Yes definitely. Setting up distributed fire bases with IRBMs/HGVs and distributed small air bases with which they can operate F-35s from most definitely are viable and important targets to be capable of striking.
And if you look at the distances in the South China Seas, you're looking at a maximum of around 1900km from Hainan to potential island bases that the US has occupied. Again, you have a similar calculation between:
1. JH-XX launching 400km range JASSMs that cost $0.5M
versus
2. trucks on Hainan launching the same missiles with a 1900km range that cost $1.5M
With a notional JH-XX cost of $150M, you need to launch say 150 missiles before a JH-XX works out better.
Again, you've got the same issues with a JH-XX being shot down and higher operating costs.
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And I just don't see the US setting up that many bases on Malaysian or Indonesian territory
So I see any contingencies here being covered comfortably covered by a combination of long-range missiles, tankers, J-20s, H-6s, H-20s, GB-11s etc
In that case I think we have differing views for the long term requirements that China has for the PLA.
The way I see it, any Taiwan contingency will be composed of two complementary, simultaneous missions and requirements:
1. The Taiwan "invasion" proper, including all of the operations needed to gain air superiority, sea control, SEAD/DEAD, amphibious assault, ground operations around Taiwan island proper and on the island itself.
2. The "deterrence" mission, which requires a massive multipronged air-naval-missile force capable of surrounding the region around Taiwan so as to preemptively meet and track any movement of aircraft and ships from outside nations that may either seek to directly intervene on behalf of Taiwan or to use military force to undermine the Chinese war effort (including blockades of SLOCs and so on). That is to say, there is a requirement to not only be capable of outright defeating a highly capable outside hostile force on even terms, but also to be capable of significantly undermining or crippling an enemy's ability to conduct a blockade at least in the overall western pacific region (that includes the SCS).
Perhaps my view of these requirements are a bit more ambitious than yours, which is why I view the proposed mission of the JH-XX in the way that I do.
All of this is growing outside the scope of the thread, therefore if you continue this further then I will move the relevant posts in a different thread.
If not, well I have said my part.
In terms of priorities and importance, I see defence of Chinese SLOCs as secondary.
And for the next 15 years at least, it's futile to divert many resources to break a US blockade on China, because US carriers will control the waters past the 2nd Island Chain anyway.
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In comparison, the defence of the mainland China seaboard is paramount.
That includes the megacity of Shanghai which only lies 800km from the Japanese Home Islands.
South Korea is only 400km from mainland China.
They are close enough for fighters to conduct airstrikes and air superiority missions against each other
So why develop a yet another new bomber type for distant operations when a larger Y-20U tanker and J-20 fleet could simultaneously:
1. Secure Chinese cities on the mainland
2. Establish air superiority (at least temporarily) and target the ships at Korean or Japanese ports.
Korea and Japan are small resource-poor island nations which can't survive if their SLOCs are crippled by attacks on their ports. (South Korea is effectively an island because the northern border is sealed off)
In comparison, China can be largely self-sufficient as it is the same size as the continental US and also has overland trade routes
So if there is a US blockade of China (which includes US bases in the South China Seas), it's easier and better for China to push a counter-blockade of Korea and Japan.
In such a scenario, we can expect Korea to collapse first, with increasingly desperate US attempts to prevent this.
But this mission does mean the Chinese Air Force taking on the entire air forces of the US, Korea and Japan.
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Now, if China continues to spend a modest 1.7% of GDP on the military, the military balance is only going to change gradually, and the US will still have a significant advantage in the number of 5th generation fighters for air superiority purposes, along with secure rear area bases in Japan.
But the more J-20s and tankers China has, the higher the costs that China can impose. Potentially ensuring a Korea collapse even if China is at a disadvantage in overall 5th generation fighters. And presumably this would be combined with a ground campaign against the US Army in South Korea.
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But if China were to engage in an arms race and double military spending, the situation would change drastically in the next 10 years.
If China were to double military spending to 3.4% of GDP, that is still less than the US which is currently at 3.7%
That works out to almost $300 Billion per year extra in Chinese military spending on an exchange rate basis.
And that would buy you enough J-20s and Y-20U tankers to contest overall air superiority in Korea and Japan.
And if you also strip out the effects of labour costs (39% for the USA, DOD estimate 33% for China), it also means China is spending more on the military than the US. And that is before we take into account lower equipment costs in China
