1, part of OTH landing concept means to park the LPD/LHD at minimum 30km off shore so land based radar cannot detect them thus avoid being attacked, but instead send in LCAC to shore. The risk for LPD/LHD might be reduced, but for those LCAC, they will anyway operate under artillery, mine or ashm while approaching the shore making their delivery.
An LST like the Type 072A can only carry a maximum of two helicopters depending on what it is carrying, some other LST models do not have this capability. LCAC/LCU vehicles are not capable of carrying any helicopters as are LSM and other smaller amphibious ships. So just look at the difference. An LPD can carry 4 fully armed helicopters (has hangars for maintenance) and an LHD can carry 30 helicopters (has hangars for maintenance). In an amphibious assault, the LHD and LPD complement each other. But how are they different from other amphibious ships?
Much difference.
First - LCACs, LSTs, LSMs, hovercrafts and other amphibious vehicles lack coordination capabilities and C2 (command and control) networks to organize and maintain control of the execution of the amphibious operation. If an amphibious task force does not have these ships acting as coordinators of the amphibious assault, the planning and execution of the amphibious operation is very likely to go wrong. Americans aware of this immense contribution in an amphibious operation execution have in their inventory 4 LCCs that act as coordinators of an amphibious fleet, in addition to having LHD/LHA that could also act in this way. If a Marine force does not rely on these amphibious ships for the operation, the PLA would have to coordinate the entire land-based amphibious offensive of the mainland, which would be inherently inefficient and plausibly high likely to go awry in executing the amphibious operation.
Second - LHD/LPDs have hangars for helicopter maintenance. This may seem like a non-existent approach, but the chances of many helicopters having problems is high, not all helicopters can be expected to be successful in the operation, and as probably some helicopters will take off from the mainland, and in the middle of the way there may be some problem. caused, can land on the LHD/LPDs for maintenance, the helicopters originally assigned to these ships could return to the mainland if there are not enough places for all the helicopters on the ship. This represents enormous operational flexibility.
Third - LHD/LPD can replenish LCAC/LCUs. An LCAC/LCU when it lands on the beach and the troops are all landed, the LCAC needs to return, if there is no ship like LHD/LPD, the LCAC/LCU will not be able to return to the mainland, but if an LHD/LPD is acting at a safe distance of 40-50 km from the coast, the LCACs will have enough range to return to the ship, refuel and start operating again, landing more troops on the enemy coast. Hypothetically, the LCAC/LCU can be supported by the other LST/LSM ships or helicopters carrying the supplies/fuels, but this would mean less fuel for the landing forces and more for the LCAC vehicles/LCUs, which would limit logistically. the amphibious force on the beach.
There are other factors.
2, in TW scenario, considering width of the strait is only 80 miles, why bother to use LPD/LHD to take LCAC half way and having the trouble of unloading them, why not just send the LCAC shore to shore?
View the answer above, please.
3, considering limited number/lift of LCAC, follow up troops (after beach head is secured) will probably need to be transported TO SHORE by other measures, such as LST, LSM or smaller LCU, or maybe civilian ro-ro ships with artificial port facility.
Yes. I agree with that. This is exactly why I consider the LST/LSM and other smaller amphibious ships as a second-tier landing force when the beachhead is secure. The problem here is the approach of using these ships as a first-tier force, which is conceptually flawed.
4, the threat to those transport ships are mainly saturated ashm strikesm either from hapoon launchers on TW island, or from US bombers (LRASM & SLAMER) , or from US surface ships (Tomahawk blk Va MST). Those strike will come through from time to time. How to disrupt the kill chain of those strike and protect the transport ships? of course to place heavy air defense in the strait is one thing, 2nd is to prevent those ships from being correctly targeted, 3rd thing is in case a missile hit, limit the damage
I would disregard any US intervention in the PLA's amphibious operation. It would take at least two weeks for the Americans to organize the forces, during which time analysts expect the PLA to have all troops landed and that would be enough time for the PLA to conquer Taiwan. Full amphibious landing of all echelons would be done in 2-4 days, PLA has distance from the island as a force multiplier, so landing large amounts of troops in a short time by distance is a reasonable consideration.
US bombers need escort and also resupply, PACAF has insufficient numbers to withstand a PLA intervention in Taiwan. The logistical effort to commit other aircraft from other COCOMs (Combatant Commands) would be required and would need many more tanker aircraft. Even assembling the necessary logistical war effort to intervene in Taiwan would take the time needed to capture the island.
In fact, I see US and allied forces not as an attempt to defend the island, but to recapture the island, because by the time US and allied forces are prepared for a high-intensity war scenario, China would already have captured the island.
Some may claim that the PLA's preparation for the invasion of Taiwan may be being spotted by satellites, since it is impossible to hide large movements, this is certainly an undeniable truth, but the PLA has the advantage of being very close to the Theater of Operations (TO ), actually 130 km to be exact. Compare a full US and allied logistical effort to the PLA, surely that the PLA logistical efforts would be ready much faster than enemy forces, not only because it was on their own territory, but because the TO would be very close to the continent.
The biggest problem I see is Taiwan's anti-ship missiles and mines. It is to be expected that the PLA will attack some coastal battery positions with its ballistic and cruise missiles as well as guided and precision bombs, but the chances of many batteries surviving are still high, which could pose a risk to the landing forces, therefore, the PLA would have to rely on close support aircraft and drones. Regarding mines, dedicated ships can play a role, but I would expect some helicopters to play that role like the MH-60S(AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS)) which has this role.
