055 DDG Large Destroyer Thread

[AndrewS]

The number of 055 and other vessels should not be measure against the total USN fleet but should be build to prevent USN to be used to intimidate China {i]and[/i] neighbours of China. Under such a circumstance USN looses much of its utility and it should be enough to allow Asia to develop economically without warlike interference.

Yes.

And to prevent the US even thinking about using the military, it would be very useful to have a larger military and economy. Particularly since the US has the advantage of forward bases in Asia from which to attack mainland China, whilst the US homeland is far away from the fighting.

So it would be somewhat akin to the situation where Royal Navy admirals told the British government that there is no way they could win a protracted war against the US.

Then the British Empire simply rolled over and let the US have whatever it wanted in the Americas.

 

[delft]

Yes.

And to prevent the US even thinking about using the military, it would be very useful to have a larger military and economy. Particularly since the US has the advantage of forward bases in Asia from which to attack mainland China, whilst the US homeland is far away from the fighting.

So it would be somewhat akin to the situation where Royal Navy admirals told the British government that there is no way they could win a protracted war against the US.

Then the British Empire simply rolled over and let the US have whatever it wanted in the Americas.

It didn't really happen like that even if it seemed that way, especially from the distance of ninety years.
As for the ability to isolate Taiwan that has already been achieved.

 

[Jura The idiot]

related to new posts here, I see two options for China:

1. the permanent presence in the area OK without looking at a map: approaches to Vladivostok - Tsushima - through Philippine Sea towards approaches to Guam - Palau - Celebes Sea - approaches to Singapore - up through Strait of Malacca - Coco Island (Myanmar);
2. global presence

for #1 they would need two dozen(*) of Type 055 to have a strong SAG on patrol at any moment (to immediately 'shadow' any Navy entering the area I specified, which then would be Chinese 'Mare Nostrum') plus half of dozen(*) aircraft carriers

(*) numbers are approximate

for #2 even bigger numbers would be needed, something I leave to Strategists (LOL I've always preferred Tactics)

the time-frame: around the time I'm supposed to retire which is in 2036 (if the law doesn't change here, no LOL now)

 

[AndrewS]

It didn't really happen like that even if it seemed that way, especially from the distance of ninety years.
As for the ability to isolate Taiwan that has already been achieved.

British Admirals most certainly warned the British government in strenuous terms about not going to war with the USA.

Also remember that the British exempted the US Navy from the 2-power standard.

 

[weig2000]

It's been a hot topic both inside China and outside on fast China should build its navy fleet and what size it will eventually reach, given the rapid pace that PLAN is building/expanding. The concern is that China is eventually going to slow down and settles for a more steady and sustainable ship build rate and, when that happens, China would be facing a situation where it has a glut of shipbuilding capacity, much of them wasted.

There are two reasons why this worry is both premature and misplaced.

First, for all the talk about China's impressive naval ship construction, China still only has 5 052D's and more 051's than 052C's. It still has not had even a single class of batch-produced world-class SSB's. While all of discussions around 001, 001A and 002 (and 003) are pretty exciting , China still only has one carrier in service, which mostly serves as a training ship. The first domestically-built 001A won't be commissioned until 2019 at the earliest. As it stands, PLAN is not even where it should be for today's China, let alone China in the medium term. It seems that a lot of people are confusing the reality with a projected future, prematurely worrying more about the risk of excess capacity and waste of resources two decades down the road than the risk of not having a navy commensurate with China's strategic needs and national interest before it that happens.

Second, while it is true that building at such a frenetic pace is not sustainable in longer term and can cause idled resources and wasted investment for most countries, it's not entirely applicable to today's China. China does not need to invest more in infrastructure and labor to build naval ships at today's rate or ramp up even more. The capacity is there already. China has plenty of shipbuilding capacity now. it'll be a waste to not fully utilize them now. In fact, one can also argue than a decade or two down the road, it'll be much more expensive.

As to what kind of fleet level that PLAN would want to achieve in medium term (2030 ~ 2035), we don't know exactly since China does not publish a 30-year navy fleet plan or something like that. But it's not too difficult to guesstimate based on what we observe today and on China's strategic requirements in medium term. IMO, it's easier to speculate naval capital ships than tanks or military aircraft. China has two strategic directions that need navy presence and protection: Western Pacific and Indian Ocean (OBOR). There is converging consensus that China needs six aircraft carriers in medium term, plus the corresponding escort fleet. These are the power projection fleet; China also needs homeland defense fleet to take care of SCS, ECS, and Taiwan contingencies (the US, btw, does not really need a homeland defense fleet; Coast Guard will do). Another way to look at it: PLAN is increasingly modeled after USN and it will only be the US that can seriously threaten China's security - it makes sense to benchmark PLAN against USN. It's not unreasonable to believe PLAN will aim at its fleet at about 1/2~2/3 of the USN with similar force structure. Specifically, my speculations are in medium term as defined above, the PLAN will have about 6 carriers, 50~60 modern cruisers/destroyers, 50~60 modern frigates (excluding 056's), 20~30 SSN, 10~12 SSBNs, 8~12 LPDs, 6~8 LHDs as well as other support ships.

It will not surpass USN during the time period, but it would be far and away world's second most powerful navy.

 

[tidalwave]

055 needs to converted to nuke powered like Peter the great. China making mistakes of constructing too many conventional powered surface ships. It's really unnecessary to have so many of them as oil supply is unsure during wartime. If it really comes that point, 055 would be sitting duck at the port and can't go anywhere. Horrible planning by PLAN

 

[Blitzo]

I agree with your general characterisation of past, present, and future, however I believe that if China continues to produce 2 destroyers and 2 frigates per year, such rate is not only sufficient to deliver a fleet comparable to USN in the long-term, but is capable of delivering significant expansion and modernisation over the medium-term as well, i.e. your "10+ years" -- let us say to 2030.

If China commissions 2 destroyers and 2 frigates each year between 2017 and 2030 that equates to 28 of each type. The 28 destroyers will replace 8-11 existing destroyers (051s, 052s, maybe 051B and 956As), therefore increasing total destroyer numbers by 17-20 over the period. The 28 frigates will replace 13-19 existing frigates (053H1s, 053H2, 053H1Gs, maybe earlier 053H3s), therefore increasing total frigate numbers by 9-15 over the period. Thus, even at the more modest level I suggest, the total number of major surface combatants increases from the current number of 76 ships to 102-111 over the period. Improvements in tonnage and technology terms will, of course, be much greater.

It is certainly possible for China to embark upon a more rapid (and less sustainable) path of expansion by producing 5-6 major combatants each year over the 2020s rather than 4, but beyond producing the undesirable long-term effects that I mentioned in my previous post, such a path seems incongruent with what we have observed to date in China's approach to military development. China's willingness to reduce military spending growth in line with broader economic performance these past few years suggests to me that PLAN is unlikely to try to rush for a "USN-level Navy" when a more modest schedule will in any case deliver that outcome over time.

Yes,, I think an average of about 2 destroyers and 2 frigates commissioned per year between now and 2030 sounds about reasonable.

Personally I don't expect there to be 3 destroyers commissioned per year every year, but there may be a few years in that timespan when it happens but I expect the overall rate to be 2 destroyers, or maybe 2.5 or something.

 

[Blitzo]

It's been a hot topic both inside China and outside on fast China should build its navy fleet and what size it will eventually reach, given the rapid pace that PLAN is building/expanding. The concern is that China is eventually going to slow down and settles for a more steady and sustainable ship build rate and, when that happens, China would be facing a situation where it has a glut of shipbuilding capacity, much of them wasted.

There are two reasons why this worry is both premature and misplaced.

First, for all the talk about China's impressive naval ship construction, China still only has 5 052D's and more 051's than 052C's. It still has not had even a single class of batch-produced world-class SSB's. While all of discussions around 001, 001A and 002 (and 003) are pretty exciting , China still only has one carrier in service, which mostly serves as a training ship. The first domestically-built 001A won't be commissioned until 2019 at the earliest. As it stands, PLAN is not even where it should be for today's China, let alone China in the medium term. It seems that a lot of people are confusing the reality with a projected future, prematurely worrying more about the risk of excess capacity and waste of resources two decades down the road than the risk of not having a navy commensurate with China's strategic needs and national interest before it that happens.

Second, while it is true that building at such a frenetic pace is not sustainable in longer term and can cause idled resources and wasted investment for most countries, it's not entirely applicable to today's China. China does not need to invest more in infrastructure and labor to build naval ships at today's rate or ramp up even more. The capacity is there already. China has plenty of shipbuilding capacity now. it'll be a waste to not fully utilize them now. In fact, one can also argue than a decade or two down the road, it'll be much more expensive.

As to what kind of fleet level that PLAN would want to achieve in medium term (2030 ~ 2035), we don't know exactly since China does not publish a 30-year navy fleet plan or something like that. But it's not too difficult to guesstimate based on what we observe today and on China's strategic requirements in medium term. IMO, it's easier to speculate naval capital ships than tanks or military aircraft. China has two strategic directions that need navy presence and protection: Western Pacific and Indian Ocean (OBOR). There is converging consensus that China needs six aircraft carriers in medium term, plus the corresponding escort fleet. These are the power projection fleet; China also needs homeland defense fleet to take care of SCS, ECS, and Taiwan contingencies (the US, btw, does not really need a homeland defense fleet; Coast Guard will do). Another way to look at it: PLAN is increasingly modeled after USN and it will only be the US that can seriously threaten China's security - it makes sense to benchmark PLAN against USN. It's not unreasonable to believe PLAN will aim at its fleet at about 1/2~2/3 of the USN with similar force structure. Specifically, my speculations are in medium term as defined above, the PLAN will have about 6 carriers, 50~60 modern cruisers/destroyers, 50~60 modern frigates (excluding 056's), 20~30 SSN, 10~12 SSBNs, 8~12 LPDs, 6~8 LHDs as well as other support ships.

It will not surpass USN during the time period, but it would be far and away world's second most powerful navy.

Fully agree.

And for a year or so now, I've been nursing the idea that the Chinese Navy's ambition/goal for the medium term (early 2030s) period might be to achieve a "1/2 to 2/3" USN orbat (or capability) fleet of today, in terms of major surface and subsurface combatants especially in terms of carriers and destroyers, not counting things like corvettes or certain strategic assets like SSBNs. Nice to see others have reached some similar conclusions.

 

[delft]

China should, and I think does, consider its needs and not model its fleet on USN.
Industrially China has the advantage that its naval yards are also building merchant vessels and can switch capacity and personnel, to some limited extend, from one side to the other ( except for the nuclear submarine building ). That's an advantage that USN doesn't have and which makes its ships more expensive.

 

[Blitzo]

China should, and I think does, consider its needs and not model its fleet on USN.
Industrially China has the advantage that its naval yards are also building merchant vessels and can switch capacity and personnel, to some limited extend, from one side to the other ( except for the nuclear submarine building ). That's an advantage that USN doesn't have and which makes its ships more expensive.

Oh yes, of course I wasn't suggesting that China should blindly seek a fleet that's "X%" as capable as the USN just for the sake of it, but rather I was thinking that by the early 2030s, the blue water capable, non strategic nuclear fleet (i.e.: excluding short range non blue water corvettes and excluding things like strategic SSBNs) that's 1/2 to 2/3 the capability of the USN would be suited to fulfilling China's likely strategic and military requirements by that period, and being "modelled" after the USN is a result of the changes in requirements that the Chinese Navy will face between now and the early 2030s that will force them to transform to something that happens to look a bit like the USN today.

That is to say, it is still China's own strategic and military requirements driving fleet size, but it so happens those requirements I think may drive their fleet size to one that conveniently can be placed in context of the USN's fleet size today.