Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario


Biscuits

Senior Member
Registered Member
It's not a statement. It is a provocation exercise. The provocation is to analyze if really all the countries in the region or most of them will adopt neutrality between a war between the USA and China, I can accept the optimistic version that there will be neutrality, but I do not share this optimism because I see clear intentions and directions that this may not really be true.
There's just too many guns pointed to most of those nations for them to contemplate aiding a crazy war of aggression against China.

If you stay neutral or help China tacitly, its not like US has the ability to start attacking everyone. On the flip side, China's active defense doctrine means they will hit your infrastructure with at least some drones and possibly heavier munitions too. Countries like Indonesia or Thailand have very limited air defense, navy and air force.

Even actual states that are united into USA such as SK or Japan will not necessarily help. Especially SK that faces direct bombardment and land invasion from the 38th parallel.

A realistic estimate would be that regional US puppets act similar way as Belarus has done in the Ukraine war. Optimistic estimate would be that SK or even Japan declares open neutrality.

Saying Indonesia will help an American invasion is US nationalist cope pipe dream levels of belief. Its like those Russians who think Poland will help them by invading Ukraine from the other side lmao.
 

AndrewS

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Registered Member
It's not a statement. It is a provocation exercise. The provocation is to analyze if really all the countries in the region or most of them will adopt neutrality between a war between the USA and China, I can accept the optimistic version that there will be neutrality, but I do not share this optimism because I see clear intentions and directions that this may not really be true.

The intentions and direction have become far clearer since the Ukraine war, which is clearly a case of one nation-state attacking another fully recognised nation-state which is a democracy.

Note only the West has even enacted sanctions. The rest of the Global South haven't enacted any sanctions, even though it would be almost painless to do so, as Russia is geographically distant and an economically minor player overall. Even symbolic sanctions against Russian individuals (who will never leave Russia and have no assets to freeze) haven't been enacted.

In conclusion, the Global South (comprising 7 of 8 billion people in the world and 60% of Gross World Product) has decided to be neutral.

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Looking at ASEAN specifically, all countries in the ASEAN region do not recognise Taiwan as a country and formally accept that China-Taiwan are still in a state of unresolved civil war. Even the US is in the same situation, as it removed US troops and the US embassy from Taiwan back in 1979, and recognised China instead.

Only Singapore has enacted sanctions on Russia. And Singapore has been very clear over many decades (both in private and public) that they will be neutral in a China-US war.

So what does this tell you about the current situation? Do you see people in ASEAN clamouring to enact sanctions and join a war on Russia? India is another example as well.

Furthermore, look at the direction of Chinese military and economic capability.

In 10-15 years time, we're likely looking at a situation where China has outright military superiority up to 3000km from the Chinese mainland, even if the US military were to intervene.

And economically, we're looking at a Chinese economy approaching twice the size of the US economy. It would be very silly for countries in ASEAN to choose the US, instead of remaining neutral and playing both sides.
 
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AndrewS

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Registered Member
@Sinnavuuty

But let's play devil's advocate and say Indonesia does choose to support the US in a war with China.
And let's say that the US wins a conventional war that somehow doesn't go nuclear.

What then?

In the aftermath of WW1 and WW2, it took 5 years for countries to rebuild and get to pre-war output levels. So let's take this as a worse case. Then how long would it take to rebuild the entire Chinese military?

If we look at destroyers, China currently has about 40 modern AEGIS-type destroyers in service and has demonstrated an ability to launch 10 destroyers in a single year back in 2019 during peacetime. So China has recently demonstrated the capacity to build a replacement Destroyer fleet in as little as 4 years.

We see something similar with Chinese Frigates. I call it about 50 vessels with Frigate-level capability and missions.
In the year of 2021, 8 Type-054 Frigates were launched by a different set of shipbuilders.
So the Chinese Navy could receive a replacement Frigate fleet in as little as 6 years.

You get similar calculations for other major weapons systems.

But with missiles and drones, these are actually a lot easier, cheaper and quicker to build.
That applies especially to Shaheed-136 type drones which cost $20K and have a range of 2500km.

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The second point is that a demilitarised China currently spends 1.7% of GDP on the military, which is only half of the 3.5% that the US spends.
In the aftermath of a war and with China rebuilding its military, we can expect the Chinese figure to easily double to match the US figure.
The implication is that the Chinese military will support a force structure which is twice the size of todays. For example, 80 AEGIS destroyers + 100 Frigates

And looking further into the future, let's say China has an economy twice the size of the US
How much larger would the Chinese military be in that case?

There are very good reasons for countries to be neutral
 

tygyg1111

Senior Member
Registered Member
It's not a statement. It is a provocation exercise. The provocation is to analyze if really all the countries in the region or most of them will adopt neutrality between a war between the USA and China, I can accept the optimistic version that there will be neutrality, but I do not share this optimism because I see clear intentions and directions that this may not really be true.
I am sure that Chinese planners have and are considering the scenarios (and worse) that you have outlined. What we think here is just a best guess, which has no effect whatsoever on actual events if and when they unfold.
 

Biscuits

Senior Member
Registered Member
@Sinnavuuty

But let's play devil's advocate and say Indonesia does choose to support the US in a war with China.
And let's say that the US wins a conventional war that somehow doesn't go nuclear.

What then?

In the aftermath of WW1 and WW2, it took 5 years for countries to rebuild and get to pre-war output levels. So let's take this as a worse case. Then how long would it take to rebuild the entire Chinese military?

If we look at destroyers, China currently has about 40 modern AEGIS-type destroyers in service and has demonstrated an ability to launch 10 destroyers in a single year back in 2019 during peacetime. So China has recently demonstrated the capacity to build a replacement Destroyer fleet in as little as 4 years.

We see something similar with Chinese Frigates. I call it about 50 vessels with Frigate-level capability and missions.
In the year of 2021, 8 Type-054 Frigates were launched by a different set of shipbuilders.
So the Chinese Navy could receive a replacement Frigate fleet in as little as 6 years.

You get similar calculations for other major weapons systems.

But with missiles and drones, these are actually a lot easier, cheaper and quicker to build.
That applies especially to Shaheed-136 type drones which cost $20K and have a range of 2500km.

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The second point is that a demilitarised China currently spends 1.7% of GDP on the military, which is only half of the 3.5% that the US spends.
In the aftermath of a war and with China rebuilding its military, we can expect the Chinese figure to easily double to match the US figure.
The implication is that the Chinese military will support a force structure which is twice the size of todays. For example, 80 AEGIS destroyers + 100 Frigates

And looking further into the future, let's say China has an economy twice the size of the US
How much larger would the Chinese military be in that case?

There are very good reasons for countries to be neutral
Any Asian countries that are able to even moderately plan ahead from the future do absolutely not want to normalize using military force to claim territory in Asia.

Lets say US can do a Crimea style takeover of Taiwan province. What's the next step then? I guess if American invasion works, it would really mean the end of the communist party in China. At least its current form. It'd be replaced with a nationalist movement, like the one you see in Ukraine today.

Of course, they would not run the economy as well as current China. But they don't need a well run economy. They still control the no 1 economy and industry in the world, even if its stagnating under their leadership, they can just put pedal to the metal on the military.

And by that point, America itself normalized annexation in Asia. So anyone who helped USA naturally becomes target for revenge. When the National Republic of China finishes its preparation and goes to war, it will not just be over its own territory, it will expand across Eurasia, with absolutely terrible consequences for everyone in the path.
 

tphuang

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this showed up on the Ukraine thread and is quite interesting.
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Most importantly, in a confidential annexe to the ‘friendship without limits’ was a mutual security guarantee that Russia had sought from China for decades but hitherto been unable to obtain, said the source.
If something like this was agreed to between China and Russia, the implication is quite far reaching. At a minimum, I would imagine that Russia (and North Korea) would allow Chinese aircraft to operate out of Russian air bases in the far east. Other possibilities would be allowing DF-26 or DF-17 brigades to operate out of Siberia so they can attack air fields in Alaska. And maybe set up and share early warning radar data with the Russians. Other possibilities of being able to use military base In Russia far east is that they'd be able to station surface ships and nuclear submarines in Sea of Okhotsk and operate with Russian Far East Fleet. That would allow them to have air protection for their fleet.

Just generally speaking, they will be able to keep up attacks on Japanese air fields if they can operate out of Russian and NK air fields.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
It's not a statement. It is a provocation exercise. The provocation is to analyze if really all the countries in the region or most of them will adopt neutrality between a war between the USA and China, I can accept the optimistic version that there will be neutrality, but I do not share this optimism because I see clear intentions and directions that this may not really be true.

Latest from ASEAN below

bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-25/china-hustles-on-summit-sidelines-to-challenge-us-trade-deals
archive.ph/Nzosw#selection-3427.35-3431.83

Key points relating to Indonesia:
1. The Indonesian President can publicly call the Chinese President "Big Brother" with no/little blowback from the Indonesian public or the opposition party
2. If Indonesia was to join the US in declaring war on China (as you suggest), presumably that new and expensive railway linking Jarkata would fall into disrepair due to lack of spares

You can't be any clearer than this, so what does this tell you?
 

Chilled_k6

Junior Member
Registered Member
this showed up on the Ukraine thread and is quite interesting.
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If something like this was agreed to between China and Russia, the implication is quite far reaching. At a minimum, I would imagine that Russia (and North Korea) would allow Chinese aircraft to operate out of Russian air bases in the far east. Other possibilities would be allowing DF-26 or DF-17 brigades to operate out of Siberia so they can attack air fields in Alaska. And maybe set up and share early warning radar data with the Russians. Other possibilities of being able to use military base In Russia far east is that they'd be able to station surface ships and nuclear submarines in Sea of Okhotsk and operate with Russian Far East Fleet. That would allow them to have air protection for their fleet.

Just generally speaking, they will be able to keep up attacks on Japanese air fields if they can operate out of Russian and NK air fields.
GLONASS ground stations are being build in China, and vice versa for Beidou. This would give Beidou better coverage near the Arctic.

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Note that one station is build on the Kamchatka Peninsula opposite of Alaska, and could have strong maritime and military implications. In general, GLONASS can serve as a backup in case a large number of Beidou satellites become offline in a conflict, and GPS gets completely cut for civilian use.
 

Sinnavuuty

Junior Member
Registered Member
Latest from ASEAN below

bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-25/china-hustles-on-summit-sidelines-to-challenge-us-trade-deals
archive.ph/Nzosw#selection-3427.35-3431.83

Key points relating to Indonesia:
1. The Indonesian President can publicly call the Chinese President "Big Brother" with no/little blowback from the Indonesian public or the opposition party
2. If Indonesia was to join the US in declaring war on China (as you suggest), presumably that new and expensive railway linking Jarkata would fall into disrepair due to lack of spares

You can't be any clearer than this, so what does this tell you?
Of course can. This says a lot more:
Good to see China and Indonesia resuming joint military exercises. Signs of warming ties all around. This is after meeting between Xi and Indonesian president
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AndrewS

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Registered Member
The red line: Biden and Xi’s secret Ukraine talks revealed

spectator.co.uk/article/the-red-line-biden-and-xis-secret-ukraine-talks-revealed/



Red-LIne_SE_FORF1.jpg

Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China has played a decisive – though publicly low-profile – role in strategic decision-making in both Washington and Moscow. As I report for the first time in my new book Overreach, it was a back-channel intervention approved by Beijing that caused the US to scupper a deal for the Poles to provide Soviet-made MiG-29 jets to the Ukrainian Air Force back in March. And since September a flurry of personal diplomacy by Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi with Nato and the US has led to a rare moment of public agreement over Russia, when Xi Jinping said that the world ‘needs to prevent a nuclear crisis on the Eurasian continent’ in a meeting with Joe Biden at the G20 summit in Bali.

Throughout the war, China’s true position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been hard to pin down – not least because Beijing has been telling both sides what they want to hear. In March, Wang implicitly appeared to be blaming the US for ‘stoking tensions’ and ‘sowing discord’ with Russia. Last month he told his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, that ‘China will also firmly support the Russian side, under the leadership of President Putin, to unite and lead the Russian people’, according to state broadcaster CCTV. Wang also promised that ‘China is willing to deepen contacts with the Russian side at all levels’. Yet in September, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Wang had told Nato Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg that China ‘stays open-minded to dialogues and exchanges with Nato and is willing to jointly promote the sound and steady development of bilateral relations … in the spirit of honesty and mutual respect’.

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What changed Washington’s mind? In part, it was an urgent and confidential back-channel initiative led by the UK-based Institute for East West Strategic Studies involving former European leaders and senior officials, and ultimately endorsed by the Chinese leadership. Ever since Putin’s 27 February declaration on nuclear readiness, the PLA had also been reaching out through military-to-military (as opposed to diplomatic or political) channels to senior Russian general officers with whom they had made personal contact over years of joint military exercises and military procurement talks. Beijing’s aim was to ensure that even if there were a political decision to use nukes, the Russian army would insist on sticking to its long-standing nuclear military doctrine to use them solely if provoked by attacks on Russian soil. Through these unofficial ‘track two’ contacts, Washington and the PLA agreed – unusually, given a deterioration in relations during the Donald Trump presidency – that if the US stopped the MiG deal, Beijing’s generals would do their best to defuse Putin’s nuclear threat on an operational level. ‘It worked,’ said the Chinese source. ‘The [US] decided that supplying aircraft was a step too far.’

Though this back-channel initiative of early March has not been previously reported, the fact that the US retained a fundamentally cautious attitude to supplying strategic weapons to Ukraine throughout the war effectively confirms that Washington, remained deeply aware of Chinese concerns, which were shared with many of the largest nations in the European Union. Despite a dramatic escalation in supplies of money and military hardware – including Nato-standard 155mm artillery capable of firing guided shells and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System – Nato has held back on providing attack aircraft, helicopters, Nato-standard tanks, long-range battlefield missile and cruise missile systems.

At the same time, Chinese backing for Moscow remained equally cautious. Beijing offered diplomatic and informational support – but excluded significant military cooperation, forcing the Russians to buy drones from Iran, cannibalise domestic appliances for computer chips and attempt to buy back helicopters, missiles and missile defence systems from its military customers around the developing world. The threat of US sanctions on their global operations caused many leading Chinese banks such as ICBC, the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to withdraw credit and financing from Russia. Chinese energy giants such as Sinochem also suspended all Russian investments and joint ventures. In August, UnionPay – the Chinese equivalent of Visa and Mastercard – also ceased its cooperation with Russian banks, citing sanctions. The material motivation for Beijing’s corporations to pull out of Russia was clear: before the war China did $100 billion in trade with Russia (rising by a projected $30 billion this year thanks to increased oil imports) but more than $1.5 trillion with the US and EU.

With Biden and Xi’s joint condemnation of the threat of nukes at Bali earlier this month, the so-called ‘track two’ understandings of March have become a ‘track one’ public policy. Thanks to Wang’s shuttle diplomacy, Nato and China have effectively aligned on not escalating the Ukraine-Russia conflict, according to the Chinese source. Over a series of meetings with Nato leadership since early September, Wang pledged to use China’s considerable leverage in Moscow to dissuade Putin from using nukes, while in return Nato has affirmed that they would not provide strategic weapons to Ukraine.
 
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