Well still, how survivable are modern ships?
Is it more effective to build 4-5 Type 052Ds, or one big cruisers with 200 VLS cells?
Or is there some capability that such a ship would bring that a Type 055 wouldn't?
055 Large Destroyer Thread II
- Thread starter Blitzo
- Start date
Is it more effective to build 4-5 Type 052Ds, or one big cruisers with 200 VLS cells?
Or is there some capability that such a ship would bring that a Type 055 wouldn't?
Currently the primary incentive to go larger is to provide more power to very demanding larger sensors, larger sized ordnance (ie cell size) and perhaps, going forward, DEWs. That is still the principal reason USN and also Japan were/are looking at very large hulls (20k tons+) for their dedicated BMD designs. But they were/are rather bespoke concepts to assume that particular role.
As long as a Type 055 successor fills that type's requirements, it seems unlikely to grow a lot, given implications for its more mundane requirements (berthing, signature, cost etc). That said, a successor type is probably also not exactly shrinking, given overall trends.
As long as a Type 055 successor fills that type's requirements, it seems unlikely to grow a lot, given implications for its more mundane requirements (berthing, signature, cost etc). That said, a successor type is probably also not exactly shrinking, given overall trends.
Russian navy builds/upgrades operationally significant numbers of frigates of various kinds, this isn't the problem.
The problem is that they're frigates(1), relying on a rather fragmented and vulnerable external kill chain(2).
Russian targeting away from its own shores can come either from submarines (which inherently can't broadcast at will, and anyway only see ships&other subs), MPAs (just a single-digit number of outdated aircraft, and a couple of dozens of flying museums - with negligible levels of survivability on 2020s battlefield), and space assets - either SIGINT(inherently unreliable and dependant on enemy emitting) or RADARSAT (cool Russian feature, but only a couple of highly expensive and well-known assets at low, almost circular orbits - i.e. they are (a)predictable, (b)jammable, and (3)outright vulnerable to direct SM-3 intercept).
For any extended AAW(sub-horizon) picture, Russian navy can rely only on AEW helicopters. These are few (threshold numbers of continuous patrol capability is high for helicopters), they're associated with just a few largest ships...and they don't really see too far.
Unlike others listed below, Russian navy can cheat around this limitation, though (forward-position Nakhimov-centric detachment in the likely direction of the enemy to sustain AEW helicopters. No, of course, others can do it too, but I wouldn't really bet on the survival of a forward-positioned frigate). Either way it is only a roundabout way, with many very obvious downsides.
---
I.e. Russian (British, French, Japanese, Indian) squadrons have to work under the assumption that they won't reliably see the whole battlespace beyond radar horizons, and that there will be quite a limited number of highly connected nodes per squadron.
In this case, destroyer battlefleet doesn't make any sense - without this extended, merged and uninterrupted picture of battlespace destroyer-type warship is basically blind - and has no advantages (or, to be exact, is at a distinctive relative disadvantage) against heavy strike frigates. Aegis destroyers don't have appreciable within-the-horizon defense superiority over modern frigates.
In this case, rather than going for an integrated&merged battlefield, where you try to actually create uninterrupted information/tracking/engagement bubbles (and shoot from whatever is suitable and available at whatever comes in, in optimal priority), you just go strike. Ships bunch together, relying on good old in-horizon mutual defense, and just try to send as powerful salvo(es) as possible, at targets when they get the targeting data. It doesn't even have to be continuous, just enough of a fresh enough track to get a launch.
Or maybe an unreliable track (SIGINT, espionage, bro with a satellite phone on a trawler), if one is willing to toss a coin.
Is this a weaker strategy? Yes, absolutely, because it essentially forefeits much of the integrated fleet survivability progress achieved since the 1990s. Is it a viable strategy? Yes, absolutely, because if you send a powerful enough salvo of good strike missiles into the right place - it will still do lots of things, and even 1st tier navies will have to treat such a threat deadly serious.
For Russian and Indian navies it's business as usual ("Gorshkov navies"). For France&UK - it isn't, but both don't have money for survivable destroyer-centric fleets anyways - so from 2020s they went strike, too. China was building this way in 1990s-2000s (its older destroyers are now basically exactly this type of heavy 'strike frigates'), but by now it's a superficial similarity - as continuous ISR datastream makes the whole thing kinda redundant.
The problem is that they're frigates(1), relying on a rather fragmented and vulnerable external kill chain(2).
Russian targeting away from its own shores can come either from submarines (which inherently can't broadcast at will, and anyway only see ships&other subs), MPAs (just a single-digit number of outdated aircraft, and a couple of dozens of flying museums - with negligible levels of survivability on 2020s battlefield), and space assets - either SIGINT(inherently unreliable and dependant on enemy emitting) or RADARSAT (cool Russian feature, but only a couple of highly expensive and well-known assets at low, almost circular orbits - i.e. they are (a)predictable, (b)jammable, and (3)outright vulnerable to direct SM-3 intercept).
For any extended AAW(sub-horizon) picture, Russian navy can rely only on AEW helicopters. These are few (threshold numbers of continuous patrol capability is high for helicopters), they're associated with just a few largest ships...and they don't really see too far.
Unlike others listed below, Russian navy can cheat around this limitation, though (forward-position Nakhimov-centric detachment in the likely direction of the enemy to sustain AEW helicopters. No, of course, others can do it too, but I wouldn't really bet on the survival of a forward-positioned frigate). Either way it is only a roundabout way, with many very obvious downsides.
---
I.e. Russian (British, French, Japanese, Indian) squadrons have to work under the assumption that they won't reliably see the whole battlespace beyond radar horizons, and that there will be quite a limited number of highly connected nodes per squadron.
In this case, destroyer battlefleet doesn't make any sense - without this extended, merged and uninterrupted picture of battlespace destroyer-type warship is basically blind - and has no advantages (or, to be exact, is at a distinctive relative disadvantage) against heavy strike frigates. Aegis destroyers don't have appreciable within-the-horizon defense superiority over modern frigates.
In this case, rather than going for an integrated&merged battlefield, where you try to actually create uninterrupted information/tracking/engagement bubbles (and shoot from whatever is suitable and available at whatever comes in, in optimal priority), you just go strike. Ships bunch together, relying on good old in-horizon mutual defense, and just try to send as powerful salvo(es) as possible, at targets when they get the targeting data. It doesn't even have to be continuous, just enough of a fresh enough track to get a launch.
Or maybe an unreliable track (SIGINT, espionage, bro with a satellite phone on a trawler), if one is willing to toss a coin.
Is this a weaker strategy? Yes, absolutely, because it essentially forefeits much of the integrated fleet survivability progress achieved since the 1990s. Is it a viable strategy? Yes, absolutely, because if you send a powerful enough salvo of good strike missiles into the right place - it will still do lots of things, and even 1st tier navies will have to treat such a threat deadly serious.
For Russian and Indian navies it's business as usual ("Gorshkov navies"). For France&UK - it isn't, but both don't have money for survivable destroyer-centric fleets anyways - so from 2020s they went strike, too. China was building this way in 1990s-2000s (its older destroyers are now basically exactly this type of heavy 'strike frigates'), but by now it's a superficial similarity - as continuous ISR datastream makes the whole thing kinda redundant.
When we talk navies here, we are often far too ship/weapon-centric. The problem is that the ship/weapon-centric approach is actually a sign of being poor. Ships ultimately are platforms. Weapons - means to prosecute that we already know&see(i.e. it's already got one leg into the grave).
Visible parts of PLAN and USN shipbuilding superiority are their impressive destroyer fleets - but those are only the tip of an iceberg (huge tip admittedly), made possible by huge investment into persistent, continuous, and survivable (replenishable, defendable) ISR, comm and data processing networks, distributed from the bottom of the oceans up to the very geostationary orbit.
The scariest part of 055 isn't in its huge field of boxes - it isn't even necessary for it to use its own. Scariest part is that it - and others, even distributed over hundreds of miles, emitting and not - see and work in a continuous and relatively uninterrupted data space hundreds of miles wide.
Without this gargantuan investment - in assets, in comms, in making all this crp actually work together, - large AAW combatants are simply pointless. What's the point of carrying 50 heavy AA missiles（which themselves cost as much as a frigate）, capable of shooting down an ASM 500 kms away, when you'll actually get to see them just a minute away from striking your ship, and halfway into your huge and impressive SAM's dead zone.
It isn't that '2nd tier' countries can't build destroyers (even large ones, like 055) - they can, and in fact, do (Hobart in AUS, Bazan in Spain, Kongo/onwards in Japan, Sejong in Korea). The problem is that they are 'someone else's ships', built out of their pocket. Cool, impressive, but you can't use them on your own properly w/o big Bros' approval.
These nations don't really have a need for their own fleets doing their own sovereign work away from home, thus such a compromise works just fine for them.
Last edited:
Lethe
Captain
Obviously folks can take this discussion wherever they like, but I would just like to clarify my own perspective.
First, I was using "Sino-Kirov" as shorthand for a very large surface combatant that is roughly double the size of 055, rather than suggesting a similar configuration/role. I said I was "holding out for" such a ship (rather than "anticipating", "predicting" or "recommending" it) to indicate that this was a rather whimsical notion, i.e because it would be awesome, however I appreciate that I could've been considerably clearer on this point.
Nonetheless, I do think even fanciful ideas like a Sino-Kirov need to have some plausible basis in reality, for at first glance the notion is highly dubious for the reasons noted by several posters here. So the question becomes, if such a ship were to exist, what characteristics and role would it have? What could such a vessel do better than could be achieved by a pair of 055s? I think there are several possible areas such a vessel could focus on that would benefit from the "above linear" scaling offered by increased volume/displacement:
1. Shore bombardment, whether using railguns or more conventional artillery. More power, more mounts, more barrels, and much, much deeper magazines. Such a vessel would look to achieve sustained bombardment capacity at least 4x that of 055 to justify the exercise, and this should be easily achievable. Additionally, such a vessel could potentially host very large missiles beyond those that can be accommodated by the general purpose VLS on 055/052x. See the LRHW missile being fitted to Zumwalt, which weighs about 7000kg.
2. A super-sized radar to serve as the AAW/BMD fulcrum node for the entire battlegroup, as detailed in previous post. VLS capacity would probably be considerable, but not really the point of the exercise.
3. Helicopter ASW with much better sustained operations characteristics than can be achieved even with dual hangar types like 055 (and hopefully 054B). Basically the Hyuga role. Definitely useful, but this is probably a different ship from one that addresses (1) and/or (2).
4. Symbolic value. Nice to have, but if you cannot justify the ship otherwise....
TL;DR: Would a very large surface combatant just be a super-sized 055? No. Do I think PLAN should begin work on it in the next five-year plan? No. Do I think the notion is entirely inconceiable? No. Would it be awesome? Definitely.
Last edited:
one role that I think you have noted and believe would be highly unique is the ballistic missile launching ship. Unlike a sub which has a difficult time recieving or transmitting data, it can fire datalinked hypersonic strike missiles at both stationary and slowly moving (ship level) targets. Unlike TELs, it can project power far beyond Chinese shores. So this role has significant offensive value. It would also have 100+ standard VLS at the very least, and have a substantial radar, so it would be valuable defensively too.
however, being confined to the SCS, ECS and Yellow Sea a ballistic missile equipped cruiser would lose the buffer space that increases its value because it can be ambushed by SSKs, shore based ASM batteries from behind mountains guided by some certain foreign ISR, etc. It would be a great weapon for the situation where China can deny enemy sensor coverage 1000 km from its shores, but unfortunately Okinawa is only 500 km away from Shanghai. such a ship would be highly valuable if it can keep a huge buffer zone between it and other ships in blue water, and shoot other ships from a range that they can't even think about returning fire in, but that's not China's geography.
basically, China needs assets that can work in both blue water and green water, but a ballistic missile equipped, 100+ VLS cruiser is awesome but only suited for blue water. Russian Kirov is much more valuable to them than it would be to the PLAN because they have open access to the Arctic Ocean and can hide in the vast frozen expanse of the Arctic with no other countries for thousands of km... PLAN starts out in fistfight range with adversaries like South Korea, Taiwan and Japan.
If you want to compare Russian 1144 ships with 055 you have to start with historic perspective. 1144 started in the 60s as nuclear ASuW destroyer of some 10 kT displacement. In 70's it was merged with 1165 project of nuclear anti-carrier cruiser and the final project gained displacement over 20 kT. The anti-carrier function became the primary with anti-sub as second. When Adm. Gorshkov realized that ship has become too expensive even for USSR, 1164 conventional anti-carrier cruiser was introduced.
In case of 055 the process has been reversed. It started with a very ambitious project of 20kT and has been scaled down to more rational and affordable dimensions and tasks. With a CV-centred Navy (which RuNavy is not) I don't see a point in scaling up the size of 055 again. PLAN needs numbers not "all-eggs-in-one basket" concept.
In case of 055 the process has been reversed. It started with a very ambitious project of 20kT and has been scaled down to more rational and affordable dimensions and tasks. With a CV-centred Navy (which RuNavy is not) I don't see a point in scaling up the size of 055 again. PLAN needs numbers not "all-eggs-in-one basket" concept.
Oddly enough, I would say that w/o a fleet carrier, supercruiser (upgraded Kirov) doesn't make much sense.
055/052 grid, on the other hand, can actually exist without a carrier.
But that aside, both navies are now hugely overbalanced. Too much "bottom" for too little "top".
Regarding your first point, I'm doubtful of the value of shore bombardment platforms on larger ships. As the Zumwalt had found out, unless magical breakthrough in material science happens, even rail guns will need the ship to remain relatively close to shore which will expose it to shore based anti shipping.
There isn't enough justification for big guns on ship if a carrier nearby can provide the same level of firepower without exposing itself to danger.
I think gun mounts on large ships should strictly be CIWS, since for the most likely anti piracy operations they will be used for, a 30mm CIWS will tear them apart just as well as a 155mm round will, while also providing air cover.
I believe main ship guns are indeed used in an air defense role and can put rounds on slow flyers like drones and subsonic cruise missiles from a longer range than smaller CIWS.
