PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
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Yes, I agree that China can live with the status quo in Taiwan. After all, that has been the situation for the past 70 years.
For the next 5+ years, I don't see this situation changing.
Taiwan already faces the prospect of the Chinese Air Force obtaining air superiority over Taiwan within a few days. At that point, Taiwan's entire infrastructure and economy would be crippled by air attack. There are only like 30-odd major power plants, 3 oil refineries and about 20 fuel terminals or depots. Without electricity or fuel, nothing else works. That is already enough of a deterrent, irrespective of whether China can successfully conduct an amphibious invasion of Taiwan or not.
As for China, the strategic balance will continue to move significantly in China's favour over the next 10+ years, so there's no rush. There's still a lot of economic and technological development to accomplish, which a war would disrupt. Plus China's stock of advanced weapons (with a typical lifetime of 30 years) is growing fast because military spending only really started ramping up 10 years ago. If the economic and military balance grows enough, Taiwan may capitulate without a shot being fired. And in 20 years time, China will be very different from today. Perhaps it won't particularly care too much about what Taiwan does.
In any case, the status quo and parking the Taiwan issue seems to be the best solution.
Except for elements in the USA, who see a Taiwan war now as being in the interests of American hegemony and keeping China down.
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plawolf
Lieutenant General
This post perfectly exemplifies the dated views clouding your judgment because you keep seeing the PLA as inherently and irrevocably inferior.
Because you cannot accept that the PLAN can protect its high value assets, you place disportioncate value on LSTs as disposable amphibious assault assets where it doesn’t matter if many missiles get through because you will have loads more LSTs.
That is not the view or strategy the PLA is pursuing. The PLAN would not be investing in 071 and 075s and carriers if there were any doubts about their ability to protect such high value assets. And it is because of your consistent underestimation of the PLA that you cannot make sense of what the PLA is doing and instead insist they are making mistakes and missing key steps. Rest assured they are not.
Heavy amphibious assault ships like LHDs and LHAs not only offer vastly improved load carrying capability, range and speed, compared to LSTs, they also have the benefit of comfort and flexibility. Which are factors you consistently go out of your way to ignore.
Not only would LSTs take longer to cross the strait, they will be far more bumpy rides to the extend that your troops are going to be fairly fatigued before they even leave the LSTs. A very bad start to any combat operation.
Relying on LSTs would also massively restrict the times of year when an amphibious assault could be launched because of their limited seakeeping capabilities. Not so with big LHDs and LHAs. This is also something the western MSM consistently ignore when they parrot the obsolete party line about when the PLA might be able to launch an offensive.
i really wonder why PLA would need LHD or LHA in a Taiwan scenario, afterall, it is only some 100 mile away from mainland.
using LHD or LHA to release LCU or LCAC beyond horizon? i am not sure, cannot the the smaller ships just travel by themselves that mere 100 miles? why using a mother ship to complicate the operation? it is not like the fleet need to go cross high sea first
using the LHA as helo mother ship to refuel and re-arm? maybe, but that can be done with just any civilian ship with a large deck, why bother with a LHA?
so i think 071 & 075 are prepared for other scenario that are much more distant from mainland.
and seriously, i think any measures that can be considered to use to move troops and heavy equipment across the strait, the first factor is survivability.
In this regard helicopters are mostly survivavble but it cannot do much heavy lifting.
Smaller LST provide the heavy lifting, plus better survivability because they are more difficult to target and easier to hide with jamming, compared to larger ships. and what is important is even if one is sunk, the damage is very limited.
larger ships, no matter they are 071, 075 or the 30kton ro-ro ships, are just too vunerable to missile attack, and even if just one missile slip through, the stake is just too high
using LHD or LHA to release LCU or LCAC beyond horizon? i am not sure, cannot the the smaller ships just travel by themselves that mere 100 miles? why using a mother ship to complicate the operation? it is not like the fleet need to go cross high sea first
using the LHA as helo mother ship to refuel and re-arm? maybe, but that can be done with just any civilian ship with a large deck, why bother with a LHA?
so i think 071 & 075 are prepared for other scenario that are much more distant from mainland.
and seriously, i think any measures that can be considered to use to move troops and heavy equipment across the strait, the first factor is survivability.
In this regard helicopters are mostly survivavble but it cannot do much heavy lifting.
Smaller LST provide the heavy lifting, plus better survivability because they are more difficult to target and easier to hide with jamming, compared to larger ships. and what is important is even if one is sunk, the damage is very limited.
larger ships, no matter they are 071, 075 or the 30kton ro-ro ships, are just too vunerable to missile attack, and even if just one missile slip through, the stake is just too high
I see it as being realistic.
If you accept that the US Navy's large ships are at high risk 1500km from the Chinese mainland if they can be located, then you have to accept the same for the large ships of the Chinese Navy. Note that the Japanese Home Islands are a shorter distance from Taiwan, and Chinese ships will be visible next to ports or beaches in Taiwan. As I understand it, current US wargames have US bombers/aircraft being able to affect Taiwan every 12 hours for 1-2 hours. Then the rest of the time, the Chinese Air Force have uncontested air superiority.
A Type-071 costs around $200 million and a Type-075 guestimate is $1000 million. So it's worth launching large expensive antiship missiles. An LRASM (560km range) is $4 million and the latest US hypersonic missiles (with a 3000km range) are running about $40-$50 million.
But if mass-produced Type-072 LSTs are only $14 million each, using long-range hypersonic missiles will not be viable.
Chinese Carriers will be operating in blue water in the Western Pacific with the space to manoeuvre and disappear. That does not apply to ships directly involved in a Taiwan operation which will be located within a small fixed box inside the Taiwan Straits. Yes, there would be a lot of SAMs protecting such an operation, but the US would have the advantage of when it wants to concentrate missile launches and also massing aircraft.
LHDs and LHA offer less load carrying capacity than an LST on a cost basis.
Range, speed and comfort are distinctly secondary considerations due to the short distances involved in the Taiwan Straits. And remember that transport helicopters could operate from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan and back in one trip. Theoretically LCACs could also operate directly from China to Taiwan, if they have a refueling stop after dropping off their cargo. I don't see the additional flexibility of LHDs and LHAs being worth it for Taiwan. So I see these ships primarily tasked with operations elsewhere to seal off the Western Pacific.
Plus I see LSTs mainly transporting vehicles rather than men. Remember that prior to LSTs reaching Taiwan, I've already mentioned there would already be multiple Airborne and Amphibious SOF Brigades inserted by small boats and helicopters, which would have largely secured the beaches and approaches under Chinese air cover.
Whilst the Taiwanese Army is currently hollowed out due to a failed transition from a conscript to a professional force, you cannot rely on this still being the case in 5 years time. So I just don't see any alternative to having a large of amount of sealift onto beaches, because the other infrastructure is subject to attack. Even then, any ships in the Taiwan Straits are inherently vulnerable because they are essentially in a fixed location.
Hence my conclusion that a larger number of smaller, cheaper LSTs is preferable to larger amphibious ships.
Distance does not make amphibious operation against Taiwan any less challenging, distances provide a lot of flexibility for the PLA to take advantage of other amphibious capabilities that if it were at a further distance it could not employ.
Smaller ships can cross the Taiwan Strait, but the LCACs would only be able to make the crossing and when it reached its destination, it would have to be refueled to return to the mainland. The problem is the amphibious vehicles that do not have the necessary range to carry out the assault from 50 km away and the helicopter support that the large amphibious ships have on their flight decks.
Conducting landings beyond enemy radar and visual range is a technique that employs maneuver warfare concepts such as surprise, operational speed, operational flexibility, and mobility tactics to achieve a tactical advantage over the enemy that can be decisively exploited while minimizing risk to assault ships.
The concept of assault beyond the horizon (OTH) is to not approach the enemy coast. Amphibious ships are located between 50 and 450 km from the beach, out of reach of enemy sensors and weapons on the coast.
Fast platforms such as LCACs, ZTD-05s and helicopters will do the landing work at the most critical hours of landing and would then be supported by conventional means. These means ensure that the amphibious force does not have to worry about topography (sand, clay, beach slope etc) or oceanographic conditions (tides and sea state). The area of operation or "battlespace" will be expanded, making the problem of defending the coast much more difficult for enemies.
An LST has to remain close to shore to land which increases the losses, both because of the enemy's coastal anti-ship batteries, also because of enemy aviation as its close air support capability will be limited and because of the threat of mines, as he has to get very close to shore to carry out the heist, this greatly increases the chances of losing a large amount of LSTs.
As an example, in 1991, a raid on Fayalka Island to destroy radars, communications centers and command posts, as well as capture Iraqi troops, was canceled after the USS Tripoli (LPH-10) and USS Princeton (CG- 59) hit mines on 18 February.
LHAs are helicopter carriers for transporting and landing 1,200-1,800 troops with organic aircraft and combine the main features of assault cargo ship, helicopter transport ship and amphibious transport in one hull. These features include a full-length landing cover, a full-length dike depot, a large depot area for trucks and armored vehicles, and for housing a reinforced battalion. They also have an integrated computerized support amphibious warfare system for the control of helicopters, aircraft, onboard weapons, sensors, navigation, landing craft and electronic warfare.
Ships like the Type 071 and Type 075 are prepared for any kind of scenario.
The LPD(Type 071) is one of the most versatile members of the amphibious forces. Its primary use is for troop transport and armored vehicles with considerable rear space. It combines the features of the Amphibious Transport (LPA), Amphibious Cargo Ship (LKA), and Helicopter Carrier (LPH), Amphibious Landing Vessel (LSD) and Tank Landing Vessel (LST). Must be able to carry helicopters permanently, due to its hangar. It's not good at everything, but it has a wide variety of capabilities.
It has a running dock carrying LCU or LCAC and a flight deck capable of arming and refueling attack and assault helicopters. In the US Navy, the LPD ranks below the LPH in troop-carrying capacity, but serves as a base for SEALs and EOD forces. Due to its versatility, during a division of an ARG, the LPD can conduct independent low-intensity operations involving sea-land, naval and air movements. It also serves as a mother ship for advanced operations forces (reconnaissance, special forces, beach reconnaissance, diversionary attacks, etc). Because it is closer to the enemy coast, it is better protected with armor, QBR protection, electronic warfare and active defense systems. Most countries have LPD, centering their forces around them.
Have you ever seen the size of a Type 072A? They are over 100 meters long. If the LST approaches within only 5 km of the enemy coast, the ship will be tracked by the radars of coastal anti-ship batteries or even by small UAVs and will be quickly neutralized if the enemy launches AShM with explosive and penetrating warheads.
In terms of self-defense and self-survival, larger amphibious ships are by far the best job you can use. In addition to having anti-aircraft and anti-missile capabilities, large amphibious ships operate far from shore, which further increases the chances of survival, an LST cannot support these operations and rely on sea conditions to carry out the amphibious landing.
Correct. But the use of a helicopter is versatile, and fundamentally important in the initial landing, the conquest of the beachhead has to be explored by helicopters, in addition to amphibious ships.
Among the helicopter missions during the amphibious assault we have:
- speed, superior maneuverability; troop mobility on the beach, allows troops to move faster inland from the beachhead;
- assault - transport troops and equipment to the beachhead;
- combat logistics - transport of ammunition, fuel, food and other cargo;
- escort - made by armed or specialized helicopters or by fixed-wing aircraft. They must defend enemies both on the ground and in the air;
- flexibility - can be used after landing and not only during it;
- Surprise and evasion - aircraft take off beyond the horizon, can use the terrain and are briefly exposed over the traffic area;
- has organic capacity for aeromedical evacuation, SAR and rescue. Carry the wounded after landing troops or cargo when near troops and beyond beaches;
- visual and armed recognition;
- air control for long-range air assault operations;
- C3 for OTH assault operations from LCACs and other amphibious vessels.
- has organic firepower, either from the aircraft itself or from escort helicopters;
- Expanded landing zone options. It is not limited to beaches and you can disembark without touching the ground (rappel);
- complicates the problem of enemy defense. The area to be defended is immensely larger as it includes the inland region and the beach. In conventional vessels, the beaches suitable for landing would be the ones best defended by the enemy. In air assault it is very likely to find the defenses scattered and less dense and the enemy will need advanced systems to act efficiently.
- the landing can start a day earlier with the insertion of precursors and with "empty" landings where the aircraft touches the ground and does not disembark troops. The objective is to disperse enemy troops in search of troops that do not exist.
You completely disregard the employment of these ships (OTH), the self-defense capability (CIWS, anti-aircraft guns and SAMs) and minimally exploit the shortcomings of the employment of the smaller ships. If you start to amplify this argument that all types of larger ships are more vulnerable and are more susceptible to being neutralized, then the PLAN should immediately stop the construction of Type 003 as they are vulnerable to AShM missiles like LRASM among others and disable permanently Type 001 and Type 002.
you talked a lot about benefit of oth landing which i agree very much, but in tw scenario using 726 all the way from shore to shore is not taking away that benefit of oth but only saving the trouble of loading/offloading in middle of the strait, am i wrong?
i am confused here, are you saying the range of 726 is just too low to do a shore-to-shore in the strait and have to use a mothership in bwtween?
i honestly think 072 is also too big, i think a re-designed 067 or 074-like LCU with high speed and towed decoy is the answer.
with proper fake targets sailing along and cover of darkness, it is almost impossible for the enemy to identify and hit the real target, and even if they somehow manage to score a hit, one ashm will only destroy one squard or platoon, very limited damage.
not disregarding oth at all, like i described earlier
and when it comes to air defense, i would say the decisive air defense capability is not from the amphibious ships themselves anyway, no matter it is a 072,074 or a 071, 075, it comes from the fleet defense of the 052d/055 in the strait. so it does not really matter that much whether you have that additional hq10. and if last line of point defense needs to be strengthened, i would simply sail a 022 or a 056 alone side the LCU
and remember, self defense capability is not only in SAM or AA guns, but also in how you can prevent enemy from targeting you correctly, and how you can prevent one ashm causing too much damage, in which case the small LCU solution like i described is very competitive
this is completly not true, we are only talking about how to move troops across the taiwan strait, not about any other general scenario
No. Because they are ships that, although they have essentially the same purpose, the employment requirement is totally different.
No. I said that the LCAC can only cross the strait once, for it to return to the mainland as soon as the troops landed, it must necessarily resupply before returning.
So it would have to be an LSM - Land Ship Medium.
And in that case, where would the air support be?
And the mines? Will they land on the beach without carrying out the location and removal of the mines?
What if they are tracked? What will you do? Turn back?
What if they are tracked and the enemy launches missiles from coastal batteries? Will they have punctual defenses to neutralize the attack?
I could fill an entire comment with questions along these lines.
Excellent. In addition to putting amphibious landing ships at risk with a high chance of being neutralized the landing on the beach, you would also be putting escort ships, and this considering only the enemy's anti-ship coastal batteries, I am completely disregarding aviation and drones here.
So it is. And how can you expect the enemy not to target an LST/LSM if these ships need to land on the beach to land vehicles and troops?
Also, an ARG has 1-2 destroyers as an air defense dependency, so it should be a good point to start looking at. However, as the large amphibious ships operate 50-100 km away from the beach, the SAMs batteries located on the mainland are able to adequately protect without having to have a destroyer acting as an air defense, since at these distances, the amphibious ships would be in the middle of the strait, far from coastal radar range, but this is a situation that will not occur, regardless of how the invasion will occur, the PLAN will most certainly implement a CSG in addition to the amphibious task force.
The initial invasion with helicopters, LCACs and LSTs is the easy part.
The difficult part is supplying these forces and then building up a large enough force to overwhelm the defenders.
And you could be looking at a really large number of defenders in urban terrain.
For the duration of a campaign, there is no practical option but to have ships sail right up to the Taiwanese coastline to unload vehicles and supplies, whether that is on a beach or port. And that makes these ships vulnerable.
Initially, the landing of advanced forces is followed by forward observation teams, counter-mining operations and finally the amphibious assault.
Advanced forces conduct beach reconnaissance and locate enemy assets. Advanced directional observation teams Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) against enemy positions and also create a divisive and deceptive attack on the enemy over the main assault location.
When amphibious landings have a subordinate role, the preference is for small-scale landings. Usage differs between countries, particularly between NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries.
For Westerners, conquering a beachhead is always the prelude to extensive action on land. The US Marines made an administrative (unopposed) landing in Vietnam and fought on land permanently. The British did the same in Falklands where the Commandos landed together with the paratroopers and fought side by side throughout the campaign. US Army troops also landed along with the Marines in Normandy. In France there is no unit specialized in amphibious operations, but some have training in amphibious operations. The army's own troops are embarked and the French navy is responsible for special forces troops, beach organization and amphibious ships. The French Army has two light armored divisions involved in routine amphibious operations which in the future will have brigade support (2 armored, 2 mechanized, 2 light armored, 1 mountain, 1 paratrooper, 1 airmobile including helicopters, 4 combat support and 2 service support).
In the communist bloc, these specialized troops only hold a beachhead (or conduct incursions further inland). Subsequent efforts would be mechanized infantry units, terrain permitting, with artillery support. Withdrawal of naval infantry is made as quickly as possible to keep them available to ensure successful landings elsewhere. Another task may be to ensure coastal defense.
Amphibious landings have the characteristic of combined arms. No amphibious landing can be successful unless temporary naval and air superiority is achieved. Heavy fire preparation is also necessary to suppress all but the enemy's weakest defenses. Many fires are made from the air, including the use of armed helicopters in escort duty. The main force artillery must also be able to provide support in shallow landings.
For successful amphibious and air landings, it is also necessary to obtain an accurate picture of enemy air, naval and ground forces within the intervention range. Intensive data collection always precedes landing.
A helicopter or airborne landing precedes or accompanies the initial amphibious landing. If the amphibious landing is small-scale and short, a heli-borne force may suffice. However, a larger and deeper landing may necessitate an air landing. The airdrop (landing or parachute) of ground forces may be necessary to secure a beachhead, port or airport, interdict the approach of enemy reserves or attack important points of the rear.
Naval infantry units constitute the first echelon of an operational-level amphibious operation. They have the responsibility to break down anti-landing obstacles in the water and on the beach, to conquer a beachhead and to defend the arrival of the main force in the landing area. When they arrive on the beach, the naval infantry units employ tactics in line with those employed by the main force. They arrive within 1.5-2 km of the beach, 15 minutes before the amphibious assault. Its immediate mission is to establish a line to provide protection for the landing and deployment of second-tier forces. The first echelon also receives a further advance axis (and the final objective of landing).
When naval infantry conquers the bridgehead, mechanized infantry units land in the second echelon. At this point, they take over the battle. They replace, rather than reinforce, the assault force, even if they have suffered few casualties. The objective is to make naval infantry available for further landings.