Damn, it's all over the screen.
My drink that is.
PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
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My drink that is.
A CMSI Report on Deception in Taiwan scenario
Main Findings
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) views deception as a force multiplier and war-winning weapon. The PLA leadership reserves a special place of veneration for wartime commanders who can employ deception to obtain surprise, something Xi Jinping refers to as “excelling at stratagem.”
In January 1955, the PLA launched a surprise attack on the Yijiangshan islands, then controlled by the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taipei. This campaign remains a case study in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for how to conduct amphibious operations and catch defenders off guard.
Empirical historical research shows that amphibious operations, while complex and difficult to conduct, almost always achieve their objectives. The critical factor is the shock they cause, and that is often enhanced by deception.
PLA textbooks and field manuals explicitly link the difficulty of a future Taiwan invasion with the need to embrace unconventional approaches. They exhort officers at all levels of command to use deception.
Advanced intelligence and surveillance technologies do not make a surprise attack on Taiwan unachievable. A zero-warning invasion remains virtually impossible, but it is also unnecessary from the PLA’s perspective.
Chinese military researchers envision employing robots, containerized missiles, and unmanned amphibious vehicles to confuse and unbalance Taiwan’s defenders in a future war.
American and Taiwanese strategists should account for unique ways the PLA may attempt to achieve the element of surprise and plan against those courses of action.
War games, simulations, and field exercises that account for a surprise attack on Taiwan could generate insights and help senior leaders rethink the levels of risk associated with current and possible future defense postures.
Immediate steps should be taken to cope with deception and minimize reaction times so that any sudden amphibious landings on Taiwan, while dramatic, will not be decisive.
Main Findings
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) views deception as a force multiplier and war-winning weapon. The PLA leadership reserves a special place of veneration for wartime commanders who can employ deception to obtain surprise, something Xi Jinping refers to as “excelling at stratagem.”
In January 1955, the PLA launched a surprise attack on the Yijiangshan islands, then controlled by the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taipei. This campaign remains a case study in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for how to conduct amphibious operations and catch defenders off guard.
Empirical historical research shows that amphibious operations, while complex and difficult to conduct, almost always achieve their objectives. The critical factor is the shock they cause, and that is often enhanced by deception.
PLA textbooks and field manuals explicitly link the difficulty of a future Taiwan invasion with the need to embrace unconventional approaches. They exhort officers at all levels of command to use deception.
Advanced intelligence and surveillance technologies do not make a surprise attack on Taiwan unachievable. A zero-warning invasion remains virtually impossible, but it is also unnecessary from the PLA’s perspective.
Chinese military researchers envision employing robots, containerized missiles, and unmanned amphibious vehicles to confuse and unbalance Taiwan’s defenders in a future war.
American and Taiwanese strategists should account for unique ways the PLA may attempt to achieve the element of surprise and plan against those courses of action.
War games, simulations, and field exercises that account for a surprise attack on Taiwan could generate insights and help senior leaders rethink the levels of risk associated with current and possible future defense postures.
Immediate steps should be taken to cope with deception and minimize reaction times so that any sudden amphibious landings on Taiwan, while dramatic, will not be decisive.
You forgot to mention the most important detail; it's authored by the one and only Ian Easton.
(Actually not a terrible paper though)
Technology gives you more information, but ultimately it's failible people who are the ones making the decision that this is true and that is false. Or not.
This seems to be a writeup by an American, and it seems that American writeups on a Taiwan conflict are just junk in general. The one big flaw of this one (and most of the other ones out there) is that it just doesn't pay any attention to why there's a fight over Taiwan in the first place. Normally, it makes sense to limit the scope of a scenario like this, the whys of such a war are completely informative of how it will take place.
And in this case, China is only ever likely to attack Taiwan if a red line has been crossed. There's no such thing as a surprise attack in this kind of scenario so basically nothing that's laid out here has much chance of happening.
But even if we were to remove the red line situation from the scenario, what's laid out here is still junk. In warfare, a sneak attack like this is a very risky move that's designed to eke out a temporary advantage. It's only worth doing if it's the only way to defeat a superior foe. But in a Taiwan, not only is China in a superior position, it has overwhelming advantages; especially in firepower. China has the ability to knock out every radar installation, every air defence system, every air field, every fortifed emplacement, and most defences of any kind on Taiwan before a single soldier boards an amphibious transport. So why the hell would China throw these advantages away for the sake of some silly gamble?
It would be so funny when US has already given up on Taiwan but Japan still haven't got the memo. Like John Mearsheimer once said, it is going to be pleasure before business
That is some HOI4 TFR looking ahhhh level of stupid but man don't we wish that to happen.
The script of TFR is hard to occur in reality.
After all, for China in reality, forcing Japan to kneel and beg for mercy through a shipping blockade is an easy task, and it doesn't even require many combat.