Well, above all else - single targeting band hitting upper limits of available power, limiting self-defense/close in capability. No designed C-UAS capability (ad hoc additions are there, but this isn't quite the same). As far as we can tell, 052D isn't truly ABM capable. Not that much in updates in terms of EW.I don't see the signs that the Type-052D will become obsolete, but do expand.
In general I do agree, but practice is that when LRAD becomes domineering, attack tends to go below it.And I highly doubt long-range air-defence will become an obsolete mission.
"Control" of the air is essential to projecting/denying power at long-distances.
At a minimum, you have to prevent ISR aircraft from detecting, tracking and shadowing your own ships.
And long-range strike has to be performed with missiles.
Keeping up with CSG is indeed 052D job; it isn't frigate job.A Type-052D can operate as a good FFG.
It is faster than a FFG, and is better able to keep up with a carrier group.
Remember that Type-052Ds are kept close to home at high readiness, and tasked for a high-intensity conflict in the Western Pacific.
So crampedness is not really a factor.
Distant presence and escort missions are given to actual Frigates.
Don’t really see how a 052D can’t do independent operations like a 054A, and if we’re talking reassignment of hulls that have already been purchased where are higher prices involved?Any destroyer is, it is destroyer, not a battleship. Yet, at least.
It just comes at a higher price, yet isn't really fit to respond to contingencies shall they truly occur.
052D just isn't a type of ship for independent operations.
And the further to the right, the more both will be true. What you can and probably should do is consider them for long deployments in far stations during dusk of their career, Victorian style. As (old)destroyers in their primary role.
Not to mention that the majority cost of a ship program comes from the R&D. Once the systems are fully developed and production lines for systems are created, the most expensive part is the radar/electronic systems. The actual hulls aren't that expensive, particularly for a ship produced to such an extent as the Type 052DL. If we look at other nations and the ships they're using for independent operations, especially during peace time, the Type 052 is more than sufficient albeit while being unremarkable.Don’t really see how a 052D can’t do independent operations like a 054A, and if we’re talking reassignment of hulls that have already been purchased where are higher prices involved?
I don’t see how your critique of the 052D lacking the ability to prosecute UAS threats is specific to employment for frigate type roles since this problem also applies to destroyer type roles. Nor do I see why, if the ability to prosecute UAS type threats is so crucial in future contingencies, 052Ds can’t be upgraded to cover such threat profiles. It’s not like they can’t retrofit new radars onto old hulls.Well, above all else - single targeting band hitting upper limits of available power, limiting self-defense/close in capability. No designed C-UAS capability (ad hoc additions are there, but this isn't quite the same). As far as we can tell, 052D isn't truly ABM capable. Not that much in updates in terms of EW.
Old hull design with negative effect on most modern ASW (again, there were updates in this regard, but patchwork isn't same as new hull making full use of modern Chinese capabilities).
Compare it to 055, basically. Or most modern DD designs, such as DDGX or Italian DDX.
In general I do agree, but practice is that when LRAD becomes domineering, attack tends to go below it.
And 052D is really, like really dead-focused on defending against classic US air power(Aircraft, including stealth ones, and harpoons - i.e. radar guided ASCMs). Big powerful S band volume search combined with not pinpoint accurate, but powerful HHQ-9; UHF set for VLO threats; proliferation of HHQ-10 which is meant to punish active seekers, together with active jamming decoys.
But take a look where US attack venues shift:
-hypersonics and ballistics(CPS, PrSM, SM-6b)
-fully passive, LO ASCMs(LRASM and NSM)
Plus, while USN isn't quite there yet, USMC already started small droning.
Your main destroyer is your "everything", it should adapt. Especially since 2010s Chinese warships went so specialized on classic USN, that ironically many older combatants are now potentially more flexible.
Keeping up with CSG is indeed 052D job; it isn't frigate job.
The questions arise when we try using 052D on its own - it's there when it becomes expensive, it's powerful weaponry doesn't really add much(instead lacking in key metrics), and the ship in fact turns rather vulnerable.
In fact, the only current major Chinese ship to carry specifically C-UAS weapon is 056A. Best chinese warship for close-in wvr defense against passive weapons is quite likely 054A(g), with its fixed 360 deg x-band coverage(x band is crucial as it combines high accuracy against targets at very low altitude with still high scan rates, and doesn't suffer nearly as much from spray/weather interference as higher bands).
More than quantity, I'm concerned about whether there are larger and deeper HT-2 to enhance the fleet's BMD capabilities, such as accommodating HHQ-19s.
A larger VLS would also make quad packs HHQ-9C possible.
For frigate role it's crucial now - world is on the edge of closed gulf, and frigate, due to the nature of the mission, is expected to fend for itself. Even if Iran will collapse, region won't become safer; most certainly not for Chinese shipping. As we see from world events, it already goes worse, US already targets Chinese(HK) shipping.I don’t see how your critique of the 052D lacking the ability to prosecute UAS threats is specific to employment for frigate type roles since this problem also applies to destroyer type roles.
EM compatibility is one of the hardest things to solve in ship design - for both radars and their power supply. More so when it's an already built design, and you can't do it cleanly and efficiently(for example, like 055 does).Nor do I see why, if the ability to prosecute UAS type threats is so crucial in future contingencies, 052Ds can’t be upgraded to cover such threat profiles. It’s not like they can’t retrofit new radars onto old hulls.
One thing I really hope China adopts with future ships is having at least 3 of one system, particularly CIWIS. It makes logical sense until you’re in a wartime scenario where 1 is operational. Future developments and upgrades need to factor in the reality of battlefield damage and make sure there is sufficient redundancy. Far too many navies make the mistake of designing ships for operating in the ideal where everything works, when every war in history has shown us that weapons regularly break and things go wrong.For frigate role it's crucial now - world is on the edge of closed gulf, and frigate, due to the nature of the mission, is expected to fend for itself. Even if Iran will collapse, region won't become safer; most certainly not for Chinese shipping. As we see from world events, it already goes worse, US already targets Chinese(HK) shipping.
C-UAS as of now is not big on CSG threat lists, and when it is(Red sea) - collective defense, combining multiple ships and aircraft(all of which can be adapted for the role) is a much higher starting point.
EM compatibility is one of the hardest things to solve in ship design - for both radars and their power supply. More so when it's an already built design, and you can't do it cleanly and efficiently(for example, like 055 does).
C-UAS as a mission requires cleanest possible arcs for both radars and weapons, including look down angles; this is often hard to add.
Finally, all these systems don't come out of nowhere - if original energy balance is tight, and there's barely enough space for systems and crew adding more users, more equipment and more crew makes matters worse.
It doesn't help that 2010s Chinese ships, for the lack of better word, are very "clean" - they're at clean math minimum for classic CIWS self defense, and there's no in-built growth. Frankly speaking, it really seems China thought that terrorism at sea, iranian speed boats etc(threat which directly evolves into modern usv threat) is that guys' problem.
Which it is...but things change fast in warfare against sentient beings.
And overall conclusion is, while 052D is a perfect AD node of 2012-2024 period, it's hard to say same for 2024...now; it will be progressively worse as time drags on. As such, there's a need for a new, updated ship class with updated hull, sensor suit and self-defense fit.
Well, above all else - single targeting band hitting upper limits of available power, limiting self-defense/close in capability. No designed C-UAS capability (ad hoc additions are there, but this isn't quite the same). As far as we can tell, 052D isn't truly ABM capable. Not that much in updates in terms of EW.
Old hull design with negative effect on most modern ASW (again, there were updates in this regard, but patchwork isn't same as new hull making full use of modern Chinese capabilities).
Compare it to 055, basically. Or most modern DD designs, such as DDGX or Italian DDX.
In general I do agree, but practice is that when LRAD becomes domineering, attack tends to go below it.
And 052D is really, like really dead-focused on defending against classic US air power(Aircraft, including stealth ones, and harpoons - i.e. radar guided ASCMs). Big powerful S band volume search combined with not pinpoint accurate, but powerful HHQ-9; UHF set for VLO threats; proliferation of HHQ-10 which is meant to punish active seekers, together with active jamming decoys.
But take a look where US attack venues shift:
-hypersonics and ballistics(CPS, PrSM, SM-6b)
-fully passive, LO ASCMs(LRASM and NSM)
Plus, while USN isn't quite there yet, USMC already started small droning.
Your main destroyer is your "everything", it should adapt. Especially since 2010s Chinese warships went so specialized on classic USN, that ironically many older combatants are now potentially more flexible.