PLAN Naval Helicopter & ASW Capability II

kwaigonegin

Colonel
The biggest threat and deterent to a SSN is another SSN.. No doubt about it. This is especially so in the vast and deep waters of the Pacific.
While PLAN is surely improving their surface and aerial ASW capabilities, their sub surface force is equally impressive considering where they were even just a short decade ago.

The 095s will do doubt play a significant role in not only deterring surface combatants but will have an equally critical role in searching and hunting enemy subs as far out as the 3rd island chain. My educated guess is these boats will likely be as quiet but slightly more capable than the Improve Los Angeles class due to more modern electronics and better processing power. Just like the LA class, I see them building a bunch of 095s unless there is something fundamentally wrong with the design..
These boats will give PLAN a generational leap in subsurface warfare capabilities not available at present.

Alos unlike previous generation ships or fighters their vast numbers of older subs still pose a significant threat to any opfor.
 

Tyloe

Junior Member
Whatever happened to the Z-15? I thought PLAN was attempting to use it as a replacement for the Z-9 naval helicopters? Are they too small and replaced by Z-20s?

Yeah it's weird. Airbus has already started production and international delivery since last year, wonder what's holding HAIG? Z-20 might have a larger capacity but does its fit in current PLAN ship hangers?

PLAN is a huge customer of Z-9 and Ka-27s, which was built to fit in the small cramp hangers of Soviet vessels. Guess it depends if 054A and 052 hangers were required to fit Z-20 size rotary craft.
 

Tyloe

Junior Member
OK after digging around Z-15 is facing delays since its change of suppliers from P&Ws PT6C to French Turbomecca Ariden 3C around 2010s.

Airbus's H-175 version uses available P&W's PT6c engine which it was designed around, but it's a compromised supplier for China, as its a sub of US based United Techonlogies that infringed US embargo laws since secret Z-10 engine software deal. But that's not all, it's known to them that they wanted to compete with France's Turbomeca on engine supplies to the Z-15.

Since engine change, Turbomeca developed and tested Ariden engine and its a 50/50 partnership but I don't know if that means ToT. Probably, given the Chinese version is publicly known as WZ-16.

I'm not sure about Washington but they could be trying to put pressure on French firm since they want to rein in on European companies selling dual tech to China, which Beijing is racing for licensed production to domesticate them. They also know Aiden 3C would aid a lot in Z-10 by increasimg its armament load, and future military rotercraft.

Avicopter's First prototype and Ariden engine was displayed last year. Flight test was secheduled this year but I dont remember a Z-15 being spotted. Delays to new engine parameters and possible third party pressure.



Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!


Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!


Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
 
Giving 056As the same TAS and VDS suite as 054A+ and 052D, as well as seemingly replacing the AShMs with long range ASROC, and mass producing 056As is probably one of the most significant decisions in improving their regional ASW capabilities over the last few years.

Remember what the 056s and 056As are replacing (037 variant subchasers) and they will be supported by 022 FACs, land based air power for air cover and maritime strike, as well as probably a number of frigates during operations, not to mention ASW MPAs as well. 056As will not merely be a stopgap, but will operate in conjunction with currently developing and early fielding ASW capabilities and will likely remain a key role in the Navy's regional ASW forces, at least within green water range.

The requirement for heavily arming a ship of 056/As size with AShMs is simply not there given the way they will probably be operated. But giving them a potent ASW sensor suite, and then mass producing them in large numbers OTOH is a capability that will significantly enhance the Navy's overall capability. In context, 056/As AShM armament is barely a criticism worth noting IMO.

That is not my point. I stated that additional 054A+ (not the 056/A) are the stopgap for the PLAN's weaknesses in ASW helos, MPAs, and competitive SSNs that Jeff Head mentioned.

When the 056/As are part of a full spectrum PLA presence they can still use being more heavily armed as their potential opfor is the full spectrum presence of the world's most powerful military (superior to the PLA) likely with as forward regional basing as the PLA, with additional assets from regional allied second tier (competitive with the PLA) militaries. The PLA is likely to face both quantitative and qualitative disadvantages.

That the 056/A is not a stopgap only lends weight to the argument that it is underarmed. Several other regional militaries have much more heavily armed assets for a similar role or are likely to acquire them. Given the role of the 056/A it is also likely to be the target of a surprise attack. It can use a larger SAM complement, perhaps a CIWS, not just more main missile armament. When it comes to main missile armament, given its role it should be armed with a mix of anti-ship and anti-sub missiles if it can carry a large enough total number of missiles.
 

FORBIN

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
Giving 056As the same TAS and VDS suite as 054A+ and 052D, as well as seemingly replacing the AShMs with long range ASROC, and mass producing 056As is probably one of the most significant decisions in improving their regional ASW capabilities over the last few years.

Remember what the 056s and 056As are replacing (037 variant subchasers) and they will be supported by 022 FACs, land based air power for air cover and maritime strike, as well as probably a number of frigates during operations, not to mention ASW MPAs as well. 056As will not merely be a stopgap, but will operate in conjunction with currently developing and early fielding ASW capabilities and will likely remain a key role in the Navy's regional ASW forces, at least within green water range.

The requirement for heavily arming a ship of 056/As size with AShMs is simply not there given the way they will probably be operated. But giving them a potent ASW sensor suite, and then mass producing them in large numbers OTOH is a capability that will significantly enhance the Navy's overall capability. In context, 056/As AShM armament is barely a criticism worth noting IMO.
Combattants with helos again more 2 helos are the best for ASW ships/helo combination vs submarine is undoubtely the more efficient.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
That is not my point. I stated that additional 054A+ (not the 056/A) are the stopgap for the PLAN's weaknesses in ASW helos, MPAs, and competitive SSNs that Jeff Head mentioned.

When the 056/As are part of a full spectrum PLA presence they can still use being more heavily armed as their potential opfor is the full spectrum presence of the world's most powerful military (superior to the PLA) likely with as forward regional basing as the PLA, with additional assets from regional allied second tier (competitive with the PLA) militaries. The PLA is likely to face both quantitative and qualitative disadvantages.

The word "stopgap" is generally accepted to be defined as a temporary or makeshift solution to a problem or need.
Calling 056A a stopgap for their ASW capabilities would imply that they would become obsolescent or withdrawn once a certain type of future type of equipment is introduced that fields additional/better capabilities than it.

However, I see 056As as having a key role for the Navy's ASW capability (especially green water/regional ASW) going forwards even once ASW helicopters, MPAs and more capable SSNs are inducted.


That the 056/A is not a stopgap only lends weight to the argument that it is underarmed. Several other regional militaries have much more heavily armed assets for a similar role or are likely to acquire them. Given the role of the 056/A it is also likely to be the target of a surprise attack. It can use a larger SAM complement, perhaps a CIWS, not just more main missile armament. When it comes to main missile armament, given its role it should be armed with a mix of anti-ship and anti-sub missiles if it can carry a large enough total number of missiles.

The ship you are describing is quite different to what most people believe the mission and role 056/A is meant to fulfill.

The entire point of 056/A is to provide a cheap, plentiful vessel capable of operating in relatively short durations in large numbers while being able to operate in a low intensity/safe environment and being able to operate successfully in a medium intensity environment with additional naval or air support.

And to my knowledge there are few if any other regional navies that are procuring ships similar to 056/A in displacement class while being "much more heavily armed" and while also retaining its other capabilities like in ASW etc.
 
The word "stopgap" is generally accepted to be defined as a temporary or makeshift solution to a problem or need.
Calling 056A a stopgap for their ASW capabilities would imply that they would become obsolescent or withdrawn once a certain type of future type of equipment is introduced that fields additional/better capabilities than it.

However, I see 056As as having a key role for the Navy's ASW capability (especially green water/regional ASW) going forwards even once ASW helicopters, MPAs and more capable SSNs are inducted.

Once again you are mistaken, I called the 054A+ not the 056/A a stopgap solution to make up for the PLAN's ASW weaknesses.

The ship you are describing is quite different to what most people believe the mission and role 056/A is meant to fulfill.

The entire point of 056/A is to provide a cheap, plentiful vessel capable of operating in relatively short durations in large numbers while being able to operate in a low intensity/safe environment and being able to operate successfully in a medium intensity environment with additional naval or air support.

And to my knowledge there are few if any other regional navies that are procuring ships similar to 056/A in displacement class while being "much more heavily armed" and while also retaining its other capabilities like in ASW etc.

That may be a description of what the existing 056/A is capable of. As I mentioned previously the 056/A as a patroller will likely be subject to surprise attack not by its equivalents but by qualitatively and perhaps quantitatively superior full spectrum opfor, it will need to hold its own in such an event. It is dubious that it can do that with its current armament. Along the same lines it is dubious that it can always avoid operating in a high intensity environment, especially if it is to be of any worth in any full scale conflict.

If you hold tonnage, class, and capabilities constant then of course there can only be equivalents to the existing 056/A. Holding the patroller role constant and keeping the tonnage much below that of the 054A+, sometimes below that of the 056/A:
- Vietnam has the more heavily armed Gepard
- Taiwan has the more heavily armed Tuo Chiang
- Indonesia has the more heavily armed Bung Tomo
- Japan has the more heavily armed Abukuma
- South Korea has the more heavily armed Ulsan
- Malaysia has the more heavily armed Kasturi and Laksamana
- Singapore has the more heavily armed Victory
- Russia has the more heavily armed Bora, Buyan/M, and Steregushky in addition to the Gepard
- US has the more heavily armed LCS Fast Frigate
 

Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
My educated guess is these boats will likely be as quiet but slightly more capable than the Improve Los Angeles class due to more modern electronics and better processing power. Just like the LA class, I see them building a bunch of 095s unless there is something fundamentally wrong with the design..
These boats will give PLAN a generational leap in subsurface warfare capabilities not available at present.
I also see the 095 as falling into this range of capability, i.e. somewhere between improved Los Angeles and Severodvinsk. But I would be surprised if they build more than 12-16 of these subs given such a sub would still be almost a generation behind the Seawolf/Virginia class. I think they will build enough of these subs to be able to escort China's near term number of carrier groups and the 1 or 2 SSBNs that will be on constant nuclear deterrent patrol in the near future, and then move on to the Type 097.

That the 056/A is not a stopgap only lends weight to the argument that it is underarmed. Several other regional militaries have much more heavily armed assets for a similar role or are likely to acquire them. Given the role of the 056/A it is also likely to be the target of a surprise attack. It can use a larger SAM complement, perhaps a CIWS, not just more main missile armament. When it comes to main missile armament, given its role it should be armed with a mix of anti-ship and anti-sub missiles if it can carry a large enough total number of missiles.
Given the role of the 056A I would be utterly shocked if it were the target of a surprise attack from a sub unless it was out of desperation. First of all it is a smaller ship which would weight against an enemy wanting to risk exposing itself to launch an attack. Second it is an ASW vessel and with VDS deployed would be very difficult to "surprise". Subs usually avoid ASW ships, not attack them, because where there is an ASW ship there is also a torpedo or two somewhere ready to send up the sub's rear end.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
Once again you are mistaken, I called the 054A+ not the 056/A a stopgap solution to make up for the PLAN's ASW weaknesses.

Whoops, I misread that, my mistake.
That said, the same principle about 056A not being a stopgap also applies to 054A+ not being a stopgap for the Navy's ASW capabilities, considering the definition of the word "stopgap".



That may be a description of what the existing 056/A is capable of. As I mentioned previously the 056/A as a patroller will likely be subject to surprise attack not by its equivalents but by qualitatively and perhaps quantitatively superior full spectrum opfor, it will need to hold its own in such an event. It is dubious that it can do that with its current armament. Along the same lines it is dubious that it can always avoid operating in a high intensity environment, especially if it is to be of any worth in any full scale conflict.

If they are caught in a situation where they are forced to fight in a high intensity environment and/or if they are subject to attack by a qualitatively or quantitatively superior opponent then that means the deployment of these has either been done incorrectly or a war is not going China's way.

To increase the ship's survivability or weapons suite/defence capabilities would mean trade offs in other assets (such as possibly helipad, ASW sensor suite, and/or others) if the ship's displacement is to be maintained -- or if you want to keep everything then it would result in a larger ship as well which would then have knock on effects about the cost and number of 056/As that could be purchased.



If you hold tonnage, class, and capabilities constant then of course there can only be equivalents to the existing 056/A. Holding the patroller role constant and keeping the tonnage much below that of the 054A+, sometimes below that of the 056/A:
- Vietnam has the more heavily armed Gepard
- Taiwan has the more heavily armed Tuo Chiang
- Indonesia has the more heavily armed Bung Tomo
- Japan has the more heavily armed Abukuma
- South Korea has the more heavily armed Ulsan
- Malaysia has the more heavily armed Kasturi and Laksamana
- Singapore has the more heavily armed Victory
- Russia has the more heavily armed Bora, Buyan/M, and Steregushky in addition to the Gepard
- US has the more heavily armed LCS Fast Frigate

The problem is that all the ships you list are either quite different in displacement to 056/A or they are not even corvettes to begin with.

Gepard: a corvette which is nearly five hundred tons heavier than 056/A at full
Tuo Chiang: more of an FAC/missile boat, not a corvette like 056/A
Bung Tomo: a corvette, nearly five hundred tons heavier than 056/A at full
Abukuma: this ship displaces nearly a thousand tons more than 056/A at full
Ulsan: this ship displaces nearly seven hundred tons more than 056/A at full
Kasturi: displaces about four hundred tons more than 056/A at full/ Laksamana: more of a missile boat than a corvette, note its much lower displacement
Victory: more of a missile boat than a corvette, note its much lower displacement
Bora: are we comparing 056s to a hovercraft FAC now? Buyna/M: a smaller ship than 056/A and makes other design/capability sacrifices in favour of its configuration (e.g.: no helipad, reduced capability ASW suite) / Steregushky: eight hundred tons bigger than 056/A / Gepard: five hundred tons heavier than 056/A
LCS/FF: are you really comparing the 1400 ton 056/A with the 3000+ ton LCS/FF?

Let's be fair here -- out of all the ships in the region that exist with a similar displacement and role orientation to the 056/A, it would be the Indonesia Navy's Sigma 9113... and funnily enough its armament is very close and equivalent to that of 056/A...
If I take your way of looking at things I could say the 022 and the 053H3 are both more heavily armed ships than the 056/A as well, but they are also ships in completely different categories with different capabilities.

So I rest my case that on any fair comparison between 056/A and its "true" contemporaries (ships of similar role and displacement), its armament and configuration fares quite well.


If you want to compare 056/A with other FACs, or large corvettes/light frigates in the region because you think those are the potential foes that they will face, then I can understand that choice, but then it becomes not a question about 056/A vs other nation's vessels but about China's navy versus another nation's navy in a given contingency/scenario, in which case we need to consider the total quantity of ship types that each side may deploy there. Frigates and destroyers would also have to be roped in, not to mention air and subsurface assets. It does not simply become a question of "056/A vs opponents FACs or corvettes/frigates".

If you want to judge 056/A only by its ability to withstand a "surprise attack" by an enemy, then its performance in such a situation is simply the result of the choices that the Navy has made regarding their balance of capability/displacement vs cost/quantity, and in such a scenario the fault would lie not with the 056/A vs its foes but with the Navy's assessment of its opponent which attacked this 056/A in this hypothetical situation in the first place.

At the end of the day the 056/A is a specific design meant for the Chinese Navy's own requirements. If it has to be compared with other ships, the only fair way is to compare it with ships that have a similar configuration/role and a similar displacement.
If it is to be judged based on its survivability/performance in a situation where it is not intended for, then that is just the trade off that needs to be made vs how good it can perform in the situations it is intended for.

If you want a ship that can fulfill all of those categories and requirements and outmatch the ships you've listed... well the 054A class does exist.
 

Totoro

Major
VIP Professional
Whatever happened to the Z-15? I thought PLAN was attempting to use it as a replacement for the Z-9 naval helicopters? Are they too small and replaced by Z-20s?

I don't think Z-15 was ever mentioned as a military project, let alone a PLAN platform. While, of course, it may happen sometime in the future, so far there don't seem to be any plans for such a helicopter. All we had was Z-15 being "a helicopter" of nice enough class that many people just jumped to conlusion with that it's definitely going to be military helo. Maybe, some day. But not soon.

As for Z-20, we definitely know it's being developed as a military helo, but for now all we've seen is a PLA utility variant. A PLAN variant would need certain changes. Again, it may be in the pipeline but it may be several years in the future, if it happens.

Even if Z-20 or Z-15 (i really doubt both would be used within PLAN, as they're too close in capability) get their naval variant and production starts - it would take at least another decade of production until produced volume gets to satisfactory level and most Z9 are replaced.

With all the above, I'd say PLAN very, very much counts on Z9 being its most numerous ASW helicopter for at least next 10-15 years, and plans to use Z9 (even if by then other models get used in greater numbers) for the next 20-25 years.

Which brings me to the new mystery missile - alleged winged torpedo carrying missile. Layout and size points to a long range, fairly long loiter torpedo carrying platform. That itself is a very strange concept - as usually a helicopter carrying torpedos is more efficient. BUT, usually, ASW helicopter isn't a tiny Z9. Z9 is very, very much limited by its size. It can carry the full sensor package and full fuel. Or it can carry almost full fuel and one torpedo. Or it can save further on fuel and carry two torpedoes. It's loiter time over target area is quite small and probably unsatisfactory for modern ASW combat. Which is maybe why we're seeing the new mystery missile- to completement Z9 and alleviate their limitations. Z9 could then carry no torpedoes and stay in air for a fairly long time, using their sensors, and other platforms can fire the torpedoes when needed, even have them stay in air and loiter near the target (For quick reaction) if situation requires it.
 
Top