Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis

[Zichan]

People who suggest that mainland China can punish Taiwan by taking Kinmen never really understand the cross-Strait affairs. DPP would probably be quite happy to get rid of Kinmen and label PRC as aggressor to appeal to the world (or "the rest of the world"). Besides, Kinmen will neither help PLA to take Taiwan Island or prevent PLA from taking over Taiwan Island. Not to mention why PRC has never really wanted to take over Kinmen since 1950s in the first place.

In fact, if the Operation of Liberating Taiwan starts, PLA will mostly likely leave Kinmen alone, except maybe to send a plain cloth PLA official to Kinmen in advance to tell the ROC force there to refrain from shooting at Xiamen or, if they have to fake some action, shoot to some designated zone. I'm sure POC force there will comply instead of engaging in some pointless shooting to seek self-destruction to no avail.

Of course, after PLA lands on Taiwan, ROC force on Kinmen will cease and desist. No blood will be shed there.

I think there’s another reason. If the ROC would lose Kinmen and Matsu islands, they would de facto lose administration over the last vestige of the mainland. That would in turn embolden the pro independence forces.

 

[OppositeDay]

I find the talks of peaceful reunification on the last few pages of this thread overoptimistic. US will throw everything at its disposal to stop it. Taiwanese economy is dependent on TSMC so unless China can develop a non-American semiconductor supply chain, American technological threats will make sure peaceful reunification is not an attractive option.

 

[abc123]

Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong – have a total population of 350 million. The per capita GDP of these seven provinces/cities has reached 55% of that of the United States. taking about PPP. all these cities/regions are better than any first world country main city.

according to 2022 rankings, China have second highest number of top universities in the world in top 500 after USA. according to Peking and Tsinghua Universities, this year lowest number of students wants to go foreign for higher studies. mostly are preferring home institutions. record number of Chinese overseas students returned since 2017.

i don't think so, i need to tell more about this anymore. Chinese EV has taken over the world. more and more Chinese inclined towards domestic brands. check Chinese automobile thread.

Check my posts in 'Chinese aviation industry' thread. C919 have 60% subsystem/parts/components localization include many joint ventures with foreign firms produced in mainland. after engine , nacelle , APU percentage likely to increase.

its happening since 2019, you will see result after few years.

Development of some country is seen by the level of last village in some backwater area, not by 5-6 of largest cities. Big cities are developed everywhere.
Also, 55% is way lower than say 80% or 90%.

Not saying that China has bad universities, but that CPC and business elite still more favoures Ivy League than Tsinghua. That's like Putin's daughter living in Netherlands, not in Crimea or Ekaterinburg. Say's much about Russia.

Average Chinese millionare will be driven in Mercedes/Rolls-Royce or in some Chinese car?

When China has say 90% of C919 parts from China, then she can say that she has domestic airliners industry. Same thing with engines, when foreign buyers buy them with Chinese engines and not with GE or RR engines...

 

[56860]

The current development reminds me a lot about the Beiping Model and the Tianjin model during 解放战争 (I dislike the term Chinese Civil War for various reasons). Now I actually think armed reunification is actually not that necessary and we may actually see peaceful reunification in the next 5 - 10 years, in line with what Xi and many CPC higher-ups have been suggesting in the past many years. It seems like this has always been the plan, things have just become obvious to us lay-folks after the Pelosi event - I was a firm believer of AR prior to this, but now I think a peaceful reunification is a much more powerful game plan with profound impacts to the balance of power in West Pacific.

I'll explain my rationale, starting with a bit of history:

In the 3rd phase of 解放战争, PingJin campaign（平津战役）, PLA's goal is to liberate Beiping (Beijing's previous name during ROC peroid) and the costal city of Tianjin. Beiping was a tricky matter as its liberation has high political significance as it's been the capital for a few dynasties in China (duh - which is why it's the current Chinese capital) and there are a lot of historical sites that needed to be preserved. Mao did not want to forcefully take the city, although he could. KMT's commander in Beiping thought he could hold off the PLA for some time and use that as leverage for subsequent negotiations, and the KMT defender of Tianjin was a trusted subordinate of his, and Tianjin was especially heavily fortified and defended by the KMT troops.

Long story short, PLA surrounded Beiping and negotiated with Fu (KMT commander defending Beiping) and Fu would not surrender believing he still has a chance to play this out. In the mean time, PLA attacked Tianjin after a few rounds of negotiations and steamrolled the KMT defendants, and captured the KMT commander alive within 29 hours of fighting and eliminated 130,000 KMT defenders. So the Tianjin model summarized in a few words would be giving you a heads up then properly f**king your s**t up.

Having seen his most trusted subordinate properly f**ked in Tianjin, Fu essentially gave up and surrendered, and agreed to laid down arms and let PLA in under immense psychological and military pressure from the PLA and CPC spies. Mao was able to take Beiping without firing a single bullet. That is the Beiping model - a classic example of 不战而屈人之兵 (a force that can defeat opponents without fighting) described in the Art of War.

I believe a combination of Tianjin and Beiping model has always been the plan for Taiwan. Although AR would seem satisfying to a lot of people and will showcase the capability of the PLA to the world, it is not the most ideal solution.

Remember - 主不可以怒而兴师，将不可以愠而致战。合于利而动，不合于利而止 (lords and generals shall not wage war due to anger/rage, only strike when there is tangible benefit, make no move if there is nothing to be gained) - CPC's ultimate goal is the great rejuvenation of the Chinese civilization, and a key pillar in this goal is to undermine US dominance in West Pacific. Reunify Taiwan under the most ideal situation contributes to this goal; AR can put up a good show, but it is not the most ideal solution and has significant risks and drawbacks - you can never fully control the fallout of a war, wars can have direct and indirect impact on nations' fates for many decades and you will never know if it ultimately serves your purpose or not. (Think about how the Vietnam War contributed to the onset of hippies and civil rights movement, then the woke culture, and subsequently the current trans-movement. A US general in the 1960s would not have imagined that the decisions to send Marines to South Vietnam may mean that a non-insignificant portion of the US armed forces in the 2030s may be made up of transgendered people... Although this example is a bit exaggerated lol but you get my point)

Now how would peaceful reunification be achieved? By combining both Beiping and Tianjin model: immense military, economic, and psychological pressure, Taiwan may actually cave in and give up in a few years when its people can no loner bear the suffering. If the type of exercise we are witnessing these couple of days from the PLA becomes routine, and happens like 2 - 3 times a year for the next couple of years, how would that impact Taiwan's economy? If Taiwan's infrastructures are constantly under cyber-attack (apparently Taiwan's police system has been attacked and it is not currently functional), normal people will feel that (I really felt it when Rogers went down for a full day a little bit ago in Canada). What if every couple of weeks a few PLA drones fly over Taiwan in the middle of the night over populated cities and make huge noises, do they shoot them down or not? What if every couple of months PLA started mass assembling and pretend to launch a AR which forces all Taiwanese people to have to go hide in shelters? There are literally so many military options to make everyone in Taiwan suffer more and more each day, and it can just get worse by each day.

And we are not even counting the economic front. Decades of 惠台 (benefit-Taiwan) policies from CPC is such a screwed-up and brilliant move, regardless of their original intensions, the fact of the matter is that these policies made so much of Taiwan's economy to be dependent on the mainland. If you simply take these policies away, Taiwan would suffer, and we are not even talking about actual sanctions. I'm not going to list all the possibilities but you can imagine (TSMC and the semi-conductor industry alone cannot feed all Taiwanese).

In an extreme scenario, maybe in 5 years, your normal Taiwanese can experience what it is like right to live in Russia in 1991. After all, no business and capital would want to stay on a tiny island that is at risk of suffering armed conflict and they would gradually pull out, all the rich Taiwanese as well - which is not the majority of the Taiwanese. What would be left?

Look at Sri Lanka, I'm pretty sure it was one of the richest nations in South Asia by per capital GDP a few years ago, but Covid and the war in Ukraine has completely changed the fate of this nation. We don't know how much suffering CPC can bring to Taiwan through military and economic pressure, but I don't think it can be taken lightly. By then, if Taiwan just agrees to reunify with China, then this could all disappear, do you think the Taiwanese people would want that? No one can be 100% sure, a lot of things can change really quickly in the span of a few years (e.g., think about PLAN in 2011 vs 2021, or US - China relationships 2017 vs 2022) but let's just say that even if by then Taiwan still does not want to peacefully reunify with the mainland, these kind of things can make AR so much more easier than today.

I think the US has really left itself in a very awkward position. With Pelosi's visit there is literally not much else they could do to about the Taiwan card other than declaring Taiwan's independence formally or station troops directly on Taiwan. I don't think they want to do those things. But Pelosi's visit enables CPC to do all of the things I mentioned above, and the US can't really do much about it unless they directly intervene militarily. The US military may intervene during a scenario of AR, but the likelihood of them intervening militarily when the CPC and PLA are doing the things I mentioned above is really slim. I don't think the US has any more cards to play after this, from now on, it is the CPC that will be making future moves and the US can only follow when it comes to Taiwan.

I kind of feel like this is CPC's plan for a while now, contingencies have been set up to initiate the a certain process on Taiwan, and they're just waiting for US to make its move - by crossing the "red line" for domestic political purposes, China will exploit this opportunity and kickstart the planned contingency. WJP's recent article suggested this as well.

So yeah, that's basically some of the things I thought about in the past 2 days. I guess that is my prediction lol - peaceful reunification is possible within the next 5 - 10 years, but by then yall probably would no longer care about Taiwan as it is no longer that relevant

Do you agree? Disagree? Any thoughts?

China has a lot of buttons it can press to make life difficult for the average Taiwanese. I agree with your thought process but disagree with the timeframe - I think the upper end of 10-20 years is a more realistic timeframe for peaceful reunification. By that time, PRC will be the largest, most influential and most powerful economy in the world by all three metrics - nominal GDP, PPP, #1 trading partner. By then I believe China would have also cracked EUV and put TSMC out of business, thereby devastating the Taiwanese economy. Economics and technology will solve the Taiwan problem.

 

[dirtyid]

IMO there were a few fundamental premises that people disagree on which makes China's seeming relative "inaction" seem confusing and/or frustrating.

...

personally believe that striving to hold cold, clinical views with minimal emotion and temperament, is vital during tense moments of great potential danger and consequence, and I think that is a challenge every person interested in military matters and geopolitics, have to square with themselves.

I would add, a little PRC diplomatic literacy goes a long way, which means listening to less Hu Xijin and more MFA. As far as I know, the official rhetoric by MFA over Pelosi's visit has been below threshold for language PRC historically used for impending war, using verbiage like "forceful/effective" instead of "military/non-peaceful" which should have signalled little chance of shooting Pelosi down (maybe some intercept drama if visit was on Aug1 PLA day) that would initiate premature Sino-US war. Use of "forceful" implies exercises and then it's a matter of extrapolating what kind of interventions would extract most benefits to PRC, in this case shifting operational status quo like invalidating median line, overflights of TW, possibly permanent fighter basing in SCS or enforcing sovereignty over strait transits. Actions that improve PRC peacetime posture going forward that will benefit training and opportunities in event of actual war. It also helps to appreciate that all evidence in the last 10 years points toward Xi being relatively patient and seems to consistently make difficult but in general, correct decisions that weighs risks appropriately.

 

[5unrise]

The decisions of the PRC in the Fourth Taiwan Crisis suggest to me that, in the event of its red line of formal independence being crossed, there is a reasonable possibility China will not actually carry out an immediate military assault on Taiwan. China's reaction will depend critically on the willingness of third-party actors to go to war with China over Taiwan, and it may choose to wait further still. I used to believe China will definitely launch an assault in this scenario, but now I am not so certain.

Hindsight is 20/20, but still hindsight tells us that China had to issue an explicit threat to Pelosi and the Taiwanese government no matter what happened, even if Beijing does not intend to use lethal force. This is China's way of communicating to a trespasser that its core interests are being harmed, regardless of what it decides to do about it immediately. Not issuing these threats would be tantamount to an acquiescence of the trespassing, and this would make Beijing appear weak both internally and externally, which would of course invite domestic unrest and further trespasses. If Beijing's threat successfully deters a would-be violation, then great. If not, it is not exactly a worse outcome than if Beijing said nothing. Of course, repeated reliance on this strategy with repeatedly foiled bluff will lead to a loss of Chinese credibility.

China has shown consistently that it is a pragmatic and calculated actor, whose decisions are firmly rooted in realpolitiks. Add to this the very real Chinese belief that time is on its side, you end up with a picture of a very cautious, risk averse actor. This is where I will make a leap of logic: it does not make sense for a risk averse actor, whose strength is growing relative to its adversaries, to gamble on immediate military action. China's red line on Taiwan could just be a way to signal its resentment to a formal declaration of Taiwanese independence, and the threat component of it may not necessarily be carried out, at least immediately. How China will respond depends on the risk involved. If there are no external support forthcoming for Taiwan, China will almost certainty not hesitate to use force. However, if the US signals convincingly that it will fight a long drawn-out war with the PRC, or signal through the act of joining the fight, China may very well back down to a ceasefire.

You might think what I'm saying is crazy, but stop and consider the actual impact of a formal declaration of independence. Does it actually change the facts on the ground? Does it preclude the possibility of military assault in the future? Well, of course not. Borders and nations are man-made, and as such they can be man-broken. If Taiwan declares independence at a suboptimal timing for China, and with US support, China can conceivably still not do anything just to buy more time, providing it perceives that its comprehensive national strength will continue to increase in relative terms. Once China has a sufficient preponderance of force to reduce the military risk to an acceptable level, it can still launch an armed reunification while deterring or defeating a US-led intervention. There are no laws of physics preventing the PLA from crossing formal national borders. Russia recognised Ukraine's independence, but there's a reasonable chance that in time Russia will annex any part of Ukraine it wants to annex.

Taiwanese independence forces may well be emboldened by the events of this crisis, but this is not to say that they will certainly go ahead and cross the red line. There is still a big risk that China will deviate from its usual risk aversion and simply react with lethal force, particularly given the domestic cost of inaction for Beijing. So formal independence will be deterred for the time being. However, the risk I see is that Taiwanese independence forces will continue to salami slice right up to the red line, to test Beijing's resolve. They may undertake further provocations, e.g. inviting more foreign leaders to Taiwan, changing the RoC flag, changing the anthem, disavowing Sun Yatsen, disbanding/renaming the KMT, further desinicisation policies, stationing sizable foreign troops, or making military agreements. The lack of a strong reaction by Beijing to any of these moves, particularly the lack of lethal response, could very well convince the independence forces that Beijing's red line is just a bluff. They would then cross it and declare independence if they have reliable confirmation of US military support. This is where I see the danger to both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and especially more so for Taiwan, in the medium term.

 

[NeutralWarrior]

Big hammer-time:

Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Announces China's Sanctions on U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi

According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi insisted on going to Taiwan in disregard of China's serious concerns and firm opposition, seriously interfering in China's internal affairs, seriously undermining China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, seriously trampling on the one-China principle, and seriously threatening the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. In response to Pelosi's vicious and provocative actions, China has decided to impose sanctions on Pelosi and her immediate family in accordance with the relevant laws of the People's Republic of China.

Source:

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[efficient_kiwi]

The decisions of the PRC in the Fourth Taiwan Crisis suggest to me that, in the event of its red line of formal independence being crossed, there is a reasonable possibility China will not actually carry out an immediate military assault on Taiwan. China's reaction will depend critically on the willingness of third-party actors to go to war with China over Taiwan, and it may choose to wait further still. I used to believe China will definitely launch an assault in this scenario, but now I am not so certain.

Hindsight is 20/20, but still hindsight tells us that China had to issue an explicit threat to Pelosi and the Taiwanese government no matter what happened, even if Beijing does not intend to use lethal force. This is China's way of communicating to a trespasser that its core interests are being harmed, regardless of what it decides to do about it immediately. Not issuing these threats would be tantamount to an acquiescence of the trespassing, and this would make Beijing appear weak both internally and externally, which would of course invite domestic unrest and further trespasses. If Beijing's threat successfully deters a would-be violation, then great. If not, it is not exactly a worse outcome than if Beijing said nothing. Of course, repeated reliance on this strategy with repeatedly foiled bluff will lead to a loss of Chinese credibility.

China has shown consistently that it is a pragmatic and calculated actor, whose decisions are firmly rooted in realpolitiks. Add to this the very real Chinese belief that time is on its side, you end up with a picture of a very cautious, risk averse actor. This is where I will make a leap of logic: it does not make sense for a risk averse actor, whose strength is growing relative to its adversaries, to gamble on immediate military action. China's red line on Taiwan could just be a way to signal its resentment to a formal declaration of Taiwanese independence, and the threat component of it may not necessarily be carried out, at least immediately. How China will respond depends on the risk involved. If there are no external support forthcoming for Taiwan, China will almost certainty not hesitate to use force. However, if the US signals convincingly that it will fight a long drawn-out war with the PRC, or signal through the act of joining the fight, China may very well back down to a ceasefire.

You might think what I'm saying is crazy, but stop and consider the actual impact of a formal declaration of independence. Does it actually change the facts on the ground? Does it preclude the possibility of military assault in the future? Well, of course not. Borders and nations are man-made, and as such they can be man-broken. If Taiwan declares independence at a suboptimal timing for China, and with US support, China can conceivably still not do anything just to buy more time, providing it perceives that its comprehensive national strength will continue to increase in relative terms. Once China has a sufficient preponderance of force to reduce the military risk to an acceptable level, it can still launch an armed reunification while deterring or defeating a US-led intervention. There are no laws of physics preventing the PLA from crossing formal national borders. Russia recognised Ukraine's independence, but there's a reasonable chance that in time Russia will annex any part of Ukraine it wants to annex.

Taiwanese independence forces may well be emboldened by the events of this crisis, but this is not to say that they will certainly go ahead and cross the red line. There is still a big risk that China will deviate from its usual risk aversion and simply react with lethal force, particularly given the domestic cost of inaction for Beijing. So formal independence will be deterred for the time being. However, the risk I see is that Taiwanese independence forces will continue to salami slice right up to the red line, to test Beijing's resolve. They may undertake further provocations, e.g. inviting more foreign leaders to Taiwan, changing the RoC flag, changing the anthem, disavowing Sun Yatsen, disbanding/renaming the KMT, further desinicisation policies, stationing sizable foreign troops, or making military agreements. The lack of a strong reaction by Beijing to any of these moves, particularly the lack of lethal response, could very well convince the independence forces that Beijing's red line is just a bluff. They would then cross it and declare independence if they have reliable confirmation of US military support. This is where I see the danger to both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and especially more so for Taiwan, in the medium term.

I do think the main issue is the loss of credibility internally. Xi has repeatedly said that force will be used against Taiwanese separatists/independence activists. This is a red line that has carried through many different CCP leaders. I doubt this extremely strong tradition can be cast aside so easily.

 

[Dante80]

As a lurker I'd like to give many thanks for the post quality in the last pages.

 

[56860]

The decisions of the PRC in the Fourth Taiwan Crisis suggest to me that, in the event of its red line of formal independence being crossed, there is a reasonable possibility China will not actually carry out an immediate military assault on Taiwan. China's reaction will depend critically on the willingness of third-party actors to go to war with China over Taiwan, and it may choose to wait further still. I used to believe China will definitely launch an assault in this scenario, but now I am not so certain.

Hindsight is 20/20, but still hindsight tells us that China had to issue an explicit threat to Pelosi and the Taiwanese government no matter what happened, even if Beijing does not intend to use lethal force. This is China's way of communicating to a trespasser that its core interests are being harmed, regardless of what it decides to do about it immediately. Not issuing these threats would be tantamount to an acquiescence of the trespassing, and this would make Beijing appear weak both internally and externally, which would of course invite domestic unrest and further trespasses. If Beijing's threat successfully deters a would-be violation, then great. If not, it is not exactly a worse outcome than if Beijing said nothing. Of course, repeated reliance on this strategy with repeatedly foiled bluff will lead to a loss of Chinese credibility.

China has shown consistently that it is a pragmatic and calculated actor, whose decisions are firmly rooted in realpolitiks. Add to this the very real Chinese belief that time is on its side, you end up with a picture of a very cautious, risk averse actor. This is where I will make a leap of logic: it does not make sense for a risk averse actor, whose strength is growing relative to its adversaries, to gamble on immediate military action. China's red line on Taiwan could just be a way to signal its resentment to a formal declaration of Taiwanese independence, and the threat component of it may not necessarily be carried out, at least immediately. How China will respond depends on the risk involved. If there are no external support forthcoming for Taiwan, China will almost certainty not hesitate to use force. However, if the US signals convincingly that it will fight a long drawn-out war with the PRC, or signal through the act of joining the fight, China may very well back down to a ceasefire.

You might think what I'm saying is crazy, but stop and consider the actual impact of a formal declaration of independence. Does it actually change the facts on the ground? Does it preclude the possibility of military assault in the future? Well, of course not. Borders and nations are man-made, and as such they can be man-broken. If Taiwan declares independence at a suboptimal timing for China, and with US support, China can conceivably still not do anything just to buy more time, providing it perceives that its comprehensive national strength will continue to increase in relative terms. Once China has a sufficient preponderance of force to reduce the military risk to an acceptable level, it can still launch an armed reunification while deterring or defeating a US-led intervention. There are no laws of physics preventing the PLA from crossing formal national borders. Russia recognised Ukraine's independence, but there's a reasonable chance that in time Russia will annex any part of Ukraine it wants to annex.

Taiwanese independence forces may well be emboldened by the events of this crisis, but this is not to say that they will certainly go ahead and cross the red line. There is still a big risk that China will deviate from its usual risk aversion and simply react with lethal force, particularly given the domestic cost of inaction for Beijing. So formal independence will be deterred for the time being. However, the risk I see is that Taiwanese independence forces will continue to salami slice right up to the red line, to test Beijing's resolve. They may undertake further provocations, e.g. inviting more foreign leaders to Taiwan, changing the RoC flag, changing the anthem, disavowing Sun Yatsen, disbanding/renaming the KMT, further desinicisation policies, stationing sizable foreign troops, or making military agreements. The lack of a strong reaction by Beijing to any of these moves, particularly the lack of lethal response, could very well convince the independence forces that Beijing's red line is just a bluff. They would then cross it and declare independence if they have reliable confirmation of US military support. This is where I see the danger to both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and especially more so for Taiwan, in the medium term.

I am not sure the CPC would be able to stifle the domestic outburst if Taiwan declared independence with zero consequences. I think in such a scenario China would have no choice but to go to war.