PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

SEAD

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AEW aircraft, shipborne radar, land based radar, with modern networking, I believe can substantially increase the ability to detect VLO bombers especially if you operate in a region where you know the VLO bombers have to fly through.
Physically it's hard, if not impossible. I won't say I'm a radio engineer etc. but I really want to know more about your evidence.
They are capable of being deployed during the first day, because China will not start shooting at them prior to commencement of hostilities.
I don't think USAF/USN assuming this.
That is partially because offense outweighs defense in the US strategic doctrine and plays into their pre-existing geographical advantages. Partly it is because those projects (new bomber, new SSN, new generation fighter) are the ones where the US has been needing to move onto the next generation anyhow.
But comprehensive BMD development and procurement remain ongoing, with current projects underway either in development or construction (Flight III Burke, new SM-6 and SM-3 variants, new THAAD variants).
"more vs. less" is not "yes or no".
Because you want to be able to defend against the missile attack while also maximizing the survivability of your aircraft to give yourself every advantage, in case if some of the missiles get through or if the enemy launches a larger salvo than expected, you do not lose everything due to an unforced error.
Again, I have showed the Aegis test timeline and I believe it's enough. I hope you can convince me with more convincing evidences.
I'm aware of the USAF's demands for the aircraft. Depending on the opfor nation, depending on the theater of the opfor nation in which the B-21 is operating, it may well be possible that they can do day one hunting for TELs.

Against the PLA, in the 2030s, in the ETC or STC? Much more doubtful.
Are you speaking "hunting for TELs 30km away from fighters and SAMs is easy but penetrating a 4000km(or 5000km) dot line is hard"? Really?

I never said that the US needs to saturate the entire area with AEW&C and Aegis ships to pose a threat that is able to credibly degrade H-20 strike packages to Guam.
You can try any tactics, math will not change.
I am aware.

Carrying out SEAD operations against US integrated IADS in the first island chain to second island chain region (comprising land based aircraft and radars, at least 2-3 CSGs, and multiple additional SAGs with aegis), I believe will be very difficult.
Again, basically it's a math problem, even ignoring any AShBM or SEAD.
 
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SEAD

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I don't think USAF/USN assuming this.
to be more clear, i noticed USAF/USN trend to deploy their vulnerable assets(especially CBGs and subsonic airplanes) far away from 1st island in recent(indeed for several years) simulations. They do entry 1st island chain but not for the first day.
 

Blitzo

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Physically it's hard, if not impossible. I won't say I'm a radio engineer etc. but I really want to know more about your evidence.

I'm not a radio engineer either, but with AEW&C and BMD ships with UHF and S band radars respectively, and datalinking systems like JADC2 and NIFC CA, with land based and carrier based fighters with modern datalilnking, it is too dangerous to assume that H-20s can operate safely without first substantially degrading opfor land bases, carriers, and IADS.


I don't think USAF/USN assuming this.

For the PLA, they have to assume it.


"more vs. less" is not "yes or no".

And as I said, that is also a reflection of those new platforms being generational replacements.


Again, I have showed the Aegis test timeline and I believe it's enough. I hope you can convince me with more convincing evidences.

What timeline was that? Stating "Aegis can interrupt neither DF-26 in 2015 nor DF-17 in 2022"?
SM-6 and SM-3 have both demonstrated their capability to defeat representative MRBM targets including complex MRBM targets.

I am not confident at all that weapons like DF-26 and DF-17 will be capable of being untouchable by BMD systems of the 2030s, especially with more complex space based sensors providing additional targeting discrimination.

The only way to ensure mission success is a multilayered approach of having a large number of weapons, a large variety of weapons with different flight profiles, launched from multiple platforms, from multiple axes, supported by simultaneous coordinated strikes against closer in opfor BMD platforms/IADS capabilities/sensors.


Are you speaking "hunting for TELs 30km away from fighters and SAMs is easy but penetrating a 4000km(or 5000km) dot line is hard"? Really?

Depending on what region the TELs are, yes .


You can try any tactics, math will not change.

Again, basically it's a math problem, even ignoring any AShBM or SEAD.

I agree that it's a maths problem, and it's a problem where the PLA require a substantially sized first wave strike to be able to guarantee that they are capable of significantly degrading second island chain US bases for follow on operations.
 

SEAD

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I'm not a radio engineer either, but with AEW&C and BMD ships with UHF and S band radars respectively, and datalinking systems like JADC2 and NIFC CA, with land based and carrier based fighters with modern datalilnking, it is too dangerous to assume that H-20s can operate safely without first substantially degrading opfor land bases, carriers, and IADS.
I mean i'm actually a former radio engineer, I don't believe any 2030s radar can detect B-21 300km away but I hope you can convince me with more data.
What timeline was that? Stating "Aegis can interrupt neither DF-26 in 2015 nor DF-17 in 2022"?
Yes, the first reliable interrupting test for MRBM is around 2016. For HGV, the first test would be in FY2023. (you can check MDA records, every analysts concerning BMD should read and analyze them.)
SM-6 and SM-3 have both demonstrated their capability to defeat representative MRBM targets including complex MRBM targets.
hmm. consider the MDA records and think twice.
I am not confident at all that weapons like DF-26 and DF-17 will be capable of being untouchable by BMD systems of the 2030s, especially with more complex space based sensors providing additional targeting discrimination.
They must have moved to more complex missiles in 2030s. Again, any BMD against CONTEMPORARY missiles are unreliable.
The only way to ensure mission success is a multilayered approach of having a large number of weapons, a large variety of weapons with different flight profiles, launched from multiple platforms, from multiple axes, supported by simultaneous coordinated strikes against closer in opfor BMD platforms/IADS capabilities/sensors.
hmm. I won't waste my time if no more data. Argument is meaningless.
Depending on what region the TELs are, yes .
physically a radar in 30km away is 10,000 times more powerful than the same radar in 300km. Even for Iran or North Korea, it's definitely anything but easy.
I agree that it's a maths problem, and it's a problem where the PLA require a substantially sized first wave strike to be able to guarantee that they are capable of significantly degrading second island chain US bases for follow on operations.
I'm going to sleep, good night.
 
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SEAD

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hmm. consider the MDA records and think twice.
To be more clear, they haven't did any salvo (only 2 targets) interrupting test until 2021, and then failed. They did a series of MRBM interrupting test so I assume they were increasing the authenticity of targets, but the last test failed.

I have to go to bed now.
 
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Blitzo

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I mean i'm actually a former radio engineer, I don't believe any 2030s radar can detect B-21 300km away but I hope you can convince me with more data.

Yes, the first reliable interrupting test for MRBM is around 2016. For HGV, the first test would be in FY2023. (you can check MDA records, every analysts concerning BMD should read and analyze them.)

They have yet to conduct tests against HGV targets yes, but they've conducted sufficient tests against MRBM targets with sufficiently credible results that I do not think a MRBM launched by the PLA can be considered to be a non-interceptable kill.


hmm. consider the MDA records and think twice.

They must have moved to more complex missiles in 2030s. Again, any BMD against CONTEMPORARY missiles are unreliable.

hmm. I won't waste my time if no more data. Argument is meaningless.

physically a radar in 30km away is 10,000 times more powerful than the same radar in 300km. Even for Iran or North Korea, it's definitely anything but easy.

I'm going to sleep, good night.

Very well.

Keep in mind the force requirement I am envisioning is one where the PLA is capable of achieving a relatively lopsided victory even if luck is not on their side. If the force required ends up being excessive on the day, then so be it. But far better that than the other way around.
 

AndrewS

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They have yet to conduct tests against HGV targets yes, but they've conducted sufficient tests against MRBM targets with sufficiently credible results that I do not think a MRBM launched by the PLA can be considered to be a non-interceptable kill.

The issue is that US ABM testing is against non-manoeuvring targets on a predictable ballistic trajectory.
Yet the standard DF-26/DF-21/DF-17 warhead does manoeuvre.

So to summarise, here are the key points:

1. Missile defences would be trying to track a small manoeuvring incoming missile at very high speed at long range, which requires a very large dedicated X-Band radar and also early warning
2. The incoming missile is almost certainly going to be flying much faster than the defending missile. And the defending missile is losing energy as it travels upwards whereas the attacking missile is gaining energy (and manoeuvrability) as it travels down
3. From a cost perspective, the cost of defending missiles will be greater than the cost of incoming DF-26 missiles

So even if missile defence can intercept some of the DF-26, the cost will be prohibitive from the defender's standpoint.

And if we assume that the Chinese military will be significantly outspending the US military by 2035, the US trying to deploy enough missile defences to protect Guam is a fool's errand. So I don't see a vast expansion in US spending on missile defence.
 

AndrewS

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@Bltizo

Couple of other comments.

Another way of looking at it, is how likely is it that China will need to launch a lightning strike against Guam out of the blue?

For the next 20+ years, China's economic and military potential should continue to rise much faster than the US and its allies.
And China is the world's largest trading nation, depending on imports of raw materials and exports of manufactured goods. Most of this trade is seaborne.

A war would likely derail China's economic plans, which is why some in the US advocate a war with China now, before China achieves military/economic superiority over the US.

And look at the latest news where Trump thought China had a hurricane weapon that could be used to secretly attack the US, or how Trump wanted to attack other countries but blame these attacks on China. The worrying (and depressing) thing is that Trump is likely to be back as the US President in a few years.

---

And assuming there is a period of tensions beforehand, one would expect Chinese submarines to be surged as a warning or in anticipation of a US declaration of war against China. So if China has 60 SSNs with 12 on patrol at any time, that means another 30+ ready for surge within a few days. So it would be better for those 12 SSNs to be patrolling further afield, and to rely on the surge boats to flood the waters around Guam and the 1st/2nd Island Chain.

One would hope that in such a scenario, the US would take it seriously.

Remember that the objective is to deter the US from interfering in the Western Pacific, not to actually go to war with the USA and have to defeat them in a war of attrition.
 
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Mohsin77

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USAF is facing a much much denser air defense network but they still decide to bet their future on the huge contract of 145 B-21. Meanwhile PLAAF, after explored this field for 30 years, perhaps did much wider and deeper research than any competitors, also decides to build H-20 as their main attack platform. You can trust the double endorsement.

That's generally a dangerous argument. By that logic, Horse Cavalry should've dominated the field in WWI and Battleships should've dominated the seas in WWII.

It's an open question how relevant B-21/H-20s can be in a 21st century US-China war. Just because billions are spent on acquiring them doesn't prove anything. We really don't know how "VLO" they will be, or how efficient they are compared to CM+BM+HGV saturation attacks.

Let's put it this way -- my belief is that after 2035, the PLA should be capable of waging a high intensity conflict that can neutralize virtually all US air and naval surface forces, including land bases (that has been surge deployed during a period of tension leading up to conflict -- constituting up to 70% of total US deployable naval and air strength) in the western pacificwithin two to three weeks, and to be able to do so even if they roll a "two" (on a six sided dice) during the conflict in terms of luck/fortune.
After those two to three weeks, the US should have no meaningful air or naval capability west of Hawaii.

This should definitely be the objective. However, the pace of events might prove even quicker than this. Such a conflict could even be decided in the first few hours.
 

Mohsin77

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Also, by the way:

I don't believe any 2030s radar can detect B-21 300km away but I hope you can convince me with more data.

This defeats the entire purpose of having 'VLO' strategic bombers. The whole point of spending billions on highly expensive (and thus very limited) stealth bombers is to penetrate enemy airspace.

If you're only using them for launching standoff munitions from outside the enemy's defensive umbrella, then you don't need to spend billions on "VLO." There's a whole range of cheaper solutions for that already. Think about how many of those you can acquire for the price of one B-21.
 
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