Unless you can some evidence for what proportion the overall Allied Force campaign was distributed in terms of geography, I don't think you can claim how "concentrated" the targeting was.
If you review the way the actual air campaign occurred, you will find that Allied Force's overall air campaign lasted 78 days, and that it was composed of three phases:
The air campaign consisted of three phases: phase one focused on Serbian air defense systems; phase two called for strikes against military targets in Serbia below the 44th parallel and south to the Kosovo border; and in phase three airstrikes would seek targets north of the 44th parallel, including striking Serbia's capital Belgrade.
.... and if you look a bit lower, you'll see:
When the phase one strikes did not achieve their intended effect on Milosevic, NATO proceeded with phase two strikes south of the 44th parallel. During this phase, the U.S. Air Force introduced B-1 bombers while NATO forces also averaged just 50 strikes per night. Realizing that it would take a more intensive effort to force Milosevic to withdraw his troops from Kosovo, NATO moved to phase three on the ninth day of the air offensive. U.S. Navy aircraft joined the operation on April 6, with the arrival of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt. Operation ALLIED FORCE had struggled to meet its objectives for several reasons, including poor weather, difficult terrain, and problems inherent in coordinating 18 allied air forces.
In other words, by day 9 of the campaign that would end up lasting 78 days, the whole of the FRY was already authorizedfor NATO bombardment, moving well beyond only "south of the 44th parallel".
And if you even look at a map, you'll see that "south of the 44th parallel" is still much bigger than Kosovo alone (the below from Operation Allied Force - Lessons for the Future )
But if you have any evidence to suggest that "the targeting activities were concentrated around Kosovo" then feel free to provide it.
Otherwise, your argument flies in the face of what evidence we have of the NATO area of operations during 69 out of 78 days of Allied Force.
Why will the PLA have to strike the dispersed and camouflaged targets in the first place? More importantly, will the ROC even be able to disperse their units on the ground adequately when facing the imminent threat of a PLA amphibious invasion and ground component of the war? (See my final part of this post where I expand on both of these points)
Based on the fact that vast majority of the the Allied Force campaign was covering the entirety of Yugoslavia at the time which is about three times the overall surface area of Taiwan.
And based on the fact that one major category of targets that Allied Force was targeting was individual VJ and MUP troop units, and that NATO deliberately tailored their air campaign in a way because they wanted to avoid sending in ground troops is also significantly different to what the PLA would seek to achieve in a Taiwan campaign.
Page 28 and 29 of "NATO's Air War for Kosovo A Strategic and Operational Assessment":
Page 43:
Page 120 and 121 below details the difficulty of targeting ground units using air power alone without the opfor's ground units facing the threat of an imminent ground threat (which would cause them to be unable to disperse and hide):
OTOH for the PLA, they will not have to leave the job of targeting all mobile ground units with air power alone because they will have a major ground/amphibious component of their overall Taiwan strategy, meaning they do not have to target the same kind of dispersed and camoflaged FRY troops and vehicles in the way NATO did during Allied Force, because NATO was willing to commit to a ground component of their overall strategy.
Furthermore, the fact that the PLA will have a ground/amphibious component of its strategy means it will force the ROCA to be unable to hide and disperse their troops and units in the same way that the FRY did during Allied Force, because if FRY forces faced a NATO ground war as well then they would have had to position their forces in a way to adequately respond to NATO units in formations and in locations that they could be much more easily targeted.
In a previous post you mentioned the terrain of Yugoslavia being mountainous and making NATO targeting more difficult, therefore the PLA will face similar difficulties.
However, you don't seem to recall that the terrain of Yugoslavia is vastly different to that of Taiwan, because Yugoslavia's mountainous terrain has valleys which makes airborne targeting much more difficult while Taiwan has a main eastern mountainous ridge but mild sloping plains on the west (where, funnily enough, the major population and industrial and military centers and bases are).
Page 105 and 106 which describes that specific factor:
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So overall I do not agree with your efforts to use the Allied Force air campaign experience to argue that a PLA air and strike campaign against Taiwan would have more aimpoints or require more munitions, in fact I would consider the opposite, because of two major reasons:
1. The overall Allied Force air campaign duration covered the whole of Yugoslavia at the time (69 out of 78 days despite the initial campaign being much more limited in scope at phases 1 and 2), with an overall surface area that is about 3 times the size of Taiwan, and there is no evidence or statistics that you have provided which suggests that those 69 out of 78 days of bombing were specifically focused at or around Kosovo. If you have any evidence or statistics then I'm happy to observe it.
2. The Allied Force air campaign was deliberately made in a manner because NATO wanted to avoid sending in ground troops, greatly increasing the difficulty of targeting FRY troops and ground units because it provided them the initiative to be capable of dispersing and hiding when not facing an imminent ground threat. For the PLA, their overall Taiwan strategy include a major ground/amphibious component -- meaning they do not have to use air power to destroy the mobile fighting forces of the ROC Army in the first place. In other words, for the PLA, their air campaign/strike campaign will primarily be focused on the so-called "low hanging fruit" and they have no need to target the similar more difficult and more mobile targets that NATO was forced to target during Allied Force.
- However, the fact that the PLA will be launching a major ground component to their Taiwan strategy also means the ROC Army will not be able to disperse and hide in the same way the FRY's ground troops and vehicles were, because the ROCA will be forced to organize their forces in a way to prepare for a PLA amphibious assault and ground war, meaning if the PLA did want to conduct strikes (whether it be air strikes, missile strikes or long range MLRS strikes) against ROC Army ground forces, the ROCA will not be able to hide and disperse like the FRY troops did.
