US military procurement practices and priorities

MarKoz81

Junior Member
Registered Member
Three main points:

1. Whether something is "pork barrel" or "profit driven" has nothing to do with the capabilities of the resulting system.

The F-35 could be the result of a clean contest and be a failure or be the result of a corrupt process and be a success. The reason why F-35 is "profit driven" and "pork barrel" is because the primary goal of the JSF program was to establish a Lockheed monopoly in the fighter market with the F-22 and F-35 and concurrency in development which would lock all sub-systems under Lockheed's contractual rights. Establishment of monopolies is always profit driven. To achieve this and to ensure that the program was politically unassailable Lockheed created the world's most extensive pork spending campaign which resulted in the world's most complex production chain. It is a fact and it has nothing to do with the capabilities of adversaries' aircraft. It also explains why the F-35 is a failure and why USAF wants to cut the production as soon as the "pork barrel" is shifted into NGAD and MR-X because JSF was largely successful in establishing a Lockheed monopoly - hence Lockheed as "lead contractor" on NGAD. There's a reason why USAF wants the B-21 also for air superiority roles - and not just Offensive Counter Air - read CSBA's white paper on future trends in warfare.

Note that the JSF could be profit-driven and be an exampl of pork-barrel spending and could still deliver. That it didn't is on Lockheed being an incompetent manufacturer.

Lockheed has not built any fighters prior to F-22 other than F-104 which was similarly a disaster. They were only the lead contractor for the ATF and had to acquire GD's production lines to build basic capacity. Then they amassed every possible sub-program under "concurrency" as they were acquiring companies in other areas of the industry growing into the company they are today - and leveraging themselves in the process. They said "we can do it" when they couldn't. The failure of the F-35 is the result because there's nothing particularly wrong with the plane. It's everything else. Which is why every other aircraft somehow manages - including Gripen - and the world's largest and best funded program is a failure on its own terms.

2. F-35 and Virginia are the exact opposite in terms of procurement concept and results

Virginia is textbook example of how to do procurement properly. It used only tested solutions from Seawolf and from other areas (Dassault's CAD/CAM process) to build a series of Blocks with incremental increase of capabilities based on the current state of available tech. Because of cuts to shipbuilding it had to rationalize delivery and production chains which is why now additional investments are necessary to increase production rate above 2 per year. No concurrency. No market grab. No pork barrel. As a result Virginia has excellent performance, the delivery rate is consistent despite cuts to overall funding and most importantly the cost of the submarine came under budget already in Block 2. In 2010 the ships cost below $1,8 bn. To compare Los Angeles cost $0,9 bn in 1990 which is $1,5bn in 2010 and $1,87bn in 2021. So Virginia being significantly more capable than Los Angeles and future-proof thanks to modular design (Virginia Payload Module) was only 20% more expensive. Virginia is a success story. The equivalent of F-35 in naval procurement is the LCS.

I mentioned Virginia and Seawolf because they were completely different doctrinal concepts and should not be considered natural replacements - much like F-22 and F-35.

3. You have the wrong idea about how air combat works (and it's Lockheed's fault).

Kinematics is describing kinetics and dynamics of the system without considering forces. Kinematics is space, time and energy and their rates of change. When I say "kinematics of an aircraft" I mean its movement and energy from the moment it takes off from the airstrip to the moment it lands.

Kinematics comes first because kinematics determines the tactical logistics of your operation and the physical battlespace. It is about being able to determine what battlespace is and what isn't. It is about time from point A to point B. You can have perfect information on the enemy and if you can't get the aircraft in time to launch the missiles it doesn't matter.

For example the Russian MiG-31 is the extreme opposite of LO design but has kinematics - maximum ceiling at 24km and cruise speed at 2,3 Ma. That alone trumps almost all other considerations because when MiG-31 is used properly the only aircraft that can reach it is the F-22, and it can't do it without getting close to enemy airspace where it can be threatened or at least its missions can be disrupted.

Situational awareness comes second and in large portion due to the fact that integrated information about battlespace has been the standard of C2 since the 1980s. The first example of that is 1982 and the Beqqa Valley (Mole Cricket 19) then comes Desert Storm in 1991. What you are claiming is Lockheed's PR intended to push Lockheed's product as the only solution not how air combat works in reality. And that is completely neglecting strategic and operational logistics which decides the outcome.

Consider that modern ARH or long range IR AAMs can be guided to their targets with the help of AEW aircraft. That's how Turkey shot down Syrian Su-24s last year - F-16s only launched AIM-120s which were directed and guided by E-7 all the way. If you have an integrated sensor network you are not going to use your aircraft's own sensors outside of what they can contribute to the network - that's because due to the inverse square law the emission of the signal is always working to the defender's advantage.

Furthermore low observability is a variable that depends on many factors including the aspect of the illuminated plane. F-35 is not "VLO" when painted from the side by a radar at 20km or on the ground. It is not "VLO" when IRST detects the plume of the engine and missile launch flare at distances of somewhere between 100 and 150km. Until F-35 carries a long range AAM that will be able to engage targets from 200km it is not a serious. It will also be able to only carry 2 of them on long range missions - hence a separate "penetrating counter-air" program. F-35 doesn't have the kinematics.

As for everything else China is catching up fast in terms of radars, EW and information networks. The only remaining advantage for the US is LO but it is not a decisive advantage once China closes in terms of numbers, readiness and other systems. China is more worried about disruption to their global economic system caused by some military intervention led by the US that they can't readily counter if it occurs away from China. Right now China is more worried about Super Hornets because they can be deployed anywhere in the world at excellent mission rates. Right now the biggest problem for China isn't F-35s but its own readiness and logistics. The focus on F-35 is the consequence of two decades of Lockheed's propaganda and Pentagon trying to shift attention away from its actual problems onto something that is of little consequence like F-35's delays.

F-35 is a plane that was intended to give Lockheed the market at a very unique time in history. That time has passed before F-35 entered service properly. What's worse F-35 was designed using the requirements of European than Pacific theater. The F-35 is still a decent fighter against Russia but against China it is limited by geography. You can have the best fighter in the world and it is useless if you can't reach the enemy.

People forget that F-35 is something very specific - an airframe with a contractual bind on systems integration and maintenance. You can't say AN/APG-81 is F-35 because AN/APG-81 equivalent can be put on another platform. Similarly the updated avionics and combat systems and sensors. The reason why it didn't happen was political - because F-35 was meant to be the solution for political (profit-driven and pork-barrel) reasons. This is why F-35 is still chasing Block 4 and F-16 are flying with AN/APG-68(v)9 - and according to present plans they are to remain in service until mid 30s (in the ANG mostly).

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If the forum did not limit posts to 10k and 5 images I'd post something I wrote in another place with regards to Desert Storm and how it really went vs how it was presented for the purpose of capturing markets. Unfortunately it's a long write-up that would take some 20 posts. I can give you the link to the original material but you'll just have to translate the text into English. If you are interested in the basis for my arguments it might be worth it because of the data I collected to support it from official USAF and GAO documents. Let me know if you're interested.
 
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Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
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Registered Member
Three main points:

1. Whether something is "pork barrel" or "profit driven" has nothing to do with the capabilities of the resulting system.

Read the original context in which the F-35 and Virginia were described using those words.

It was not written with appropriate acknowledgment of their capabilities.

If plawolf had described F-35 and Virginia using those words while also acknowledging how capable they were, then I would have less issue with it.


The F-35 could be the result of a clean contest and be a failure or be the result of a corrupt process and be a success. The reason why F-35 is "profit driven" and "pork barrel" is because the primary goal of the JSF program was to establish a Lockheed monopoly in the fighter market with the F-22 and F-35 and concurrency in development which would lock all sub-systems under Lockheed's contractual rights. Establishment of monopolies is always profit driven. To achieve this and to ensure that the program was politically unassailable Lockheed created the world's most extensive pork spending campaign which resulted in the world's most complex production chain. It is a fact and it has nothing to do with the capabilities of adversaries' aircraft. It also explains why the F-35 is a failure and why USAF wants to cut the production as soon as the "pork barrel" is shifted into NGAD and MR-X because JSF was largely successful in establishing a Lockheed monopoly - hence Lockheed as "lead contractor" on NGAD. There's a reason why USAF wants the B-21 also for air superiority roles - and not just Offensive Counter Air - read CSBA's white paper on future trends in warfare.

Note that the JSF could be profit-driven and be an exampl of pork-barrel spending and could still deliver. That it didn't is on Lockheed being an incompetent manufacturer.

Lockheed has not built any fighters prior to F-22 other than F-104 which was similarly a disaster. They were only the lead contractor for the ATF and had to acquire GD's production lines to build basic capacity. Then they amassed every possible sub-program under "concurrency" as they were acquiring companies in other areas of the industry growing into the company they are today - and leveraging themselves in the process. They said "we can do it" when they couldn't. The failure of the F-35 is the result because there's nothing particularly wrong with the plane. It's everything else. Which is why every other aircraft somehow manages - including Gripen - and the world's largest and best funded program is a failure on its own terms.


2. F-35 and Virginia are the exact opposite in terms of procurement concept and results

It goes without saying that the Virginia class is more successful as a program than the F-35 is.
But that doesn't change how capable of a product the F-35 has ended up being.



3. You have the wrong idea about how air combat works (and it's Lockheed's fault).

I read everything you wrote here, and I'm not sure how it is contradictory to what I wrote and my belief of contemporary and future air combat in relation to F-35's relevance.

In fact, everything you wrote here -- about the VLO nature of an aircraft, about the fact that all aircraft will be operating in a network centric manner, about the other means of detecting an aircraft (like EO/IR) -- none of this goes against what I wrote about the importance of VLO, sensors, networking and payloads, and that they presently offer better value for money to attain bleeding edge capabilities in those domains rather than kinematic performance once you've reached a sufficient level of kinematic performance.

The existence of AEW and EOIRST systems does not somehow make VLO irrelevant, because in a system of systems confrontation where all else is held equal, the side with the 5th gen fighters that have superior VLO, superior weapons, sensors, networking, is going to be capable of outfighting the side with inferior VLO weapons, sensors and networking.



Also, in future if you are replying to a post please quote at least a portion of someone's post so that they can receive a notification that you've responded to them.
 

Mohsin77

Senior Member
Registered Member
In summary, my position is that the F-35 as an individual platform is a very capable multirole aircraft, and in terms of its air superiority role, its advantages and world leading qualitative capabilities in stealth+sensors+networking+payload flexibility+range coupled with the sheer number of the aircraft that will be procured (as a result of its lower procurement and operating cost), far outweighs the compromises in blistering kinematic performance, and that when comparing the overall F-35 fleet and program with the likely 5th generation fleets that can be procured by opposing nations

Maybe you missed these recent reports:

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TLDR: The USAF's Lt.Gen Hinote says that "the F-35 would essentially be useless in such a conflict." That's quite an indictment for a trillion dollar program. Especially one that failed to replace the (many) 4th gen platforms it originally claimed it would.

In an alternate universe where the US still underwent the same budget cuts as they did in our universe, what would the best optimal alternative procurement method have been if they did not pursue the F-35?

I think that's the wrong question.

Let's step back and look at the real problem. Those "budget cuts" in the 90s were a result of the 'peace dividend' following the end of the Cold War. It made sense on paper. The problem; however, was that after the Cold War, inefficiency and corruption in the procurement pipeline went up dramatically, which resulted in massive price increases anyway. There are many examples of this across all US Military Branches (and not just in the defense sector). It is also covered in one of the articles I linked above, where Gen. Hyten (Chariman of the Joint Chiefs) is ranting about the debacle of the USAF's fleet-tanker replacement program as a case study. He compared how much the last tanker program cost, and how efficient it was when it was launched in the 70s (or whenever it was), and compared it to the current program which has been a complete mess.

The problem isn't any one specific platform anymore. The problem is that the entire US Defense Sector, that "Military-Industrial-Complex" that Eisenhower warned about, has gone completely off-the-rails. During the Cold War, it was still somewhat efficient. After the Cold War, its only goal became making money, and Congress enabled this whole drama. This is why they keep over-ruling the military's own efforts to cancel useless programs and obsolete platforms. It's too much money on the line, and everyone wants a piece of the pie.

Now, with that context, lets look at the F-35 again, and I'll ask a question: Why is the F-35's production stretched over so many factories and "partner" countries? This was a business decision, not a military one. The reason is simple: When you spread production across a million different factories and cities, all you're really doing is making the program "too big to fail," by diversifying its vested interests. It doesn't make the program better in any way from a functional military perspective. It makes it much more inefficient and expensive. But it also makes it impossible to cancel. Because the losses from cancellation would be spread over so many constituencies that the outcry would be massive, and no one will dare cancel it.

That's how you sell a trillion dollar program which is described as "useless" by its intended user.
 
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Blitzo

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Maybe you missed these recent reports:

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
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TLDR: The USAF's Lt.Gen Hinote says that "the F-35 would essentially be useless in such a conflict." That's quite an indictment for a trillion dollar program. Especially one that failed to replace the (many) 4th gen platforms it originally claimed it would.

I haven't missed those reports, but those recommendations are a reflection of the high standards that the US have placed on the F-35 family in context of their finite budget.

Non Block 4 F-35s will still be able to out fight almost everything else that will be in service by 2030 simply because of how few adversary 5th gens there will be. Furthermore, the same report which led to the USAF recommendation about non Block 4 F-35s is the same one that didn't include the F-22 in the US forces.

I think that's the wrong question.

Let's step back and look at the real problem. Those "budget cuts" in the 90s were a result of the 'peace dividend' following the end of the Cold War. It made sense on paper. The problem; however, was that after the Cold War, inefficiency and corruption in the procurement pipeline went up dramatically, which resulted in massive price increases anyway. There are many examples of this across all US Military Branches (and not just in the defense sector). It is also covered in one of the articles I linked above, where Gen. Hyten (Chariman of the Joint Chiefs) is ranting about the debacle of the USAF's fleet-tanker replacement program as a case study. He compared how much the last tanker program cost, and how efficient it was when it was launched in the 70s (or whenever it was), and compared it to the current program which has been a complete mess.

The problem isn't any one specific platform anymore. The problem is that the entire US Defense Sector, that "Military-Industrial-Complex" that Eisenhower warned about, has gone completely off-the-rails. During the Cold War, it was still somewhat efficient. After the Cold War, its only goal became making money, and Congress enabled this whole drama. This is why they keep over-ruling the military's own efforts to cancel useless programs. It's too much money on the line, and everyone wants a piece of the pie.

Now, with that context, lets look at the F-35 again, and I'll ask a question: Why is the F-35's production stretched over so many factories and "partner" countries? This was a business decision, not a military one. The reason is simple: When you spread production across a million different factories and cities, all you're really doing is making the program "too big to fail," by diversifying its vested interests. That's the reason why the F-35 has so many "partners" and factories spread everywhere. It doesn't make the program better in any way. It makes it much more inefficient and expensive. But it also makes it impossible to cancel. Because the losses from cancellation would be spread over so many constituencies that the outcry would be massive, and no one will dare cancel it.

That's how you sell a trillion dollar program which is described as "useless" by its intended user.

Well, in that part of my post I did also talk about alternative procurement and production structures:
"This is somewhat a rhetorical question, because obviously the possibilities are endless -- like continued production of the F-22 in variants, or perhaps a less ambitious F-35-esque program involving fewer variants and fewer partner nations, or something in between.... and all of this is ignoring the fact that a possible non-F-35 procurement program might have been less successful than F-35 as well."

I agree that the production of the F-35 being split between many US states is certainly a budget/domestic US political decision.

The production of the F-35 being split between many US allies OTOH, is a geopolitical decision and was one of the costs for getting that level of international participation and which allows the US to make those nations dependent on the US even further.
 

Mohsin77

Senior Member
Registered Member
...the high standards that the US have placed on the F-35 family in context of their finite budget.

"Finite budget"? A Trillion is a thousand billion dollars....

If after spending that much, you produce a platform that is "useless", then you wouldn't get anywhere even if I gave you another trillion. There is no greater indication of a systemic problem.

Furthermore, the same report which led to the USAF recommendation about non Block 4 F-35s is the same one that didn't include the F-22 in the US forces.
That doesn't help the F-35's case, because it came after the Raptor and was supposed to be better. Instead, they are both equally "useless" now, according to their own reports.

The production of the F-35 being split between many US allies OTOH, is a geopolitical decision and was one of the costs for getting that level of international participation and which allows the US to make those nations dependent on the US even further.
It also makes the US dependent on those nations. This too was a business decision that benefited Lockheed more than anything else. It's another way to make the program "too big to fail." The program is unkillable, no matter how "useless" it is.
 
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Blitzo

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"Finite budget"? A Trillion is a thousand billion dollars....

If after spending that much, you produce a platform that is "useless", then you wouldn't get anywhere even if I gave you another trillion. There is no greater indication of a systemic problem.

The USAF described it as a platform that wasn't in their future procurement model, not that it was useless.
As I wrote, the F-35 pre Block 4 would still remain one of the most capable fighters in the world and would be superior to anything older than 5th generation.
The force structure they described didn't include F-22s or 4th gen fighters outside of F-15EX, yet that doesn't mean they are all "useless".


That doesn't help the F-35's case, because it came after the Raptor and was supposed to be better. Instead, they are both equally "useless" now, according to their own reports.

It does help the F-35's case from my argument, because my argument about the F-22 is that stealth, sensors, networking, payload and numbers as much and should be primary to pure kinematic performance.


It also makes the US dependent on those nations. This too was a business decision that benefited Lockheed more than anything else. It's another way to make the program "too big to fail." The program is unkillable, no matter how "useless" it is.

It is those nations which become dependent on the US. See the example of Turkey, where the US was able to replace the role of Turkey in the F-35 program without any major issue, yet Turkey is now lacking a 5th generation fighter until/if they are able to develop their TFX.
It makes partner nations both dependent on and subservient to the US, in a way that wouldn't have been otherwise possible.
Furthermore, their industrial involvement also incentivizes their purchase of the aircraft, further reducing unit cost for the US as well.
That isn't to say that development model is perfect or problem free, I'm just saying it does offer significant advantages.
 

Mohsin77

Senior Member
Registered Member
The USAF described it as a platform that wasn't in their future procurement model, not that it was useless.
As I wrote, the F-35 pre Block 4 would still remain one of the most capable fighters in the world and would be superior to anything older than 5th generation.
The force structure they described didn't include F-22s or 4th gen fighters outside of F-15EX, yet that doesn't mean they are all "useless".

The report was based on Block 4 capabilities. Even with that (still unfinished) upgrade package, Hinote literally said: "we wouldn’t even bother putting (the F-35) into these scenarios."

I understand your position, but I still think you're being too generous. This thing cost a trillion dollars. If we here, or the Warzone in its articles, calls it "useless" that's the least of its problems. Spending that much money on a platform that the USAF wouldn't even bother deploying to the most likely war-scenario they are expecting... That's a failure of epic proportions.

It does help the F-35's case from my argument, because my argument about the F-22 is that stealth, sensors, networking, payload and numbers as much and should be primary to pure kinematic performance.
Then we're just speaking past each other, because I see that as irrelevant, given the above.

It is those nations which become dependent on the US. See the example of Turkey
But Turkey is an example of the opposite. If the goal was to make partners dependent on the US, then it completely failed in Turkey, which left the program and chose to pursue its own geopolitical priorities anyway.

On the other hand, Lockheed's business-case for diversifying the program to as many "partners" as possible, to ensure survival of the program, is still intact. Which is why I said that was always the real reason for the "partners."
 

Blitzo

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The report was based on Block 4 capabilities. Even with that (still unfinished) upgrade package, Hinote literally said: "we wouldn’t even bother putting (the F-35) into these scenarios."

I understand your position, but I still think you're being too generous. This thing cost a trillion dollars. If we here, or the Warzone in its articles, calls it "useless" that's the least of its problems. Spending that much money on a platform that the USAF wouldn't even bother deploying to the most likely war-scenario they are expecting... That's a failure of epic proportions.

I don't think I'm being generous at all.
Please look back at the original report, here:
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The comments from the USAF general was specifically "We wouldn’t even play the current version of the F-35,” Hinote said. “It wouldn’t be worth it. … Every fighter that rolls off the line today is a fighter that we wouldn’t even bother putting into these scenarios.”

-- But that has to be considered in context of their force mix in the simulation, which was :

"In the war game, four types of aircraft made up the Air Force’s future fighter inventory. Three of those are ongoing programs of record for the service:

The highly advanced Next Generation Air Dominance aircraft, or NGAD, and its associated systems, which were capable of penetrating highly contested airspace.
The Lockheed Martin-made F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which operated as a “workhorse” aircraft attacking targets at short ranges.
Boeing F-15EX aircraft, which mainly conducted defensive missions but were also loaded with long-range missiles and hypersonic weapons to strike targets farther downrange.
Finally, the service operated a non-stealthy, light, tactical fighter for homeland and base defense, which could also be flown in support of counterterrorism missions. That aircraft, which aligns with Brown’s idea for a “fourth-generation plus” replacement for the F-16, doesn’t currently exist in the service’s budget plans."

So only four types -- NGAD, F-35s in general (not only block 4), F-15EX, and a "fourth gen plus" low cost F-16 replacement.

Does it mean that every other fighter type that the USAF currently fields outside of those four are useless, or a waste of time?
No of course it doesn't -- it just means that was the USAF's ideal capability/cost force balance for their future, in a manner that they think allows them to achieve the sort of outcome and exchange ratios that they have traditionally sought to achieve.





Then we're just speaking past each other, because I see that as irrelevant, given the above.


But Turkey is an example of the opposite. If the goal was to make partners dependent on the US, then it completely failed in Turkey, which left the program and chose to pursue its own geopolitical priorities anyway.

On the other hand, Lockheed's business-case for diversifying the program to as many "partners" as possible, to ensure survival of the program, is still intact. Which is why I said that was always the real reason for the "partners."

Turkey's choice to geopolitically go against the US demonstrated that the US could strip away a partner nation's 5th generation procurement plans at relative will with minimal to nonexistent adverse effect to the overall F-35 procurement program at large.
I would call that a success.


Finally, I think you have repeatedly misunderstood my argument. I'm going paraphase/copy what I wrote in my previous reply to Gloire, because it is related to the same arguments you keep bringing up as well:
My argument is that these programs (including F-35 and Virginia class) are very capable platforms and the way in which plawolf described them (as pork barrel, gravy train projects) was an excessively negative and trivialization of the capabilities they present. Whether there could have been slightly more capable alternatives for a great power competition with China, that could have been pursued had the US had more military budget, or if they had more accurate projections of the PLA's military advancement, is irrelevant to my point.
 
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Mohsin77

Senior Member
Registered Member
Finally, I think you have repeatedly misunderstood my argument.
Yep, and I still don't get it.

Case in point:

My argument is that these programs (including F-35 and Virginia class) are very capable platforms and the way in which plawolf described them (as pork barrel, gravy train projects) was an excessively negative and trivialization of the capabilities they present. Whether there could have been slightly more capable alternatives for a great power competition with China, that could have been pursued had the US had more military budget, or if they had more accurate projections of the PLA's military advancement, is irrelevant to my point.
First, you're implying that a Trillion dollars isn't enough money. Second, you're kind of saying that the F-35's actual effectiveness in the real-world today, is "irrelevant" to your point...(??)... In any case, this bird is still young. But so far, the picture doesn't look all that good. We'll see how well this platform works out over its lifespan.

As for the point about Turkey, it was Turkey's choice to exit the program. So the "dependence" angle of the program clearly didn't work.
 
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