PDF-link is dead?
View attachment 128847
Given what we know of the production rate estimates at ChengDu, how likely is pilot training and unit conversion a bottleneck in J-20 deployment. Or, is the author simply way out of date in his information?
He's just wrong.View attachment 128847
Given what we know of the production rate estimates at ChengDu, how likely is pilot training and unit conversion a bottleneck in J-20 deployment. Or, is the author simply way out of date in his information?
View attachment 128847
Given what we know of the production rate estimates at ChengDu, how likely is pilot training and unit conversion a bottleneck in J-20 deployment. Or, is the author simply way out of date in his information?
At this stage, places like CASI can be assumed to be 1-2 years behind our understanding, as well as inject a degree of optimism from their perspective.
It would be useful to ask these individuals how strongly they hold to these projections they're making, because I'm sure on some level they understand that the most important part of these articles are always the predictions and projections for force/capability trajectory.
Not only do they seem confident in the production rate range they've described, but they also seem to not be willing to seriously entertain the idea of that production rate growing in the future either. It seems like such a massive blindspot I assume it has to be partly deliberate.
I just contacted the author and asked him if this is a rather conservative estimate to be on the safe side and why he omitted the 4th and 54th (as well as the highly probable 55th) Air brigades?
ExactlyI can already guess the answer, but let's see what he says