C/S band etc suffers strong interference over water surface. It is nowhere near complete "nay", but performance is degraded by a lot; this is clearly a loophole US are aiming at right now at scale(NSM, LRASM).My understanding is that the Type-052D, given that it has very long-range AESA panels, shouldn't suffer from a lack of radar power for self-defence/close-in capability against LO ACSMs.
Furthermore, full performance for powerful AESA is a lot of power - ship can't do it all the time it is at sea.
This is in fact a problem addressed by PLAN - if you pay close attention to 052D class, you'd remember new small X-band 3D multirole AESA radar, replacing old surfase search set. It's its exact role.
But this is only on latest ships, rather ad hoc, and clearly supporting rather than integrated(with bands working to support each other). Are there limitations? I like nice tea, but tbh i like it at home. So here we should probably stop at just registering that this is an issue.
As for C-UAS, the Chinese Navy doesn't really face a UAS threat.
US are getting into the game, this has to be reassessed. So do the others(esp. ROCN) - Ukraine shown, that this is the way of an underdog, and it's a capability that can be procured fast, at will, and it more or less breaks normal AAW.We also see the Type-045 installing a 50KW laser for C-UAS. Call it a power draw of 150KW overall, which does sound manageable for a Type-052D.
Furthermore, 150kw is already a lot of additional power - which is not universal, as it works only v closing in aircraft in good weather conditions. You still need more.
Well, SM-6 IB(and AIM-174), PrSM, CPS.How many fast antiship ballistic missiles will a Type-052D face? Realistically zero.
All high profile systems. Some of the highest.
Let me expand on this one in fact, as it's important for mission statement.
What is historical USN ASuW threat profile?
Surface/air: stand off. All aerodynamic. Key threats: Harpoon, JSOW, HARM; LRASM added relatively recently. Stand in: paveway.
Submarines: Mark 48(LA, Virginia).
Basically, not that much of specialised threat, as it was good enough anyway. Most is air breathing (or outright planes), other than torpedo. Single most likely asuw weapon - harpoon - is active radar homing.
On the other hand, emerging USN profile:
Battle: SM-6 IA/B; AIM-174, PrSM, CPS. All ballistic, meant to break through active AD. +AARGM-ER (aerodynamic)
Ambush: NSM, LRASM, Mark 48(Virginia, SSN(X), UUSV). Come suddenly - not too dangerous if you're alert, but easy to miss, and absolutely deadly if you missed them.
Stand in/finishers: SDB II, JSOW, Quicksink, Tomahawk IV; LUCAS. Finishers. Normally aren't dangerous, but come in numbers if your AD is compromised.
+priority ECCM upgrade, b/c 2020s will see entire range of USN EW(NGJ) updated.
Helicopter is indeed weapon, means of prosecution, it is not single stop ASW solution. It is cued by the ship. Helicopter can't find submarine by itself, nor it can even be flying for most of the time.Yes, the Type-052D hullform won't be as good in ASW. But remember the primary ASW weapon is the helicopter. The job of the ASW ship is to screen and physically block the submarine.
Which means that both ships in close escort and ships on ASW duty have full requirement for ASW fit.
That is, if you are ABM capable. Also, SM-6 comes in numbers, i.e. apart from usual ABM requirements(long range high power volume scan), you also get the issue of ABM magazine depth. But sensor problems come first, as they aren't solvable via adding new weapons into VLS. RIght now China will be reliant on presense of 055. But going forward, given that US are visibly shifting their threat portfolio, this should come down to all AD ships. "Just" a floating HQ-9B battery is no longer enough.PrSM and SM-6 are too slow and too easy to shoot down.
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