Taiwan Military News, Reports, Data, etc.


zgx09t

Junior Member
Registered Member
Taiwan was never in its history governed by the CCP, nor has the CCP ever held any sovereignty over that territory. A quick review of history shows that the first government on the island was established by the Dutch (who ousted the Spanish from their colony in the north), who were subsequently ejected by Koxinga, whose descendants in turn were defeated and the island annexed by the Qing, who in turn ceded the island to the Japanese, who in turn relinquished their sovereignity of the island in the Treaty of Taipei, wherein "Japan renounced all claim to them [Taiwan and the Penghu Islands] without specifying to what country they were to be surrendered". Since then, ROC has exercised sovereignty over the island.
That's a rather obtuse, crass and mendacious statement. 1992 Consensus laid out that both sides of Taiwan strait recognize there is only one "China": both mainland China and Taiwan belong to the same China, though each side can interpret their own presentation of what one China means. UN, including the four other veto powers, recognize PRC as legitimate ruler of China, based on one China principle, which , given the still ongoing Chinese civil war, is to be understood as there may be two governments, but only one China.
Western powers have long meddled in China's internal affairs and still would like to have China weak and divided. Thus, the poisonous words of treason spread far and wide in MSM. Those rather dull minds like the perfect specimen quoted in above preclude the delicate and yet complex historical perspectives, instead falling back on boiler plate cliche thus clearly showing the lack of precise and refined understanding of the matter they foolishly try to comment on.
 

Brumby

Major
Early to mid course, the BVR missile has yet to select a target, as the homing system is yet to be activated. You want to bring the missile as close to the target as possible before opening up the homing system. That would give the target the least amount of time to react and with it the highest potential percentage of kill. Remember the target's RWR is going to look for the missile's CW illumination, and this waveform is easily distinguished from pulse frequency that search radars use. If the missile goes autonomous early with its homing illumination, the target gets warned early by the RWR and can take appropriate actions.

Midcourse corrections is guiding the missile to the spot where it can be best go terminal and homing. Even if the missile itself has not selected the target, the fire control radar on the fighter already did and is trying to bring the missile close enough to the intended target before lighting the seeker.
A BVR launch implies that an initial targeting solution has been found. The process getting to the initial targeting solution is the contentious point because the context of the conversation is about the PL-15's ability to engage at a distance of 200 kms. You need a corresponding radar that offers that range capability. So far no one is able to come up with "how" besides the notion of using AWACs (which is a separate conversation altogether). The most recent widescale air to air combat was the first Gulf war. On average BVR detection was at 70 kms and kills were at 20 kms with a Pk of 54 %..(Source Air to air trend CSBA) .

The F-16V will not sit idle to let a lock on without corresponding ECM being automatically deployed. Its AN/ALQ-211 will pick up the emission and that a radar lock is attempted based on the nature of the waveform when mapped against its EID threat library. The An/ALQ-211 is a fully integrated RWR and DRFM jammer with wideband tracking. It has the capability of not only able to identify the nature of the threat emission but also the ability to geolocate its source.

Typically it requires 7 to 10 dB more jamming power to break the lock of a tracking radar than to prevent a radar lock (Source: Journal of Electronic Defense January 2018). As I mentioned in a previous post, distance is to the jammer's advantage based on radar equation. I therefore question the whole notion of an effective launch at such a distance when considering ECM being in play and historical data.

Once the distance closes (whatever that might be), the PL-15 launch platform is at risk because its position is already exposed and itself is likely subject to a similar radar lock. In the example associated with a launch with mid course update, that can only happen if a lock can be maintained when the launch platform itself is subject to a threat requiring maneuver. That is a big if. The towed decoy is a terminal defense activation when the on board self protection probably failed to break the lock. Studies and history has demonstrated that it is effective as a terminal defense.

The idea that there is an incoming missile launched from the type of distance under discussion and somehow the target is actively tracked but unaware is just not supported by the capabilities of digital RWR in modern ECM systems.
 
A BVR launch implies that an initial targeting solution has been found. The process getting to the initial targeting solution is the contentious point because the context of the conversation is about the PL-15's ability to engage at a distance of 200 kms. You need a corresponding radar that offers that range capability. So far no one is able to come up with "how" besides the notion of using AWACs (which is a separate conversation altogether). The most recent widescale air to air combat was the first Gulf war. On average BVR detection was at 70 kms and kills were at 20 kms with a Pk of 54 %..(Source Air to air trend CSBA) .

The F-16V will not sit idle to let a lock on without corresponding ECM being automatically deployed. Its AN/ALQ-211 will pick up the emission and that a radar lock is attempted based on the nature of the waveform when mapped against its EID threat library. The An/ALQ-211 is a fully integrated RWR and DRFM jammer with wideband tracking. It has the capability of not only able to identify the nature of the threat emission but also the ability to geolocate its source.

Typically it requires 7 to 10 dB more jamming power to break the lock of a tracking radar than to prevent a radar lock (Source: Journal of Electronic Defense January 2018). As I mentioned in a previous post, distance is to the jammer's advantage based on radar equation. I therefore question the whole notion of an effective launch at such a distance when considering ECM being in play and historical data.

Once the distance closes (whatever that might be), the PL-15 launch platform is at risk because its position is already exposed and itself is likely subject to a similar radar lock. In the example associated with a launch with mid course update, that can only happen if a lock can be maintained when the launch platform itself is subject to a threat requiring maneuver. That is a big if. The towed decoy is a terminal defense activation when the on board self protection probably failed to break the lock. Studies and history has demonstrated that it is effective as a terminal defense.

The idea that there is an incoming missile launched from the type of distance under discussion and somehow the target is actively tracked but unaware is just not supported by the capabilities of digital RWR in modern ECM systems.
LOL The bold part is an incredibly sad and lazy attempt to try to discredit AWACs, which are an integrate part of any conversation involving aerial combat.

Secondly, what do numbers from the Gulf War have to do with anything modern??

Third, you are trying to write walls of text and pointless math to obscure a very simple picture: F-16V has AIM-120D (in your scenario), its RCS, and its ECM while J-10B/C, J-16, etc... have PL-15, their RCS, their ECM. (A towed decoy is just ECM on a rope, and unlike China's ECM pods on the wings, they severely limit aircraft's ability to maneuver.) There are a LOTTTTTTT more of the latter than there are the former (if any of the former are able to get airborne at all). As per your original claim, where in this scenario can you see an advantage for an F-16V?

Imaginary statements like, "F-16V has this radar... we don't know its performance or that of the J-10C radar... so the F-16 one's probably better," don't count as reasoning LOL
 
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Tam

Major
Registered Member
A BVR launch implies that an initial targeting solution has been found. The process getting to the initial targeting solution is the contentious point because the context of the conversation is about the PL-15's ability to engage at a distance of 200 kms. You need a corresponding radar that offers that range capability. So far no one is able to come up with "how" besides the notion of using AWACs (which is a separate conversation altogether). The most recent widescale air to air combat was the first Gulf war. On average BVR detection was at 70 kms and kills were at 20 kms with a Pk of 54 %..(Source Air to air trend CSBA) .
Yes but that is long ago, generations of radars and electronics have moved on.

The F-16V will not sit idle to let a lock on without corresponding ECM being automatically deployed. Its AN/ALQ-211 will pick up the emission and that a radar lock is attempted based on the nature of the waveform when mapped against its EID threat library. The An/ALQ-211 is a fully integrated RWR and DRFM jammer with wideband tracking. It has the capability of not only able to identify the nature of the threat emission but also the ability to geolocate its source.
This is typical, and not exclusively special, of any ESM/ECM from ship to planes.

Typically it requires 7 to 10 dB more jamming power to break the lock of a tracking radar than to prevent a radar lock (Source: Journal of Electronic Defense January 2018). As I mentioned in a previous post, distance is to the jammer's advantage based on radar equation. I therefore question the whole notion of an effective launch at such a distance when considering ECM being in play and historical data.
Except here, if jammed the AAM can switch to a HOE (Home on Emissions) mode and lock into the jammer itself.

Please don't mistake that a tracking radar requires a lock to launch a BVR missile other than a SARH type. You only need a "weapons quality track" and the actual lock is done by the missile. Since this is done over a distance, the jamming signal may not be strong enough against the original or home tracking radar, and even then the tracking radar has its own ECCM measures to reject the jamming or spoofing signals.


Once the distance closes (whatever that might be), the PL-15 launch platform is at risk because its position is already exposed and itself is likely subject to a similar radar lock. In the example associated with a launch with mid course update, that can only happen if a lock can be maintained when the launch platform itself is subject to a threat requiring maneuver. That is a big if. The towed decoy is a terminal defense activation when the on board self protection probably failed to break the lock. Studies and history has demonstrated that it is effective as a terminal defense.

The idea that there is an incoming missile launched from the type of distance under discussion and somehow the target is actively tracked but unaware is just not supported by the capabilities of digital RWR in modern ECM systems.

The target is aware that it is being tracked and scanned under an enemy radar under TWS (Track While Scan). But Track While Scan is used in all search radars to do track and scan at the same time --- even without firing anything. In fact the majority of the time TWS does isn't firing anything. So how are you going to tell from all the TWS going on which one hasn't and which one has already launched a BVR missile? Furthermore, what happens if the TWS is being done in LPI conditions? So at best, the target knows he is being scanned and tracked, but he is not sure if an ARH missile is fired. If LPI is used, he may not be aware that he is being tracked and scanned as the scanning signal may resemble clutter, which radar systems will filter out.

Of course, this works both ways.

I am not sure what you mean if the PL-15 launch platform is already exposed given that TWS can be conducted a good distance away. In case if the missile loses updates, a BVR missile would continue based on the coordinates from its most recent update, and until it is updated again. If there are no updates it will reach those coordinates and the seeker turns active to hunt for any target including friendlies within its catch basket.
 
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Tam

Major
Registered Member
LOL The bold part is an incredibly sad and lazy attempt to try to discredit AWACs, which are an integrate part of any conversation involving aerial combat.

Secondly, what do numbers from the Gulf War have to do with anything modern??

Third, you are trying to write walls of text and pointless math to obscure a very simple picture: F-16V has AIM-120D (in your scenario), its RCS, and its ECM while J-10B/C, J-16, etc... have PL-15, their RCS, their ECM. (A towed decoy is just ECM on a rope, and unlike China's ECM pods on the wings, they severely limit aircraft's ability to maneuver.) There are a LOTTTTTTT more of the latter than there are the former (if any of the former are able to get airborne at all). As per your original claim, where in this scenario can you see an advantage for an F-16V?

Imaginary statements like, "F-16V has this radar... we don't know its performance or that of the J-10C radar... so the F-16 one's probably better," don't count as reasoning LOL

If a plane has two ECM pods each on two separate wings, rather than one in the centerline, chances are it is also using cross eye jamming.
 
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Page xviii
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thanks though yesterday I couldn't wait and found it using google, as I guessed that part should concern my favorite topic which is attrition warfare

a sampler:
Feb 18, 2019
here's the simulation

(just
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with attrition coefficients based on
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF US FIGHTER FORCE REDUCTIONS:
AIR-TO-AIR COMBAT MODELING USING LANCHESTER EQUATIONS
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from 2011, now:
3.3 for "F-35" (as was for the Raptor against the Flanker in there, Table 4)
and 0.7 for "4 Gen" (was 0.8 for the Flanker against the Raptor in there, Table 4);
there's like background in the thread which is gone
Mathematical model of air-to-air combat and loses https://www.sinodefenceforum.com/mathematical-model-of-air-to-air-combat-and-loses.t6641/
):



in the final time-point the solver says
4.6847 "F-35s" which means four remaining out of the initial 12,
and 0.7774 "4 Gen" which means none remaining out of the initial 24

so? so some other model (or "model") was in play at Red Flag 17-1, I guess
 
The link to the RAND report.
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The report basically outlines different options in which Taiwan should invest in their air defense to extract maximum effectiveness.

Relevant piece of the summary :


The argument boils down to individual interpretation of the report and what it means relative to respective choice of narrative.
thanks; I was interested in the problem of attrition of that specific force structure
 
thanks though yesterday I couldn't wait and found it using google, as I guessed that part should concern my favorite topic which is attrition warfare

a sampler:
Feb 18, 2019
I don't know how they calculated the 2-4 week number or how they calculated strict jet-to-jet combat losses but they specifically said that was a scenario of only jets, nothing else, especially no saturation missile strike and that's the whole point.
 
I don't know how they calculated the 2-4 week number or how they calculated strict jet-to-jet combat losses but they specifically said that was a scenario of only jets, nothing else, especially no saturation missile strike and that's the whole point.
yeah it's two separate issues, 16 minutes ago I didn't mix attrition (which here means engagements in the air, and they basically assume probabilities of engagements' outcomes and propagate engagements in time) with availability of aircraft or nothing
 

Max Demian

Junior Member
Registered Member
That's a rather obtuse, crass and mendacious statement. 1992 Consensus laid out that both sides of Taiwan strait recognize there is only one "China": both mainland China and Taiwan belong to the same China, though each side can interpret their own presentation of what one China means. UN, including the four other veto powers, recognize PRC as legitimate ruler of China, based on one China principle, which , given the still ongoing Chinese civil war, is to be understood as there may be two governments, but only one China.
Western powers have long meddled in China's internal affairs and still would like to have China weak and divided. Thus, the poisonous words of treason spread far and wide in MSM. Those rather dull minds like the perfect specimen quoted in above preclude the delicate and yet complex historical perspectives, instead falling back on boiler plate cliche thus clearly showing the lack of precise and refined understanding of the matter they foolishly try to comment on.
Which part of the history that I summarized is mendacious? All I see is an inability to face up to the historical facts so you had to resort to ad-hominem attacks instead.

The only piece of history that you brought up, was the alleged 1992 consensus. Unfortunately for your argument, the DPP has continuously since 1992 denied the existence of such a consensus, and has reiterated that position as early as this year:
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That you believe how a few semi-official representatives were actually representing the whole of ROC in a shadowy meeting and achieved a "consensus", while at the same time the president of ROC Lee Teng-Hui made a firm rebuttal of any consensus being reached, is demonstrating a complete lack of refined and precise understanding of how democracies operate.
 

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