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Turkey was a level 3 f35 partner since long.
They also knew s400 was squarely designed to be effective against LO targets. Also, even before any s400 deal, US without specific direction indicated that any partner that buys s400 would be excluded from f35 program.
Yet turkey decided to buy a couple regiments anyways. I was just curious, if they knew they were going to be excluded from the program over s400 and were in bed with russians to reveal some tech regarding f35, they could've just waited 24 months to order s400. Its not like the russians wouldn't want to supply them the system just because they had f35 operational.
Anyways, i'm not going to push this any further because i don't know where i went counter factual.
I think by "counter factual" Brumby meant
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anyway about one year (?) ago the speculation was Turkey had used the S-400 negotiations as an attempt to trim the price of the Patriots (I might even post this speculation, but it's a moot point now LOL so I won't start looking for a link; somebody either made it up or was wrong)
 
and in the meantime:
EDipDF_WsAAujRn


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Brumby

Major
for example cutting off an F-35 coating and calling Moscow and/or Beijing well had it happened, it would've been a total misuse of the gear and treacherous behavior, I guess the StateDept and White House would've handled it first: full trade-embargo, breaking diplomatic relations, leaving Incirlik ASAP

The F-35 is an electronics platform. Turkey already had plenty of access to its capabilities and so if it chose to share some of its secrets with Russia I think the damage can be considerable. The main piece that comes to mind is the information contained in the threat data library whereby essentially all the known electronic signals that the US, its allies and its adversaries are stored. I wonder how much of those classified data Turkey had managed to siphon off before they got booted out.
 
D

Deleted member 13312

Guest
US congress bans F-22 export because of technological sensitivity, yet the F-35 was specifically designed to be exported (ie: does not contain sensitive tech) but we are to believe that any leaks would be damaging. Maybe not put all eggs into one basket next time ?
Sometimes the world is so funny.
 
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The F-35 is an electronics platform. Turkey already had plenty of access to its capabilities and so if it chose to share some of its secrets with Russia I think the damage can be considerable. The main piece that comes to mind is the information contained in the threat data library whereby essentially all the known electronic signals that the US, its allies and its adversaries are stored. I wonder how much of those classified data Turkey had managed to siphon off before they got booted out.
well ГРУ, f it could, would look into F-35 mission data files to check how accurate/erratic/whatever they are,

but Russians/Chinese wouldn't be interested in F-35 software which is so buggy that even the Pentagon can't manage May 4, 2019
Fixing The F-35?
part of (dated May 03, 2019)
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:

it's
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Mar 1, 2019
;

Russians/Chinese though would be interested to see what are the F-35 signature-reduction materials, to confirm/deny what they've learned by espionage so far

There Are Things Even Google Can't Find
 

Anlsvrthng

Captain
Registered Member
;

Russians/Chinese though would be interested to see what are the F-35 signature-reduction materials, to confirm/deny what they've learned by espionage so far

There Are Things Even Google Can't Find

More interesting should be the towed decoy and its signature shape / delay / ratio.

The second interesting is the sensors and warning stuff.

The shaping is public, it takes only computer simulation time and sweat in the front of the PC to construct everything else.
 

Brumby

Major
well ГРУ, f it could, would look into F-35 mission data files to check how accurate/erratic/whatever they are,

but Russians/Chinese wouldn't be interested in F-35 software which is so buggy that even the Pentagon can't manage May 4, 2019
;

Russians/Chinese though would be interested to see what are the F-35 signature-reduction materials, to confirm/deny what they've learned by espionage so far

There Are Things Even Google Can't Find

I am afraid I don't think you understand what I am referring to regarding threat data library. Threat data library is standard provision in all electronic support systems. It is a storage of all known electronic signals that enable RWR/ESM to identify classify and make determination on the nature of threats. Essentially you cannot operate EW/ECM without such data. Typically each country operating their own aircraft is responsible for gathering such electronic signals through their own ELINT/SIGINT platforms. In the case of the F-35, I understand the arrangements are possibly different with the US being responsible for such provision (at least initially). If that is the case, Turkey would possibly have access to all known electronic signals in the US reservoir. Such information would allow Turkey and if leaked to Russia, the entire US electronic intelligence. There might be compartmentalization protocols in place for security reasons. I am just highlighting this would be a serious compromise if not contained. This issue has nothing to do with any software conversation.
 
I am afraid I don't think you understand what I am referring to regarding threat data library. ...
could be we talked past each other;

Yesterday at 7:33 PM by "F-35 mission data files", which would've been of interest to an adversary if it ever could access them,

I meant what's described in

The F-35 Is About to Get A Lot Smarter
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which I reposted Dec 13, 2018 and quote,

“It’s the data on board that proactively notifies the pilot of the aircraft of upcoming threats. The problem today is that it takes way too long to actually generate that Mission Data File. We can apply the data aggregation capabilities that C3 has and AI to make that process an order of magnitude faster so the data are more current,” said Edward Abbo, C3’s President and CTO.

end of quote;

I've been following F-35 mission data files issue for some time for example Jun 4, 2018 quoting

May 15, 2017 BreakingDefense
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:
"To make it as clear as possible, if the F-35 does not possess current threat data for everything from
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to
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to kinetic threats such as
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, then it simply “might not know what it is looking at,” Pleus told me. That would hobble one of the fighter’s great advantages, its capacity to
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for the pilot.

Who’s responsible? The Mission Data Files are created using information from the Intelligence Community and are then built into usable data by the 513th Electronic Warfare Squadron at Eglin Air Force Base.

This is not a new problem. Pleus’ predecessor,
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(he’s now the three-star commander of all Central Command’s air forces) identified this as the biggest problem facing the program two years ago."
 

Anlsvrthng

Captain
Registered Member
I am afraid I don't think you understand what I am referring to regarding threat data library. Threat data library is standard provision in all electronic support systems. It is a storage of all known electronic signals that enable RWR/ESM to identify classify and make determination on the nature of threats. Essentially you cannot operate EW/ECM without such data. Typically each country operating their own aircraft is responsible for gathering such electronic signals through their own ELINT/SIGINT platforms. In the case of the F-35, I understand the arrangements are possibly different with the US being responsible for such provision (at least initially). If that is the case, Turkey would possibly have access to all known electronic signals in the US reservoir. Such information would allow Turkey and if leaked to Russia, the entire US electronic intelligence. There might be compartmentalization protocols in place for security reasons. I am just highlighting this would be a serious compromise if not contained. This issue has nothing to do with any software conversation.
That library up to 2001 was given to China with the Hinana incident.
 

Brumby

Major
MAKS 2019: Refined MiG-35 Gets New Missiles and Avionics

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Russia still hopes to win an Indian order for the
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, RAC MiG general director Ilya Tarasenko told journalists at MAKS 2019. The airshow that closed on September 1 saw Indian test pilots Group Captain BS Reddy and Wing Commander FL Roy taking seats in a MiG-35D two-seater for type familiarization flights.

India’s national delegation was led by Director General of Air Operations Air Marshal Amit Dev, who visited Russia to learn more about yet another export version of the MiG-35 that was unveiled at the show. Russia is expected to offer it in the ongoing competition for 110 medium fighters for the Indian air force.

According to Tarasenko, the new version features further-refined geometry of the airframe, uprated Klimov RD-33MK engines with thrust at full afterburner of nine tonnes, an advanced electro-optical reconnaissance system, and an active-array (AESA) radar capable of tracking up to 30 targets simultaneously. Additionally, RAC MiG’s press release also mentions “renewed mission equipment” and “other improvements made to meet the requirements of potential foreign customers."

It is also worth mentioning that a flyable example of the aircraft that was demonstrated to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey on the show’s opening day had new air-launched munitions on its weapons stations, including the Grom-E2 glide bomb and the 600-kg (1,232-pound) Vympel R-37, also known as RVV-BD, the Russian acronym for “air-to-air missile, long-range.” Although the possibility of the MiG-35 being outfitted with the 300-km (162-nm) R-37 was first mentioned a couple of years ago, MAKS 2019 was the first time that the aircraft had been displayed with this weapon.

The MiG-35 full-scale mockup at MAKS 2019 featured a new head-up display with extra-wide field of view, part of a new mission equipment suite from Ramenskoye PKB. The latter is described as “a generation ahead” of that in use on the MiG-29K/KUB deck fighter and its land-based MiG-29M/M2 derivative in service with the Indian Navy and Egyptian air force, respectively. The mockup also exhibited taller, more upright vertical tails that had hitherto only been seen on a small model.

Speaking to journalists on the eve of the show, Tarasenko acknowledged “issues” with the low operational availability of the Indian Navy’s MiGs, but insisted that the aircraft “fully meets the original specification” demanded by the customer at the program launch 15 years ago. The aforementioned issues arose during operational service after the guaranteed lifetime had expired, he noted.

Tarasenko further said that Russian industry has been working closely with India to resolve the issues and introduce changes to the MiG-29K/KUB fleet, amounting to 45 units, so it meets “a recent version of the customer requirements for deck aircraft intended for operation from the Indian navy carriers." RAC MiG hopes to win a new Indian Navy order if the earlier announced tender for 57 deck fighters proceeds. They would equip the navy’s new carrier, Vishal, construction of which is yet to start.
 
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