The capability of BMD is very suspicious when facing missiles with contemporary tech. Aegis can interrupt neither DF-26 in 2015 nor DF-17 in 2022, I don’t think in 2030 they can be magically more efficient so 1) PLARF is enough for any ‘kicking the door’ operation 2) spending too many resources on BMD of 1st island is unreasonable. I believe US has realized that and that’s why they are spending less for BMD but more for bombers, SSNs and NGAD, especially compared with what they were doing several years ago.
The US is continuing to spend on BMD (including new generation BMD ships, theater BMD capabilities, and new missiles).
As for the efficacy of US BMD against DF-26 and DF-17, I think we will just have to agree to disagree.
For the purposes of discussion, I generously assume for the PLA that half of their IRBMs/HGVs that they launch at Guam from land in the main axis of attack will be shot down.
Any USAF attack packages must face even more defense but they still decide to leverage B-21 as a part of first wave of strike. I said they have endorsed the capability of VLO platforms in this way.
Actually, US attack packages will face less formidable defenses than what the PLA faces, because those B-21s will also be able to launch stand off weapons 1000km from China's airspace, and the PLA will have virtually no persistent air defense or organic air capabilities during the onset of conflict.
The nature of geography of the western pacific and the peacetime basing of US forces in the region (and the ability to surge deploy their capabilities as tensions rise prior to a conflict) means that the US will have far superior air and sea presence outside of the first island chain at onset of hostilities.
It will be the PLA's responsibility to break that presence... but until they are able to do that, it means that US B-21s will be very difficult to intercept if they are more than say, 500km outside of of China's airspace. It also simultaneously means that for PLA H-20s to conduct missions against Guam/second island chain, they would have to thoroughly crush US forces basically between the first island chain and Guam.
Any operation must suffer losses, the real question is is it worth it.
If your losses mean you are unable to achieve your mission, then it is not worth it.
I don’t know what’s your imagination about a 1000 MRBM/CMs attack, but for me it can literally stop all 1st island chain air bases for a long time and destroy hundreds of planes, so H-6 can freely go anywhere, at least for a while.
Indeed I cannot believe they will use so many missiles for 1st island chain even during the whole war.
To clarify -- I believe that 1000 land based long range missiles + 480 SSN launched missiles (prepositioned) + 30 H-20s +/- additional surface ship and possible carrier based strike from 2-3 carrier strike groups, is needed
for Guam (as well as also one or two other second island chain ACE bases), on day one only.
For the first island chain, they will use many more SRBMs/shorter range ground launched weapons, with H-20s and H-6Ks and strike fighters carrying shorter range ALCMs/standoff weapons (alloperating simultaneously with the strike mission for Guam/second island chain).... with the first island chain in the initial couple of days likely requiring totalling thousands of munitions, to begin with.