Not to downplay Russia's recent advances, but the way I see it is them achieving the bare minimum given Russia's available military resources.
It might be the opposite: the
maximum of what they can achieve. Russia is constrained by the shortage of the most important military resource - the ability to plan and execute the effective use of all the other resources.
When your "brain" is capable then you can adapt and make up for other weaknesses - much like Israel was able to do early on. When it isn't it doesn't matter how big or strong the rest of the body is. Russian military is brain-dead on a level that makes NATO look like the reincarnation of Einstein. The only question is how much of it is endemic to the military establishment itself and how much of it is caused by political structures outside of the military.
For me the best evidence is
no combined assault at the Dniester estuary.
There were multiple missile strikes against the bridge in Zatoka but despite capturing Snake Island Russia didn't execute the logical next step. It would open a second front toward Odessa, open direct sea connection to Transnistria, put pressure on Moldova and cut off transit from Romania. When you look at the map the area is ridiculously defensible and causes so many disruptions that it is a crime that nobody had plans for the operation prepared in advance.
I mean... just look at this. As long as you have the means to put a perimeter along the Dniester your back is against a neutral third party. You capture the western part of the bay and set up a base of operations there and sit tight.
The two yellow dots indicate the only two passages across Dniester. The red area is the maximum necessary to completely isolate the Budjak from the sea ensuring protection for Snake Island and beachhead for further advancement as well as the area necessary to connect to Transnistria by sea and road.
What's worse I made a quick calculation of the available transport capacity in the amphibious fleet that was deployed in the Black Sea and it was sufficient for 1 or 2 BTGs depending on composition in a single trip. Augmented by helicopter and paratrooper assault delivering another 1-2BTGs it would be sufficient to hold the ground until reinforcements were transported. Yes, this is precisely the kind of scenario where having paratroopers would be an advantage and it would be glorious because they really would be used as paratroopers to capture the land.
If it was done in the first day of the invasion the air force would have full control of the skies and the navy could be used to full capacity without much opposition. By day 3 the control of the area would be firmly established and Odessa would be threatened directly even without Mikolaiyv being captured.
But that's just the military part and war is just politics with other means.
This is the ethnic composition of the region:
When you compare Russian majority areas and the areas I marked as red a lot overlaps. The rest is ground for intelligence preparing riots, insurgent and separatist groups. Budjak has the means to sustain itself as a politically independent region because of sea access and the ability to mediate transit between Moldova and Transnistria. It's also a non-Ukrainian majority region and one that mostly voted for opposition parties. This is not an overtly pro-Russia region like Crimea or Donbas but it is not overtly pro-Kiyv so it can be done... if done competently.
All the forces that were wasted capturing the western bank of Dnepr for nothing could be put to good use in Budjak.
There are other less obvious examples but this one is my favourite because it lays bare the sheer incompetence of Russian military planning and lack of coherent strategy of escalation. It is so obvious and so potent that lack of any attempt to capture it is the equivalent of Ukraine not creating a defensive buffer along the border with Crimea which caused the collapse of the southern front in the first days of the invasion, and loss of Mariupol as a result.
It would obviously also help if Russia actually planned for such operations and developed its force structure toward such mission. The 31st Air Assault Brigade from Ulyanovsk experimented with their own aviation. There should be a similar unit in Crimea serving as a vanguard for further VDV deployment. Similarly the 810th Marine Infantry Brigade shouldn't be a mechanized formation primarily but one that specializes in riverine warfare and small unit tactics.
Instead their genius plan was to capture Kiyv by landing at Hostomel (home of one of the few heavy rapid reaction units of the Ukrainian National Guard no less!) It wasn't a "daring raid". It was "damn retarded". And marine infantry was used to help with the capture Berdyansk and then kept fighting deep inland. Because apparently that's what
marines should do -
fight in the deserts of Iraq and in the mountains of Afghtanistan.
Anyway, the real action will happen when Russia will begin their big offensive operation, that's when we can say if they are really succeeding or not
You mean... this big offensive operation?
Rule of thumb is one vehicle/system temporarily lost to wear for every one vehicle/system lost to combat.
Add about 50 lost helicopters and another 50+ combat aircraft. Double it for wear. Current "high combat tension" sortie rate is 150 per day. It's been six months since there has been any serious VKS activity on the front. They're flying CAP with R-37s within their own airspace
against a country with no air force.
To compare: Ukraine has received almost 2,5 thousand wheeled IMVs and APCs which are not much worse than BMP-1/2 as far as protection goes. The calculus starts to look strangely fair and balanced.
The only other big offensive operation that is coming is the good old human wave "
Urraaaaa! Vpyer'yod! Za rodinu i bat'ka Stalina Putina!".
Oh wait. They're already doing that, aren't they?
I've studied many military conflicts over the years but this one absolutely takes the top as being the most grotesquely surreal and counter-logical and just downright confusing in terms of how absurdly hilarious it is when it should have no right to be. At this point I'm watching it with morbid curiosity as if it was roadkill that still twitches and makes funny noises and just refuses to die.
Russia Stronk'ers are the military equivalent of flat-earthers or Wehraboos so their presence in this thread turned it into a useless waste of time. But Russia was still fully capable of capturing all of the coast, the land bridge to crimea and some of the eastern part of the country. Whether it made strategic sense (it didn't) is another question but militarily they could do it
if they prepared for it. Wars are won by whoever is better prepared. But to prepare you need to have a brain to develop a plan. Whatever is the equivalent of the brain in Russian military wasn't working. I think this is why their army is moving in Ukraine like an army of zombies.
They want
braaaaaaiiiiins.
If so then seriously they invaded the wrong country for that. What a clusterf...
Their sorties have been overwhelmingly ineffective. I say this with a fair deal of knowledge on VKS employment during the conflict.
They've performed adequately in a counter-air capacity, and their use of AEA has been broadly competent, but they have utterly failed to conduct an impactful, successful strike warfare campaign at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
Have something interesting to share? Can be PM if you don't want to make a mess out of it in this thread. Doesn't have to violate any rules. I have my own ins for that. Just interested in observations.