not sure about the F-35 "bang",
not sure about the F-35 "buck"
no way they can even cough up the cash anyways.
The F-35B is still well north of $100 million, and then a first time buyer would have to pay a bunch of costs for support equipment, spare parts and training, which is going to kick the price well north of $200 million per airframe.With South Korea and Japan flying F-35A's, if Taiwan were to be able to purchase F-35A's, that would provide all those operators with inter-operability as the F-35's would be information vacuums, and could even "talk" to each other.
As Mr. Brumby has well stated, we likely would not do that in order to remain on good terms with the Chinese, and in fact Taiwan has NOT asked for the F-35, they have asked for NEW F-16's. The F-35 would be tactically a much more effective tool for defending Taiwan, and allow them to maintain air superiority against a much more numerous foe, so that's your "BANG"...
The F-35 coming down to around 80 million for initial purchase, would put it solidly in the high end 4 Gen market, that's making the best of your bucks....
So while this will likely never happen, its always an option if things were to go South?
Past US presidents have delt with China using Taiwan's F-16 purchase as a bargaining chip. Well Taiwan is way past the point they should be waiting for these airplanes.
The F-35B is still well north of $100 million, and then a first time buyer would have to pay a bunch of costs for support equipment, spare parts and training, which is going to kick the price well north of $200 million per airframe.
The Chinese military is reorganizing its land forces, but its moves do not increase its ability to mount a large-scale beach assault across the Taiwan Strait, according to a new Department of Defense report.
Taiwan is the primary focus of amphibious assault and sea-based missile launch capability improvements made in 2018 by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the PLA Navy and PLA Marine Corps, according to the
“Taiwan persistently remains the PLA’s main ‘strategic direction,’ one of the geographic areas the leadership identifies as having strategic importance,” the report states.
The Chinese communist party seeks to diplomatically isolate Taiwan by stripping it of its diplomatic allies, by meddling in democratic elections and by applying economic pressure through redirecting tourism and financial development away from the island, Randall Shriver, assistant secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Affairs, said during a Friday media briefing about the report.
“China has never renounced the use of military force and continues to conduct military exercises,” Shriver said.
However, China does not appear to be currently investing in the equipment likely required for a direct assault on Taiwan, such as large amphibious assault ships and medium landing craft necessary for a large beach assault, according to the report. The bulk of China’s recently created marine corps forces currently lack proper equipment or operational training.
“There is also no indication China is significantly expanding its landing ship force at this time – suggesting a direct beach-assault operation requiring extensive lift is less likely in planning,” the report states.
Instead, China’s recent spate of military exercises and the PLA Navy’s focus on building large aircraft carriers, escort cruisers and amphibious transport dock (LPD) ships suggest the military, for now, is geared toward blue water naval operations and smaller expeditionary missions.
In 2018, the PLA Navy had five operational large Yuzhao-class (Type-071) amphibious transport docks, and three more were either under construction or being outfitted, according to the report. The first Rehnai-class guided-missile cruiser is expected to become operational later this year, carrying an array of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, Shriver said.
“This cruiser class will be China’s premier carrier escort for blue water operations, carrying an array of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles,” Shriver said.
Meanwhile, the U.S. is monitoring China’s development of submarines capable of carrying ballistic missiles, Shriver said. China already can deliver ballistic missiles via ground-based launchers and from aircraft. Shriver wouldn’t say that China’s submarines now give the nation a nuclear triad. However, “they’re working toward having capable delivery systems in those three domains.”
The report also highlighted China’s increased interest in Arctic operations. China is building a new series of patrol boats designed to operate in the Arctic and has launched its second heavy icebreaker in 2018. Beijing maintains research stations in Iceland and Norway, according to the report.
“The report finds China continues to deploy tactics designed to fall short of armed conflicts and accomplish its objects and goals along its periphery in a so-called grey zone approach,” Shriver said.
A week ago, Senior Col. Ren Guoqiang, a spokesman for China’s Ministry of National Defense, discussed China’s activities in the South China Sea during a press briefing.
“China sticks to the path of peaceful development and adheres to a defense policy that is defensive in nature,” he said, according to an English translation of the briefing’s transcript released by the Ministry of National Defense.
“China will always be a builder of world peace, a contributor of world development and a protector of international order. We hope that some U.S. officials can see China and the PLA rationally and objectively, focus on the implementation of the consensuses reached between the two heads of state to develop bilateral and mil-to-mil relationship, and on maintaining global and regional peace and stability. This is what a responsible and faithful big country should do.”
In the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, Shriver said much of China’s activities are designed to expand its influence over the region through military exercises, sea patrols and the placing of anti-ship missiles and jamming technology on islands in the region, Shriver said.
“I think those steps at militarizing those outposts are designed with a certain aim, and they seek to operationalize an illegal expansive sovereignty claim, basically inside the nine-dash line or the entire South China Sea,” Shriver said. “So, what we do about it is fly, sail, operate where international law allows. We’re increasingly joined by other countries, making that investment that the Chinese have made as insignificant as possible, particularly where their core goal is aimed at.”
“The effect is the fundamental nature of the South China Sea hasn’t changed,” Shriver said. “China has changed some facts on the ground with respect to the land reclamation and the infrastructure on these outposts, but the effect that the Chinese seek, which is operationalizing this illegal expansive sovereignty claim, has not been achieved.”
China is improving and increasing its options for a possible future invasion of Taiwan, with military reforms and investments in multi-domain military capabilities offering a range of options to defeat the self-governing island, according to a Pentagon report.
These options range from an air and sea blockade of Taiwan to a full-scale invasion, although the latter option would require a significant increase in the number of amphibious ships, according to the latest annual China Military Power Report released Thursday by the Department of Defense.
Nevertheless, the report cautioned that the People’s Liberation Army or PLA’s efforts to convert the bulk of its maneuver units to combined arms brigades, “should eventually create more capable, modular brigades and battalions,” while the “expansion of army aviation and the creation of two new air assault brigades also provides more attack, air assault and close air support options for a Taiwan invasion.”
China’s PLA has also made efforts to improve its ability to insert forces by air, by restructuring its airborne corps and establishing air assault units, which would be charged with aerial insertion and seizing key terrain. This restructure saw it reorganizing its previous units into airborne infantry brigades, a special operations brigade, an aviation brigade, and a support brigade, with the corps conducting training exercises in 2018 that involved long-range raid and airborne operations based on actual war plans.
The service has also established a joint logistics support force in late 2016, with the primary goal of supporting a strategic campaign such as a Taiwan invasion. This would be accomplished through command and control of joint logistics, delivering of materiel, and managing various civil-military integration support mechanisms. It’s strategic support force would then be responsible for the use of electronic warfare and cyber operations during a Taiwan contingency, by “seizing and maintaining battlefield information control in contemporary informatized warfare.”
The report added that the PLA is likely still exploring how to reform its joint command processes to integrate information operations and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities more fully at the theater-level, but noted that the structural reforms have removed the biggest barriers to integrating these strategic capabilities.
Nonetheless, the report raises questions about China’s current ability to conduct a full-scale invasion. Despite advances in the
The preparedness of the recently expanded PLA Marine Corps was also in doubt, with exercises rarely going beyond battalion level events, and its newly raised brigades yet to receive “their full complement of required equipment and not fully mission capable.” As a consequence, the report noted that the scope of training for these units was “rudimentary and the new brigades remain unequipped to perform amphibious assault operations," concluding that an invasion of Taiwan, besides being fraught with significant political risk, “would likely strain China’s armed forces.”
Dream on. Whenever the US met China in Asia, the loser has always been the US. It lost in North Korea and it lost in Vietnam, when the balance was much more in favor of America. In ROC, it won't even dare fight. It won't meet Russia in Ukraine or Georgia, it won't meet China in the South China Sea, and it won't meet China over the ROC. You know what strategic ambiguity means? It means bluffing. America's attack submarines are gonna sail in circles to protest just like its destroyers.that's gonna be a "loser" for China, all this talk is good to remind everyone involved that you better be ready, and to remind the US that we better keep our attack submarine fleet West Coast based and "ramped up"....
That has to be our first line of defense against any naval invasion...