Xi Yazhou's latest video on how to conduct a punitive campaign against India should the need arise in the future.
He submits that an all out attack to destroy India as a nation and cause it to fracture into multiple parts is within PLA's capability but extremely unlikely to actually take place.
The most likely scenario is 1962 2.0, a limited engagement where PLA attack with the goal of wiping out a corps sized unit but not to gain ground permanently. IA's level of mechanisation is far shy of PLA and they lack sufficient armour and modern artillery force so that in mobile war a corps sized unit could easily be isolated, surrounded, pined down and then destroyed by PLA. In an engagement of this size several thousand PoWs are likely.
However Xi Yazhou says an attack like this, being a modern day replay of 1962 although very degrading to the Indian elites does not actually cause much long lasting damage considering their million strong army. The result is thus likely to be same as 1962 - India would calm down for several years, maybe a decade then things would return to same old.
Instead Xi Yazhou proposes an alternative - destroy half of Indian air force and/or their nuclear capability using similar tactics as NATO did during the Kosovo War. PLAGF are to hold their position on the ground and not go on the offensive while PLAAF and PLARF are to conduct the offence from their air. A PLARF ballistic missile attack with about 100 missiles will only give warning of several minutes and paralyse all military air fields in northern India. This is then followed up for several days with PLAAF air strike and further missile attacks with the aim of destroying the majority of SU-30MKI on the ground while runway repairs are under way.
Unlike North Korea or Pakistan, India did not seriously consider attack on their nuclear facility. With almost their entire missile force concentrated at Abdul Kalam Island and lacking mobile launch capabilities an attack with just several medium range ballistic missiles with conventional warhead would almost completely neutralise India's nuclear capability. Should a handful of missiles be launched before the launch site could be destroyed they would make easy targets for HQ-19 interceptors recently demonstrated. This attack is riskier than attack on air force. It does not necessarily have to be carried out concurrently with the above.
An attack like the above, where over the course of a few hours several decades worth of air force or ballistic missile built up goes up in smoke is both psychologically degrading as well as materially painful.
Xi Yazhou also points out that India's missile defense or even missile early warning system are near as to non-existent, thus this attack would not require the latest and greatest such as DF-26 or DF-17. Instead the majority of the work could be carried out with the huge reserve of DF-11, DF-15 and DF-21 that are nearing the end of their service life.
