What ever did happen to Tonya Harding?
PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
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What ever did happen to Tonya Harding?
Unlike Russia with Ukraine, there was an actual test of this: the flash drills near Taiwan in August 2022 around the Pelosi visits.
US believed that China can't do anything about it.
US later expressed strategic surprise at the 'unprecedented' tests, calls them "overreactions". This is a tone that the US has never used before, and isn't from a position of strength.
Basically, US did not predict either 1. the existence of or 2. the magnitude of the drills around Taiwan that China held.
If you actually read it, it's another version of this:
Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis
Just saw a cool pic of PLAN type 052C 'Changchun' with ROCN Cheng-Kung Class escorting. Thought it was relevant. There was a time when those Cheng Kung Class ships could take on the entire PLA Navy. Incredible how much has changed in just 20 years
www.sinodefenceforum.com
Goes double for US since they have to invade China on the other side of the Pacific.
China can call up defensive forces around its border on very short notice. Its much harder for US to get a force capable of taking over Taiwan Island without raising huge red flags everywhere.
If US actually attacks, then I don't think there's any doubt that China would undergo general mobilization.
China does not benefit as much from surprise as from just dragging out the fight so they can mobilize. For Americans, the war is at most a vague attempt at "defending hegemony", while for Chinese it is an issue of survival.
There is a question of what Americans can send. A mere special military operation with 2 CVBG + 200k troops? Declare war and send the whole US military? The former would probably just get run over by the PLA, even before China makes a draft. The latter means huge risk, and what if China avoids decisive battle with the US armada and merely engages using missiles and drones spewed out by its industries?
Plus, if US opts for the latter, the whole world will realize what they're doing the moment they prepare it. It would take months to transit all equipment to China's border, and unlike Russia who at least has the flimsy excuse of doing border drills, its hard to see how US could excuse collecting 8+ CVBGs in Asia as a routine exercise.
They don't have the capability to deploy 8/12 CBGs in the near term, they will need 42 months to get to the 70% readiness required for deploying 8/12 carriers. Doctrinally, CBG readiness is 20-30% with surge capability up to 50% within 18-24 months.
Typical deployment today is 3 CBGs globally (25% deployment). 6 is their short term surge capability which was seen during Desert Storm. Note that in 1991 their navy was much larger with 16 CBGs total: 9 conventional (1x Midway, 4x Forrestal, 4x Kitty Hawk), 7 nuclear (1x Enterprise, 6x Nimitz).
The problem with all these western analyses is the incorrect underlying assumption that China would attack on a whim. The most likely realistic scenario is China attacking in reaction to a move towards formal independence. That would involve a drawn out ratcheting up of preparations. But even if there's no preparation, a blockade can be implemented by the PLAN with no preparation, as has been demonstrated already. A bombardment of the island with missiles won't need any additional preparation. The air force is practicing flying into the ADIZ on a daily basis. So a shock and awe campaign could be started immediately. Whether it's worth it to attack with no preparation to deny the separatists the possibility of mobilisation or whether it's better to mobilize first I don't know, but I'd tend towards attacking immediately and mobilising while the US starts its own mobilisation.
Isn't China already building missiles at a rapid pace?
Most of this has already partially been done because of zero covid or could be done immediately such as tightening currency controls and nationalising foreign assets. The only thing that can't be done already is selling China's reserves, some of them will likely have to be written off if China is forced to act.
America's actions are sufficient to create anti American sentiment in China. The US has never been this unpopular. And if war broke out but zero covid would be stopped, most people would probably benefit financially
That would be nice to have, but unnecessary. 2007 was a long time ago and the stop loss was probably more about signalling than preparation. In any case, recently demobilised personnel can easily be reintegrated
That would make sense for the US or Russian military that is mostly managing old hardware. The vast majority of PLA equipment is new so it won't need excessive maintenance before the war
Once again the author is confusing American capabilities with Chinese capabilities. China can build a hospital in less than two weeks
None of these takes much time
That seems unlikely. More reasonably China would destroy the separatists as fast as possible and only start mobilisation after the resumption of hostilities and only if the US starts its own mobilisation
Russia's campaign is a masterclass in what not to do. The government is probably learning more from it than the separatists. Just use the American air war on Iraq as a template
Americans thinkers are often clueless and can't stop saying America number one. A strategic surprise attack is possible today, but in 2027 it would be even easier. So it's better to wait for now
Russia's campaign mainly shows US what to do and not do.
Dont rely on separatists to do heavy fighting.
Dont send only a small portion of forces.
Rockets (both bigger iskander types and smaller tornado/himars) are effective.
Heavy bombers are not viable vs remotely modern air defenses.
Drones can do heavy lifting, but only if they're numerous.
Not sure where this fits in.
In AR scenario, the logistics / escalation potential over evacuation of 750,000 foreign nationals from TW is going to be interesting, especially if airfields / maritime facilities to resupply TW are going to be zero hour targets. My thinking is that PRC needs to spell out sooner than later that since TW is legally considered Chinese territory that any unauthorized efforts to exfil is legally an attack on sovereign Chinese soil. Domestic optics would view it as such regardless. Which leaves PRC/PLA asserting control over coordinating extraction/repatriation, preferably via secured TW port, that even without PLA taking, there will likely be global pressure on TW admin to allow. Which begs the followup, where to? IMO, if smart, directly to the mainland via maritime routes where foreign nationals will be processed. Which itselfs opens up the legal status / drama of foreign nationals operating on TW (read: Chinese soil) without valid PRC authorization. Which opens up all sorts of hostage drama / strategy options. Look up stats for foreign residents on island, risk to their nationals in TW will likely deter most of the region from cooperating with US intervention until evacuation. 750k will take lots of time, and ships, that itself makes anti shipping activity in TW strait (by TW or US et al)... complicated. And every evacuation ship going to the island is an opportunity to unload PLA assets. Also mitigates TW talent being paper clipped away, while mininizing chances of "enemies of the state" from escaping to their golden parachutes in west.
Related strategic/lawfare tomfoolery that should be implemented years prior would be to "encourage" foreign nationals on TW to apply for VISA via mainland, which will erode TW sovereignty, undermine migrant labour economy, possibly discourage/make lives difficult for increasing western PRC watchers and ex mainland media relocating to TW. The implication being if one doesn't have the proper PRC stamps, when shit goes down, one can't really expect to be treated as anything but a spy/hostile/illegal migrant subject to PRC domestic laws.
Of course if implemented prematurely, could also backfire spectacularly.
In AR scenario, the logistics / escalation potential over evacuation of 750,000 foreign nationals from TW is going to be interesting, especially if airfields / maritime facilities to resupply TW are going to be zero hour targets. My thinking is that PRC needs to spell out sooner than later that since TW is legally considered Chinese territory that any unauthorized efforts to exfil is legally an attack on sovereign Chinese soil. Domestic optics would view it as such regardless. Which leaves PRC/PLA asserting control over coordinating extraction/repatriation, preferably via secured TW port, that even without PLA taking, there will likely be global pressure on TW admin to allow. Which begs the followup, where to? IMO, if smart, directly to the mainland via maritime routes where foreign nationals will be processed. Which itselfs opens up the legal status / drama of foreign nationals operating on TW (read: Chinese soil) without valid PRC authorization. Which opens up all sorts of hostage drama / strategy options. Look up stats for foreign residents on island, risk to their nationals in TW will likely deter most of the region from cooperating with US intervention until evacuation. 750k will take lots of time, and ships, that itself makes anti shipping activity in TW strait (by TW or US et al)... complicated. And every evacuation ship going to the island is an opportunity to unload PLA assets. Also mitigates TW talent being paper clipped away, while mininizing chances of "enemies of the state" from escaping to their golden parachutes in west.
Related strategic/lawfare tomfoolery that should be implemented years prior would be to "encourage" foreign nationals on TW to apply for VISA via mainland, which will erode TW sovereignty, undermine migrant labour economy, possibly discourage/make lives difficult for increasing western PRC watchers and ex mainland media relocating to TW. The implication being if one doesn't have the proper PRC stamps, when shit goes down, one can't really expect to be treated as anything but a spy/hostile/illegal migrant subject to PRC domestic laws.
Of course if implemented prematurely, could also backfire spectacularly.
Pentagon, Chinese analysts agree US can’t win in Taiwan Strait
US mulls ‘scorched earth’ strategy for Taiwan instead of defense
by David P. Goldman December 6, 2022
China’s satellite coverage in the Western Pacific has doubled since 2018, the Pentagon reported last week in its annual assessment of the Chinese military. That gives China the ability to detect American surface ships with an array of sensors that can guide its 2,000 land-based missiles to moving targets, including US aircraft carriers.
The Defense Department’s November 29 report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” reflects a grimly realistic rethinking of China’s military capacity in its home theater.
China hawk Elbridge Colby, a prominent advocate of a Western Pacific military buildup to deny China access to its adjacent seas, tweeted on November 6, “Senior flag officers are saying we’re on a trajectory to get crushed in a war with China, which would likely be the most important war since WWII, God forbid.”
The strategic takeaway is that the United States cannot win a firefight close to China’s coast, and can’t defend Taiwan whether it wants to or not. That view in the Joe Biden administration’s Department of Defense (DOD) persuaded the president to discuss “guardrails” against military confrontation in his November summit with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping.
Republican hawks appear to have come to the same conclusion. The United States will enact a scorched-earth policy in Taiwan, destroying its semiconductor industry, if the PRC seizes the island, former Trump national security adviser Robert O’Brien told a conference at the Richard Nixon Foundation on November 10, reports army-technology.com.
“If China takes Taiwan and takes those factories intact – which I don’t think we would ever allow – they have a monopoly over chips the way OPEC has a monopoly, or even more than the way OPEC has a monopoly over oil,” O’Brien said.
A much-read paper by two Army War College professors published this year proposes that “the United States and Taiwan should lay plans for a targeted scorched-earth strategy that would render Taiwan not just unattractive if ever seized by force, but positively costly to maintain.”
“This could be done most effectively by threatening to destroy facilities belonging to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the most important chipmaker in the world and China’s most important supplier.”
O’Brien evidently agrees with the Pentagon’s assessment that the US can’t win a war in the Taiwan Strait, proposing – apropos of the Vietnam War’s most celebrated sound bite – to destroy the island in order to save it.
Anti-ship missiles are the 21st-century equivalent of the torpedo and dive bombers that banished the battleship from military budgets after the 1940 sinking of the Bismarck by the British and the 1941 sinking of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales by the Japanese. Surface ships including aircraft carriers can’t defend against modern missiles that can downlink guidance data from reconnaissance satellites.
The DOD report states that the PLA Rocket Force’s “conventionally armed CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) ASBM variant gives the PLA the capability to conduct long-range precision strikes against ships, including aircraft carriers, out to the Western Pacific.”
“The [People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s] ground-based missile forces complement the air and sea-based precision strike capabilities of the PLAAF and PLAN.… DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km, is fitted with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV), and is reportedly capable of rapidly reloading in the field.
“The PLARF continues to grow its inventory of DF-26 IRBMs, which it first revealed in 2015 and fielded in 2016. The multi-role DF-26 is designed to rapidly swap conventional and nuclear warheads and is capable of conducting precision land-attack and anti-ship strikes in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea from mainland China.
“In 2020, China fired anti-ship ballistic missiles against a moving target in the South China Sea.”
China tested these weapons thoroughly, the Pentagon report adds:
“In 2021, the PLARF launched approximately 135 ballistic missiles for testing and training, more than the rest of the world combined excluding ballistic missile employment in conflict zones. The DF-17 passed several tests successfully and is deployed operationally.
“While the DF-17 is primarily a conventional platform, it may be equipped with nuclear warheads. In 2020, a PRC-based military expert described the primary purpose of the DF-17 as striking foreign military bases and fleets in the Western Pacific.”
Key to the effectiveness of anti-ship missiles is satellite intelligence and electronic warfare measures. As the Pentagon reports:
“China employs a robust space-based ISR [intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance] capability designed to enhance its worldwide situational awareness. Used for military and civilian remote sensing and mapping, terrestrial and maritime surveillance, and intelligence collection, China’s ISR satellites are capable of providing electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery as well as electronic and signals intelligence data.”
Most important:
“As of the end of 2021, China’s ISR satellite fleet contained more than 260 systems – a quantity second only to the United States, and nearly doubling China’s in-orbit systems since 2018.”
Satellite signals can be jammed or spoofed (misdirected to show incorrect coordinates), but
“The PLA continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, and satellite navigation … the PRC continues to develop a variety of counter-space capabilities designed to limit or prevent an adversary’s use of space-based assets during crisis or conflict.
“In addition to the development of directed energy weapons and satellite jammers, the PLA has an operational ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missile intended to target low-Earth orbit satellites, and the PRC probably intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.
“PLA [electronic warfare] units routinely train to conduct jamming and anti-jamming operations against multiple communication and radar systems and Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite systems during force-on-force exercises.
“These exercises test operational units’ understanding of EW weapons, equipment, and procedures and they also enable operators to improve confidence in their ability to operate effectively in a complex electromagnetic environment.”
China’s military has improved quality as well as quantity, according to the Pentagon:
“Recent improvements to China’s space-based ISR capabilities emphasize the development, procurement, and use of increasingly capable satellites with digital camera technology as well as space-based radar for all-weather, 24-hour coverage.
“These improvements increase China’s monitoring capabilities – including observation of US aircraft carriers, expeditionary strike groups, and deployed air wings. Space capabilities will enhance potential PLA military operations farther from the Chinese coast.”
Overall, the Pentagon’s readout on China’s missile and satellite capability is virtually identical to the estimation of Chinese analysts, for example, the widely read military columnist Chen Feng in the prominent Chinese website “The Observer” (guancha.cn). In a November 27 report, Chen explained why an array of small satellites can achieve precise real-time target location:
“Small satellites are not only small, lightweight, and low-cost, but also operate in low orbits. In terms of space ISR, one is worth nearly three. This is true for optical and radar imaging, as well as for signal interception. So the actual reconnaissance capability of small satellites is no weaker than large satellites, and commercial Synthetic Aperture Radar small satellites in the United States and China are able to reach 0.5-meter resolution.
“Optical imaging has always had the advantage of high resolution, which is also a very mature technology. In the era of digital imaging, there is no longer a need to use the re-entry capsule to send the film back to the ground when the satellite is overhead.”
Synthetic aperture radar, Chen explains, “is not applicable to moving targets, but most of the intelligence can be interpreted from still images, and the similarities and movement can be inferred from differences between the before and after still images can also be inferred from the movement.”
A lead satellite may detect a suspicious object, and follow-up satellites “can be switched to a detailed investigation mode, and relay the results of detailed investigation.” Other satellites with electromagnetic rather than optical sensors can conduct real-time triangulation.
In addition to its satellite ISR capability, Chen says, the other half of China’s reconnaissance capability consists of “unmanned aircraft, unmanned boats, submarines, and networked land-based radar, and undersea hydroacoustic monitoring.”
China, Chen concludes, does not yet have global ISR capability, “but theater coverage has been achieved.”
See link for rest of the article.