US Military News, Reports, Data, etc.

Jura · Nov 4, 2018

Yesterday at 1:01 PM

Jura said: ↑

Today at 7:42 AM
anyway
Pentagon rejected request for troops it viewed as emergency law enforcement at border

Updated 11:35 PM ET, Fri November 2, 2018
https://us.cnn.com/2018/11/02/politics/white-house-pentagon-troops-border/index.html

while (dated just "yesterday")
Troop deployment creates tense atmosphere on US border https://apnews.com/d5889a081f2a4c548d7bc789a4487b20

Members of the U.S.military place razor wire along the U.S.-Mexico border on the McAllen-Hidalgo International Bridge, Friday, Nov. 2, 2018, in McAllen, Texas.

TerraN_EmpirE · Nov 4, 2018

gelgoog said: ↑

I thought the US Army could not be used for missions like these on US soil.

When Arkansas governor Orval Faubus attempted to prevent the integration of a segregated school in his state then President Dwight David Eisenhower ordered in the 101st Airborne division.
Since the American Civil war the U.S. Army has been allowed to engage in selected duties in the United States. But not law enforcement. In particular it's governed by the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 which was the result of a compromise after the Disputed election of 1876. That compromise was as the Republican candidate lost the popular vote. However then as now the popular vote is not the actual method of Presidential election the Electoral collage comes into play. With a number of states holding back there electoral votes it was Tilden 184 to Hayes 165 With 20 untallied electoral votes. A seal deal was struck which is how President Hayes came to office.
As part of the deal federal troops were withdrawn from southern states ending reconstruction. This combined with a majority Democrat Congress in 1878 allowed the southern states to push restrictions on deployment of Federal Army troops in side the state's. The state's of course control there National guard. But you see there is always a loop hole. For Ike it was the Enforcement acts of 1870.
Another case was in 1992 When the Insurrection act was used to order the 7th infantry division to deply to put down riots in LA.
It's hard to say on this one.
I side with the preference of use of national guard troops for this, because of the law. And that really doesn't actually exclude support and assistance by active federal troops. The DOD and active military support local and other federal agencies with logistics, intelligence and more all the time.

bd popeye · Nov 4, 2018

Both President Bush and President Obama sent National Guard troops to the Mexican border;

https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/03/politics/border-troops-deployed-obama-bush/index.html

Jura · Nov 5, 2018

bd popeye said: ↑

Both President Bush and President Obama sent National Guard troops to the Mexican border;

https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/03/politics/border-troops-deployed-obama-bush/index.html

I still recall discussions at Fox News (if to deploy to the border) from the time I had lived in the US, which was in 2001 and 02;

at first glance it sounded like an outrage to have "permeable" borders with Terrorists potentially coming,

but from what I figured, there wouldn't have been enough Illegals to for example pick up apples for less-than-minimal wage, so

LOL no big tasty apple for a quarter,

and of course enough Lobbyists to keep this going

(not sure if it's changed since then)

asif iqbal · Nov 5, 2018

Anyone got a update on San Antonio class Flight II production ?

355 ship navy with 51 amphibious class is done deal?

Jura · Nov 5, 2018

May 12, 2018

Jura said: ↑

Today at 8:22 AM
and now I read Military.com story
How They Fell: Army Team 'Fought to the End' in Niger Ambush https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/05/11/how-they-fell-army-team-fought-end-niger-ambush.html

while now
Two-star general, Green Berets punished for deadly Niger ambush that killed 4 US soldiers https://www.armytimes.com/news/your...eadly-niger-ambush-that-killed-4-us-soldiers/

The military has reportedly punished six troops, including an Air Force two-star general, for their roles in the October 2017 Niger ambush that resulted in the deaths of four American and four Nigerien soldiers, The New York Times reported Saturday.

The punished troops include Air Force Maj. Gen. Marcus Hicks, who was the commander of all special operations troops in Africa, and two members of the 11-man Army Green Beret team that was ambushed. Three others in the team’s chain of command also were reprimanded, according to the Times' report.

Those punished reportedly include Capt. Mike Perozeni, the Green Beret team leader, and his second in command, a master sergeant. Those two faced reprimands over their planning and team training prior to the mission.

The Times reported that a letter of reprimand given to Perozeni cited the team’s insufficient training and a lack of mission rehearsals. The two senior officers who approved the mission and oversaw the ill-fated operation were not reprimanded, according to the Times, while Hicks was reprimanded for not having appropriate oversight of the officers below him.

A 6,300-page investigation detailed by the Pentagon in May said that the mistakes leading up to the ambush were widespread. An unclassified eight-page summary was released for public viewing.

“The direct cause of the enemy attack in Tongo Tongo is that the enemy achieved tactical surprise there, and our forces were outnumbered approximately three to one,” said AFRICOM’s former chief of staff, Army Maj. Gen. Roger Cloutier, who led the investigation.

The AFRICOM investigation had 23 findings. Three pertain to the ground commanders involved with filing and approving the paperwork for the mission.

What the investigation did not do was make recommendations for any type of punishment to those commanders. Instead, any disciplinary actions were referred “to [U.S. Special Operations Command] for appropriate action,” Marine Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, head of AFRICOM, said in May.

Sgt. 1st Class Jeremiah Johnson, Staff Sgt. Bryan Black, Sgt. La David Johnson and Staff Sgt. Dustin Wright were killed in the deadly Oct. 4, 2017, ambush. The Green Beret team and 30 Nigerien troops were returning from a village near the Malian border when they were overrun by scores of extremist fighters.

The team had originally been heading toward the Niger-Mali border in order to conduct a capture or kill mission against an Islamic State group leader named Doundoun Cheffou.

After intelligence had located Cheffou, the Green Beret team and its partner forces planned to jointly infiltrate the militant leader’s camp alongside a helicopter-borne team of U.S. special operations and Nigerien counterterrorism forces. Weather caused the helicopter team to be scrubbed, and the ground team continued alone.

The Green Berets did not find Cheffou at his campsite and headed to the nearby village of Tongo Tongo for a key leader engagement. When departing the village, the team was ambushed by the group of Islamic State-aligned militants that had been reportedly tracking the joint team’s movements for hours.

The investigation found that while the team was authorized to perform key leader engagements and advising for local forces, they were not authorized to perform capture or kill missions.

The concept of operations paperwork sent up through the chain of command reportedly mischaracterized the nature of the mission. Had the Green Beret team been clear about their intent to pursue Cheffou, a higher level of review would have been required.

The investigation determined that the commanders who filed the paperwork were not being intentionally deceptive.

“The paperwork that was submitted, the packet was identical to a previous [concept of operations]. So it was done hastily, and there was a lack of attention to detail,” Cloutier said. “It wasn’t a deliberate intent to deceive, it was lack of attention to detail.”

Since the ambush, AFRICOM has made several changes to better protect troops, including giving forces armored vehicles rather than low-visibility ones, providing armed drones to provide overwatch, and cutting the response time for medical evacuations.

Jura · Nov 6, 2018

cross-posting from
PLAN breaking news, pics, & videos 13 minutes ago

what's related to Oct 1, 2018

Jura said: ↑

now noticed
Chinese warship in 'unsafe' encounter with US destroyer, amid rising US-China tensions https://us.cnn.com/2018/10/01/politics/china-us-warship-unsafe-encounter/index.html

which is:

Exclusive details and footage emerge of near collision between warships in South China Sea

UPDATED ON 5 Nov 2018 https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geop...ils-and-footage-emerge-near-collision-between

bd popeye · Nov 6, 2018

Not only that Jura but this.....

U.S. EP-3 Intercepted in the Black Sea by Russian Su-27

Release Date: 11/5/2018 11:15:00 AM

From U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. 6th Fleet Public Affairs

BLACK SEA (NNS) -- On Nov. 5, 2018, a U.S. EP-3 Aries aircraft flying in international airspace over the Black Sea was intercepted by a Russian SU-27. This interaction was determined to be unsafe due to the SU-27 conducting a high speed pass directly in front of the mission aircraft, putting at risk the pilots and crew. The intercepting SU-27 made an additional pass, closing with the EP-3 and applying its afterburner while conducting a banking turn away. The crew of the EP-3 reported turbulence following the first interaction, and vibrations from the second. The duration of the intercept was approximately 25 minutes.

While the Russian military is within its right to exercise within international airspace, this interaction was irresponsible. We expect them to behave within international standards set to ensure safety and to prevent incidents, including the 1972 Agreement for the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (INCSEA). Unsafe actions‎ increase the risk of miscalculation and potential for midair collisions.

The U.S. aircraft was operating in accordance with international law and did not provoke this Russian activity.

Jura · Nov 6, 2018

Apr 7, 2018

Jura said: ↑

well recently I've read a real world article, plus a discussion below it, at defense24.pl (in Polish so I don't bother with the link),

related not just to the Polish acquisition of Patriots (off topic here anyway), and the point is (I won't push it, actually I'm not going respond if there're comments)

countries should be careful when spending billions on HYPED Patriots (with just 120 degrees of radar coverage etc.) IF not integrated in the air-defense system

now
Don’t dumb down this US Army radar https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2018/11/06/dont-dumb-down-this-us-army-radar/

Abandoning 360-degree coverage would make air defenses more vulnerable and undermine their mission

Press reports and statements from U.S. Army leadership suggest that omnidirectional capability for the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor, or LTAMDS, may be slipping away as the threshold requirement it deserves to be.

Air defenders and joint forces under their protection should hope this doesn’t happen.

While unveiling the Army’s six modernization priorities last year, Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley declared: “None of this is going to matter if you’re dead. And that’s why you need air defense.”

But without omnidirectional sensing, U.S. air defenses and their defended assets may also end up dead, suppressed by enemy threats they cannot see.

And that’s why air defenders need 360-degree sensor coverage.

Omnidirectional threats

During the post-Cold War holiday from history, air superiority was taken for granted as a birthright. The corresponding neglect of air defense has now caught up with us. The joint force now faces a more complex and contested aerial-threat environment than ever before.

LTAMDS is intended to replace the 120-degree Patriot radars designed decades ago. The Q-53 and Q-65 radars have improved, but threats have frankly outpaced them.

Past air and missile defenses focused on threats with more predictable trajectories. Today’s threat spectrum is far more diverse. Even a poor man’s air force today may have drones and cruise missiles that fly around sectored sensors to kill them in their blind spots. Maneuvering ballistic missiles, radiation-seeking missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles pose further challenges. Sensors for the modern battlefield must also be capable against non-kinetic attack, like electronic spoofing and jamming.

Of particular concern is the prospect that U.S. air defenses could be suppressed by complex, integrated attacks. Last summer, North Korea used a UAV to surveil the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense ballistic missile defense battery in South Korea. Had it instead attacked the TPY-2 radar, it could have incapacitated THAAD on the Korean Peninsula. Yemen’s Houthis openly brag about using drones to target Saudi Patriot radars. In Syria and Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated the lethal effect of integrating electronic attack, drones, artillery and short-range ballistic missiles.

25 years and counting
Concrete manifestations of the Army’s seriousness about the current strategic environment include the conceptual development of multidomain operations, the creation of a cross-functional team for air and missile defense, the reconstitution of maneuver short-range air defense, and the establishment of Army Futures Command.

Much history precedes these recent efforts for the Army Air Defense Artillery branch. A quarter-century ago, the Army planned a 360-degree radar for what was then called Corps SAM. That program later became the multinational Medium Extended Air Defense System, or MEADS, which the United States exited in 2012.

Although advancing LTAMDS is a long-awaited, welcome development, it would be unfortunate if accelerated fielding comes at too steep a capability cost. Yet, references to 360-degree capability are conspicuously absent from a recent announcement for an LTAMDS “sense-off” event next year.

In last year’s defense authorization bill, Congress warned that if the Army couldn’t deploy a multi-threat, 360-degree sensor by 2023, then LTAMDS and its budget would be taken away and given to the Missile Defense Agency.

Integration necessary but insufficient
One justification for deprioritizing the LTAMDS 360-degree requirement is that gaps will be filled by stitching together sectored radars or by tethering to other unspecified assets.

To be sure, network centrism represents the future of integrated air and missile defense. The Army has prudently advanced the “any sensor, best shooter” vision, integrated fire control via the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System, and other near-term interoperability improvements.

Caution is nevertheless in order. Integration is no substitute for a fire unit fighting effectively on its own. Data from supporting sensors may not always be available due to competing missions, battery dispersal or network degradation. The Army’s last air and missile defense strategy touted the need for 360-degree sensors in the same paragraphs presupposing networked integration.

Building a ring of sectored radars is possible, but reduces the defended area. Circling the radar wagons also invites sudden rather than graceful degradation. Once the enemy punches a hole in the defense by eliminating one wagon, strike assets would follow, killing the other sensors from their blind spots.

Assuming lots of extra sensors lying around is also in tension with the primacy of maneuver. Expeditionary forces must be able to execute their mission without austere or little augmentation. Patriot batteries on the move won’t have the luxury of borrowing radars from other branches to lug around.

Retaining 360-degree coverage at the element or battery level, by contrast, supports both resilience and flexibility by allowing commanders to send self-sufficient, untethered batteries wherever needed.

Multifunctional considerations

The functions that air defense radars must perform further underscore the importance of unadulterated 360-degree coverage. A radar must find, fix and track threats, and then support fire control engagement — guiding interceptors to target. Sentinel radars are proven to serve surveillance and tracking functions for air breathers, but are not built for Patriot fire control, nor for ballistic missiles.

It’s not easy to do all these functions in every direction simultaneously. MEADS was initially designed to have one continually spinning surveillance sensor and another, higher-frequency radar that could stare for tracking and fire control. Several years ago, the Army chose to consolidate these functions onto one platform, rather than two.

Increased expectations from a single platform may have lead to increased cost and prompted the consideration of LTAMDS designs relatively less capable against salvo attacks.

When a single rotating radar stops spinning for fire control with one engagement, its ability to track others in a complex raid might be diminished. Conversely, a stationary, staring radar with one primary face and two smaller faces would favor a particular sector.

The Army’s upcoming sense-off test provides an opportunity to aggressively pit sensor entrants against diverse and integrated salvo attacks. Based on the results, it may make sense to re-evaluate both the consolidation decision and other requirements, even if it means combining several companies’ wares into a “best of breed” solution.

The sense-off should be a catalyst for minimizing sensor gaps and seams, not a justification for widening them. The characteristics of LTAMDS will likely persist a long time, both for U.S. air defenders and likely for international partners, including the 14 other countries operating Patriot.

And if in the end, near-term priorities do force the delay of omnidirectional coverage, an alternative threshold requirement should be to build in ample margin for subsequent upgrades to accommodate an objective requirement of true 360-degree, multi-threat coverage.

The stakes

But failing to provide robust sensor coverage would fail to honor the threat.

The Air Defense Artillery branch’s motto is “First to Fire.” In a conflict like those envisioned in multidomain operations, they would also likely be the first to be fired upon.

At stake is survivability in a challenging aerial-threat environment. Sacrificing 360-degree coverage for LTAMDS could be a grave mistake. Army leadership shouldn’t make it easier for the enemy to suppress Army air defenders by lowering sensor requirements.

Jura · Nov 7, 2018

Jul 29, 2018

Jura said: ↑

May 18, 2018
while
The US Navy’s Columbia class submarines could squeeze General Dynamics’ profits https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2...rines-could-squeeze-general-dynamics-profits/

now
‘Substantial’ Columbia-class Missile Tube Weld Fix Will Cost $27 Million, Take a Year https://news.usni.org/2018/11/07/co...ld-issues-to-cost-27-million-take-year-to-fix

A problem with Columbia-class submarine missile tube welds is more serious than initially thought, causing the contractor responsible to set aside $27 million to cover repair work that is expected to take nearly a year.

BWX Technologies, the sub-contractor building missile tubes for Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) prime contractor General Dynamics Electric Boat, discovered the welding problems over the summer. Electric Boat had not yet installed the tubes in submarine hulls, Rex Geveden, chief executive of BWX Technologies, said while speaking with Wall Street analysts during a Wednesday morning conference call. The fixes might not be finished until the summer of 2019.

“Inspection efforts and rework effort was more substantial than previously believed,” Geveden said. “Our plans call for completing all the repairs by the middle of next year. In terms of any delays, the U.S. boats will not be affected by the missile tube delay.”

The missile tubes will be used on both U.S. and U.K. submarines.

The company finished the quarter with revenues of $426 million compared to revenues of $419 million a year ago. Profits for the quarter were $77.9 million, compared to $46.6 million reported a year ago, according to a BWX earnings statement.

BWX has made nuclear submarine components since the Navy first started using nuclear propulsion. Most of BWX’s work for the Navy involves building and fueling reactors used on both the Columbia-class and Virginia-class attack subs, as well as on the new Ford-class aircraft carrier. Missile tube production represents about 3 percent of BWX’s Navy business, Geveden said.

The 12-hull Columbia-class program is estimated to cost $122.3 billion. The Navy has awarded contracts to Electric Boat to purchase long-lead materials, including the missile tubes from BWX and two other sub-contractors, in anticipation of starting production. Electric Boat expects a contract to build the first Columbia-class submarine in late 2019, General Dynamics officials said during a recent conference call discussing third quarter financial results with Wall Street analysts.

After identifying the missile tube welding problems, BWX halted production while inspectors from the company, Electric Boat and the Navy determined the cause and developed a solution. The process involved the use of ultrasonic equipment to check very long, complex welds, Geveden explained. The welds are 100 inches long, and Geveden said the original technique for inspecting the welds did not catch all the quality issues along that lengthy weld that the Navy’s ultrasonic checks did.

“Our weld techniques were not adequate for those large metric welds. So we’re changing our technique,” Geveden said.

BWX revamped its weld inspection process and retrained its welders. The welding issue was limited strictly to BWX’s missile tube production, and Geveden stressed there was no “spillover” affecting manufacturing in the company’s much larger reactors business.

During the next round of submarine contract awards, Geveden is confident BWX will be considered. The Navy is buying 12 Columbia-class submarines but is now also expected to purchase five post-Columbia-class subs, according to a Congressional Budget Office analysis of the Navy’s long-term shipbuilding plan. The Columbia-class design is likely to be the base design of these five subs, which would be akin to a guided-missile submarines (SSGN), according to the CBO.

“We are dead certain this problem is restricted to this product line, and restricted to this particular weld on this particular product line,” Geveden said of the missile tube welds.

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