PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

vincent said:

PLA SSNs are much more useful as convoy hunters. Americans needs to supply plenty of materials to its bases in the West Pac and Japan. Imagine a fleet of 10+ SSN moving around the known routes between CONUS and Japan/Guam/Hawaii/etc and inform PLA where to look for the merchant fleets. PLA can either use DF-26, H-6(H-20 in the future) or naval task forces to take them out. US navy will be forced to divert parts of their fleet to hunt down the subs and to protect the convoys instead of attacking PLA assets.

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I would agree with this one. Here is what I think is the rationale behind the SSNs, but comments are welcome.

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The SSNs will only come into service in the 2025-2030 timeframe.

By then, whilst the US Navy would like to keep its carriers at a standoff distance from mainland China as much as possible, I don't see this happening with respect to Taiwan.

The Taiwan situation would be:

1. Taiwanese airbases knocked out in an initial missile strike
2. follow-up airstrikes conducted
3. followed further by potentially huge numbers of Shaheed-136 type munitions every single day (say 800 Army TELs x 5 munitions per salvo). And each Shaheed is equivalent in cost to a JDAM.

With no electricity and all the 5000-odd fuel distribution storage tanks in destroyed in Taiwan, Taiwan will collapse swiftly unless there is resupply which will require a lot of transport planes and cargo ships. That will require US carriers to provide air cover for extended periods and essentially over Taiwan which is 200-300km from mainland China. Standing off the carriers at 1000-1500km and conducting occasional air sorties will not cut it, as the cargo aircraft and ships will get slaughtered unless there is a constant fighter presence provided by closeby carriers. Those carriers have to take on 600+ air sorties per day from the Chinese Air Force, and there should be a lot more Y-20U tankers in service by then.

In such a scenario, using SSNs to launch AShBMs isn't really required because the carriers have to get that close to mainland China.

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But if I look at the situation in 5 year's time, I see Japan also facing the same scenario as Taiwan today, with no electricity and a guesstimate of its 30,000-odd fuel distribution tanks also destroyed.

Again, Japan would need significant resupply from transport planes and cargo ships in order to prevent a collapse. But in the Japanese scenario, because Japan is significantly further away from mainland China, the Chinese military will not be able to field large numbers of affordable land-based missiles to target the carriers. Plus Japan presents a very long (1500km+) geographical barrier which prevents PLAAF aircraft or ISR assets flying through. For comparison, Taiwan is only 350km long, so PLAAF aircraft can easily fly around Taiwan into the open ocean.

So in such a Japan scenario, SSN-launched AShBMs would make a lot more sense. And with a mooted 1.2m missile diameter, that would be comparable to a DF-16/17 class missile in terms of being affordable. Call it $2 Mn.

The length of Japan (1500km+) also means that a smaller missile class (such as the DF-11 with a diameter of 0.86M and a 600km range) doesn't cut it in terms of covering all the potential target locations.

So the next largest missile is a 1.2m diameter DF-16/17 missile. And with a 2500nm range, a submarine could loiter quietly deep in the Pacific and still reach Japan. As a bonus, such submarines could cover targets in the Guam area as well. The greater distance also means the submarine can successfully evade any MPA aircraft sent after the submarine reveals its location by firing. Not that I expect many (if any) MPA aircraft to be available as the closest operating base is now Hawaii

Of course, this assumes that Japan would declare war and intervene if there is a resumption of the China-Taiwan civil war.
But a rational Japanese government should decide neutrality is a better option than a modern-day version of Operation Starvation.

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So let's say there are 8 Type-093B SSNs in service. If they follow the USN operating profile, 1 should be on patrol at any time, plus 5? more ready to surge.

Currently the USN has about 50 SSNs with 6 on active patrol at any time, and 3 nominally assigned to the Pacific. If the USN was able to keep all 6 of these SSNs permanently in the Western Pacific, then they could manage to tail or intercept all the outgoing Chinese SSNs. But this isn't realistic because other demands or duties will come up.

So a Chinese SSN surge will see most Chinese SSNs successfully pass through the 1IC and then disappear to the East of Guam/Japan and into the vast expanse of the Pacific.

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So there's no need to keep SSNs within air cover of the Chinese mainland and within the 2IC, as the nearest available MPAs will be operating from Hawaii.

Blitzo said:

Yes. I mean, I've been having this discussion with a generous assumption that they would have more than half of their SSNs available, so sure let's say 6 out of 8 09IIIB SSNs available.

My view is that even with 6 out of 8 09IIIBs available -- heck, even if they had 8 out of 8 09IIIBs available, it is probably a dicey proposition to use them in the onset-of-conflict strike role in a circa mid to late 2020s scenario.

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I think 6 out of 8 093B being available is a very generous already. And I'm only using such a high % because it's a new fleet and PLA has shown the ability to have very high availability due to good sustainment practices and not using them anywhere near as aggressively (on long missions) as USN does. And they are ready to surge at very short notice. Let's just say for the sake of argument that they can have 4 093As and 6 093Bs available for use at the start of a conflict. A good question will be how can these boats be deployed and what kind of oppositions they are facing.

Let's say USN is at around 45 SSNs at the start of conflict (given current projections) and that half of them are available at any given time (so 20 to 25). Due to having them all around the world for different missions, USN is likely to have just 2 to 4 of them in the theater at the onset of the conflict, although maybe 6 to 10 more maybe available in Indian Ocean, Pearl and West Coast that can be sent over in 1 to 2 weeks. I'd love to actually know from @Patchwork_Chimera how far off I am on this.

If you have 10 093A/093B, then I would assume that they are split between the 3 theater commands. Maybe you have 3 or 4 093s in STCN to help with protecting surface fleet and 094s, 3 or 4 more available in ETCN and 3 more in NTCN. That would presumably allow for 2 093Bs to be operating around surface fleet in Philippines Sea.

I think in this scenario, just having 093Bs in Philippines Sea would allow them to use VLS to launch ASBMs toward Japan from a different axis. Due to wider diameter, it would just be able to launch a more powerful ASBM than what you get from 055. a 1500 nm ASBM can hit ships around Tokyo and around Guam. That might not be possible with a 800 nm ASBM from UVLS. This would also not really stop them from the mission of protecting the fleet. You can make the same argument about putting a fleet in Sea of Japan.

tphuang said:

I think 6 out of 8 093B being available is a very generous already. And I'm only using such a high % because it's a new fleet and PLA has shown the ability to have very high availability due to good sustainment practices and not using them anywhere near as aggressively (on long missions) as USN does. And they are ready to surge at very short notice. Let's just say for the sake of argument that they can have 4 093As and 6 093Bs available for use at the start of a conflict. A good question will be how can these boats be deployed and what kind of oppositions they are facing.

Let's say USN is at around 45 SSNs at the start of conflict (given current projections) and that half of them are available at any given time (so 20 to 25). Due to having them all around the world for different missions, USN is likely to have just 2 to 4 of them in the theater at the onset of the conflict, although maybe 6 to 10 more maybe available in Indian Ocean, Pearl and West Coast that can be sent over in 1 to 2 weeks. I'd love to actually know from @Patchwork_Chimera how far off I am on this.

If you have 10 093A/093B, then I would assume that they are split between the 3 theater commands. Maybe you have 3 or 4 093s in STCN to help with protecting surface fleet and 094s, 3 or 4 more available in ETCN and 3 more in NTCN. That would presumably allow for 2 093Bs to be operating around surface fleet in Philippines Sea.

I think in this scenario, just having 093Bs in Philippines Sea would allow them to use VLS to launch ASBMs toward Japan from a different axis. Due to wider diameter, it would just be able to launch a more powerful ASBM than what you get from 055. a 1500 nm ASBM can hit ships around Tokyo and around Guam. That might not be possible with a 800 nm ASBM from UVLS. This would also not really stop them from the mission of protecting the fleet. You can make the same argument about putting a fleet in Sea of Japan.

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To clarify, in your scenario, where are you placing your SSNs?

It sounds like to me you are keeping them all within the first island chain, which if so imo would be unwise.

Instead, most of them should be used beyond the first island chain (i.e. in the open ocean) where their speed and endurance can be exploited.


My view is that:
A) if you want your SSN to be part of multiaxis strikes in the Westpac environment, they need to be located outside of the first island chain at minimum, to provide an additional "axis" of attack to begin with.
B) if you want your SSN to launch missiles outside of the first island chain at the outset of conflict, you must accept that they are making themselves more vulnerable to enemy detection by virtue of launching its payload. Thus, you must contend with the risk that you may very well lose those SSNs.
C) the PLAN should not place SSNs in potentially compromising situations where there is higher risks for higher rewards until they have a sufficiently sized fleet of SSNs that they can use for other "standard SSN missions" such as conducting harassment missions in the open ocean (beyond first island chain, out to second island chain and beyond).


So, the question is how big should the "sufficiently sized fleet of SSNs" be for the PLAN in terms of "standard SSN missions"

Personally I think an available force of 10-12 competitive SSNs in wartime for the "standard SSN mission set" would be the minimum needed, and the allocation of any of those 10-12 competitive SSNs for the multiaxis strike role would have to be done somewhat cautiously.

Any additional SSNs on top of that, would make the decision to allocate said SSNs to the multiaxis strike mission somewhat easier.

For a multiaxis war, I am only confident if all high priced items like submarines, fighter jets or destroyers are accompanied with their respective unmanned partners.

for example:
each 095 submarines can acted as a command center for 2-3 Large UUV and also serve as an independent attack platform.
Same for J-20 with 2-3 loyalman drone.
055 destroyer with 2-3 unmanned destroyer.

China has a massive global manufacturing capability for commercial products. they need to apply that capability for UUV, Loyalman, and other unmanned machines production too.

On top of these command centers and their unmanned partners, there are also independently controlled drone like wing long 3, WZ-7 or 8 to support the fight

Using this strategy is how you beat several countries at once like U.S Japan, Australia.

Blitzo said:

To clarify, in your scenario, where are you placing your SSNs?

It sounds like to me you are keeping them all within the first island chain, which if so imo would be unwise.

Instead, most of them should be used beyond the first island chain (i.e. in the open ocean) where their speed and endurance can be exploited.

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Not at all, Philippine Sea and going into Sea of Okhotsk are definitely not in first island chain. Even Sea of Japan is not somewhere you would almost assuredly not want to put a 039B/C.

Even for STCN subs, you can attack ships in Guam from different axis (around West of Phillipines) or Western fleet of RAN (if you move to north of Java island). Could even potentially be used against an incoming CSG in Indian Ocean that gets spotted by satellite.

Blitzo said:

My view is that:
A) if you want your SSN to be part of multiaxis strikes in the Westpac environment, they need to be located outside of the first island chain at minimum, to provide an additional "axis" of attack to begin with.
B) if you want your SSN to launch missiles outside of the first island chain at the outset of conflict, you must accept that they are making themselves more vulnerable to enemy detection by virtue of launching its payload. Thus, you must contend with the risk that you may very well lose those SSNs.
C) the PLAN should not place SSNs in potentially compromising situations where there is higher risks for higher rewards until they have a sufficiently sized fleet of SSNs that they can use for other "standard SSN missions" such as conducting harassment missions in the open ocean (beyond first island chain, out to second island chain and beyond).


So, the question is how big should the "sufficiently sized fleet of SSNs" be for the PLAN in terms of "standard SSN missions"

Personally I think an available force of 10-12 competitive SSNs in wartime for the "standard SSN mission set" would be the minimum needed, and the allocation of any of those 10-12 competitive SSNs for the multiaxis strike role would have to be done somewhat cautiously.

Any additional SSNs on top of that, would make the decision to allocate said SSNs to the multiaxis strike mission somewhat easier.

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so I think we just discussed with Patch and Toastie about difficulties of finding SSN in the open ocean.

That has really hardened my view on utilizing 093B in anti-shipping roles (assuming they have a VLS installation). Sure, if they cannot start mass production of 095 by 2025, then they should be building more 093B.

Also my view is that if SSN is launching missiles from outside of first island chain, then they should be confident it's not getting tailed by adversarial subs. Given where the targets are, I don't think they will be under the danger of MPAs. Outside of that, it sounds like finding a semi modern SSN in the middle of the ocean and prosecuting is really difficult.

tphuang said:

Not at all, Philippine Sea and going into Sea of Okhotsk are definitely not in first island chain. Even Sea of Japan is not somewhere you would almost assuredly not want to put a 039B/C.

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tphuang said:

Even for STCN subs, you can attack ships in Guam from different axis (around West of Phillipines) or Western fleet of RAN (if you move to north of Java island). Could even potentially be used against an incoming CSG in Indian Ocean that gets spotted by satellite.

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Geographically I think sea of Japan would still be very much in the first island chain, and I'm not sure sending SSNs past the Japanese islands northwards is the best choice during wartime given Japanese ASW capabilities, unless one assumes the bulk of the JMSDF and JASDF are wholesale defeated.

I do agree that going in deep to the Philippine sea is viable but even then I think you'd want to go well east of Guam for maximum effects in terms of multiaxis geometry.

tphuang said:

so I think we just discussed with Patch and Toastie about difficulties of finding SSN in the open ocean.

That has really hardened my view on utilizing 093B in anti-shipping roles (assuming they have a VLS installation). Sure, if they cannot start mass production of 095 by 2025, then they should be building more 093B.

Also my view is that if SSN is launching missiles from outside of first island chain, then they should be confident it's not getting tailed by adversarial subs. Given where the targets are, I don't think they will be under the danger of MPAs. Outside of that, it sounds like finding a semi modern SSN in the middle of the ocean and prosecuting is really difficult.

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I definitely agree that as a mission it's not non-viable, but whether they view it as something realistic for the 2025-2030 period depends on how capable 09IIIB is, what the overall underwater and ASW threat environment is like, and how many SSNs they have.

In the 2025-2030 time period, I am not sure if the balance of those factors means that 09IIIBs operating outside of 1IC and around 2IC would definitely be safe from not being tailed or monitored.

Without a doubt, the use of SSNs as major strike/land attack/missile platforms is in the PLAN's future for a Westpac scenario, but I think we aren't at a stage where we can say it's definitely how they will be utilised if a war to happen in the 2025-2030 period.

There is no such thing as a free lunch, space on ships are always at a premium, and allocating space for something (like large diameter VLS) means something else forgone as opportunity cost.

Similarly, equipping and tasking subs for one mission means they are unlikely to be able to perform other missions.

Using 093Bs for VLS attacks against fixed targets is exactly the same as using J20s for Kinzhal attacks and compromising the J20’s primary AA capabilities to achieve this secondary capability.

When I look at some scenarios being put forward, I cannot help but think people are just imagining Pearl Harbour 2.0, with all the assumptions and baggage that goes with that.

But the Chinese will likely purposefully avoid making such an obvious and silly historic parallel. It’s alpha strike is not going to be aimed to ships in port, but rather ships underway because China doesn’t want and cannot afford to rely on a sucker punch to win, and instead want to be able to delivery and land hay markers ‘fair and square’ all day long until the other guy goes down and stays down.

Multi-directional attacks only really makes sense when attacking fixed, land based targets with geographical barriers and fixed long range sensors and defences to try to take advantage of and avoid respectively. But that’s not the kinds of targets that will make or break the alpha strike that the PLA is planning to deliver. Against enemy fleets underway in open waters, multi-directional attack really shouldn’t matter if the enemy fleet is properly equipped and trained, as the USN would be.

Blitzo said:

Geographically I think sea of Japan would still be very much in the first island chain, and I'm not sure sending SSNs past the Japanese islands northwards is the best choice during wartime given Japanese ASW capabilities, unless one assumes the bulk of the JMSDF and JASDF are wholesale defeated.

I do agree that going in deep to the Philippine sea is viable but even then I think you'd want to go well east of Guam for maximum effects in terms of multiaxis geometry.

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My scenario for operating in Sea of Japan would be to get a large exercise there with Russian navy. The air wing would chase away MPAs and such. And then you could have a couple of 093Bs sneak north into different and unexpected attacking axis and keep most of the fleet in Sea of Japan where UVLS can launch ASBM/LACMs and carrier view can carry about attacks from J-15s/J-35s. Against Japanese bases in Misawa and around 7th fleet in Yokosuka, there is a lot of air defense to overcome.

Blitzo said:

I definitely agree that as a mission it's not non-viable, but whether they view it as something realistic for the 2025-2030 period depends on how capable 09IIIB is, what the overall underwater and ASW threat environment is like, and how many SSNs they have.

In the 2025-2030 time period, I am not sure if the balance of those factors means that 09IIIBs operating outside of 1IC and around 2IC would definitely be safe from not being tailed or monitored.

Without a doubt, the use of SSNs as major strike/land attack/missile platforms is in the PLAN's future for a Westpac scenario, but I think we aren't at a stage where we can say it's definitely how they will be utilised if a war to happen in the 2025-2030 period.

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From my point of view, it really depends on whether or not they have VLS. If they do, then you inevitably will use them even if they never wonder away from your flotilla. If they do not, then this is just not something they can (aside from maybe some YJ-18 launches).

Based on our conversation, it appears to me that as soon as you cross SOSUS without getting tailed, it would be pretty hard to be followed after that.

FairAndUnbiased said:

if long range multiaxis attack and rapid build speed is whats important why not have some VLS equipped SSKs like Korean KSS-III?

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SSKs are simply bad under unfriendly skies and take a long time to transit where they need to be. That means lower endurance in the intended patrol box. Low underwater high-speed endurance also means a small patrol box and no chance of offensive pursuits.

plawolf said:

When I look at some scenarios being put forward, I cannot help but think people are just imagining Pearl Harbour 2.0, with all the assumptions and baggage that goes with that.

But the Chinese will likely purposefully avoid making such an obvious and silly historic parallel. It’s alpha strike is not going to be aimed to ships in port, but rather ships underway because China doesn’t want and cannot afford to rely on a sucker punch to win, and instead want to be able to delivery and land hay markers ‘fair and square’ all day long until the other guy goes down and stays down.

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That's what I observed too. The discussion is too centered around a decapacitating alpha strike. A Pearl Harbor-like surprise strike is a massive diplomatic self-own even if you win the war. Unless you manage to completely destroy the enemy nation and somehow become a global hegemon, such a strike would cause problems for a nation for multiple decades. I won't even talk about the boost in morale the US would get and how easy it will be able to draw in allies.

And needless to say planning your strategy around such a strike is wrong and is unchinese. In fact, when the Soviets were advising the PLA in the 1950s, the Russian focus on the beginning of the war was among the major things the PLA disagreed with. China always wanted a military that can fight a long war rather than one that depends on a successful opening.

plawolf said:

When I look at some scenarios being put forward, I cannot help but think people are just imagining Pearl Harbour 2.0, with all the assumptions and baggage that goes with that.

But the Chinese will likely purposefully avoid making such an obvious and silly historic parallel. It’s alpha strike is not going to be aimed to ships in port, but rather ships underway because China doesn’t want and cannot afford to rely on a sucker punch to win, and instead want to be able to delivery and land hay markers ‘fair and square’ all day long until the other guy goes down and stays down.

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Hitting Pearl is an objective for the PLAN for the same reason that hitting Chinese ports is an objective for the USN. It's not a "sucker punch" if you delete the opposition's assets in port, it's the opposition's job to protect their own ports.

With that said, hitting deployed fleets/assets is also (obviously) a critical objective. No one is saying you over-index on one and ignore the other.