09III/09IV (093/094) Nuclear Submarine Thread

[ZeEa5KPul]

Australia is corrupt and dumb af, their procurement is driven by interests groups and needs to send kickbacks to USA. Why tf would China take a single inspiration from their procurement priorities? It'd be like USA looking at Belarus for an example of what to procure, because thats pretty much what Australia is, an American Belarus.

Even corrupt and dumb as it is, the American Belarus sees the strategic utility of nuclear submarines; you don't.

Youre the delusional one if you think China has no need to operate in the straits around Taiwan island and the yellow sea. SSKs completely dominate in that environment, so up until now they have been the priority.

Because if China hasn't destroyed Japan's (and Korea's, if it's stupid enough to get involved) warfighting capacity and shut down US bases there within the first days of a war, we already have a problem. SSKs have zero power projection capacity and no role to play past the initial overwhelming strikes on nearby targets. If the war turns around and they do have a role to play, as I said before something has gone seriously wrong.

As for up till now, that's not my concern. Up till now China has had a pathetically weak brown water navy that would have been butchered if it sailed outside territorial waters. Up till now is a historian's concern, my concern is the future.

If US invades

Three words in and I already have a problem with it. Why are you putting China on the defensive from the get-go? Why wouldn't it be China that strikes first? What advantage do you see in giving the enemy the initiative on a silver platter?

but likewise USA will probe into east Taiwan waters and the SCS.

Why would it if it can strangle Chinese shipping from afar and whittle down China's defenses? Why would it enter hostile waters before it's sufficiently degraded China's warfighting capacity? What advantage do you see in the US having complete freedom of action in the SIC and China having no capacity to operate there?

When US SSNs are forced to go close into the first island chain

What would force them to do so? Why would they go there at all?

thus annulling American ability to attack key Chinese shipping

Why would the US need to operate in the FIC to attack Chinese shipping? Sorry to put this so bluntly, but you need to revisit every single assumption you have about this subject and rebuild your thought process from zero because what you think is just warped.

And US does need to attack fast, because speed is key in a Taiwan/SCS invasion scenario. Allowing China to keep bombing limited US Asia basing as well as wiping out the ROC rebels and then consolidating the island means failure for Washington.

No, it doesn't. This is just a false assumption you pulled out of a hat and based everything on. America's goal is to force China to capitulate, why do you think it gives a shit about Taiwan? It can shut down China's access to the world's oceans, whittle away at it from a distance, stage operations from places outside China's reach, and launch closer attacks once China is exhausted and its defenses degraded.

Therefore the most important priority of the PLA is to gain first the ability to project watertight defense over Chinese territory and waters (all that encompasses the first island chain), which is more boosted by VLO platforms, newer missiles etc.

That "therefore" is doing nothing. Garbage in, garbage out.

As for the last part, apparently you didn't read what I wrote:

You're right about that. When I read a train of illogical and poorly thought through assumptions and unsound conclusions, I'm not going to read to the very last sentence with bated breath.

Because China has secured relative safety at home territories, I predict that we will see a major SSN investment starting with this new boat on the new facilities.

Why would you predict this? It contradicts everything you wrote. China has no need to project power, it can just wait for the US to attack and then make the monumental unforced blunder of fighting where it is weakest and China is strongest. That's the winning strategy, right?

 

[tphuang]

You look way too much at hull sizes of submarines to guess their noise levels. There is correlation but that correlation is actually quite weak. Virginia is smaller than the Seawolf yet has the noise level. The LA's surface displacement is just 75% of the surface displacement of Project 971's but it was significantly quieter at the beginning and equaled them in late cold war. The Project 941 (The Typhoon for NATO) was louder than the LA by a significant margin despite a surface displacement of 24,000 tons. The Astute and Virginia are quieter than the Yasen despite having smaller surface displacements. The Collins class is known as an underwater rock band despite its size. The German Type 212A, despite being very small is quieter than Kilos. The correlation is so weak that I think we should only include that as a sidenote. If China can not equal the noise level of Sturgeon in 2022 then we should stop PLA watching altogether.

You do realize America had significant improvement in quieting technology from Seawolf to Virginia class, right? If America built a 12 m wider SSN right now, it will be a lot quieter than Virginia class.

Western technology with rest to rafting is significantly better than Soviet technology. That's why Astute and Virginia class might be quieter than Yasen class. We don't know for sure. Yasen should be pretty quiet. Yasen is the first Soviet nuclear sub to have extensive/complicated rating that's comparable to Western SSNs.

Who told you Collins class is loud? It was an extremely quiet sub by 2010 standard. Right up there with Oyashio class.

Who told you Kilos class is louder than Type 212A? That's not the figures I've looked at. The numbers I got also show that the recent Russian Kilos class are quieter than the newer but smaller Lada class. That's why Kilos class are still being produced in large numbers.

This is according to all the submariners I've spoken to. Just go please listen to Shilao's podcast on nuclear submarines. 093B isn't going to be any good. 095 will skip a generation and still not reach current Virginia class performance. If you cannot accept it, at least find legitimate sources that back up your claims.

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

This is according to all the submariners I've spoken to. Just go please listen to Shilao's podcast on nuclear submarines. 093B isn't going to be any good. 095 will skip a generation and still not reach current Virginia class performance. If you cannot accept it, at least find legitimate sources that back up your claims.

Why did China expand BHSIC?

 

[Biscuits]

Even corrupt and dumb as it is, the American Belarus sees the strategic utility of nuclear submarines; you don't.

Because if China hasn't destroyed Japan's (and Korea's, if it's stupid enough to get involved) warfighting capacity and shut down US bases there within the first days of a war, we already have a problem. SSKs have zero power projection capacity and no role to play past the initial overwhelming strikes on nearby targets. If the war turns around and they do have a role to play, as I said before something has gone seriously wrong.

As for up till now, that's not my concern. Up till now China has had a pathetically weak brown water navy that would have been butchered if it sailed outside territorial waters. Up till now is a historian's concern, my concern is the future.

Three words in and I already have a problem with it. Why are you putting China on the defensive from the get-go? Why wouldn't it be China that strikes first? What advantage do you see in giving the enemy the initiative on a silver platter?

Why would it if it can strangle Chinese shipping from afar and whittle down China's defenses? Why would it enter hostile waters before it's sufficiently degraded China's warfighting capacity? What advantage do you see in the US having complete freedom of action in the SIC and China having no capacity to operate there?

What would force them to do so? Why would they go there at all?

Why would the US need to operate in the FIC to attack Chinese shipping? Sorry to put this so bluntly, but you need to revisit every single assumption you have about this subject and rebuild your thought process from zero because what you think is just warped.

No, it doesn't. This is just a false assumption you pulled out of a hat and based everything on. America's goal is to force China to capitulate, why do you think it gives a shit about Taiwan? It can shut down China's access to the world's oceans, whittle away at it from a distance, stage operations from places outside China's reach, and launch closer attacks once China is exhausted and its defenses degraded.

That "therefore" is doing nothing. Garbage in, garbage out.

You're right about that. When I read a train of illogical and poorly thought through assumptions and unsound conclusions, I'm not going to read to the very last sentence with bated breath.

Why would you predict this? It contradicts everything you wrote. China has no need to project power, it can just wait for the US to attack and then make the monumental unforced blunder of fighting where it is weakest and China is strongest. That's the winning strategy, right?

China is the defender because it doesn't claim American territory. The goal is to repel the aggressor and destroy their ability to launch attacks. What concerns blockading the US by force using 60 SSNs isn't within China's immediate planning. If you think China wants that, then youre just projecting your own ideas and wishes on their strategy.

I was responding to a post talking about why historically China didn't bother to invest more than minimum in SSNs. Again, reading comprehension would be useful to you here.

"America's goal is to force China to capitulate" this is a ridiculous assertation. There will be no pursuing total victory for either side because of MAD. If US cannot take Taiwan it has lost.

US cannot "degrade Chinese capabilities" without deeply entering the so called hostile waters. So on that point your whole argument falls apart into pointless US wanking, even US military itself acknowledges it is generally outranged by the PLAN.

"Why would you predict this? It contradicts everything you wrote. China has no need to project power, it can just wait for the US to attack and then make the monumental unforced blunder of fighting where it is weakest and China is strongest. That's the winning strategy, right?"

Again you would benefit from actually having a little bit of reading comprehension. What I wrote above is about the current national defense strategy, the Huludao port and increased SSN procurement concerns the future, to deal with potential threats in the Indian ocean and wider pacific.

US has to make the ""unforced blunder"" if they attack because theyre the ones who want an island 200kms away from the mainland coast, it ain't as if China claims Hawaii or even Guam. This fact shouldn't be too hard for you to grasp? You seem to believe USA's winning move is to declare war and then sit in the East Pacific waiting for China to sail out with SSKs and then beat them because SSNs > SSKs in such an environment, therefore China needs to invest in bigger, quieter SSNs than USN at the detriment of everything else so they can go out there and duel them where US weight of numbers are strong. Seems like you're the one betting on China to make a huge unforced error.

If US adopts passivity and fails to attack within China's first island chain, PLA will set up shop in Taiwan and then push an unsupported SK (if SK doesnt immediately expel all US troops and cut ties with them) with NK's help and then Japan will be bombed. US can keep sitting in the Eastpac and Indian ocean, waiting for a decisive battle that will never come. China has everything it needs to keep everyone fed and keep pushing out military hardware. Meanwhile US allies will enjoy firebombing worse than what happened to Tokyo in ww2. How long will that last until US is forced to push anyways? If you think US can win a war of aggression against China without pushing or risking its forces, then you're too far gone, maybe /r/ukraine or /r/genUSA is a more suitable place to peddle such presumptions?

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

The goal is to repel the aggressor and destroy their ability to launch attacks.

You're not going to do that without being able to deal with US SSNs in far waters. Not only are you forcing China into a defensive position, it doesn't even have the resources to defend itself adequately.

Again, reading comprehension would be useful to you here.

My reading comprehension is just fine, your analytic ability isn't. A basic fact you should learn before you try to "analyze" anything is that the opponent is not going to play the way you want him to play. You have to plan for every scenario the opponent can realize, not just the ones you like. You not only impose your preferences on US strategies, but also on US war aims. Who told you the US would want to immediately retake Taiwan? Who told you the US cares if its allies get pounded into rubble?

"America's goal is to force China to capitulate" this is a ridiculous assertation.

It's not a ridiculous assertion, it's a tautology. There's plenty of damage the US can impose on China to force it into an unfavourable peace without threatening state survival enough to merit nuclear war. "MAD" is not a divine invocation that gets you out of difficult scenarios.

US cannot "degrade Chinese capabilities" without deeply entering the so called hostile waters.

Why not?

So on that point your whole argument falls apart into pointless US wanking, even US military itself acknowledges it is generally outranged by the PLAN.

Where has the US military acknowledged this?

US has to make the ""unforced blunder"" if they attack because theyre the ones who want an island 200kms away from the mainland coast, it ain't as if China claims Hawaii or even Guam. This fact shouldn't be too hard for you to grasp?

Who told you that an island 200 kilometers away is what America wants?

You seem to believe USA's winning move is to declare war and then sit in the East Pacific waiting for China to sail out with SSKs

I didn't know the Second Island Chain is in the east Pacific, TIL. Aside from your "geography", if this is what you got from what I wrote then you're in no place to make snide remarks about others' reading comprehension. Since you seem to have such difficulties, I'll try to be more explicit: America can hit China without sailing into the First Island Chain. It can hit China repeatedly and for a long enough time that China's defenses in the First Island Chain crumble. America can hit China, China can't hit America. That is bad. Do you understand now or do I have to go even slower?

If US adopts passivity and fails to attack within China's first island chain, PLA will set up shop in Taiwan and then push an unsupported SK (if SK doesnt immediately expel all US troops and cut ties with them) with NK's help and then Japan will be bombed.

So what? How would the complete destruction of Japan and Korea affect the US's ability to launch long range strikes on China from outside the First Island Chain?

China has everything it needs to keep everyone fed and keep pushing out military hardware.

Who told you that? Do you think China trades with the outside world because it's doing them a favour? And how would it be pushing out military hardware when its military infrastructure is under persistent attack it can't address?

Meanwhile US allies will enjoy firebombing worse than what happened to Tokyo in ww2. How long will that last until US is forced to push anyways?

Who cares? Not the US, that's for sure. It isn't San Diego being firebombed, or even Honolulu.

If you think US can win a war of aggression against China without pushing or risking its forces, then you're too far gone, maybe /r/ukraine or /r/genUSA is a more suitable place to peddle such presumptions?

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[AndrewS]

My gut tells me that H-20 bombers are higher priority and more useful than SSNs for the next 15 years. If the US military has no access to local bases withing the 2nd Island Chain, it can no longer effectively project power to the Western Pacific, which includes carriers.

If we use the Virginia and B-21 as comparable systems, then I reckon you can operate 4 H-20 bombers for the price of a single Type-095 SSN.

The H-20s would be able to deliver far more firepower to the 2nd Island Chain, at lower cost and risk.

For example, H-20s would be based safely some 2000km in the Chinese interior. 4 H-20s could deliver 432 SDB glide bombs or 32 LACMs to Guam. The H-20 could aim for a sortie every day.

In comparison, a Type-095 SSN would only deliver 40 LACMs say every 4 days to Guam.

Something similar applies to the Japanese bases that the US could use.

But of course, if you have targets in the Third Island Chain, that is simply too far for bombers and nuclear submarines are the way to go.

 

[tankphobia]

My gut tells me that H-20 bombers are higher priority and more useful than SSNs for the next 15 years. If the US military has no access to local bases withing the 2nd Island Chain, it can no longer effectively project power to the Western Pacific, which includes carriers.

If we use the Virginia and B-21 as comparable systems, then I reckon you can operate 4 H-20 bombers for the price of a single Type-095 SSN.

The H-20s would be able to deliver far more firepower to the 2nd Island Chain, at lower cost and risk.

For example, H-20s would be based safely some 2000km in the Chinese interior. 4 H-20s could deliver 432 SDB glide bombs or 32 LACMs to Guam. The H-20 could aim for a sortie every day.

In comparison, a Type-095 SSN would only deliver 40 LACMs say every 4 days to Guam.

Something similar applies to the Japanese bases that the US could use.

But of course, if you have targets in the Third Island Chain, that is simply too far for bombers and nuclear submarines are the way to go.

If the enemy has no ships, then Guam has lost its value since mid-ranged BMs should be more than enough to incapacitate aircraft launch facilities. It's very risky but also critically important for China to be able to present a persistent anti-shipping threat out to Guam. Using SSNs in a land strike role would be under-utilizing its potential, as even a fleet in being of nuclear submarines will vastly complicate US strategic planning and force it to deploy ASW assets.

 

[latenlazy]

You do realize America had significant improvement in quieting technology from Seawolf to Virginia class, right? If America built a 12 m wider SSN right now, it will be a lot quieter than Virginia class.

Western technology with rest to rafting is significantly better than Soviet technology. That's why Astute and Virginia class might be quieter than Yasen class. We don't know for sure. Yasen should be pretty quiet. Yasen is the first Soviet nuclear sub to have extensive/complicated rating that's comparable to Western SSNs.

What prevents the 093 from adopting the same kinds of technological improvements to make its noise signature comparable or more competitive?

 

[tphuang]

What prevents the 093 from adopting the same kinds of technological improvements to make its noise signature comparable or more competitive?

not enough space in the engine room to install the type of raft needed to really reduce noise level. I think that's what Soviet found with Victor 3 class. Even with all their effort, it was still not as quiet as LA class, which led them to build the larger Akula class. Now, China has technology with ACPR50S to build something in the Akula/Yasen class.

 

[Totoro]

natural circulation don't really matter all that much. Most reactors are naturally circulating at low to medium speed.

US sub reactor on LA/iLA does not use any natural circulation, but uses pumps to cool down the reactor even at all speeds. It was a deliberate decision on the part of the USN, to sacrifice some noise for speed. LA/iLA class is a bit specific in that regard, as it came about at the moment USN felt confident enough in noise advantage over the Soviets that they wanted to cash in on other performance instead.