South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)

Blitzo

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I think it would also require China to shift its position of not negotiating individually. The other would be how to address the sovereignty issue, whether as condition precedent, subsequent or non conditional.

I think China would probably be willing to discuss the terms of any joint patrol and the joint use of the new airbases in a multilateral manner, but I think it would not negotiate on the actual issues of sovereignty itself as part of the negotiations regarding the operations itself. That is, China would try to separate issues of sovereignty from the negotiation of how to conduct joint patrols and use of the airbases.

Of course, that means only certain nations more willing to tolerate China's sovereignty claims in certain parts would be more likely to participate in such an effort in the first place.

In a way, it is asking nations whether they'd be willing to not raise the issue of the new islands too much in return for being on better terms with China and having more ways of reducing tensions via joint patrols (and also reducing China's likelihood of militarizing the islands against those nations), versus those nations who are unwilling to remain silent on China's new islands and the overall territorial disputes in SCS and would be more willing to risk a conflict with China in the region.
 

Brumby

Major
I think China would probably be willing to discuss the terms of any joint patrol and the joint use of the new airbases in a multilateral manner, but I think it would not negotiate on the actual issues of sovereignty itself as part of the negotiations regarding the operations itself. That is, China would try to separate issues of sovereignty from the negotiation of how to conduct joint patrols and use of the airbases.

Of course, that means only certain nations more willing to tolerate China's sovereignty claims in certain parts would be more likely to participate in such an effort in the first place.

In a way, it is asking nations whether they'd be willing to not raise the issue of the new islands too much in return for being on better terms with China and having more ways of reducing tensions via joint patrols (and also reducing China's likelihood of militarizing the islands against those nations), versus those nations who are unwilling to remain silent on China's new islands and the overall territorial disputes in SCS and would be more willing to risk a conflict with China in the region.

I think the decoupling part is the road block and hence any solution has to be able to address the background issue of sovereignty. That would probably require a series of steps. I think step one requires some form of de-escalation and in my mind means China needs to stop the reclamation and island building activities because it is the source of the tensions. The second step is to determine a framework in which the joint programs would be undergirded i.e. the basis of such relationships. The third step would be to execute the agreed confidence building programs and all parties to refrain from pursuing the sovereignty issue for a defined period.
 

Blitzo

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I think the decoupling part is the road block and hence any solution has to be able to address the background issue of sovereignty. That would probably require a series of steps. I think step one requires some form of de-escalation and in my mind means China needs to stop the reclamation and island building activities because it is the source of the tensions. The second step is to determine a framework in which the joint programs would be undergirded i.e. the basis of such relationships. The third step would be to execute the agreed confidence building programs and all parties to refrain from pursuing the sovereignty issue for a defined period.

I imagine China would likely propose any use of the airbases after the reclamation and island building is completed, rather than before.
 

Brumby

Major
I imagine China would likely propose any use of the airbases after the reclamation and island building is completed, rather than before.
The details obviously have to be worked out and would not be easy. However broad agreement on principles and the structure of the relationship would have to precede it or else it would be girded on air.
 

Blitzo

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The details obviously have to be worked out and would not be easy. However broad agreement on principles and the structure of the relationship would have to precede it or else it would be girded on air.

Yes, but I can't imagine China would be willing to suspend island reclaimation and the construction of its airbases prior to beginning talks or as a prerequisite for talks occurring.

I think China would optimally like to finish its island building and finish construction of the facilities, then use those facilities in a joint way, with the understanding that they could be militarized if the situation demanded it but that China is choosing not to militarize them.
 

Brumby

Major
Yes, but I can't imagine China would be willing to suspend island reclaimation and the construction of its airbases prior to beginning talks or as a prerequisite for talks occurring.

I think China would optimally like to finish its island building and finish construction of the facilities, then use those facilities in a joint way, with the understanding that they could be militarized if the situation demanded it but that China is choosing not to militarize them.

The problem is depleted trust and goodwill, perception and lack of transparency. When a Chinese official said the reclamation has stopped during the Singapore security conference and challenged anyone to take a flight to seek satisfaction, it doesn't help to see continuing building activities and planes being warded off. It doesn't equate word with deed and that depletes credibility. The Asean/China code of conduct has been dragged for years without any tangible progress. The man made islands are like fortresses.

When I said the building and reclamation has to stop to de-escalate it is not simply a literal action but a set of collective steps on China's part. It means China being more transparent with what is going on with the building activities, sharing details and end point. Open up the facilities so that the Asean officials can actually tour it. Uncertainty breeds insecurity.
 

Blitzo

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The problem is depleted trust and goodwill, perception and lack of transparency. When a Chinese official said the reclamation has stopped during the Singapore security conference and challenged anyone to take a flight to seek satisfaction, it doesn't help to see continuing building activities and planes being warded off. It doesn't equate word with deed and that depletes credibility. The Asean/China code of conduct has been dragged for years without any tangible progress. The man made islands are like fortresses.

When I said the building and reclamation has to stop to de-escalate it is not simply a literal action but a set of collective steps on China's part. It means China being more transparent with what is going on with the building activities, sharing details and end point. Open up the facilities so that the Asean officials can actually tour it. Uncertainty breeds insecurity.

Er, what you're saying doesn't really disagree with any of what I said, the only difference is that I believe what you're proposing would probably only occur after China has completed its construction activities.
 

Brumby

Major
Er, what you're saying doesn't really disagree with any of what I said, the only difference is that I believe what you're proposing would probably only occur after China has completed its construction activities.

Not necessary as all the collective steps I mentioned are independent of completion.
 

Blitzo

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Not necessary as all the collective steps I mentioned are independent of completion.

Yes, I'm saying that China would probably not undertake those steps until completion has occurred.
 

Jeff Head

General
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So when is the much talked about USN SCS panda patrol going to happen? What's taking so long?
The US Navy already has made two patrols in the South China Sea specifically oriented towards the recalamtion islands.

One with a single LCS, the second with a Burke class (the Lssen) and a LCS (the Ft. Worth). That was in July.

Lassen-FtWorth-SCS-01.jpg

See:

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When speaking of that patrol, the US Navy said:

US Navy said:
Our presence demonstrates the U.S Navy's commitment to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and emphasizes our ability to conduct maritime operations freely on the high seas, for US Navy ships to provide persistent presence that contributes to maritime stability throughout the region.

The next one will probably be directed at picking one of the islands to sail within 12 miles of.

There's no hurry...they have already been there twice in the last six months...and the US certainly does not need others to do this.

As to the upcoming patrol, the US Navy has also stated the US position clearly:

US Navy said:
The United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as we do around the world, and the South China Sea will not be an exception. We will do that in the time and places of our choosing.
 
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