China's SCS Strategy Thread

voyager1

Captain
Registered Member
Exactly which allies are you talking I am not sure if Japan or Korea will get involved They can count of Australia, Britain and Canada but they are minnow as far as naval asset concern In the next decade even counting Japan and Korea Chinese navy will have the preponderance number of asset even the next 5 years you will have 50 destroyers, 50 frigates and 80 to 100 corvette plus 40 conventional sub, 3 or 4 carrier, 7 or 8 LPD , 4 or 5 LHD
Japan will get involved in a near-future possible conflict but S.Korea would most likely stay neutral. Note that Japan is in the quad and is actively working to get inside the FIVE Eyes intelligence network as a full member which as you know entails ahem, certain duties like this one for example
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In case the Japanese dont actively participate then they will certainly aid the US by allowing the use of its bases, radars, targeting data, intelligence etc or they might just try to divert a portion of China's strength by making major military exercises in a different theater to draw China's attention.

So as you can see there are many ways Japan can and will use to aid the US. On the other hand, if by 2030 China keeps growing at the current trend along with its military then i fully expect for Japan to go at the S.Korea route by staying neutral
 

crash8pilot

Junior Member
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Big implications with the new direction the US Marine Corps are taking with the new island hopping strategy. They would be playing whack-a-mole with China in case of warfare. They would put a Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) to hop to an island put surface missiles, drones, SAM installations to form a basic A2/AD bubble.

Now imagine executing this operation with 10 MLR at the same time and also manoeuvrable so they can quickly hop to different islands depending on the tactical demands.

And i will also note that this strategy is highly compatible with some technologies like UAVs, unmanned ships, unmanned submarines, AI powered mines, swarm drones.

I predict a nightmare tactical situation for China if the USMC plans are fully realised
To quote the article you've linked:
Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger has laid out a vision for focusing on small maneuvering units instead of a large forcible entry force to fight a peer competitor like China in the Indo-Pacific in 2030.
Military reforms introduced in 2017 has the PLA completing modernization by 2035. This means that by 2030 the PLA will be at the end of reaching said modernization. Not only will the PLA then have sufficient power projection capabilities, but more importantly they will also have the ability to fight all the way out to the second island chain if push comes to shove. A small jarhead regiment would have plenty of tactical trouble without a full Amphibious Ready Group to access area (from land, air, sea, EW, information, cyber, and space) that's been thoroughly denied by a modernized PLAN/PLAAF, the only littoral region they'd realistically manage to hold is the island of Guam. I get that mobility of a small unit is an advantage, but it could become a major disadvantage when you operate further away from resupply lines - a lesson I'm sure the Americans learnt in Vietnam as well as Korea, and why they were so adamant NATO forces backed them up in the Middle East.

Seventh Fleet and PACAF have enough trouble operating around a PLA that "only" has two STOBAR carriers, a sizeable destroyer+submarine fleet that is growing in expeditionary experience/capability, a modernizing air force, and a coast line armed with SAM missiles.
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, and that 2-months would be a more realistic timeframe. What makes anyone in the White House or DoD think a small force could penetrate PLA lines of defenses when they become even more capable?
 
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voyager1

Captain
Registered Member
To quote the article you've linked:

Military reforms introduced in 2017 has the PLA completing modernization by 2035. This means that by 2030 the PLA will be at the end of reaching said modernization. Not only will the PLA then have sufficient power projection capabilities, but more importantly they will also have the ability to fight all the way out to the second island chain if push comes to shove. A small jarhead regiment would have plenty of tactical trouble without a full Amphibious Ready Group to access area (from land, air, sea, EW, information, cyber, and space) that's been thoroughly denied by a modernized PLAN/PLAAF, the only littoral region they'd realistically manage to hold is the island of Guam. I get that mobility of a small unit is an advantage, but it could become a major disadvantage when you operate further away from resupply lines - a lesson I'm sure the Americans learnt in Vietnam as well as Korea, and why they were so adamant NATO forces backed them up in the Middle East.

Seventh Fleet and PACAF have enough trouble operating around a PLA that "only" has two STOBAR carriers, a sizeable destroyer+submarine fleet that is growing in expeditionary experience/capability, a modernizing air force, and a coast line armed with SAM missiles.
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, and that 2-months would be a more realistic timeframe. What makes anyone in the White House or DoD think a small force could penetrate PLA line of defenses?
Well you have a point here as the PLAN builds 056 corvettes and other ships like crazy. It is really scary i suppose from the US' perspective the amount of ships that China can put on the water in such a small time without being on a total wartime mobilization. I guess that after a point China will just swarm the South china sea with manned and unmanned ships...
 

bajingan

Senior Member
In case the Japanese dont actively participate then they will certainly aid the US by allowing the use of its bases, radars, targeting data, intelligence etc or they might just try to divert a portion of China's strength by making major military exercises in a different theater to draw China's attention.
I think we need to take into account russia,
If China russia relationship gets stronger, this can be countered by asking russia to conduct massive military exercises in sakhalin island, to divert japan attention
 

voyager1

Captain
Registered Member
I think we need to take into account russia,
If China russia relationship gets stronger, this can be countered by asking russia to conduct massive military exercises in sakhalin island, to divert japan attention
We will see but this would be complicated. Russia is not a vassal state of China and certainly is.not a charity so it wouldnt lift a finger without expecting something in return. Also i would say that diplomatically Russia and Japan seem to be trying to get closer recently.

Now if Russia helped on the SCS issue (most probably would be about Taiwan) which is a core issue of China then Russia would expect China's real help (actions not words) on a core geopolitical issue of Russia. If Russia really helped China, then if i was the baltic states, Ukraine, Georgia or other countries i would be sweating bullets. And then EU would definitely turn hostile towards China. Finally there are other more geopolitical issues which i wont mention as i would.need another couple of pages to explain

So from China's point of view is if it is worth it to get Russia's help or ideally be so strong and present such a deterrent that it would restraint Japan and other countries from jumping in the action
 

voyager1

Captain
Registered Member
It's more that ASEAN neutrality in any China-US conflict is in their self-interest
I would actually say that as long as ASEAN is neutral then China is ok with it. Which is why i think US has such a difficult job to gather allies to confront China.

US wants allies not neutral not allied with China.
China wants allies, but neutral is ok too, and here is the thing , you can be "allied" with USA but just dont step on China's red lines so Taiwan and non.interference on internal matters.

So as you can see there is a fundamental strategic imbalance where China has a wider range of options and is more flexible than US which strategic containment of China requires only allies.

In the end the issue is that the US end goal of containment needs much more resources than China's end goal of ascendancy as a global power in a multipolar order
 
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