Future PLA strategic procurement priorities

[Blitzo]

I meant ignore the H-20 entirely if you don't believe it will have the range. The tactical nuclear bombardment mission can be done by ground-launched ICBM-range HGVs. I imagine such a launcher would be between a DF-26 and DF-31 in size, given the lighter payload and range extended trajectory of HGVs relative to ballistic trajectories.

That's what this section of your post that I responded to implied:

If you have some other way to do it you haven't mentioned, I'd love to hear it.

Did you miss the part of my previous reply to you where I said I was describing a present day conflict scenario based on what he was himself describing?

In a present day conflict scenario, I do not see any way in which China would be capable of striking at US industrial or production sites in any meaningful manner.

That is entirely consistent with my saying of: "I never said that China would not seek to attain the means to try and strike CONTUS during a conflict".
Seeking to attain means, i.e.: seeking the capability for the future.
I.e.: I do not think they have that capability if a conflict were to occur right now in the present day.

Asymmetric use of nuclear weapons is not an idea that originated with me. The First Offset and Russia's supposed "escalate to de-escalate" strategy are two examples off the top of my head. It's an idea that's regularly bounced around in respectable US think tanks by Very Serious People™ - so as I see it, what's good for the goose is good for the gander.

Once again, a 1kt warhead is barely "nuclear." If there were a way to do this feasibly with a conventional munition, I'm all for it. Sadly, whatever mechanism by which our universe came to be saw fit to make the binding energies of nuclei far exceed the energies of coupling valence electrons.

"Proportionate" escalation doesn't do much for the US that conventional force hasn't already done. If America wants to go beyond that, if it thinks it can escalate to countervalue strikes, my unshakeable view is simple: I dare them

Fair enough once again; you're free to put whatever limits you please on the topics you discuss. I don't subscribe to such a limit because I don't believe those planning war (in America or in China) are circumscribing their discussions similarly. I understand that discussion of nuclear war often escalates (no pun) into shouting matches or "everybody dies" dismissals, but I believe a nuanced discussion about calibrated nuclear responses can be had. I also think the crowd here at SDF (for the most part) is sophisticated enough to have such a discussion..

Then what you're really suggesting is to seek to use tactical nuclear weapons without the enemy using tactical nuclear weapons first.

That can warrant a whole separate dedicated thread or thesis for itself. If you want to talk about that, fine, but it's not something I want to get into and the use of nuclear weapons in general is the line where I draw for all of my conflict scenarios that I think out, because once you get that close to the threshold of nuclear exchange, it makes any discussion of conventional force conflict largely moot and irrelevant.

It's not my intention to be "emotive" or make it easy for haters to caricature my position (which isn't something I really care about). The point I'm trying to get across is that a war between the US and China must be transformed from a contest of strength and capability as it is now into a contest of wills, which it will be when China achieves comprehensive parity. That kind of concept and pattern of thinking naturally lends itself to "emotive" language, but I hope the underlying logic of my argument isn't lost.

You can write however you want within what's allowed of the forum rules, but people you're talking with (myself in this case, others perhaps in other cases) also reserve the right to not respond.
I'm always open to discussion and often happy to respond to valid questions, but when they are tinged with such emotion I personally lose the motivation to engage, and I certainly reserve the right to not reply.

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

Did you miss the part of my previous reply to you where I said I was describing a present day conflict scenario based on what he was himself describing?

In a present day conflict scenario, I do not see any way in which China would be capable of striking at US industrial or production sites in any meaningful manner.

So what capability do you see in the future whereby China would be able to meaningfully strike the continental US?

 

[Blitzo]

So what capability do you see in the future whereby China would be able to meaningfully strike the continental US?

During a conflict, in the future, I think nuclear submarines with LACMs and HGVs (conventional warheads) may be the most viable method they decide on.

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

During a conflict, in the future, I think nuclear submarines with LACMs and HGVs (conventional warheads) may be the most viable method they decide on.

I see. I have my doubts that conventionally armed submarines can deliver the density of fire to really be effective, given the length of transit and the risk they'd be under during those transits. I also wonder about the opportunity cost of not deploying the subs that would be given the CONUS strike mission closer to home.

But out of respect for your desire to not discuss unconventional options, I'll end this here.

 

[Blitzo]

I see. I have my doubts that conventionally armed submarines can deliver the density of fire to really be effective, given the length of transit and the risk they'd be under during those transits. I also wonder about the opportunity cost of not deploying the subs that would be given the CONUS strike mission closer to home.

But out of respect for your desire to not discuss unconventional options, I'll end this here.

The submarines would be in effect conducting relatively surgical strikes against important military-industrial targets. The target selection would inevitably be somewhat limited, so they'd have to choose them carefully.
Out of all of the possible options, they are the most viable, in absence of some kind of conflict where the PLA is able acquire a survivable and global string of military air bases.

PLA voluntary first use of nukes are not part of any kind of scenario of mine and for my projections I operate within those confines.

 

[EtherealSmoke]

PLA voluntary first use of nukes are not part of any kind of scenario of mine and for my projections I operate within those confines.

Signs of Chinese voluntary first strike:

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That can warrant a whole separate dedicated thread or thesis for itself. If you want to talk about that, fine, but it's not something I want to get into and the use of nuclear weapons in general is the line where I draw for all of my conflict scenarios that I think out, because once you get that close to the threshold of nuclear exchange, it makes any discussion of conventional force conflict largely moot and irrelevant.

Between peer nuclear powers, existential high-intensity conventional warfare is moot and irrelevant. It's just game theory. If one side loses conventionally, they will escalate to ensure a both-lose scenario. Escalate to de-escalate works.

 

[AndrewS]

If this thread is really about strategic priorities then you can forget about airpower beyond 20 series and maybe J-31, the real priorities are SSNs as fast as Huludao can build them and ICBMs as fast as they can be put in silos. Only once near parity with US is achieved in these areas can other types of system be prioritised.

I think we've already seen SSNs and ICBMs put as priorities.

There's not 1, but 2 huge submarine assembly halls which have recently been built.

Along with 300-odd new ICBM silos currently under construction.

Then it should be Y-20U tankers to extend the range of Chinese air ops.

 

[Blitzo]

Signs of Chinese voluntary first strike:

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Between peer nuclear powers, existential high-intensity conventional warfare is moot and irrelevant. It's just game theory. If one side loses conventionally, they will escalate to ensure a both-lose scenario. Escalate to de-escalate works.

Yet nations still pursue high end and increasingly complex conventional systems.

If one side loses conventionally, whether they would resort to the use of nuclear weapons is not guaranteed. It depends on what the conflict is about and the specific interests in question.

 

[sinophilia]

The submarines would be in effect conducting relatively surgical strikes against important military-industrial targets. The target selection would inevitably be somewhat limited, so they'd have to choose them carefully.
Out of all of the possible options, they are the most viable, in absence of some kind of conflict where the PLA is able acquire a survivable and global string of military air bases.

PLA voluntary first use of nukes are not part of any kind of scenario of mine and for my projections I operate within those confines.

If this is the maximal ability for China to strike the US then China will always be at a disadvantage in the potential for incurring civilian causalities, general infrastructure damage, production facilities of all kinds, etc. China will be at the mercy of the US while the reverse will be true at orders of magnitude less destruction at best. China could dominate a war and absolutely crush the US while incurring literally 1000x more overall damage, with the US completely untouched and only American bases in ruins, yet China is set back years or decades and the US is set back (economically, industrially, etc.) none.

There seems to be one real solution (short of a technology that negates distance as a factor completely): China establishing basing near the US...

What about Cuba and Venezuela? Establishing large numbers of units there would give China a capability approximately equal to current American force projection from Japan and the Korean peninsula (assuming Koreans ever give America permission to use their country for that purpose which I don't think is guaranteed).

You could put regular Americans at the implied mercy of Chinese forces, American infrastructure of all types, weapon production facilities, residential communities with accidental blowback from slightly inaccurate strikes and the like. Same things China would be confronted with.

Until that time, China will always be at the mercy of incurring more damage than is even possible for America to incur. That is a large and humiliating deficit that must be reduced significantly. At least I hope that's how Chinese leadership see it and are only biding their time now waiting to reach a sufficient threshold of conventional capability and volume of production before setting out on base building.

 

[Totoro]

Between peer nuclear powers, existential high-intensity conventional warfare is moot and irrelevant. It's just game theory. If one side loses conventionally, they will escalate to ensure a both-lose scenario. Escalate to de-escalate works.

I don't see that as the only or even the most likely course of events. If one side sees it's going to lose conventionally, it has two options:
A) escalating to nuclear - which has a high likelihood of escalating so much that everyone loses hard. Which involves the active side losing 50% of its population and 90% of its economy/industry/tech base.
or B) saying "ok, you win" and backing down. If it does that, it will lose a few percent of its population and some more percent of its economy/industry/tech base.

Under option A - the active country may require centuries to get to the level where it was before the war. Also centuries to get to the same level relative to the other belligerent country.
Under option B - the active country may require just decades to get to the level where it was before the war. With also a chance to once again match the other belligerent country; perhaps not within those same decades but certainly within a much, much shorter timespan than the aforementioned "centuries".

Now, if the other belligerent country insists on fighting further, after the active country said "you win", and perhaps even, as it keeps fighting, it insists on some ludicrous "peace terms" where the active country would be punished even far more than WW1 Germany was,
then the active country still retains that option of "okay, you're being totally unreasonable and if you don't stop you do leave us no choice but to nuke you and thus die together". At that point, the other belligerent has much more to lose, relatively speaking, than in the option A) and will likely back down and accept more normal peace terms.

Case in point - Germany. After WW1 it was punished severely. Politically and economically. Yet it rose up in mere 20 years to capability levels which were enough to once again question the primacy in Europe. And Germany again after WW2. It lost once again, but within half a century, it lived to see the political barriers that separated it into two countries defeated and proliferated into the most powerful European economy.

Bottom line: global nuclear war leads to very certain centuries of destruction and harsh life. Conventional defeat gives a very realistic chance that things may change within decades. Because if anything is certain from history- it's that people forget. Administrations come and go. And within just a few decades old enemies can become some kind of partners, out of necessity if not out of anything else. And from that point, it's once again race to the top. Or to some next war.