiency of intercept.
HQ-9B probably faces exact same problems (much like, say, S-400, which also does some ABM).
Systems need to be designed for ABM(S-300V, THAAD, HQ-19), or at least be thoroughly adapted to it(PAC-3, SAMP/T NG, S-400 "full", HQ-9C - to deliver).
Well, wouldn't these problems be somewhat addressable with the eventual integration of the quadpack missile and navalized HQ-19/26? As far as I know that would not require significantly more space/power while addressing much of the issues the 052D suffers from, vulnerability against saturation attack from LO sea skimmers and eventual BM threat like PrSM inc. 2/SM6 Blk. 1B
 
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