China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

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Temstar

Brigadier
Registered Member
Forcing the US to spend money to build a south facing counterpart to NORAD with the mere existence of this system (regardless of how many missiles actually deployed) seem like quite the win. All that resources could have gone into NORAD to stop China's more conventional missiles which will still make up the bulk of the strategic deterrent. If you defend everywhere then you defend nowhere.
 

AssassinsMace

Lieutenant General
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Love how this news has stirred up a hornet's nest in the West. This Vipin Narang in the above link is using the "I didn't trip and fall. I meant to trip and fall on purpose" excuse. The US's ABM in Alaska was meant scare to adversaries into spending money on new systems to avoid it? Well the present ABM system in Alaska was cancelled because it didn't live up to the hype. Also wasn't it suppose to only be aimed at countries like North Korea with fewer numbers because last I heard and this is why they probably cancelled it was it'll need to launch eight interceptors at each incoming warhead in order to get a 40% chance at interception. You don't need hypersonic missiles when the chances of hitting a large juicy target in the US are good and that alone will do enough collateral damage to cripple the US. I don't buy the argument that Aegis can intercept. You know when SM-whatever works best? It's when the ship they're on is the target. That's what it's primary purpose is for. So if this Chinese hypersonic missile isn't flying over where the launcher is, there's even a far more narrow window of interception. Also we're talking about hypersonic speeds. Just because a radar sees it, it doesn't mean they'll be able to lock on and intercept. Chinese radars saw F-22s flying over South Korea. Does that mean they can lock on and fire to intercept? No. When the hypersonic vehicle does come into that range it'll probably be seconds before it already passes by and then the interceptor will be instead chasing and then it's too late. There are many other factors that are also in play against reactions times. People bragged how the US can intercept ICBMs at boost phase because that's where they're the most vulnerable. Well against a hypersonic vehicle, an interceptor will be at its weakest at boost phase and it has only one chance at course correction when the hypersonic vehicle will have many available.
 

broadsword

Brigadier
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Love how this news has stirred up a hornet's nest in the West. This Vipin Narang in the above link is using the "I didn't trip and fall. I meant to trip and fall on purpose" excuse. The US's ABM in Alaska was meant scare to adversaries into spending money on new systems to avoid it? Well the present ABM system in Alaska was cancelled because it didn't live up to the hype. Also wasn't it suppose to only be aimed at countries like North Korea with fewer numbers because last I heard and this is why they probably cancelled it was it'll need to launch eight interceptors at each incoming warhead in order to get a 40% chance at interception. You don't need hypersonic missiles when the chances of hitting a large juicy target in the US are good and that alone will do enough collateral damage to cripple the US. I don't buy the argument that Aegis can intercept. You know when SM-whatever works best? It's when the ship they're on is the target. That's what it's primary purpose is for. So if this Chinese hypersonic missile isn't flying over where the launcher is, there's even a far more narrow window of interception. Also we're talking about hypersonic speeds. Just because a radar sees it, it doesn't mean they'll be able to lock on and intercept. Chinese radars saw F-22s flying over South Korea. Does that mean they can lock on and fire to intercept? No. When the hypersonic vehicle does come into that range it'll probably be seconds before it already passes by and then the interceptor will be instead chasing and then it's too late. There are many other factors that are also in play against reactions times. People bragged how the US can intercept ICBMs at boost phase because that's where they're the most vulnerable. Well against a hypersonic vehicle, an interceptor will be at its weakest at boost phase and it has only one chance at course correction when the hypersonic vehicle will have many available.

That's how these people ingratiate to success in their careers. It's their special feature.
 

ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
Boost phase may be when a missile is most vulnerable but the intercept near impossible to do unless you have the interceptors within at least 100km of the boosting missile and positioned in the ideal places and in the direction of missile travel. Against North Korea this is entirely possible with AEGIS destroyers and cruisers positioned near launch.

Airborne lasers simply don't work because you're flying a big slow plane well within 1000km of launching missile. Until lasers become much more powerful and offer proper stand off range, the concept isn't effective. I really doubt any airborne laser system in the future can even get close to 1000km effective burning range against hardened missile. Even if these concepts become minimally effective in the future, it'll still take maybe even a minute to burn through a hardened target at 1000km or so. Right now, ship based (and powered) lasers can barely fry soft composites and plastics at 30km out within 20 seconds per target.

The only perfect counter to missiles is a sort of wonderweapon electronic attack like a strong EMP. Directing a strong enough EMP to a region the size of even India is near impossible for now ... oh and directing it from a distance and using "magic" aka yet undiscovered or unexploited new discoveries in physics and possible geophysics (to take advantage of geophysics since that would be the only way).

Oh and lasers don't work against ballistic missiles because ballistic missiles deal with immense surface heating already and far more than a laser can throw at any reasonable distance. It doesn't take much to make missiles of those sizes totally resistant to whatever an ABL can throw even the entire course of boost phase. Throwing photos on a surface is one thing, burning it is billions of times more demanding.

As said before, China reaching nuclear parity and beyond "minimal deterrence" not only includes updating delivery like we've seen but also increasing warhead numbers, warhead yields, and the numbers of delivery systems. Better ways of hiding and launching them e.g. world leading SSBN levels (and lots of them) and underground launch facilities. Chinese leaders know the US plays the henchman role and its population only complicit (many not even aware they are or that they are totally brainwashed) in perpetuating the sort of violent type of manifestation of this deeply rooted imperialism that controls most of Europe and north America. The mob boss isn't the US and in MAD, other targets must be hit so that's where the more missiles and more warheads come in.
 
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bustead

Junior Member
Registered Member
Selected a DF-5 + a nuclear warhead with a 3 Mt yield:
1.95 km radius of vaporizing everything
3.14km radius of heavy blast damage

Based om that data, lets say that for military purposes (targeting structures), margin of error could be 2.5 km. So from 2 dozen miles down to 2.5km is not that hard for missile development, it just needs more time to refine the tech
View attachment 78268
DF-5s are equipped with a 4.4Mt warhead, other than that this is accurate
 

Richard Santos

Captain
Registered Member
Its difficult but it can be done. A South pole trajectory offers considerable time compared to the North pole one for the SOUTHCOM to counter it, doesn't it?

The vital capability is a FOB attack can come without the target being aware one is launched. So one natural mode for FOB might be to first launch one or a few MIRV bus disguised as satellite launch, and then use the FOB to attack key infrastructure and components of ballistic missile defences, and key national leadership, in a coordinated fashion with the main ballistic attack in order to both magnify the effectiveness of the main attack, as well as ensure certain key enemy asset, such as national leadership or military leadership that coordinates effective response, is taken out.

This is more important to the balance of power between two nuclear opponents of than FOBS being used as a credible second strike component that is difficult to guard against.

The reason is FOBS used in the first manner magnifies the opponent’s vulnerability to one’s entire nuclear arsenal, and also create the advantageous negotiating situation where one hold the credible first strike initiative over one’s opponent. Used in the second manner the FOBS only magnifies the opponent’s vulnerability to the FOBS component and does not greatly alter the remaining parts of the balance of nuclear power.
 
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