The War in the Ukraine
- Thread starter SampanViking
- Start date
Russia literally mobilized extra 300K troops.... if it's not a shortage of (fresh) manpower causing recent slow progress, then what is?
And Kherson? I recall people stating here the Ukrainians launched a major offensive and were beaten. Yet the Russians were forced to retreat to the other side of the Dniepr.
The estimates I have read for Bakmut are about 25k to 35k on each side.
I don't have numbers other than supposed casualties for Pavlivka. The casualties sound horrendous. Even so it became a something of note in the heavily censored Russian media. If those - and what is described by the marine in the article - are correct, I would be surprised if there was not a significant battle ongoing there.
Respectfully, I think you are underestimating the battles going on there.
I am going to get mocked and screamed at, but...
Logistics is no small part of the problem as well. Not so much HIMARS destroyed the centralized dumps, but since the beginning of the war, it has been really difficult for Russia to move more than a truck drive from a railhead. That is pretty telling, IMO. The rail dependency also creates artificial choke points a purely truck mobile force would not have.
In addition, the noted lack of palletization may seem trivial to many, but it has a profound effect on the ability on logistics.
The exhaustion of the troops compounded by a logistics train (see what I did there?) that may not be up to the task are the two main culprits on the Russian side.
I haven’t seen anyone draw a parallel yet, but this seems like a hastily planned and worse executed version of the Six-Day War.
It has been hypothesized that this invasion was basically a preemptive strike. Perhaps the level of commitment was not sufficient. However, the resistance presented by the Ukrainian forces does hint that waiting any longer may have produced an even worse result for Russia.
Found a picture of Ukranian tanks deployed on the Belarusian border. They are using ancient 3BM18 APFSDS rounds, which is the export variant with a steel penetrator of the 3BM15.
Needless to say they won't be killing any other MBT from the front at all.
And a Swedish M45 SMG from 1944 as well.
Needless to say they won't be killing any other MBT from the front at all.
And a Swedish M45 SMG from 1944 as well.
Reflections from the popular Russian Telegram channels, I quote:
Alcibiades on the war: November 21st, 2022 - The Aftermath of the Million Man March on Kherson
After the Russians withdrew from their bridgehead across the Dniper in Kherson earlier this month, commentators on both sides were quick to exclaim that the Ukrainians would be able to rapidly shift huge forces freed from the long-stagnant Kherson frontline to other directions and overwhelm the Russians. The opposite actually happened - it was the Russians who quickly shifted some eight brigades elsewhere, while Ukraine is reported to have barely managed to move two as of this writing, on a much shorter line of march.
Now recall that days prior to the official Russian withdrawal, Lloyd Austin was banging the table and demanding Ukraine attack in Kherson, claiming they had the means to conquer it. The Ukrainians obliged, but mounted an effort so feeble that what must have been a skeletal Russian covering force easily drove them back. As of November 9th, Ukraine's army opposite Kherson was unable to advance against any organized opposition and took days and substantial casualties advancing to Kherson against no opposition at all. Now, weeks later, only a handful of forces have been scraped out of it to reinforce Ukrainian troops elsewhere, while the Russians have redeployed an entire corps.
The conclusion from this is clear: Ukraine's Operational Command-South, which once boasted of marching on Kherson with a million men, was destroyed on the Ingulets. The handful of battalions freed are likely the only combat-capable units it could muster to send elsewhere. We may see other OC-S brigades later in this war, but as shadows of their former selves, stuffed with territorial defense conscripts riding on MRAPs and pickup trucks.
Recall my earlier post about the "operational goad," and consider that the Russians may be focusing on destroying the Ukrainian Army first rather than conquering territory upfront.
Alcibiades on the War, November 22nd, 2022: The failure of the Ukrainian People's War
Someone replied to my post yesterday with a defeatist comment that the Ukrainians are drafting men into their army faster than the Russians can kill them, with the implication that the Russian approach to grind the UAF out of existence has failed. It's worth examining this argument closely.
The Ukrainian authorities were very clear prewar that their plan to defeat their technically-superior neighbor relied on mass mobilization to drown the Russians in an avalanche of bodies. There was nothing sophisticated about it. They simply adopted Mao's People's War to the European context and proceeded from there. They have been executing that plan since February 24th, with mass mobilization of reserves and wave after wave of conscription on top of that.
The actual results of this in terms of increasing the end-strength of the UAF have been very unclear. According to Ukrainian agitprop their military was "full" months ago, with no need for additional recruitment... until they ordered new conscription waves recently. They routinely boast of having a "million man army." But if this is true, where are all these troops?
As I detailed previously, as of two weeks ago OC-South, one of Ukraine's major front commands, barely had 10,000 combat-capable troops to push on one of Ukraine's primary strategic objectives and was failing to make any headway against even slight opposition. Ukrainian efforts near Svatovo and in Zaporozhizhe have been similarly feeble, and they are being driven from key fortresses near Donetsk as we speak. Given reports of there being some 25-40,000 troops in "Zapo," it seems as though their front line strength is barely over 100,000 men. This is consistent with them being unable to launch attacks over the company level lately. Contrast this with the huge attacks over the summer and it's clear they've been bled white.
What is taking the Mobilized so long to arrive in the theater of operations?
It is now 2 months since Russian President Vladimir Putin announced partial mobilization in Russia calling up 300,000 from the Reserves to active duty. Whenever Ukraine has announced waves of mobilization almost immediately it seems as though waves of UKR replacements keep coming and coming no matter how many the Russians kill whereas Russian replacements seem to be taking forever to arrive, even though as of a fortnight ago the Russian Ministry of Defense announced 50,000 mobilized are already at the front and a further 80,000 are receiving training in and near the theater of operations. But where are the rest? Why is it taking so long?
Training.
When the VSU drags in men off the streets and sends them into the regular VSU, the territorial defense organization, the nazi battalions, or the National Guard of Ukraine, we know from the Spring when things were dire for Ukraine that men were given 5-10 days refresher training and sent to the front where they promptly died in droves. The VSU brigades that hurled themselves at prepared Russian defenses and massed firepower from late August onwards were VSU formations that had received anywhere from 8 to 12 weeks training, much of it done in NATO countries like the UK that provides 5 week courses to the Ukrainians, when basic training in both Russia and the UK lasts 16 weeks.
The mobilized called up by Russia are all either combat veterans or men who left the Armed Forces 5 years ago or less. Russians however, unlike the UKR it seems, are traumatized by the memories of 1941 and 1942 where men with 12 days training were thrown at the Germans to slow them down and millions died. More recently untrained, ill equipped and unfed Russian soldiers were sent into Chechnya in late 1994 and early 1995 where thousands died. There was no chance to improve things much, if at all, before the Second Chechen War began. The greatest worry, indeed sharp fear of many Russians is that their men will be rushed to the front without training. It is clear that the Russian Ministry of Defense and above them President Putin are determined that this time, that will not happen and the men will receive proper training. Some units have now been in training for eight weeks of refresher training, which for veterans and those recently demobilized from the Armed Forces is more than usual. The soldiers do not just get basic refresher training but practice combined arms warfare so that armor, infantry, artillery, signals, air defense and logistics work together. The mobilized are also getting lessons in how to operate and use drones against the VSU and how to detect and counter VSU drones.
It also means that you can discount any UKR stories of mobilized Russian soldiers being rushed to the front without training. That is the UKR and the West projecting their problems and their sins onto Russia. All the mobilized will arrive at the front when they have received all the training they need. They will all arrive when they are ready and not a minute before.
Alcibiades on the war: November 21st, 2022 - The Aftermath of the Million Man March on Kherson
After the Russians withdrew from their bridgehead across the Dniper in Kherson earlier this month, commentators on both sides were quick to exclaim that the Ukrainians would be able to rapidly shift huge forces freed from the long-stagnant Kherson frontline to other directions and overwhelm the Russians. The opposite actually happened - it was the Russians who quickly shifted some eight brigades elsewhere, while Ukraine is reported to have barely managed to move two as of this writing, on a much shorter line of march.
Now recall that days prior to the official Russian withdrawal, Lloyd Austin was banging the table and demanding Ukraine attack in Kherson, claiming they had the means to conquer it. The Ukrainians obliged, but mounted an effort so feeble that what must have been a skeletal Russian covering force easily drove them back. As of November 9th, Ukraine's army opposite Kherson was unable to advance against any organized opposition and took days and substantial casualties advancing to Kherson against no opposition at all. Now, weeks later, only a handful of forces have been scraped out of it to reinforce Ukrainian troops elsewhere, while the Russians have redeployed an entire corps.
The conclusion from this is clear: Ukraine's Operational Command-South, which once boasted of marching on Kherson with a million men, was destroyed on the Ingulets. The handful of battalions freed are likely the only combat-capable units it could muster to send elsewhere. We may see other OC-S brigades later in this war, but as shadows of their former selves, stuffed with territorial defense conscripts riding on MRAPs and pickup trucks.
Recall my earlier post about the "operational goad," and consider that the Russians may be focusing on destroying the Ukrainian Army first rather than conquering territory upfront.
Alcibiades on the War, November 22nd, 2022: The failure of the Ukrainian People's War
Someone replied to my post yesterday with a defeatist comment that the Ukrainians are drafting men into their army faster than the Russians can kill them, with the implication that the Russian approach to grind the UAF out of existence has failed. It's worth examining this argument closely.
The Ukrainian authorities were very clear prewar that their plan to defeat their technically-superior neighbor relied on mass mobilization to drown the Russians in an avalanche of bodies. There was nothing sophisticated about it. They simply adopted Mao's People's War to the European context and proceeded from there. They have been executing that plan since February 24th, with mass mobilization of reserves and wave after wave of conscription on top of that.
The actual results of this in terms of increasing the end-strength of the UAF have been very unclear. According to Ukrainian agitprop their military was "full" months ago, with no need for additional recruitment... until they ordered new conscription waves recently. They routinely boast of having a "million man army." But if this is true, where are all these troops?
As I detailed previously, as of two weeks ago OC-South, one of Ukraine's major front commands, barely had 10,000 combat-capable troops to push on one of Ukraine's primary strategic objectives and was failing to make any headway against even slight opposition. Ukrainian efforts near Svatovo and in Zaporozhizhe have been similarly feeble, and they are being driven from key fortresses near Donetsk as we speak. Given reports of there being some 25-40,000 troops in "Zapo," it seems as though their front line strength is barely over 100,000 men. This is consistent with them being unable to launch attacks over the company level lately. Contrast this with the huge attacks over the summer and it's clear they've been bled white.
What is taking the Mobilized so long to arrive in the theater of operations?
It is now 2 months since Russian President Vladimir Putin announced partial mobilization in Russia calling up 300,000 from the Reserves to active duty. Whenever Ukraine has announced waves of mobilization almost immediately it seems as though waves of UKR replacements keep coming and coming no matter how many the Russians kill whereas Russian replacements seem to be taking forever to arrive, even though as of a fortnight ago the Russian Ministry of Defense announced 50,000 mobilized are already at the front and a further 80,000 are receiving training in and near the theater of operations. But where are the rest? Why is it taking so long?
Training.
When the VSU drags in men off the streets and sends them into the regular VSU, the territorial defense organization, the nazi battalions, or the National Guard of Ukraine, we know from the Spring when things were dire for Ukraine that men were given 5-10 days refresher training and sent to the front where they promptly died in droves. The VSU brigades that hurled themselves at prepared Russian defenses and massed firepower from late August onwards were VSU formations that had received anywhere from 8 to 12 weeks training, much of it done in NATO countries like the UK that provides 5 week courses to the Ukrainians, when basic training in both Russia and the UK lasts 16 weeks.
The mobilized called up by Russia are all either combat veterans or men who left the Armed Forces 5 years ago or less. Russians however, unlike the UKR it seems, are traumatized by the memories of 1941 and 1942 where men with 12 days training were thrown at the Germans to slow them down and millions died. More recently untrained, ill equipped and unfed Russian soldiers were sent into Chechnya in late 1994 and early 1995 where thousands died. There was no chance to improve things much, if at all, before the Second Chechen War began. The greatest worry, indeed sharp fear of many Russians is that their men will be rushed to the front without training. It is clear that the Russian Ministry of Defense and above them President Putin are determined that this time, that will not happen and the men will receive proper training. Some units have now been in training for eight weeks of refresher training, which for veterans and those recently demobilized from the Armed Forces is more than usual. The soldiers do not just get basic refresher training but practice combined arms warfare so that armor, infantry, artillery, signals, air defense and logistics work together. The mobilized are also getting lessons in how to operate and use drones against the VSU and how to detect and counter VSU drones.
It also means that you can discount any UKR stories of mobilized Russian soldiers being rushed to the front without training. That is the UKR and the West projecting their problems and their sins onto Russia. All the mobilized will arrive at the front when they have received all the training they need. They will all arrive when they are ready and not a minute before.
Kiev, last evening...
MOD EDIT: REMOVED MEDIA LINK TO CRUDE AND USELESS VIDEO OF DRONES DROPPING IEDS ON UNSUSPECTING SOLDIERS. THESE TYPES OF VIDEOS OFFER NOTHING NEW OR OF ANY SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE.
Bakhmut is the penultimate meat grinder. Seems like neither side is having a fun time in the town. Wagner is paying dearly for each inch. One wonders if the town is even a strategic objective at this point or just a meat grinder for both sides.
Its worth noting that there’s no armor to be found, except for the burnt out tank at the beginning of the video. Seems like it’s back to a conventional infantry on infantry brawl, although I wouldn’t want to be on the receiving end of those drones or the relentless artillery.
Bakhmut is the penultimate meat grinder. Seems like neither side is having a fun time in the town. Wagner is paying dearly for each inch. One wonders if the town is even a strategic objective at this point or just a meat grinder for both sides.
Its worth noting that there’s no armor to be found, except for the burnt out tank at the beginning of the video. Seems like it’s back to a conventional infantry on infantry brawl, although I wouldn’t want to be on the receiving end of those drones or the relentless artillery.
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