plawolf
Lieutenant General
One of the arguments put forth by the Indians for having the toehold at Depsang plains is because a tactical advantage gained there can allow Indian armor to move east and potentially cut off G219 highway running between Xinjiang and Tibet. The biggest flaw to this argument is the assumption that cutting G219 somehow will facilitate a collapse of China's supply lines.
Think about it. Where would be the most important location for PLA supplies to reach in the event that somehow the Indian army actually manages to cut off G219? You guessed it, it would be that point of the G219 itself. And China would still have the remainder of the G219 to facilitate that.
That’s actually a good example of how Indian strategic thinking is still stick in 1962. G219 was important back in 1962 when it was the main modern transport link into Tibet for China, but today it’s just another highway in China. Cut that off and there are still dozens, if not hundreds of other road and rail routes, not to mention air links and even cross country.
Although one point I would Slightly differ is that in the ridiculously unlike event that an Indian advance did manage to cut G219, the bulk of PLA counter-attacking efforts won’t be directed at the G219 breakpoint itself, but rather to focus on the route into China across the Himalayas.
China has a fondness of making dumplings, so if an invader actually crossed into Chinese territory, the focus of the PLA wouldn’t really be to push them back as much as to make sure as few of them can make it back as possible.