055 DDG Large Destroyer Thread

[Blitzo]

Nah, I don't see any reason why a near seas deployment should have to involve any less time than a far seas deployment or spend any significantly less time at sea. There is also no point to actively "deploy" a carrier to just mostly sit at a home port. Who even does that? A near seas deployment would involve the southern part of the SCS, the Philippine Sea, or the east side of the Ryukyu Islands. Any closer and there is no point; you would have land-based fighter coverage already. A carrier's job is power projection, not baby-sitting its home naval base. That's just below the level of usefulness as compared to deploying a carrier into the Taiwan Strait.

During peacetime, I see the purpose of retaining the majority of the carriers at home and only occasionally conducting relatively short duration near water patrols, would be to act as a home fleet and fleet in being as a form of deterrence (or occasional diplomatic/military signalling), and to provide a short notice surge capability in case of a crisis (including but not limited to a high intensity local/regional war).

Deploying a carrier continuously at sea at China's near waters/around first island chain during peacetime IMO is unnecessary because any interests that may be threatened there could be responded to within a couple days transit (at most) by any carrier from their homeport, and depending on the location and the crisis could even be responded to land based air power or long range missiles.

Notice that I used the phrase "you would have to", not "you have been trying to". And that is in fact what you would have to do in order to make a few days matter in a conflict scenario in which more distantly deployed carriers are somehow less available to the PLAN than nearby deployed carriers.

I'm not saying that a few days of transit time will matter for a carrier stationed in blue water if they were responding to a conflict scenario.
I am talking about the overall peacetime availability of the Navy to surge carriers available for a relatively short period of time in a high intensity conflict scenario, when using different deployment patterns. One of the parameters I've assumed in this case, is that the Navy will always want to have 1 carrier deployed at sea continuously in blue water in the Indian Ocean region.

Let's use an example of 7 carriers, of which 1 is constantly being cycled in a multi year refit, meaning there are technically only 6 "available" carriers.

In my proposal, I'm thinking of the 6 carriers, only 1 carrier will be deployed at sea continuously for many months in a manner that is away from homeport/specialized support facilities for an extended period (and I envision its area of patrol to be in the Indian Ocean), and the other 5 carriers would remain at home, in various stages of minor maintenance, training, and conducting relatively short duration (let's say 1 month max) at sea deployments at China's near waters. Having 5 carriers at home, of which most are at various maintenance or training duties and of which only 1 or two are conducting relatively short duration deployments at China's near waters at any one time intermittently, IMO would allow 3-4 of the 5 to be surge deployed at very short notice.

OTOH, in an alternative proposal, let's consider the same 6 carriers but where 2 carriers are deployed at sea continuously, both for many months. They may both be deployed continuously in the Indian Ocean, or one in the Indian Ocean and one in near waters, but the key point is that both are at sea continuously for the same relatively long period. In this proposal, there will be 4 carriers at home for various minor maintenance and training duties (and possibly also being available to conduct short duration near sea deployments). However, given 2 of the 6 carriers are always continuously at sea, it means each the 4 carriers at home (which will have been cycled through continuous at sea deployments previous to their at home stint for maintenance or training) will almost definitely require a longer maintenance or training to recover from the longer continuous at sea deployments that they've experienced compared to if only 1 of the 6 carriers are always continuously at sea in the previous proposal, and so I believe "only" 1-2 of those 4 at home carriers would be available to surge at short notice to near waters. Of course, in this proposal, there will already be 2 of the 6 carriers be deployed at sea and presumably ready to return to China's near waters (if it was deployed in blue water) or to start operations immediately (if it was deployed in near waters to begin with), and that may confer some of its own advantages such as the immediacy of being able to start operations.


But in this case I'm interested in maximizing the number of carriers available for surge, while retaining a minimal blue water/continuous at sea presence through the form of 1 single carrier (at the Indian Ocean).

So, I think for a fleet of 6 available carriers, having 1 continuously deployed carrier (in blue water in this case, in the Indian Ocean) while having 5 carriers at home (doing various maintenance, training duties, and occasional short duration patrols) allows for a significantly greater short notice near water surge capability, of up to 2 additional carriers... compared to having 2 continuously deployed carriers (whether in blue water or near water) while having 4 carriers at home (doing various maintenance, training duties, with or without short duration patrols).


I imagine if we have any disagreement here, it is probably more on the strategic/political level of the rationale of whether it is necessary or unnecessary to continuously deploy a carrier at sea in China's near waters.
I think the logic behind my 3-4 surge capability for 1 out of 6 continuously deployed carrier, versus 1-2 surge capability for 2 out of 6 continuously deployed carriers is relatively sound.

 

[Iron Man]

During peacetime, I see the purpose of retaining the majority of the carriers at home and only occasionally conducting relatively short duration near water patrols, would be to act as a home fleet and fleet in being as a form of deterrence (or occasional diplomatic/military signalling), and to provide a short notice surge capability in case of a crisis (including but not limited to a high intensity local/regional war).

Deploying a carrier continuously at sea at China's near waters/around first island chain during peacetime IMO is unnecessary because any interests that may be threatened there could be responded to within a couple days transit (at most) by any carrier from their homeport, and depending on the location and the crisis could even be responded to land based air power or long range missiles.

I'm not saying that a few days of transit time will matter for a carrier stationed in blue water if they were responding to a conflict scenario.
I am talking about the overall peacetime availability of the Navy to surge carriers available for a relatively short period of time in a high intensity conflict scenario, when using different deployment patterns. One of the parameters I've assumed in this case, is that the Navy will always want to have 1 carrier deployed at sea continuously in blue water in the Indian Ocean region.

Let's use an example of 7 carriers, of which 1 is constantly being cycled in a multi year refit, meaning there are technically only 6 "available" carriers.

In my proposal, I'm thinking of the 6 carriers, only 1 carrier will be deployed at sea continuously for many months in a manner that is away from homeport/specialized support facilities for an extended period (and I envision its area of patrol to be in the Indian Ocean), and the other 5 carriers would remain at home, in various stages of minor maintenance, training, and conducting relatively short duration (let's say 1 month max) at sea deployments at China's near waters. Having 5 carriers at home, of which most are at various maintenance or training duties and of which only 1 or two are conducting relatively short duration deployments at China's near waters at any one time intermittently, IMO would allow 3-4 of the 5 to be surge deployed at very short notice.

OTOH, in an alternative proposal, let's consider the same 6 carriers but where 2 carriers are deployed at sea continuously, both for many months. They may both be deployed continuously in the Indian Ocean, or one in the Indian Ocean and one in near waters, but the key point is that both are at sea continuously for the same relatively long period. In this proposal, there will be 4 carriers at home for various minor maintenance and training duties (and possibly also being available to conduct short duration near sea deployments). However, given 2 of the 6 carriers are always continuously at sea, it means each the 4 carriers at home (which will have been cycled through continuous at sea deployments previous to their at home stint for maintenance or training) will almost definitely require a longer maintenance or training to recover from the longer continuous at sea deployments that they've experienced compared to if only 1 of the 6 carriers are always continuously at sea in the previous proposal, and so I believe "only" 1-2 of those 4 at home carriers would be available to surge at short notice to near waters. Of course, in this proposal, there will already be 2 of the 6 carriers be deployed at sea and presumably ready to return to China's near waters (if it was deployed in blue water) or to start operations immediately (if it was deployed in near waters to begin with), and that may confer some of its own advantages such as the immediacy of being able to start operations.


But in this case I'm interested in maximizing the number of carriers available for surge, while retaining a minimal blue water/continuous at sea presence through the form of 1 single carrier (at the Indian Ocean).

So, I think for a fleet of 6 available carriers, having 1 continuously deployed carrier (in blue water in this case, in the Indian Ocean) while having 5 carriers at home (doing various maintenance, training duties, and occasional short duration patrols) allows for a significantly greater short notice near water surge capability, of up to 2 additional carriers... compared to having 2 continuously deployed carriers (whether in blue water or near water) while having 4 carriers at home (doing various maintenance, training duties, with or without short duration patrols).


I imagine if we have any disagreement here, it is probably more on the strategic/political level of the rationale of whether it is necessary or unnecessary to continuously deploy a carrier at sea in China's near waters.
I think the logic behind my 3-4 surge capability for 1 out of 6 continuously deployed carrier, versus 1-2 surge capability for 2 out of 6 continuously deployed carriers is relatively sound.

Keeping carriers at home for the purpose of deterrence would be a sad misuse of a carrier and gross misallocation of Chinese military funding. If I had just wanted to defend the waters around the homeland I can think of plenty of other cheaper and more effective weapons to spend my money on over a carrier. Again, a carrier's first and primary use is as a tool of power projection, not home defense. Nothing else projects power like a carrier, and using a carrier to do anything else falls somewhere between less than ideal and totally ridiculous. Something is happening in the Middle East that requires PLAN firepower or threat of use of firepower. Something is happening in the SCS that requires the same. Not sitting in port waiting for the improbable USN attack on China, or even briefly deploying off the coast of Hainan or Shanghai for what, gits and shiggles? Making sure the engines are still working? You are missing the point of a carrier I think.

 

[Blitzo]

Keeping carriers at home for the purpose of deterrence would be a sad misuse of a carrier and gross misallocation of Chinese military funding. If I had just wanted to defend the waters around the homeland I can think of plenty of other cheaper and more effective weapons to spend my money on over a carrier. Again, a carrier's first and primary use is as a tool of power projection, not home defense. Nothing else projects power like a carrier, and using a carrier to do anything else falls somewhere between less than ideal and totally ridiculous. Something is happening in the Middle East that requires PLAN firepower or threat of use of firepower. Something is happening in the SCS that requires the same. Not sitting in port waiting for the improbable USN attack on China, or even briefly deploying off the coast of Hainan or Shanghai for what, gits and shiggles? Making sure the engines are still working? You are missing the point of a carrier I think.

Keeping China's carriers at home would not just be to defend the waters around China's homeland, but rather to allow them to operate as part of an overall westpac air-naval-missile strategy at short notice, that includes but is not limited to the first island chain (say between first and second island chains)

For a carrier, this means conducting the standard missions it is capable of including air to ground strike, air to surface/naval strike, combat air patrol, EW, ISR and AEW&C, but all done in conjunction with land based air power, and done against the opposing naval task forces/CSGs, opposing land based air forces, and opposing land based assets that are arrayed in the western pacific. The mobile nature of carriers and their unique ability to field organic fixed wing military aviation including fighters, strike fighters, AEW&C/ISR platorms, and in future long endurance UAV/UCAV platforms, I think can greatly act as a force multiplier for land based air power and missile power not only through the natural synergy of joint operations but in China's maritime geography it helps to increase the volume of fire, the number of "forward deployed" organic aircraft, and the number of forward sensors that are all positioned further from China's coast to extend the strategic reach and strategic situational awareness China has in the overall region. Without that, the capabilities of a carrier China would otherwise lack any organic maritime based fixed wing military A2A or A2G or ISR/AEW&C platforms and thus significantly shrink the ability to take the fight further away from China's coast.

I envision the home fleet deterrence and high intensity contingency role of China's carriers/overall naval capabilities to seek to enable land based air power and land based missile power, and vice versa. The power projection capability of China's carriers will be mostly reserved for the very specific purpose of enabling a longer range/reach of Chinese air and sea control and superiority in the overall western pacific during high intensity conflict.
During standard peacetime, a single carrier in the Indian Ocean will help to maintain a Chinese presence to defend its SLOCs against low intensity and medium intensity threats or contingencies, and the remaining carriers at home will mostly train and maintain their ships and occasionally conduct a few relatively shorter duration patrols around the western pacific or sometimes more rarely beyond the westpac, to show the flag, keep up skills and for signalling and other showing the flag purposes.

 

[latenlazy]

Keeping China's carriers at home would not just be to defend the waters around China's homeland, but rather to allow them to operate as part of an overall westpac air-naval-missile strategy at short notice, that includes but is not limited to the first island chain (say between first and second island chains)

For a carrier, this means conducting the standard missions it is capable of including air to ground strike, air to surface/naval strike, combat air patrol, EW, ISR and AEW&C, but all done in conjunction with land based air power, and done against the opposing naval task forces/CSGs, opposing land based air forces, and opposing land based assets that are arrayed in the western pacific. The mobile nature of carriers and their unique ability to field organic fixed wing military aviation including fighters, strike fighters, AEW&C/ISR platorms, and in future long endurance UAV/UCAV platforms, I think can greatly act as a force multiplier for land based air power and missile power not only through the natural synergy of joint operations but in China's maritime geography it helps to increase the volume of fire, the number of "forward deployed" organic aircraft, and the number of forward sensors that are all positioned further from China's coast to extend the strategic reach and strategic situational awareness China has in the overall region. Without that, the capabilities of a carrier China would otherwise lack any organic maritime based fixed wing military A2A or A2G or ISR/AEW&C platforms and thus significantly shrink the ability to take the fight further away from China's coast.

I envision the home fleet deterrence and high intensity contingency role of China's carriers/overall naval capabilities to seek to enable land based air power and land based missile power, and vice versa. The power projection capability of China's carriers will be mostly reserved for the very specific purpose of enabling a longer range/reach of Chinese air and sea control and superiority in the overall western pacific during high intensity conflict.
During standard peacetime, a single carrier in the Indian Ocean will help to maintain a Chinese presence to defend its SLOCs against low intensity and medium intensity threats or contingencies, and the remaining carriers at home will mostly train and maintain their ships and occasionally conduct a few relatively shorter duration patrols around the western pacific or sometimes more rarely beyond the westpac, to show the flag, keep up skills and for signalling and other showing the flag purposes.

I think a simpler way to put it is in a potential defensive war against the US, China's main strategy will be reverse island hopping, and you can't contest control over distant islands effectively without forward deployed carriers.

 

[Blitzo]

I think a simpler way to put it is in a potential defensive war against the US, China's main strategy will be reverse island hopping, and you can't contest control over distant islands effectively without forward deployed carriers.

True to an extent, although I think "island hopping" implies some kind of boots on the ground assault/occupation of islands in question, which I think may not necessarily be part of China's plans (though it would depend on how far into the future we would go).

Instead, I think simply razing islands of all significant assets, infrastructure and depleting their capabilities would be enough, but to do that you'll be facing the defences on those islands that include their land based air power and SAMs, but also the opposing naval forces and naval aviation capabiliities that would seek to operate in conjunction with their land based air power.... So I think what would be optimal to deal with that combined array, is a combination of long range land based missiles, land based air power, and naval air power (and some degree of naval cruise missiles) to be able to provide multi domain offensive and defensive capabilities at tactically and operationally useful distances and density.

I suppose the reason I see carriers as important for any sort of high intensity conflict for China is because the distance at which China will want to operate and strike at, along with the density of opposing land based air power and naval/carrier based air power, means trying to fight the opfor without a robust naval/carrier based air power capability of your own is sort like fighting while missing a limb.
Of course, in China's case they do have some advantages like having a potentially greater number of land air bases to operate from that can be more easily supplied and repaired if damaged, as well as a substantial land based long range missile capability, but IMO that makes the case for having carriers even greater, because if you are able to negate or mitigate the opfor's own naval/carrier based air power then it may offer your overall military a net advantage in overall deployable capabilities in the region and a good shot at actually winning a conflict straight up.

 

[latenlazy]

True to an extent, although I think "island hopping" implies some kind of boots on the ground assault/occupation of islands in question, which I think may not necessarily be part of China's plans (though it would depend on how far into the future we would go).

Instead, I think simply razing islands of all significant assets, infrastructure and depleting their capabilities would be enough

Once you've dismantled your adversary's assets on an island you'll need to keep them from coming back. The most efficient way to do so would be to set up your own base.

 

[AndrewS]

I think 7 carriers is a more logistically sound number. This number will support 2 on station at all times whereas 6 carriers will leave gaps in coverage at certain times.

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As for the PLAN I think a reasonable and sustainable annual build rate for surface combatants would be something like 1-2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, 4 frigates, 1 SSN, and 1-2 SSKs. This combined with its current burst production of surface combatants will make the PLAN a near-peer to the USN by the middle of the century, assuming nothing catastrophic happens (which it probably will).

I think it's better to say 3-4 AEGIS cruisers/destroyers per year, as they will be sequential programmes rather than being built at the same time.

Plus 4 frigates sounds too high, as it means a fleet of 120+ frigates. 2 per year sounds more likely as it results in a fleet of 60 ships, that are also backed up by 60+ Type-56 corvettes plus the Coast Guard fleet. That is more than enough for wartime escort and littoral duty. The money saved would be better spent on high-end assets where China is still outmatched.

As for SSKs and SSNs, I see SSK production dropping slightly to 1 per year, to sustain a long-term fleet of 30-40 SSKs, which should be sufficient for littoral duties.

This will mean a significant decrease in the SSK fleet, but I see this being more than offset by an increase in SSN production to at least 1.5 per year. That would mean a huge expansion of SSNs to 45 boats.

 

[Iron Man]

Keeping China's carriers at home would not just be to defend the waters around China's homeland, but rather to allow them to operate as part of an overall westpac air-naval-missile strategy at short notice, that includes but is not limited to the first island chain (say between first and second island chains)

For a carrier, this means conducting the standard missions it is capable of including air to ground strike, air to surface/naval strike, combat air patrol, EW, ISR and AEW&C, but all done in conjunction with land based air power, and done against the opposing naval task forces/CSGs, opposing land based air forces, and opposing land based assets that are arrayed in the western pacific. The mobile nature of carriers and their unique ability to field organic fixed wing military aviation including fighters, strike fighters, AEW&C/ISR platorms, and in future long endurance UAV/UCAV platforms, I think can greatly act as a force multiplier for land based air power and missile power not only through the natural synergy of joint operations but in China's maritime geography it helps to increase the volume of fire, the number of "forward deployed" organic aircraft, and the number of forward sensors that are all positioned further from China's coast to extend the strategic reach and strategic situational awareness China has in the overall region. Without that, the capabilities of a carrier China would otherwise lack any organic maritime based fixed wing military A2A or A2G or ISR/AEW&C platforms and thus significantly shrink the ability to take the fight further away from China's coast.

I envision the home fleet deterrence and high intensity contingency role of China's carriers/overall naval capabilities to seek to enable land based air power and land based missile power, and vice versa. The power projection capability of China's carriers will be mostly reserved for the very specific purpose of enabling a longer range/reach of Chinese air and sea control and superiority in the overall western pacific during high intensity conflict.
During standard peacetime, a single carrier in the Indian Ocean will help to maintain a Chinese presence to defend its SLOCs against low intensity and medium intensity threats or contingencies, and the remaining carriers at home will mostly train and maintain their ships and occasionally conduct a few relatively shorter duration patrols around the western pacific or sometimes more rarely beyond the westpac, to show the flag, keep up skills and for signalling and other showing the flag purposes.

China's ISR and other sensor platforms are literally proliferating like wildfire these days, so using a carrier as an overpriced sensor "force multiplier" has less and less utility with each passing day. If China can send an ASBM onto a carrier target now, it already has the sensor capability to detect and track carriers and probably other smaller ships now, and at further distances than land-based Chinese fighters can reach and of course further from Chinese shores than US fighters can reach. UAVs, satellites, OTH radars and MPAs are adding a robustness to China's sensor capabilities that can be exceeded only by the US. Also, taking the fighter "further" and further from China's coast just means that the carriers are going to be more and more alone when fighting an adversary. This is not only unnecessary it is unnecessarily dangerous for the carriers. The goal is to prevent (presumably) the USN from being able to safely sortie carrier based fighters to attack Chinese land targets, or at most Chinese naval targets invading Taiwan or DYT islands. Instead of spending billions and billions on several carriers, airwings and personnel that will be sitting at pierside, I would rather have more ASCMs, more ASBMs, (especially) more subs, more mines, more UAVs/UCAVs/UUVs, more sensors of all sorts, and I can accomplish the same deterrence and firepower value against those USN carriers and fighters, and probably for much less money and less risk to assets and personnel during war than what you want to spend on all those pierside queens.

 

[Blitzo]

Once you've dismantled your adversary's assets on an island you'll need to keep them from coming back. The most efficient way to do so would be to set up your own base.

That is true, but I think that would be quite a bit after the initial stage of high intensity combat. If all of the major assets on an island have been destroyed and air and naval supply links severed I do not expect any remaining personnel to field too much resistance.

Not much like the island hopping campaigns of WWII I think.

 

[Blitzo]

China's ISR and other sensor platforms are literally proliferating like wildfire these days, so using a carrier as an overpriced sensor "force multiplier" has less and less utility with each passing day. If China can send an ASBM onto a carrier target now, it already has the sensor capability to detect and track carriers and probably other smaller ships now, and at further distances than land-based Chinese fighters can reach and of course further from Chinese shores than US fighters can reach. UAVs, satellites, OTH radars and MPAs are adding a robustness to China's sensor capabilities that can be exceeded only by the US. Also, taking the fighter "further" and further from China's coast just means that the carriers are going to be more and more alone when fighting an adversary. This is not only unnecessary it is unnecessarily dangerous for the carriers. The goal is to prevent (presumably) the USN from being able to safely sortie carrier based fighters to attack Chinese land targets, or at most Chinese naval targets invading Taiwan or DYT islands. Instead of spending billions and billions on several carriers, airwings and personnel that will be sitting at pierside, I would rather have more ASCMs, more ASBMs, (especially) more subs, more mines, more UAVs/UCAVs/UUVs, more sensors of all sorts, and I can accomplish the same deterrence and firepower value against those USN carriers and fighters, and probably for much less money and less risk to assets and personnel during war than what you want to spend on all those pierside queens.

Satellites and OTH radars can operate without disruption from threats in the air.

But for MPAs and UAVs to operate in airspace outside of China's coast and especially further out into the first island chain would require a degree of air superiority or at least a sustained presence of your own fighters to contest the skies at those sort of extended ranges.
Land based air power can fill part of that gap, especially with aerial refuelling, but carrier based air power can conduct CAP missions at a far greater distance, freeing up land based air power and aerial refuelling aircraft for a variety of other missions.
Then of course there's the ability to deploy ISR, AEW&C platforms from the carrier itself, as well as UAVs/UCAVs, and the strike role of carrierborne fighters too, which provide many roles beyond merely the aforementioned controlling airspace and allowing for MPAs and UAVs to safely operate.


I think carriers can sensibly operate in conjunction with AShMs, AShBMs, submarines, and UAVs, UCAVs, UUVs, and the unique role of carriers in a high intensity conflict is one which I think may be worth the investment which investment into only those other domains provide, even if (and perhaps even especially if) the majority of the carriers do not spend their much time on continuous at sea patrols.
The key is to strike a balance where you don't over invest on too many assets of one kind and too little in another that may reduce the overall combat effectiveness/combat capability of your force.