Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis
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The Americans are really good with PR talk. They want to always have their cake and eat them too moment.
Let's talk about 3. This one is complex,. Taiwan has been operating as a de facto independent entity for 70 years, but before 1990s, KMT was ruling Taiwan and they agreed to the one China principle, just not on who's the legitimate representor of China. In fact, KMT wanted to attack the mainland and liberate the mainland... But with DPP, Taiwan's independence take on a different political nature to things than before. It is no longer about Taiwan operating autonomously from control of the CPC, but true independence. New generations of Taiwanese have a distinct identity that is not Chinese, and the continued support from US played no small part in this. Would a visit from Pelosi change anything on the ground and enable Taiwan to declare true independence in this moment? No. But, the nature of it is much more intense as it may signal the start of a brand new US approach to US and Chinese interaction, so if viewed through this lens, it is breaking the status quo and may deserve a large reaction. An inappropriate metaphor would be two kids jokingly fighting each other but the emotions start to run high with each push/punch/slap exchanged, at one point a playful yet forceful touch will turn into a light attack, and although the two may not differ in terms of its physicals impact, the nature of intent behind the act changes and that will lead to true escalation and a fistfight between the two kids...
In terms of 4, this one is hard to say to be honest. I am under the impression that both China and US agree that time is on China's side, which is why the US is pushing hard on China, first with the trade war, then with the entire Covid thing, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and all these bullshit, now it's Taiwan. The Taiwan card differs from everything else because Taiwan card is going to lead to military confrontation if US goes down this rabbit hole, whereas anything else would not. This means that US is eager to draw China into a fight early in hopes of China being not completely militarily prepared, because it may be too late if they wait until 2025, 2030, or 2035. In this case, then this assumption may make sense, the US's response to China is indeed a reflection of their assumption that time is on China's side so they need to start a conflict with China as early as possible to avoid having less and less of a chance in the future, and China may indeed see through this and not engage.
But then again, you can never be truly ready for anything, especially for things you are going to do only one time... Maybe this may deter China from going kenetic, maybe not. I think it depends on other factors, being ready or not is not a critical factor IMO, but more of a supporting factor. All else being equal, China would prefer to reunify Taiwan forcefully when conditions are perfect, but that opportunity may never come so it is entirely possible to initiate things even if not everything is prefect.
Now let's examine the assumptions that suggest China will go kinetic.
For 1 here, I'm ambiguous. CPC operates on mysterious terms, you never know what happens on top, and anyone who claims who knows anything is probably bullshitting or spreading propaganda. It is 2017 that CPC removed presidential limits, but what does it mean? China has 3 key positions, chairman of the central military commission, president of PRC, and general secretary of the CPC. Xi is all 3, but one would argue that chairman of CMC and general secretary of CPC matters much more than president of PRC. The paramount leader of China is not always the person holding the president position, but the one who controls the party and CMC. So in this lens, that 2017 decision to scarp presidential terms if kind of meaningless because there is no term limit on CMC and CPC chairman/general secretary.
But, nothing means nothing, I think the 2017 removal of presidential term limit is also a political message, since it is a decision that all high ranking CPC members must vote on, so there must be consensus here. My take is that the higher ups in CPC may realized that going into the 2020s China will be in a peroid of turmoil and it needs a strong, powerful, and stable leader, and perhaps Xi is the correct person to ensure the party and the country's survival. The 2017 term limit change is just a public announcement of this. If this is the case, then that may mean that Xi is set to have a successful outcome this congress regardless since that decision has been made 5 years ago (think about Shandong carrier, many people speculate that it is required by CMC whereas Navy wanted to go straight to 003 after Liaoning, but CMC believed having another carrier for early 2020s will be vital to nation's security and ordered the Navy to build 002 before pursuing a 003, and how Shandong is actually being used right now in a Taiwan situation - if CMC and CPC saw this coming in early 2010s when building their warships, why would they decide right now in 2022 whether the nation's paramount leader should stay or not?).
If the outcome of this year's congress was set in stone many years ago and Xi will stay on since that is CPC's consensus for the past couple of years, then how much would a Taiwan scenario change the outcome of that pre-established decision? It is hard to say, and I have no definitive answer.
More to continue....
Taking this opportunity to convince the CPC's upper echelon to increase military spending as a percentage of GDP, as well as to normalize such an expenditure, is all well and good as many other members have pointed out.
However, this is also a golden opportunity for the PLA to normalize stationing massive amounts of military assets in position for armed reunification, permanently. The current crisis provides a perfectly valid and expected reason for such a military buildup, happening right now as numerous military convoys have been spotted heading south towards Fujian. Without this crisis, such a buildup would undoubtedly be because armed reunification is imminent. But in today's context, that is no longer a certainty, as you can make a compelling case that this buildup is simply a show of force to try to deter Pelosi's visit, and not for an actual fight. This rings slightly less alarm bells in the decision-making centers of DC and Taipei, although only slightly.
Assuming this crisis doesn't turn hot, the PLA would gain much by just not sending back what they've already built up in the general area, turning it into a new status quo. This way if they do decide to do armed reunification sometime down the line, the amount of time, assets, and personnel they will need to mobilize will be greatly reduced, giving potential adversaries far less time to react.
However, this is also a golden opportunity for the PLA to normalize stationing massive amounts of military assets in position for armed reunification, permanently. The current crisis provides a perfectly valid and expected reason for such a military buildup, happening right now as numerous military convoys have been spotted heading south towards Fujian. Without this crisis, such a buildup would undoubtedly be because armed reunification is imminent. But in today's context, that is no longer a certainty, as you can make a compelling case that this buildup is simply a show of force to try to deter Pelosi's visit, and not for an actual fight. This rings slightly less alarm bells in the decision-making centers of DC and Taipei, although only slightly.
Assuming this crisis doesn't turn hot, the PLA would gain much by just not sending back what they've already built up in the general area, turning it into a new status quo. This way if they do decide to do armed reunification sometime down the line, the amount of time, assets, and personnel they will need to mobilize will be greatly reduced, giving potential adversaries far less time to react.
escobar
Brigadier
It is not the US are really good in PR but that CN is so bad in PR
The whole plotline could've been solved by saturated missile strikes :-/
China is a huge country with tons of cover and concealment. The bases have garage structures that are bigger than strictly required for parking, AND it is known there are underground bases. Meanwhile satellite coverage is intermittent and have limited swath size.
Iraq and Ukraine are flat with little (Ukraine) to no (Iraq) cover. And in Iraq case it is small.
I'm not calling them an order of magnitude off. I'm calling them maybe 50-100% off on TEL estimates. So instead of say 24 DF-41 there's 36-48. But with a medium ground of 6x MIRVs per missile (rather than maximalist 10x or minimalist 2x) that means they're missing 72-108x. That is a 1/3-1/4 underestimate from DF-41 alone.
manqiangrexue
Brigadier
Is it 1.4%? Does the CCP announce its real spending or just a number to be transparent? Is the number flexible? In the middle of June, if a large sum could bring great benefit, can the "budget" accomodate? You don't know these things but you assume that it's not enough just because the US isn't cowed. What if this is just not enough time to surpass the US military yet? Your argument could have been made in 1996 and China would have a huge number of obsolete war machines to maintain.
Do you know how capable they are? Do you know what's in the making or how soon the next iteration will be ready? The CCP knows.
If the US doesn't dare start a war with China, or do a nuclear first strike as it watches itself being surpassed, it's enough. Nukes don't make them stay away from you like you have the plague; the US and Soviets could destroy each other several times over at any time but they provoked each other all the time. Did they not have enough nukes for deterrence?
Sounds emotional.
Of course everyone including the CCP has much to learn, but I'm not arrogant enough to think that I can teach them.
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