Air and Strike Campaigns for PLA relevance

Brumby · Dec 26, 2019

Totoro said:
I did mean WS15 in my last post, not WS20. It was a lapsus.

I do find the discussion of stand off weapons usage as missing the point. Sure, in THEORY, a missile with long enough range is better for certain kinds of missions.

But a simplest very short range guided missile like Hellfire costs around $90 000. (I'll stick to US weapons being bought by USAF so we get a common denominator)

Here are some other missiles and bombs costs. They're mostly all taken from pentagon procurement documents from recent years.
JDAM ~$25 000
SDB I ~36 000 (GPS only)
LGB with GPS ~$40 000
SDB II ~$180 000 (tri mode seeker)
JSOW ~$440 000 (undefined variant. may be average cost af all variants)
JASSM ~$1.3 million
Harpoon blk2 (and slam-er) ~1.6 million
Tomahawk ~1.5 million

Now, how many long range guided missiles does US have, (ground strike only)?
Roughly 4000 tomahawks
Roughly 2600 JASSM/ER
<1000 SLAM/ER

How many unpowered bombs does it have?
Roughly 3000 JSOW (glide bomb, some stand off range)
Roughly 2000 SDB II (glide bomb, some stand off range)

Roughly 28 000 SDB I
Roughly 250 000 JDAM kits
Roughly 300-400 thousand paveways

Even with the JASSM getting to fulfill its 5000 missile plan in the future years, we're talking about roughly 9 to 10 thousand stand off conventional missiles.
Compared to roughly 600 thousand guided bombs of various kind today. (of which some 5000 glide bombs today and some 20 000 in the future, when SDB II procurement plans are met)

Issues with stand off guided missiles are several. They're pricier to buy. They're pricier to upkeep and service. They're more complex and their production takes longer, so sudden surges in procurement take longer.

Then there are mission types.

One needs to scout a location before a strike.

If it's a fixed location like a factory, airbase infrastructure etc, that can mostly be done with satellite. Providing satellites will work in total war scenario.
Damage assessment recon needs to be performed. Satellites can do that though on average they may need hours or days. In some instances there will be higher urgency than that.

Then there are relocatable targets. Like a radar. A SAM battery. Coastal missile battery. Temporary military camp of any kind. Ship in a port. Satellites may need days to spot them as there's just so much ground to be covered. Perhaps not for ships in ports which are fairly known points, but for others - definitely. Usually various other aerial recon methods will spot them first. Various batteries can move around quickly but will usually NOT be doing that 24/7 unless there's a threat from them being spotted.

Finally, there are mobile targets. Not just ones in motion (though those too can sometimes be attacked) but primarily various pieces of equipment which haven't necessarily deployed at the front but are en route. Or artillery parked way in the back. Or we can be talking about individual planes in airbases, sitting around. Any piece of equipment which is likely to move within a few hours unrelated to whether it's being scouted.

The first kind of targets, fixed ones, are the best for stand off missiles. But if one goes just for those, ignoring the others, chances are they're gonna lose. And the usual ratio of targets requiring time crucial hits versus fixed targets is many to one. Possibly dozens to one.

In a lot of those instances there will not be a 100% exact target defined. There will be an area which would first need to be scanned to determine where exactly is that battery or that plane parked or that MLRS or whatever. And recon will need to determine if that's a real target or a dummy. Those sort of recon jobs are not regularly done by U2, Global Hawk or secret spy planes. (even though those too could do it, but those too would need to get fairly close to try to recon) They're done with targeting pods and radar imagining by strike planes' own radar.

Let's look at iraq 2003. 27 700 bombs and missiles were fired. 68 percent were guided. Out of those, perhaps a thousand were stand off weapons.

Now imagine the number of targets needed to be covered in a future US China war. There'd be need for hundreds of thousands of bombs/missiles.

US certainly seems to find stand off missiles to be too expensive and unsuited for most jobs. Otherwise they'd have as many of them as they have other guided bombs.

And stand off weapons are simply not applicable to certain dug in targets. Missiles like tomahawk lack the penetration punch. Even when they use special warheads for that, they still fall behind the penetration power of a 1000 kg bunker buster.

TL; DR No one, not even the rich US air forces with their propensity for guided weapons can afford to wage war with just/mostly stand off missiles. They're used to an extent, to help neutralize the enemy in the opening moments of the battle, or to sometimes reach strategic fixed targets - but those are in reality just a few percent of targets that need to be hit.

If one thinks a war between US and China would be decided only on the seas, hitting ships or perhaps hitting island airbases - they're deluding themselves. In such a war countless islands would be used for countless purposes and *constant, repeated* bombings of those islands and other land masses would be performed. There'd be small scale invasions, there'd be limited scope ground battles, it'd be carnage and persisting air power would be very welcome.

I generally agree with your description on the issues associated with stand off weapons. I would just like to add some macro facts to the discussion because I think there is an overall under appreciation on the number of aim points involved and hence munitions required in modern conflict.

The base line is effectively the first Iraqi war because that conflict introduced stealth and precision guided munitions. While the number of PGMs used relative to the total expended was low, it did introduce a doctrine that has guided and expanded its adoption since i.e. effects vs destruction. In the table below we can see the use of PGMs had subsequently increased as a percentage.

By the time of Iragi Freedom, the PGM per target ratio was 1.5:1. The number required in a future conflict is highly dependent on the probability of arrival (POA) and this has exponential consequences depending on the nature of the conflict. A degraded POA of 50 % requires 5 X the number of PGMs and the number does a vertical as the percentage goes down.

A projection of the number of sorties and PGMs needed in a OIF strike campaign against a much more capable target i.e 149,000 PGMs. .

It should also be noted that historical results of SEAD campaigns were not satisfactory especially against a discipline adversary e.g. Kosovo.

In a Taiwan scenario which is 3.5 X the size of Kosovo and based on the experience in Kosovo it is foolishness for anyone to advance the idea that 5,000 PGMs can do the job. My estimate is that it would need between 100,000 to 150,000 PGMs. As i previously alluded, China would run out of PGMs before the end of the week,

Blitzo · Dec 26, 2019

Brumby said:
I generally agree with your description on the issues associated with stand off weapons. I would just like to add some macro facts to the discussion because I think there is an overall under appreciation on the number of aim points involved and hence munitions required in modern conflict.

The base line is effectively the first Iraqi war because that conflict introduced stealth and precision guided munitions. While the number of PGMs used relative to the total expended was low, it did introduce a doctrine that has guided and expanded its adoption since i.e. effects vs destruction. In the table below we can see the use of PGMs had subsequently increased as a percentage.

View attachment 56183

By the time of Iragi Freedom, the PGM per target ratio was 1.5:1. The number required in a future conflict is highly dependent on the probability of arrival (POA) and this has exponential consequences depending on the nature of the conflict. A degraded POA of 50 % requires 5 X the number of PGMs and the number does a vertical as the percentage goes down.

View attachment 56184
A projection of the number of sorties and PGMs needed in a OIF strike campaign against a much more capable target i.e 149,000 PGMs. .

View attachment 56185

It should also be noted that historical results of SEAD campaigns were not satisfactory especially against a discipline adversary e.g. Kosovo.

View attachment 56186
View attachment 56187

In a Taiwan scenario which is 3.5 X the size of Kosovo and based on the experience in Kosovo it is foolishness for anyone to advance the idea that 5,000 PGMs can do the job. My estimate is that it would need between 100,000 to 150,000 PGMs. As i previously alluded, China would run out of PGMs before the end of the week,

During Operation Allied Force (which is what you are using to compare to Taiwan), NATO did not only bomb Kosovo -- it bombed the whole of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the time; with a surface area of over 100,000 km2.

Taiwan of course has a surface area of some 36,000 km2.

Other important differences between the NATO air campaign during Allied Force vs what the PLA would seek to achieve over Taiwan, is the geographic location of airbases and the impact on not only the sortie rate and persistence of combat aircraft but also ISR aircraft. The distance travelled by NATO aircraft (and in particular US aircraft that supplied the bulk of the air fleet) to reach the theatre of operation was substantially longer than the proximity of airbases that the PLA could be expected to use, not to mention lower in number than the number of PLA air bases that they would likely have available for Taiwan related sorties as well.

(Of course, another factor that is relevant is that any PLA bombardment of Taiwan would be a combination of air launched and ground launched munitions; the former would of course include ALCMs, stand off weapons and some PGMs -- while the latter includes GLCMs, SRBMs, and long range MLRS.)

The differing nature of their respective targets are also of some note.
NATO's targets against FRY included individual armoured vehicles and small troop formations with the goal of destroying them in Kosovo, as well as mobile and true shoot-scoot SAM systems like the SA-6B (which NATO was only able to destroy 3 out of 22 of).
The PLA OTOH will likely not be targeting ground force combat units that early into its bombing campaign, but rather hitting larger fixed or semi-fixed installations like airbases, radars, logistics centers, command centers, and so on. Even the ROC's current high end IADS at present (namely Patriots and their Sky Bow family) and into the foreseeable future are much larger and less mobile than systems like the SA-6B.

Now, this isn't to say the PLA will have an easier or harder time in bombing Taiwan than NATO did in Allied Force, but direct comparisons based merely on geographical size (where it is also important to get geographical size right!) are IMO too simplistic.

AndrewS · Dec 26, 2019

Totoro said:
I did mean WS15 in my last post, not WS20. It was a lapsus.

Issues with stand off guided missiles are several. They're pricier to buy. They're pricier to upkeep and service. They're more complex and their production takes longer, so sudden surges in procurement take longer.

All true. But I don't think these disadvantages outweigh the advantages, because it is difficult to suppress local air defences that can hide in the terrain and rely on passive sensors. The exception being small islands which can be successfully isolated from resupply.

Then there are mission types.

One needs to scout a location before a strike.

If it's a fixed location like a factory, airbase infrastructure etc, that can mostly be done with satellite. Providing satellites will work in total war scenario.
Damage assessment recon needs to be performed. Satellites can do that though on average they may need hours or days. In some instances there will be higher urgency than that.

Then there are relocatable targets. Like a radar. A SAM battery. Coastal missile battery. Temporary military camp of any kind. Ship in a port. Satellites may need days to spot them as there's just so much ground to be covered. Perhaps not for ships in ports which are fairly known points, but for others - definitely. Usually various other aerial recon methods will spot them first. Various batteries can move around quickly but will usually NOT be doing that 24/7 unless there's a threat from them being spotted.

Finally, there are mobile targets. Not just ones in motion (though those too can sometimes be attacked) but primarily various pieces of equipment which haven't necessarily deployed at the front but are en route. Or artillery parked way in the back. Or we can be talking about individual planes in airbases, sitting around. Any piece of equipment which is likely to move within a few hours unrelated to whether it's being scouted.

The first kind of targets, fixed ones, are the best for stand off missiles. But if one goes just for those, ignoring the others, chances are they're gonna lose. And the usual ratio of targets requiring time crucial hits versus fixed targets is many to one. Possibly dozens to one.

In a lot of those instances there will not be a 100% exact target defined. There will be an area which would first need to be scanned to determine where exactly is that battery or that plane parked or that MLRS or whatever. And recon will need to determine if that's a real target or a dummy. Those sort of recon jobs are not regularly done by U2, Global Hawk or secret spy planes. (even though those too could do it, but those too would need to get fairly close to try to recon) They're done with targeting pods and radar imagining by strike planes' own radar.

A lot of what you're saying is accurate, but irrelevant to what the Chinese military needs to achieve a victory.

The key land attacks are on the islands.

Eg. Okinawa for example is only 11km wide, so a single missile can overfly the entire island and visually identify every vehicle in the open.
Mobile vehicles have nowhere to hide.
Then a missile can dispense cluster munitions or smart munitions when it detects a target.
Once the airbase is disabled by standoff missile attacks, it can be kept isolated from outside resupply, and then unpowered munitions can used.
The SAM and coastal missile batteries will also run out of missiles, and you end up with something like Chinese air superiority.

For land targets elsewhere, the Chinese military only needs to prevent the airbases from operating, and can actually ignore the presence of mobile vehicles.

From Taiwan and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, it is:
- 300km to mainland China
- 900km+ to Kyushu

If the airbases on Kyushu are suppressed, there are literally no operational airbases within 1300km.
So China can achieve air superiority where it needs it.

On Kyushu, the Chinese military also don't need to target mobile vehicles like MLRS or Coastal missile batteries.
These simply do not have the range to really affect Taiwan or the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

---
For SAM batteries and radars, you have to use a SEAD plane equipped with standoff missiles. There is no question on that.

Let's look at iraq 2003. 27 700 bombs and missiles were fired. 68 percent were guided. Out of those, perhaps a thousand were stand off weapons.

Now imagine the number of targets needed to be covered in a future US China war. There'd be need for hundreds of thousands of bombs/missiles.

Not relevant for the Chinese military.
Taiwan can be covered by unpowered bombs/missiles or artillery guns hosted on cargo ships, because it is so close to mainland China.

There simply isn't a requirement for the Chinese military to deliver hundreds of thousands of air-launched bombs/missiles anywhere else.

US certainly seems to find stand off missiles to be too expensive and unsuited for most jobs. Otherwise they'd have as many of them as they have other guided bombs.

They never faced a true peer competitor in the past 30 years, so they could obtain air superiority and use short-range aircraft with short-ranged munitions.

And stand off weapons are simply not applicable to certain dug in targets. Missiles like tomahawk lack the penetration punch. Even when they use special warheads for that, they still fall behind the penetration power of a 1000 kg bunker buster.

An aircraft launching a 1000kg bunker buster is going to have to fly directly over its (defended) target.
An H-20 is better for this.

TL; DR No one, not even the rich US air forces with their propensity for guided weapons can afford to wage war with just/mostly stand off missiles. They're used to an extent, to help neutralize the enemy in the opening moments of the battle, or to sometimes reach strategic fixed targets - but those are in reality just a few percent of targets that need to be hit.

I do think that 5000-odd standoff weapons is enough for the Chinese military. Aside from Taiwan, the targets are a handful of airbases and aircraft carriers.

If one thinks a war between US and China would be decided only on the seas, hitting ships or perhaps hitting island airbases - they're deluding themselves. In such a war countless islands would be used for countless purposes and *constant, repeated* bombings of those islands and other land masses would be performed. There'd be small scale invasions, there'd be limited scope ground battles, it'd be carnage and persisting air power would be very welcome.

Those small islands in the East China Seas and South China Seas are just too isolated from outside support, and too close to mainland China.
So a future Chinese military can establish something close to air and maritime superiority, and cut them off from resupply.
Transport aircraft have a huge radar signature, and ships would be spotted before they can dock at an island.

I just don't see countless small battles happening on small islands.

AndrewS · Dec 26, 2019

Brumby said:
In a Taiwan scenario which is 3.5 X the size of Kosovo and based on the experience in Kosovo it is foolishness for anyone to advance the idea that 5,000 PGMs can do the job. My estimate is that it would need between 100,000 to 150,000 PGMs. As i previously alluded, China would run out of PGMs before the end of the week,

I think there was some confusion, as I specifically excluded Taiwan from the 5000 standoff PGM requirement.

If we accept that the Chinese military can achieve air and maritime superiority over Taiwan, there is no need to use standoff missiles on an ongoing basis.

4th generation fighters carrying JDAMs ($18K cost) or SDBs ($100K cost) would be perfectly fine.

Or few cargo ships with artillery guns could do much of the job as well.

80%+ of Taiwan's population (and presumably industry/military) is within artillery range (30km) of the coast.
An artillery gun could fire 1000 rounds in a few hours.
So 20 guns could fire off 20,000 rounds in a few hours.
After 10 such salvoes, that works out as 200,000 (unguided) rounds for area targets.
They probably would have some long-range guided rounds as well.

But back to topic, I don't see any need for JHXX in a Taiwan scenario.

Totoro · Dec 27, 2019

Most scenarios here seem to consider only limited wars. I personally don't agree as I see any armed conflict having a very high chance of quickly escalating into a regional war involving several nations.

The moment Okinawa is hit, chances for entire Japan entering the war and fighting under unified command with the US raise considerably. So then we're not talking about just Okinawa but literally every piece of Japanese land. Numerous smaller islands in the East China sea as well as Japanese mainland. We're talking not just about several known air bases now but about every single commercial airstrip being eventually used by the military. As well as new airbases being built, if the need arises. One can construct a small makeshift airbase within days, if needed. It wouldn't be able to generate big sortie rates, it wouldn't be able to seriously maintain its planes and so on - but it could still be useful.

Chances of Taiwan issue exploding at the same time US and China go to war are also very high. South Korea might or might not get involved. I personally feel chances for that are somewhat small, but with US forces being stationed there, anything is possible. There's Singapore possibly getting involved. There's Australia getting involved. Sure, those are far away locations that would likely be hit with stand off weapons only anyway, but there's still a dozen or more airbases involved.

US would be operating not just from Carriers and Guam but from other islands close to Guam. Some already have basic airstrips and would see enlargement, some islands would see new bases made. Wake island would be used. Palau would get used. (it has 3 islands with 3 airstrips, two of them basic) Marshall islands would be used, despite their rather far away position. There's 3 airstrips over 2 km long and 6 more at 1.2 km.

Some airbases may have a single runway without a taxiway. Some may have a runway and a full length taxiway. Some may have half a dozen runways/taxiways. Several stand off weapons would be needed just to temporarely shut down a single runway. Which may get repaired within half a day/days, depending on type of damage and repair assets at hand.

Just talking about airbases alone as targets, there are bound to be a few hundred runways involved. That's a thousand of more weapons just to stop US ops for a day or two.
What about the less repairable damage? To the infrastructure, ammo depots, fuel depots, crew quarters, comm arrays and centers etc? More weapons needed per airbase. What about trying to damage planes themselves? Again more weapons needed.

Stuff gets repaired in war at incredible speed. We're not talking about commercial contractor taking months or a year. A base that's totally obliterated will work again within a week or weeks, if left alone. Probably not at 100% of what is was, but at fair enough efficiency.

And we didn't even get to various other targets. Someone mentioned 5000 guided stand off weapons as enough. That number would likely not be enough for just a single week of war. (yes, that's excluding Taiwan) (Better not to go into topic of whether China can achieve air superiority over Taiwan while it's also fighting a total war against the US)

And once again, even if somehow, magically, china did have half a million of long range guided weapons - those could not be efficiently used if just hurled at enemy without pre and post strike assessments. Satellites will not be enough for those, even if untouched. Planes need to fly somewhat close to do that assessment and they need to repeat that regularly.

Yes, I went into a broad discussion here and that's perhaps too much. If people disagree that there's high likelihood of a regional war then we best leave it at that. We don't need to agree.

I do agree that IF the only threat to China is from a limited war with US OR (but not at the same time) a war with Taiwan, then JHXX would likely not pay back the investment. Providing J20 budget can indeed be tripled, at the expense of other Chinese plane makers. Which is dubious.

But looking into the next 10 or 20 years, who knows what will come. Certainly the speed at which US has been mobilizing for a cold war containment is something that but a few could imagine only a few years ago.

Of course, all this above is somewhat moot since PLAAF is not showing signs that it even wants to attempt such missions on a large scale. Otherwise we'd already be seeing guided weapons being put into service in large numbers and in varieties of form. Today, PLAAF is still primarily a defensive force, one to deny the enemy access to Chinese airspace. But that defensive approach is ultimately doomed against an opponent with a similar or larger economy, given enough time. And war would not just magically stop after a few weeks or months. It would go on until there is a definitive winner. Defense may help win a battle but it does not win wars.

AndrewS · Dec 27, 2019

Totoro said:
Most scenarios here seem to consider only limited wars. I personally don't agree as I see any armed conflict having a very high chance of quickly escalating into a regional war involving several nations.

The moment Okinawa is hit, chances for entire Japan entering the war and fighting under unified command with the US raise considerably. So then we're not talking about just Okinawa but literally every piece of Japanese land. Numerous smaller islands in the East China sea as well as Japanese mainland. We're talking not just about several known air bases now but about every single commercial airstrip being eventually used by the military. As well as new airbases being built, if the need arises. One can construct a small makeshift airbase within days, if needed. It wouldn't be able to generate big sortie rates, it wouldn't be able to seriously maintain its planes and so on - but it could still be useful.

Can you really use a commercial airstrip on one of the Ryukyu Islands?
Remember that the Chinese Air Force will have control of the skies above, or would be able to launch attacks at will.
And that mobile units literally have no terrain (whether natural or human) to hide against.
Those airstrips or temporary airbases would be under constant attack, and would be very difficult to resupply by air or sea.

As for more bases on the Japanese Home Islands, those bases are too far to really affect mainland China.

Totoro said:
Chances of Taiwan issue exploding at the same time US and China go to war are also very high. South Korea might or might not get involved. I personally feel chances for that are somewhat small, but with US forces being stationed there, anything is possible. There's Singapore possibly getting involved. There's Australia getting involved. Sure, those are far away locations that would likely be hit with stand off weapons only anyway, but there's still a dozen or more airbases involved.

Singapore will be neutral. There's no question on that.

On South Korea, if either China or North Korea decide it's in their interests to start a war, they can do it.

Remember that in a long war which is fought in the naval-air realm, China will eventually lose.
So it is in the interests of China to shift to a land war with the US forces stationed in South Korea.
From the Chinese perspective, the worse case is another draw, and the best case is a victory with 20000+ US soldiers marched into prisoner of war camps.
From the North Korean perspective, China losing a war means they will be utterly alone, and North Korean will be next. But a joint Chinese-NK army holds the best chance of conquering South Korea.

Totoro said:
US would be operating not just from Carriers and Guam but from other islands close to Guam. Some already have basic airstrips and would see enlargement, some islands would see new bases made. Wake island would be used. Palau would get used. (it has 3 islands with 3 airstrips, two of them basic) Marshall islands would be used, despite their rather far away position. There's 3 airstrips over 2 km long and 6 more at 1.2 km.

Look at the geography.

Wake is 4700km from mainland China.
The Marshall Islands are 5700km from mainland China.

A JHXX cannot operate to that distance, but a H-20 can.

---

Palau is 2500km from mainland China, which is closer than Guam.
Palau only has 17000 people, and has no interest in becoming a battleground between China and the USA.
A handful of missiles would be enough to completely wreck their civilian infrastructure.

Totoro said:
(Better not to go into topic of whether China can achieve air superiority over Taiwan while it's also fighting a total war against the US)

Let's look at that scenario.

As per comments from the Pentagon, the US "has lost every wargame it has run on a US-China conflict"

But let's say for argument that China can't achieve air superiority over Taiwan.
Which would incredibly given that Taiwan is only 200km from mainland China. So SAM batteries on mainland China could track and shoot down every aircraft shortly after take off.

If there is a total war AND China is unable to achieve air superiority over Taiwan - then China has lost and potentially faces an internal revolution.
The Politburo are ruthless enough to start a war against South Korea. China can potentially win and the worse case is a draw.

Seoul accounts for half the population of Korea, and is only 500km from mainland China, or 400km across North Korea.
So a Korean war scenario argues for larger numbers of small short-range aircraft such as the J-31, which can conduct air-superiority and ground attack missions in Korea.

So where does a JHXX fit into this scenario?

Totoro said:
And once again, even if somehow, magically, china did have half a million of long range guided weapons - those could not be efficiently used if just hurled at enemy without pre and post strike assessments. Satellites will not be enough for those, even if untouched. Planes need to fly somewhat close to do that assessment and they need to repeat that regularly.

This has no relevance to the utility of a JHXX regional bomber.

I agree you need to conduct a pre and post recon, but a JHXX is the wrong platform because it is too big.

If you want an airborne recon platform, you would want a smaller J-20 sized aircraft or a WZ-8 hypersonic recon drone instead.

AndrewS · Dec 27, 2019

Totoro said:
But looking into the next 10 or 20 years, who knows what will come. Certainly the speed at which US has been mobilizing for a cold war containment is something that but a few could imagine only a few years ago.

Of course, all this above is somewhat moot since PLAAF is not showing signs that it even wants to attempt such missions on a large scale. Otherwise we'd already be seeing guided weapons being put into service in large numbers and in varieties of form. Today, PLAAF is still primarily a defensive force, one to deny the enemy access to Chinese airspace. But that defensive approach is ultimately doomed against an opponent with a similar or larger economy, given enough time. And war would not just magically stop after a few weeks or months. It would go on until there is a definitive winner. Defense may help win a battle but it does not win wars.

The fact is that the US has accumulated a large stock of advanced weapons over the past 30+ years. In comparison, Chinese military spending on advanced weapons was essentially zero, even just 10 years ago.

So yes, the Chinese posture was historically very defensive. Note military spending was kept at a modest 2% of GDP for the past 20 years. In comparison , the US was at almost double that level.

But now the Chinese economy is 30% larger than the US in PPP terms, and can reasonably be expected to be twice the US in the 2030-2035 timeframe.

That already means China can decisively outspend the US in military spending. And from what we've seen of China introducing new systems and the quasi-containment policy from the US, I suspect that Chinese military spending is no longer capped at 2% of GDP.

If so, congratulations are in order for the American national security establishment for this achievement.

In any case, I think China likely will continue a strategically defensive posture, but is shifting from a defensive tactical air/maritime doctrine, to an offensive one.

But this all takes time, in order to catch up technologically and build a large stock of advanced weapons.

Brumby · Dec 28, 2019

Bltizo said:
During Operation Allied Force (which is what you are using to compare to Taiwan), NATO did not only bomb Kosovo -- it bombed the whole of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the time; with a surface area of over 100,000 km2.

Taiwan of course has a surface area of some 36,000 km2.

You are right that Operation Allied Force covered a bigger area than Kosovo. However more than half of the effort were concentrated below the 44th parallel because General Clark wanted to focus the air effort in Kosovo.

Bltizo said:
Other important differences between the NATO air campaign during Allied Force vs what the PLA would seek to achieve over Taiwan, is the geographic location of airbases and the impact on not only the sortie rate and persistence of combat aircraft but also ISR aircraft. The distance travelled by NATO aircraft (and in particular US aircraft that supplied the bulk of the air fleet) to reach the theatre of operation was substantially longer than the proximity of airbases that the PLA could be expected to use, not to mention lower in number than the number of PLA air bases that they would likely have available for Taiwan related sorties as well.

(Of course, another factor that is relevant is that any PLA bombardment of Taiwan would be a combination of air launched and ground launched munitions; the former would of course include ALCMs, stand off weapons and some PGMs -- while the latter includes GLCMs, SRBMs, and long range MLRS.)

There is no dispute that sortie generation is a function of distance and that Taiwan is a much lesser logistic issue for China. However that doesn't change the number of aim points that are required to be targeted in a major conflict and that is often significantly underestimated by the general public without base lining it to modern conflicts. For example, the Kosovo air campaign expended more than 28,000 munitions (excluding TLAMS) against 9815 aim points. Taiwan has similar environmental features as Kosovo like mountainous terrain which present challenges for ISR as it did with Kosovo. Degradation of Taiwan's ability to deter an invasion is much more than just taking out its airfields. Taiwan will present significant difficulties for China with pop up threats with manpads and AAA just as the Serbs did in Kosovo.

Bltizo said:
The differing nature of their respective targets are also of some note.
NATO's targets against FRY included individual armoured vehicles and small troop formations with the goal of destroying them in Kosovo, as well as mobile and true shoot-scoot SAM systems like the SA-6B (which NATO was only able to destroy 3 out of 22 of).
The PLA OTOH will likely not be targeting ground force combat units that early into its bombing campaign, but rather hitting larger fixed or semi-fixed installations like airbases, radars, logistics centers, command centers, and so on. Even the ROC's current high end IADS at present (namely Patriots and their Sky Bow family) and into the foreseeable future are much larger and less mobile than systems like the SA-6B.

In any air campaign, the range of targets doesn't change - just the degree and depth. For example, the range of targets in Kosovo are a mixture. It should also be noted the ROC has a very capable airforce unlike the Serbs which only has a dozen MIG-29s. China actually doesn't have enough modern airplanes to do the job if you consider its inventory is spread across at least three fronts.

Bltizo said:
Now, this isn't to say the PLA will have an easier or harder time in bombing Taiwan than NATO did in Allied Force, but direct comparisons based merely on geographical size (where it is also important to get geographical size right!) are IMO too simplistic.

I agree no situation is alike. My purpose is to point out that there are a lot more aim points and consequently PGMs required than there are in inventory.

Deino · Dec 28, 2019

Guys ... are we still in the H-XX and JH-XX or in a general War in the pacific area thread?

Totoro · Dec 28, 2019

AndrewS said:
Can you really use a commercial airstrip on one of the Ryukyu Islands?
Remember that the Chinese Air Force will have control of the skies above, or would be able to launch attacks at will.
And that mobile units literally have no terrain (whether natural or human) to hide against.
Those airstrips or temporary airbases would be under constant attack, and would be very difficult to resupply by air or sea.

Of course you can use commercial airstrips. War starts, government steps in, takes over infrastructure. Takes people's land if needed, to build new runways or expand existing ones.

I believe Chinese air force will NOT have control over the skies above the Ryukyu islands. Over some, at some time, sure. But not over most, most of the time.
Here's a list of existing runways on those islands i quickly made:
yonaguni 2km
hateruma 900m with space to expand to 1.3km
ishikagi 1.5 km and 2km and 2km taxiway
tarama 1.6 km
irabu 3 km and 3km taxiway
miyako 2 km
kume 2.1 km
okinawa airport 2km and 3km runway and 2 km and 3km taxiway and 1.8 km taxiway
okinawa base 2.7km and 2.7 taxiway
okinawa large base two runways 3.7 km and one taxiway 1.7 km
ie - one operational 1.5 km runway. 3 more old runways. all can be expanded to 1.5 or 2 km,
yoron 1.2 km
okino erabo 1.4 km
oshima 2 km
amami - 2km and 2 km taxiway
daito islands - two 1.5 km
tanega one 2km and one 2km
make - abandoned, one 4 km one 2 km

There are some further abandoned or really short runways which i didn't count. But some of them could be expanded as a good deal of those islands are flat islands with farmland around existing runways.

Northernmost islands are some 800 km away from china. southernmost islands are some 400 km away. Those are not insignificant distances. Of course, the closer one would be easier for china to attack and harder to US to defend and resupply. But given the sheer number of targets (again, in addition to those there's whole of Japan, US carriers and US farther away bases and possibly even Taiwan at the same time to deal with) it'd be VERY hard to keep constant pressure on all/most of those islands at the same time. ESPECIALLY if one uses just stand off weapons which would naturally be low in numbers. Having actual bombers drop bombs over those islands to keep those islands neutralized would be most beneficial. Especially if an initial attack (Which may have been with stand off weapons) has temporarely shut down the airbases in the area.

As for more bases on the Japanese Home Islands, those bases are too far to really affect mainland China.

That's not even remotely true. Kyushu is 700 km away. Shikoku is 1000 km away. Tokyo is 1700 km away. First two are well in range of some fighter types without any in-air refuelling. And lets remember US has a fleet of some 470 large IFR tankers and 70 C-130 tankers. Each of those large tankers can extend the combat radius of a plane roughly two times and can do so for roughly a dozen fighters. Japan has another 4 large tankers and one C-130 tanker. Who knows if UK and/or Australia would also jump in and position their planes in Japan, if needed.

Singapore will be neutral. There's no question on that.

On South Korea, if either China or North Korea decide it's in their interests to start a war, they can do it.

I won't go into whether Singapore would be neutral. That's really going too far off topic. Same with S. Korea. Though I did initially say i too don't think it's very likely for S. Korea to go in as it has potentially more to lose than to gain with joining that particular war.

Look at the geography.

Wake is 4700km from mainland China.
The Marshall Islands are 5700km from mainland China.

A JHXX cannot operate to that distance, but a H-20 can.

I agree that those particular targets are better suited to H20. And to really long range missiles. But point is - those are additional targets. If some missiles are used there, then those missiles can't be used for other targets. And there will be a finite number of missiles initially and a constant shortage even as they're produced.

Simply said, each target has its own platform. Just like wake and hawaii and what-not has H20 that's best suited, and just like Taiwan has J20 that's perhaps best suited (IF we're talking about a perfectly predictable future where China knows it will only have to deal with Taiwan) for Taiwan - there's also a midrange striker that's best suited (cost based and efficiency based) for mid range target of around 500-2000 km away.

Palau is 2500km from mainland China, which is closer than Guam.
Palau only has 17000 people, and has no interest in becoming a battleground between China and the USA.
A handful of missiles would be enough to completely wreck their civilian infrastructure.

Palau is a state in free association with US, not a sovereign country. US funds it in large part. In a total war, if US chooses to place its forces on that island, Palau would have no say in it.
And for the fifth time - stuff gets repaired. A single strike, even if it destroys EVERYTHING is not enough. That same island could become a base, to a higher or lesser degree, within days or weeks.

But let's say for argument that China can't achieve air superiority over Taiwan.
Which would incredibly given that Taiwan is only 200km from mainland China. So SAM batteries on mainland China could track and shoot down every aircraft shortly after take off.

This is getting way off topic for me so i probably won't talk about taiwan more than this post entry. (the internal chinese politics, revolution and all that are beyond of what i'm willing to discuss as it's way, waaaay off topic) I'll just nitpick that a SAM battery 200 km away will not see any objects if they're flying under 2 kilometers of altitude.

This has no relevance to the utility of a JHXX regional bomber.

I agree you need to conduct a pre and post recon, but a JHXX is the wrong platform because it is too big.

If you want an airborne recon platform, you would want a smaller J-20 sized aircraft or a WZ-8 hypersonic recon drone instead.

The plane that is dropping the bombs is in the best position to do the pre/post damage assessment. It's right there at the right time. That's how it was done for 100 years. various dedicated recon drones are best initially look for targets, before the decision to make an attack is even devised.

I would really advise/urge to have us move this discussion to another thread. As I imagine in the eyes of the most other users we're just polluting the thread.
But I am also quite happy to just have us say we disagree and leave it at that. I do believe we're slowly starting to repeat ourselves.

Air and Strike Campaigns for PLA relevance

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