055 DDG Large Destroyer Thread

[antiterror13]

Oh yes, of course I wasn't suggesting that China should blindly seek a fleet that's "X%" as capable as the USN just for the sake of it, but rather I was thinking that by the early 2030s, the blue water capable, non strategic nuclear fleet (i.e.: excluding short range non blue water corvettes and excluding things like strategic SSBNs) that's 1/2 to 2/3 the capability of the USN would be suited to fulfilling China's likely strategic and military requirements by that period, and being "modelled" after the USN is a result of the changes in requirements that the Chinese Navy will face between now and the early 2030s that will force them to transform to something that happens to look a bit like the USN today.

That is to say, it is still China's own strategic and military requirements driving fleet size, but it so happens those requirements I think may drive their fleet size to one that conveniently can be placed in context of the USN's fleet size today.

yes, but China should look at the US capability (USN) as the potential enemy and aggressor to build Chinese Navy ... I am pretty sure China would consider (heavily) the strength of USN for Chinese future Navy strategy

 

[Blitzo]

yes, but China should look at the US capability (USN) as the potential enemy and aggressor to build Chinese Navy ... I am pretty sure China would consider (heavily) the strength of USN for Chinese future Navy strategy

Yes, but that doesn't really have anything to do with whether China's Navy ends up looking similar to the USN's or not. It is rare for one side to seek to directly emulate the other with the goal of seeking to counter their strengths, unless the circumstances are right.

In other words, my statement supporting jobjed's vision of the Chinese Navy in the early 2030s as a "1/2 to 2/3" USN is not because I think such a fleet would be most optimized to countering the USN's strengths, but rather that such a fleet would be optimized for a combination of missions that include the US contingency but also is useful for other non directly US related contingencies, that happen to be quite similar to what some current USN missions and requirements are.

If China's goal was to build a navy or military whose sole purpose was able to counter the strengths of the USN directly, I imagine such a fleet and military would not look like what its current trajectory seems suggestive of.

 

[antiterror13]

Yes, but that doesn't really have anything to do with whether China's Navy ends up looking similar to the USN's or not. It is rare for one side to seek to directly emulate the other with the goal of seeking to counter their strengths, unless the circumstances are right.

In other words, my statement supporting jobjed's vision of the Chinese Navy in the early 2030s as a "1/2 to 2/3" USN is not because I think such a fleet would be most optimized to countering the USN's strengths, but rather that such a fleet would be optimized for a combination of missions that include the US contingency but also is useful for other non directly US related contingencies, that happen to be quite similar to what some current USN missions and requirements are.

If China's goal was to build a navy or military whose sole purpose was able to counter the strengths of the USN directly, I imagine such a fleet and military would not look like what its current trajectory seems suggestive of.

true ... and I wasn't suggesting that Chinese navy should be "1/2 to 1/3" of USN .. not at all

 

[Jura The idiot]

...

In other words, my statement supporting jobjed's vision of the Chinese Navy in the early 2030s as a "1/2 to 2/3" ...

did you perhaps mean
weig2000
(a post in the previous page) instead of
jobjed
? I'm basically asking not to miss a presumably important post on the topic which interests me

 

[Blitzo]

did you perhaps mean
weig2000
(a post in the previous page) instead of
jobjed
? I'm basically asking not to miss a presumably important post on the topic which interests me

oh yes you're right; my apologies

 

[Lethe]

Second, while it is true that building at such a frenetic pace is not sustainable in longer term and can cause idled resources and wasted investment for most countries, it's not entirely applicable to today's China. China does not need to invest more in infrastructure and labor to build naval ships at today's rate or ramp up even more. The capacity is there already. China has plenty of shipbuilding capacity now. it'll be a waste to not fully utilize them now. In fact, one can also argue than a decade or two down the road, it'll be much more expensive.

The problem of over-investment in the 2020s manifests in two ways: it likely results in a corresponding period of under-investment in the 2040s which can create problems for industry in terms of maintaining skills, and problems for PLAN in terms of maintaining economies of scale, and it produces a corresponding increase in retirement rates in the 2050s, translating either to a reduction in fleet size during that period or requiring increased budgetary allocations.

Specifically, my speculations are in medium term as defined above, the PLAN will have about 6 carriers, 50~60 modern cruisers/destroyers, 50~60 modern frigates (excluding 056's), 20~30 SSN, 10~12 SSBNs, 8~12 LPDs, 6~8 LHDs as well as other support ships.

I think this is a reasonable, if perhaps slightly ambitious target for the 2035 period. However, one must add to this China's considerable number of smaller combatants: 056s and whatever succeeds them. 022s and older types will of course be gone by 2035.

That is to say, it is still China's own strategic and military requirements driving fleet size, but it so happens those requirements I think may drive their fleet size to one that conveniently can be placed in context of the USN's fleet size today.

This is similar to my own conception whereby PLAN is strategically compelled to negate both the bulk of the US Navy (~65%) plus the forces of other regional nations, most significantly Japan. For the sake of convenience, the resulting force requirement can be considered as roughly on par with USN.

 

[Blitzo]

The problem of over-investment in the 2020s manifests in two ways: it likely results in a corresponding period of under-investment in the 2040s which can create problems for industry in terms of maintaining skills, and problems for PLAN in terms of maintaining economies of scale, and it produces a corresponding increase in retirement rates in the 2050s, translating either to a reduction in fleet size during that period or requiring increased budgetary allocations.

I think what you're describing as investment should really be said to be procurement.

Investment in the context of naval shipbuilding IMO relates to R&D and building the industrial capacity for constructing ships of a given technological standard or capability. Procurement OTOH is buying ships or assets or capability.

Either way, whatever their procurement rate ends up being, I'm sure it will strike the best balance they have calculated between various factors like being able to maintain skills, maintaining economy of scale, retirement rate, but also on the other hand the requirement to be able to achieve and induct new capabilities in a given timeframe to be able to achieve their requirements, or more importantly whether they have the Navy they need to fulfill national objectives in event of a conflict that may be foreseen.

So, there will always be compromise and opportunity-cost no matter which choice they end of the spectrum they lean closer to.
I personally think that given the strategic risks China faces in coming years/decade or so, it would not be illogical for them to seek a relatively fast rate of naval shipbuilding and induction in the medium term to achieve a level of critical mass that can reliably fulfill the Navy's strategic requirements, and then from there, perhaps pull shipbuilding and induction back to a more sustainable and less frenzied rate.

This is similar to my own conception whereby China is strategically compelled to negate both the bulk of the US Navy (~65%) plus the forces of other regional nations, most significantly Japan. For the sake of convenience, the resulting force requirement can be considered as roughly on par with USN.

Yes, though I'm sure the influence of air power and long range missile power for all sides will be confounding factors for what their naval requirements will be. I personally do not expect a navy that is as extensive as the USN in force projection vessels or SSNs by the 2030s.

 

[Lethe]

I think what you're describing as investment should really be said to be procurement.

Yes.

I personally think that given the strategic risks China faces in coming years/decade or so, it would not be illogical for them to seek a relatively fast rate of naval shipbuilding and induction in the medium term to achieve a level of critical mass that can reliably fulfill the Navy's strategic requirements

I can certainly acknowledge the geopolitical arguments that suggest that the risks of conflict between the US and China are likely to increase over the coming decade, and the argument that China should therefore ensure it is in the best position possible for such an eventuality. However, if China's leadership was in fact operating under this belief, i.e. that it does not merely need to continue to grow and to modernise, but in fact to prepare for war, then I would expect to see more evidence of that belief. Most significantly, I would expect to see growth in defence spending depart from GDP trends.

Yes, though I'm sure the influence of air power and long range missile power for all sides will be confounding factors for what their naval requirements will be. I personally do not expect a navy that is as extensive as the USN in force projection vessels or SSNs by the 2030s.

I don't think China will ever have the same number of SSNs or aircraft carriers or large surface combatants as USA does, because China's geography means that smaller vessels (that can be acquired and operated in greater numbers for a given level of resources) will always have a role to play. Having a fleet comparable to USN does not mean employing the same force structure as USN, even if the trend over the medium-term will be one of convergence, chiefly in the form of PLAN becoming "heavier" by operating increasing numbers and proportions of large combatants. Hypothetically, a mid-century Chinese Navy might include something like 60 large combatants (>10,000 tons), 60 medium combatants (5-10,000 tons) and 60 small combatants (<5000 tons).

 

[Blitzo]

Yes.



I can certainly acknowledge the geopolitical arguments that suggest that the risks of conflict between the US and China are likely to increase over the coming decade, and the argument that China should therefore ensure it is in the best position possible for such an eventuality. However, if China's leadership was in fact operating under this belief, i.e. that it does not merely need to continue to grow and to modernise, but in fact to prepare for war, then I would expect to see more evidence of that belief. Most significantly, I would expect to see growth in defence spending depart from GDP trends.

I'm not suggesting my proposal is one where China will be preparing for war necessarily, but more using it as an example for how projected strategic requirements will interact with the cost efficienncy/etc factors you mentioned before in determining what their actual procurement ends up being.

On that note I think if China really were preparing for war in the same timespan we were talking about, I expect their procurement to be much higher than what weig2000 and I both suggested.

I don't think China will ever have the same number of SSNs or aircraft carriers or large surface combatants as USA does, because China's geography means that smaller vessels (that can be acquired and operated in greater numbers for a given level of resources) will always have a role to play. Having a fleet comparable to USN does not mean employing the same force structure as USN, even if the trend over the medium-term will be one of convergence, chiefly in the form of PLAN becoming "heavier" by operating increasing numbers and proportions of large combatants. Hypothetically, a mid-century Chinese Navy might include something like 60 large combatants (>10,000 tons), 60 medium combatants (5-10,000 tons) and 60 small combatants (<5000 tons).

The large combatant force structure thing is possible but it will also depend on how the USN modifies it's force structure. I expect the USN to induct larger combatants by the late 2020s to 2030s as well that will drastically change their force structure by mid century too.

That said I think saying having a fleet "comparable" to XYZ's navy only really makes sense if we are talking in terms of overall capability, overall force structure or maybe overall tonnage. I don't see how anything else could reasonably work in that case.

 

[Janiz]

I expect the USN to induct larger combatants by the late 2020s to 2030s as well that will drastically change their force structure by mid century too

There's nothing to expect from US Navy in 2030. They made studies in last two years how it should look and Trump as new president already agreed on it. Look for the materials all around the Internet.