PLA (strategic) news, pics, and videos

[doggydogdo]

As an example, I recall there was a bit of a headscratcher as to why the PLAAF purchased the 24 oddball Su-35s in 2015.

That's probably just so they can use them to intercept foreign aircraft without revealing the radar signatures of their more advanced fighters. I doubt it's corruption because buying foreign equipment would probably need a lot more levels of approval compared to buying domestic.

 

[ENTED64]

As an example, I recall there was a bit of a headscratcher as to why the PLAAF purchased the 24 oddball Su-35s in 2015.

That's probably just so they can use them to intercept foreign aircraft without revealing the radar signatures of their more advanced fighters. I doubt it's corruption because buying foreign equipment would probably need a lot more levels of approval compared to buying domestic.

The reason they bought the Su-35s was pretty well known at the time to be because they wanted Russian engines. At the time (early 2010s) the Chinese aeroengine industry was much worse off than it is now and they were pretty reliant on Russia. The Chinese wanted AL-41 alone but the Russians insisted on selling it only with Su-35. This delayed things for a while but eventually China agreed so then there was another delay as the Russians insisted on 48 Su-35 and the Chinese only wanted 24. Eventually China got its way and Russia agreed to sell 24. I believe there was some Russian official who hinted that China bought like 3 sets of replacement engines for each Su-35 too.

 

[siegecrossbow]

The reason they bought the Su-35s was pretty well known at the time to be because they wanted Russian engines. At the time (early 2010s) the Chinese aeroengine industry was much worse off than it is now and they were pretty reliant on Russia. The Chinese wanted AL-41 alone but the Russians insisted on selling it only with Su-35. This delayed things for a while but eventually China agreed so then there was another delay as the Russians insisted on 48 Su-35 and the Chinese only wanted 24. Eventually China got its way and Russia agreed to sell 24. I believe there was some Russian official who hinted that China bought like 3 sets of replacement engines for each Su-35 too.

Adding to that — the three musketeers of post 2018 PLAAF (J-20, J-16, and J-10C) were under development when the deal was signed. There is no guarantee that the process is smooth and China must have a “spare” in case they don’t work out.

 

[Tomboy]

Adding to that — the three musketeers of post 2018 PLAAF (J-20, J-16, and J-10C) were under development when the deal was signed. There is no guarantee that the process is smooth and China must have a “spare” in case they don’t work out.

Well, the actual spare to J-20 was the J-11D wasn't it?

 

[siegecrossbow]

Well, the actual spare to J-20 was the J-11D wasn't it?

If they could get J-16 working then they can get J-11D working as well. You need to account for worst case scenario though. From PLAAF pov the only successful domestic designs delivered in the past two decades before 2010 were J-10 and JH-7 (J-11B if you stretch it but memories of engine woes were fresh). It is not unreasonable to be conservative.

 

[Blitzo]

That is what I mean, the onus is now different considering we have evidence of what we clearly observe to be 塌方式 corruption.

As an example, I recall there was a bit of a headscratcher as to why the PLAAF purchased the 24 oddball Su-35s in 2015.

Looking back, Zhang Youxia was the Head of General Armaments (2012-2016) and was responsible for that. Is it not more suspicious now that there was kickbacks involved in that purchase?

I'm sure there are very plausible arguments that can be made about how the PLAAF needed it for testing/trial/long range patrols yadayada, or that J-20 ramp up was delayed or whatever, but to flip the question around, how do we know what the true rationale was?

What is the likelihood that there were shenanigans involved, especially considering the degree of Russian corruption on the other side?

Additionally, in hindsight, when Li Shangfu was taken down, it was explicitly stated in his official indictment that he conducted bribery for his own benefit (Exact Quote: "

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"). It also stood to reason that he bribed the person who promoted him to be the head of the then new Equipment Development Department (2017-2022) or that he bribed someone for him to be promoted to be Minister of Defence. Considering it was literally just two CMC Vice Chairmen and Xi above him at the time (Xu Qiliang, who passed away; and Zhang Youxia), it stands to reason that he bribed at least one of them (presumably he wasn't stupid enough to bribe Xi).

I don't see how this relates to my prior post, which was about your original comment about Yang Wei having a "soft landing"?
I am saying that we had no indications of impropriety for him to begin with.


As for the "onus is now different" -- I disagree somewhat, I think the onus is still the same. Corruption, bribery etc is always a part of the calculations for trying to explain any sort of procurement or any sort of military decision, which is always in turn put in context of the overall strategic rationale that we at the outside try to deduce, and the rumours we get from the grapevine.
But it also doesn't mean we can go around attributing every outcome made to corruption or graft -- we would need to first know if there said corruption/graft had not occurred, whether the net outcome would have been greatly different (whether it's on procurement, or on readiness etc).

For the Su-35 purchase for example, there wasn't that much of a head scratcher. There were numerous reasons for why it did make sense in totality: seeing the latest of what Russia offered for export, having a platform that could still use their stocks of Russian munitions, getting admittedly a capable 4.5th gen platform that could do a couple things their existing fleet at the time could not, and reinforce the strategic partnership with Russia.
That isn't to say that the wheels were not greased in one direction or another for the deal to happen -- but the deal also isn't so bizarre that we have to think about bribery going on for it to be pushed over the line.

 

[abenomics12345]

I don't see how this relates to my prior post, which was about your original comment about Yang Wei having a "soft landing"? I am saying that we had no indications of impropriety for him to begin with.

I disagree with this framing, because we knew for a fact that his name was removed from the AVIC website without any explanation.

If it was a retirement/transfer, someone as celebrated as him would've no doubt received honors/ovations (well deserved). Even if it wasn't a highly publicized retirement, there would be no doubt that the yankee/shilaos of the world would've been able to debunk any rumors of investigations.

By your logic, Qin Gang resigning from the public role of Foreign Minister without any follow on announcement of his improprieties (and subsequently reappearing publicly, as a free person, months after the initial 'resignation') would also qualify as 'we had no indications of impropriety for him to begin with'. Because, officially, Qin Gang was not investigated, nor was he convicted.

You may as well claim Qin Gang had a serious bout of disease, and resigned to a cushy/lower level role elsewhere. (Like, technically you would be right this is a *possibility*, but the *probability* is rather farfetched.)

Or, in a more recent example, in the case of Ma Xingrui, whose last official announcement was that he relinquished his role as the XUAR Party Secretarty, but still retains his title as a Politburo member. While he's not shown up to Politburo/official meetings recently, you can very well claim that he's deathly ill in bed, because, if we used the 'we have no official announcement of his impropriety' standard, there hasn't yet been any official announcement of impropriety. (I make a similar argument vis a vis *possibility* vs *probability*)

That isn't to say that the wheels were not greased in one direction or another for the deal to happen -- but the deal also isn't so bizarre that we have to think about bribery going on for it to be pushed over the line.

Yes you're absolutely right on this point.

However, as a separate point, I will say that because the Chinese/CPC system is well known for recognizing the

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' - meaning that just because someone wasn't sentenced/convicted, it doesn't mean that said person did not do anything that would've been unacceptable if someone else did it - as we well know the contributions of Yang Wei, the 'bar' for him is very much likely higher than another person.

From this perspective, one can very much argue that someone like Yang Wei could've gotten away with more - and the result was a typical "高高举起, 轻轻放下".

 

[FKAMtS4kE]

I've noticed a lot of Western analysts on Twitter don't seem to believe the WSJ report is entirely true, in particular the part where he allegedly leaked nuclear secrets.

 

[siegecrossbow]

I've noticed a lot of Western analysts on Twitter don't seem to believe the WSJ report is entirely true, in particular the part where he allegedly leaked nuclear secrets.

They probably don’t believe that there was a giant coup skeleton in 2022 either. You gotta draw the line somewhere.

 

[Blitzo]

I disagree with this framing, because we knew for a fact that his name was removed from the AVIC website without any explanation.

If it was a retirement/transfer, someone as celebrated as him would've no doubt received honors/ovations (well deserved). Even if it wasn't a highly publicized retirement, there would be no doubt that the yankee/shilaos of the world would've been able to debunk any rumors of investigations.

Okay, so you are basing your statement on the removal of his name from the AVIC website.
I wanted to know if there was anything else that I had missed.

The grapevine generally very rarely comments on personnel matters unless it's attributing their title to a new development.

By your logic, Qin Gang resigning from the public role of Foreign Minister without any follow on announcement of his improprieties (and subsequently reappearing publicly, as a free person, months after the initial 'resignation') would also qualify as 'we had no indications of impropriety for him to begin with'.

You may as well claim Qin Gang had a serious bout of disease, and resigned to a cushy/lower level role elsewhere. (Like, technically you would be right this is a *possibility*, but the *probability* is rather farfetched.)

In the case of Qin Gang we also know the definitive statements from the government of his demotions and resignations that were a fair bit more public and official, from the horse's mouth rather than just removals of their profiles.

If we had similar information in a more official capacity for Yang Wei, then I would be more inclined to agree with you, but at least I can understand your reasoning.