Chinese Hypersonic Developments (HGVs/HCMs)


Matheus S

New Member
Registered Member
The Americans will already implement the set of Blackjack satellites for infrared detection of hypersonic missiles, the sources claim that the system when operating at its full normal capacity will be able to track an HGV. It is worth noting that the detection of the HGV is already tracked when it is launched, the Soviet FOBS had one of its reasons for canceling the set of satellites capable of tracking the Soviet FOBS still being launched, making a surprise attack on CONUS impossible. With an HGV, this supposed deficiency still exists, but at the current stage, the only possibility of interception is in the terminal phase with the THAAD, in the reinforcement and in the intermediate phase, an HGV is not yet capable of being intercepted, with the set. Blackjack satellites, there is a remote possibility of intercepting even in the intermediate phase, because the tracking and assignment would be feasible, what remains to be analyzed is the capacity of the interceptor missile.
 

escobar

Brigadier
The Americans will already implement the set of Blackjack satellites for infrared detection of hypersonic missiles, the sources claim that the system when operating at its full normal capacity will be able to track an HGV. It is worth noting that the detection of the HGV is already tracked when it is launched, the Soviet FOBS had one of its reasons for canceling the set of satellites capable of tracking the Soviet FOBS still being launched, making a surprise attack on CONUS impossible. With an HGV, this supposed deficiency still exists, but at the current stage, the only possibility of interception is in the terminal phase with the THAAD, in the reinforcement and in the intermediate phase, an HGV is not yet capable of being intercepted, with the set. Blackjack satellites, there is a remote possibility of intercepting even in the intermediate phase, because the tracking and assignment would be feasible, what remains to be analyzed is the capacity of the interceptor missile.
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Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
The HBTSS assembly will act in a layer under Blackjack, the SDA satellites are space sensors with a wide field of view and will provide target data to the HBTSS system which has a medium field of view, so the HBTSS will be interoperable under a architecture of the Blackjack space set.
Study is one thing actually building it is another matter. It will need so many of infrared satellite it become so costly. Remember SDI it was cancelled because of prohibitive cost! If they have problem with conventional ballistic missile trying to track hypersonic missile is another level. Sofar it is vaporware to fleece tax payer money.
 

gelgoog

Captain
Registered Member
Study is one thing actually building it is another matter. It will need so many of infrared satellite it become so costly. Remember SDI it was cancelled because of prohibitive cost! If they have problem with conventional ballistic missile trying to track hypersonic missile is another level. Sofar it is vaporware to fleece tax payer money.

Might be a good business opportunity for SpaceX with Falcon 9 or Starship. SDIO was developing the Delta Clipper for similar purposes.
 

AssassinsMace

Lieutenant General
Like I said before... The US isn't going to spend the money to ring the US with Aegis ships. They act like the US Navy can move ships in quick enough to intercept hypersonic missiles. Then what about allies...? They going to spend into bankruptcy missile defense system that they will too have ring around their countries?
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
America is not the only one working on defense against hypersonic missile I bet China is also working on conceptual study of shield against hypersonic missile Here is one example

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PLA Thinking on Defense against Hypersonic Weapons

PLA strategists fear that the U.S. may deploy hypersonic weapons on the first island chain and/or the second island chain, directly threatening China.[6] In particular, they recognize that Chinese long-range kinetic interceptors lack precision to kill, and precision interceptors lack the range to strike targets at long distance. As early as 2012, the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation (CASIC) Academy of Defense Technology (中国航天科工防御技术研究院, Zhongguo hangtian ke gong fangyu jishu yanjiuyuan) proposed an architecture capable of defending against hypersonic weapons.[7]

The first component of the proposed 2012 CASIC defense architecture is an efficient and optimized detection network comprised of various sensors covering a distance of 800-1000 km (497-621 miles). The second is a high-speed information center capable of processing large amounts of heterogeneous data and discriminating against noise and other interference in real-time. The third element of the hypersonic defense plan is a high-performance command and control system to support an integrated air picture with rapid sensor-to-shooter cycle. The fourth component is a mixture of fast response airborne and near space-based interceptors. CASIC advocates air-to-air missiles for this purpose. However, hypersonic cruise missiles also pose significant technical challenges for low-angle detection and tracking over long distance, and the 2012 CASIC proposal does not seem to have reached sound solutions to this problem.

Researchers from the China Air-to-Air Missile Research Institute (中国空空导弹研究院, Zhongguo kong kong daodan yanjiuyuan) recommended a similar architecture in 2016.[8] They also advocate implementing airborne interceptors using both kinetic and direct energy, because of their advantages of low risk, low R&D and deployment cost, as well as the ability to offer rapid response with maximum operational flexibility. One challenge involved with air-to-air interceptors is their reliance on powerful airborne fire control radar to lock onto targets hundreds or even thousands of kilometers away. Whether China has fully developed this technology is unknown.

Researchers from the Space Engineering University (航天工程大学, Hangtian gongcheng daxue) under the command of the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) (战略支援部队, Zhanlue zhiyuan budui) indicated that they could use existing surveillance assets consisting of early warning aircraft and ground radars for early detection.[9] Additionally, they propose fielding ground-based and ship-borne high power, high resolution, and long-range phased array radars that can detect and track small, high-speed targets such as ballistic missile warheads and hypersonic vehicles. For warfighting, they envisage “forward deployment” of air-to-air missiles for head-on intercept, though due to the HGV’s high maneuverability, the deployment area would need to be quite large, and the rate of success would likely be small.

Two engineers from PLA Units #31002 and #32032 of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) recommend a similar architecture for hypersonic defense systems, but propose to deploy layered global networks for early warning and kinetic interception.[10] They indicate that though an infrared sensor cannot render precise three-dimensional target coordinates, it can still effectively provide early warning capabilities.[11] The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) Engineering University (火箭军工程大学, Huojianjun gongcheng daxue), previously known as PLA Second Artillery Engineering University, divides the engagement of hypersonic weapons into four stages.[12] In the first stage, early warning satellite constellations detect the launch of an enemy weapon, immediately issue alerts and begin tracking the projectile. In the second stage, early warning radar detect and track the incoming target based on satellite data feeds. During the third stage, surveillance systems distinguish targets from decoys and report to the command and control center. Lastly, the command center directs weapon platforms to intercept the incoming projectile.

Based on these four stages, researchers from PLARF Engineering University identify a few capabilities requiring improvement, namely, early warning, positioning and tracking, and interceptor guidance. They largely follow the U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s thinking on interception, and separate the trajectory of a hypersonic target into boost, midcourse, and terminal phases and proposed technologies they could develop in each phase accordingly. [13] Perhaps more importantly, PLA experts recommend shortening a long chain of command to build a flat command and control organization that optimizes information flow and reduces response time. [14]

Chinese researchers at the First Aircraft Institute of Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) (中国航空工业集团公司, Zhongguo hangkong gongye jituan gongsi) recognize that laser weapons can be valuable in hypersonic defense because they can illuminate a target instantaneously using laser beams.[15] Laser weapons installed on aircraft, however, are susceptible to vibration and noise, which creates technical difficulties for beam control, high-precision aiming, tracking, and rapid damage assessment. Additionally, hypersonic vehicles are typically shielded by ceramic matrix composites, which protect their structures from extreme heat, especially in the nose cone section. The ceramics would be naturally effective at diffusing heat from laser beams for a prolonged period, rendering the laser weapon less effective. (
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In general, Chinese strategists assess that hypersonic defense systems based on airborne platforms are advantaged by flexible deployment, high initial launch speed of kinetic interceptors, and incoming targets’ relatively weak maneuverability in the cruise/glide phase. Some Chinese researchers believe these limitations can be remedied by the use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS).

China’s Air Force Engineering University (空军工程大学, Kongjun gongcheng daxue) has studied the feasibility of deploying a cluster of widely spaced UASs to intercept hostile hypersonic strikes.[16] The conceptual design makes use of high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) UAS that can loiter in the forward theater. Because UAS payloads are smaller than manned warplanes, Chinese researchers envisage that the drone cluster will be divided between two missions: early warning and interception.

In order to provide effective early warning, the UAS that are involved need collaborative decision-making, networked target acquisition, and beyond visual range communications to provide long-range detection and tracking capabilities. The early warning UAS cluster would be part of the networked sensors comprising space-based infrared satellites, land-based early warning radars, and early warning aircraft. Per the Air Force Engineering University’s conceptual design, the interceptor UAS will carry six 250 kg, 200 km range airborne missiles.[17] The proposed defense architecture also calls for robust battle management and C2 systems. The researchers divide warfighting into four stages: patrol and combat readiness, early warning, target acquisition, and intercept capabilities. They have conducted systems analysis to determine the optimal deployment strategy for both early warning and interceptor UASs.[18]

The Chinese open source literature summarized above provide a very high-level concept of operations (CONOPS) and warfighting applications against hypersonic weapons. Applied with systems engineering, CONOPS can be refined and transformed into top-level systems requirements for design, development, integration, testing, and IOC. This does not mean that China is on the verge of developing these missile defense systems, but the extensive research undertaken thus far,
 

escobar

Brigadier
America is not the only one working on defense against hypersonic missile I bet China is also working on conceptual study of shield against hypersonic missile Here is one example

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

PLA Thinking on Defense against Hypersonic Weapons

PLA strategists fear that the U.S. may deploy hypersonic weapons on the first island chain and/or the second island chain, directly threatening China.[6] In particular, they recognize that Chinese long-range kinetic interceptors lack precision to kill, and precision interceptors lack the range to strike targets at long distance. As early as 2012, the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation (CASIC) Academy of Defense Technology (中国航天科工防御技术研究院, Zhongguo hangtian ke gong fangyu jishu yanjiuyuan) proposed an architecture capable of defending against hypersonic weapons.[7]

The first component of the proposed 2012 CASIC defense architecture is an efficient and optimized detection network comprised of various sensors covering a distance of 800-1000 km (497-621 miles). The second is a high-speed information center capable of processing large amounts of heterogeneous data and discriminating against noise and other interference in real-time. The third element of the hypersonic defense plan is a high-performance command and control system to support an integrated air picture with rapid sensor-to-shooter cycle. The fourth component is a mixture of fast response airborne and near space-based interceptors. CASIC advocates air-to-air missiles for this purpose. However, hypersonic cruise missiles also pose significant technical challenges for low-angle detection and tracking over long distance, and the 2012 CASIC proposal does not seem to have reached sound solutions to this problem.

Researchers from the China Air-to-Air Missile Research Institute (中国空空导弹研究院, Zhongguo kong kong daodan yanjiuyuan) recommended a similar architecture in 2016.[8] They also advocate implementing airborne interceptors using both kinetic and direct energy, because of their advantages of low risk, low R&D and deployment cost, as well as the ability to offer rapid response with maximum operational flexibility. One challenge involved with air-to-air interceptors is their reliance on powerful airborne fire control radar to lock onto targets hundreds or even thousands of kilometers away. Whether China has fully developed this technology is unknown.

Researchers from the Space Engineering University (航天工程大学, Hangtian gongcheng daxue) under the command of the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) (战略支援部队, Zhanlue zhiyuan budui) indicated that they could use existing surveillance assets consisting of early warning aircraft and ground radars for early detection.[9] Additionally, they propose fielding ground-based and ship-borne high power, high resolution, and long-range phased array radars that can detect and track small, high-speed targets such as ballistic missile warheads and hypersonic vehicles. For warfighting, they envisage “forward deployment” of air-to-air missiles for head-on intercept, though due to the HGV’s high maneuverability, the deployment area would need to be quite large, and the rate of success would likely be small.

Two engineers from PLA Units #31002 and #32032 of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) recommend a similar architecture for hypersonic defense systems, but propose to deploy layered global networks for early warning and kinetic interception.[10] They indicate that though an infrared sensor cannot render precise three-dimensional target coordinates, it can still effectively provide early warning capabilities.[11] The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) Engineering University (火箭军工程大学, Huojianjun gongcheng daxue), previously known as PLA Second Artillery Engineering University, divides the engagement of hypersonic weapons into four stages.[12] In the first stage, early warning satellite constellations detect the launch of an enemy weapon, immediately issue alerts and begin tracking the projectile. In the second stage, early warning radar detect and track the incoming target based on satellite data feeds. During the third stage, surveillance systems distinguish targets from decoys and report to the command and control center. Lastly, the command center directs weapon platforms to intercept the incoming projectile.

Based on these four stages, researchers from PLARF Engineering University identify a few capabilities requiring improvement, namely, early warning, positioning and tracking, and interceptor guidance. They largely follow the U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s thinking on interception, and separate the trajectory of a hypersonic target into boost, midcourse, and terminal phases and proposed technologies they could develop in each phase accordingly. [13] Perhaps more importantly, PLA experts recommend shortening a long chain of command to build a flat command and control organization that optimizes information flow and reduces response time. [14]

Chinese researchers at the First Aircraft Institute of Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) (中国航空工业集团公司, Zhongguo hangkong gongye jituan gongsi) recognize that laser weapons can be valuable in hypersonic defense because they can illuminate a target instantaneously using laser beams.[15] Laser weapons installed on aircraft, however, are susceptible to vibration and noise, which creates technical difficulties for beam control, high-precision aiming, tracking, and rapid damage assessment. Additionally, hypersonic vehicles are typically shielded by ceramic matrix composites, which protect their structures from extreme heat, especially in the nose cone section. The ceramics would be naturally effective at diffusing heat from laser beams for a prolonged period, rendering the laser weapon less effective. (
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
;
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
)

In general, Chinese strategists assess that hypersonic defense systems based on airborne platforms are advantaged by flexible deployment, high initial launch speed of kinetic interceptors, and incoming targets’ relatively weak maneuverability in the cruise/glide phase. Some Chinese researchers believe these limitations can be remedied by the use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS).

China’s Air Force Engineering University (空军工程大学, Kongjun gongcheng daxue) has studied the feasibility of deploying a cluster of widely spaced UASs to intercept hostile hypersonic strikes.[16] The conceptual design makes use of high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) UAS that can loiter in the forward theater. Because UAS payloads are smaller than manned warplanes, Chinese researchers envisage that the drone cluster will be divided between two missions: early warning and interception.

In order to provide effective early warning, the UAS that are involved need collaborative decision-making, networked target acquisition, and beyond visual range communications to provide long-range detection and tracking capabilities. The early warning UAS cluster would be part of the networked sensors comprising space-based infrared satellites, land-based early warning radars, and early warning aircraft. Per the Air Force Engineering University’s conceptual design, the interceptor UAS will carry six 250 kg, 200 km range airborne missiles.[17] The proposed defense architecture also calls for robust battle management and C2 systems. The researchers divide warfighting into four stages: patrol and combat readiness, early warning, target acquisition, and intercept capabilities. They have conducted systems analysis to determine the optimal deployment strategy for both early warning and interceptor UASs.[18]

The Chinese open source literature summarized above provide a very high-level concept of operations (CONOPS) and warfighting applications against hypersonic weapons. Applied with systems engineering, CONOPS can be refined and transformed into top-level systems requirements for design, development, integration, testing, and IOC. This does not mean that China is on the verge of developing these missile defense systems, but the extensive research undertaken thus far,
Study is one thing actually building it is another matter. It will be costly. Sofar it is vaporware...
 

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