@Blitzo What's your take on the whole political side of PLA that has been cumulating during the past years
On one hand, there is so much rumour and speculation. While we are no strangers to rumours, in this case a lot are not even verifiable.
On the other hand, there is clearly something major going on and goes beyond "it's just corruption and graft". It's not illogical to conclude that there is a serious impact on PLA's combat readiness.
I believe thinking about it in reverse is a useful way of going about it.
We see the actions taken (investigations and dismissals of various senior military individuals), and we are aware of context (Xi's ongoing efforts to develop a more systematized military and civilian bureaucracy as well as ongoing anti-corruption efforts to whatever standard that he and his allies aspire the CPC to be at, as well as major PLA exclusive reforms in organizational and operational aspects).
And because of these actions, we do know there is of course going to be short term effects on aspects of military readiness (though perhaps not on the wholesale strategic level nor in every single permutation of conflict or tension that may arise, but certainly some of them could be true).
If the question is whether the driver for these actions are due to concerns of PLA combat readiness... I suppose my question is, relative to what, and what are the primary drivers?
E.g.; if we're comparing the PLA's absolute degree of combat readiness today compared to say, 2012, or 2006, I would say today (and in recent years) many times greater than what they possessed over a decade ago or two decades ago.
But if we're comparing the PLA's degree of combat readiness today, to where the CPC would
like the PLA to be today, and for the future, then it is possible they are not there yet. (I would also add that where the "CPC would like the PLA to be" can be different to "combat readiness sufficient to fight and win a conflict over Taiwan or fight and win a westpac conflict under most conditions".)
If we entertain the idea that there is a gap between "where the CPC would like the PLA to be" and what its actual state is today (keeping in mind even where it is today, as mentioned should be much greater than where the PLA was at before) -- the question is what is the cause of it.
This could be innumerable, but personally I don't see how "generic graft/corruption" -- even if it is historical -- could not impact combat readiness (e.g.: procurement methods having impropriety, senior officers retaining indirect stakes in XYZ economic interests).
Furthermore, would not warrant serious consequences especially in keeping with Xi's overall focus/obsession on having a new baseline of bureaucratic cleanliness, and I could also see senior officers trying to minimize or not be outwardly open about past impropriety may be viewed as severe lacking in obeying party discipline as well as not following civilian instructions, if such impropriety is discovered after the fact.
All of which is to say, who knows.
Anything in theory is possible. In many cases one's assessment of these kind of actions are a referendum on their opinions about the direction of Xi and the CPC overall in the last decade or so.
