US military procurement practices and priorities

Continued... part 2 of 2

plawolf said:

Well, let’s stick with the F35 to try to keep it somewhat on topic.

-edited for brevity-

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Point 3:
The sheer number of the F-35s that will be produced is fundamentally a reflection of the structure of the program and the design of the aircraft intended to make it a more affordable fighter aircraft. This relatively low procurement and operating cost of the F-35 is a strength.... but the sheer number of F-35s that will be bought is also a massive advantage that cannot be matched by any other nation on earth or indeed any other contemporary modern fighter program in the past.
Comparative quantity matters -- at this stage we don't know what the final number of F-35s will be, however the US has indicated it wants to buy nearly 2,500 F-35s for itself. This number may drop depending on how their future force structuring goes, however the sheer number of F-35s that the US itself will field will be very difficult for an opfor to challenge. Let's take the PLA -- of the 5th generartion fighters it will buy overall (including J-20, and J-XY variants) what do we think the total number will be in their lifetime? 1,000? 1,500 perhaps? Or do we think they can reach a total of 2,000 or 2,500?
I raise these hypothetical PLA numbers, because the F-35 itself is individually a qualitatively impressive and capable platform especially in domains of stealth, sensors, networking, payload flexibility, and range, and the stealth/sensors/networking aspect will be even more accentuated the greater the number of fighters that they can deploy at any one time.
To counter these numbers, the PLA can certainly try to pursue semi-asymmetrical routes such as through the use of long range strike systems to attack air bases and so on, to thin out the numbers, however the PLA must also consider that their own air bases will be under attack (as well as likely their production facilities for major military equipment). All this is to say, in terms of the air balance, the PLA's 5th generation fleet may well find itself to be at a significant numerical disadvantage to the opfor's F-35 fleet when all of each side's strike systems and defensive systems are accounted for.
Sure, the J-20 and J-XY as individual platforms might be able to supercruise or accelerate a bit better than the F-35 can. But, would that be enough to make up for the likely disparity in numbers that the J-20 and J-XY will suffer? Furthermore, would the individual qualitative capabilities of the J-20 and J-XY in terms of stealth/sensors/networking be sufficiently competitive against the F-35 as an individual platform either, especially when greater numbers means superior sensing and networking capability as well.
The geographic disposition of F-35s also matters -- simply put, the F-35s of the US will be able to be based in positions around the world where they are capable of striking Chinese economic, political, industrial and military centers, while China's J-20s and J-XYs cannot do the same to the US (aka CONTUS).

Point 4:
This point is pretty simple. The F-35 as a program, brings in many partner nations that essentially are roped into further cementing their status as client states of the US.
The geopolitical benefits of this cannot be measured in dollars or in kilometers of range or Gs pulled or missiles carried. Not only does it mean you have more geopolitical sway over them, but it also means you prevent them from being more geopolitically independent.
Furthermore, there is also one other, major aspect that we cannot forget -- that the F-35s the US's partner nations operate will all be easily operated by the US as well. That is to say, nations that the US sells F-35s to, or partner nations in the F-35 program, can be technically "neutral" in any conflict that the US is involved in, however their fleet of F-35s can be easily repatriated back to the US to replace any losses in US F-35s given the nature of the program means all F-35s will come from the same common line and undergo the same training and logistics system.



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In summary, my position is that the F-35 as an individual platform is a very capable multirole aircraft, and in terms of its air superiority role, its advantages and world leading qualitative capabilities in stealth+sensors+networking+payload flexibility+range coupled with the sheer number of the aircraft that will be procured (as a result of its lower procurement and operating cost), far outweighs the compromises in blistering kinematic performance, and that when comparing the overall F-35 fleet and program with the likely 5th generation fleets that can be procured by opposing nations, the F-35 fleet at a system of systems level will prove to be a superior (or at least, a massively challenging) force that can be fielded to attain air superiority, even if an opfor is able to field opposing aircraft that might have slightly superior kinematic capabilities.
The multinational structure of the F-35 program also enables the US to pursue much greater geopolitical sway over its client states in a manner that an alternative, more limited/domestic procurement program may not have allowed, while also allowing the F-35 fleets of its partners/client states to operate as a "technical fleet reserve" that the US will likely be able to repatriate in a very quick manner to replace/augment any wartime losses it suffers.
In context of the realities of the US budget limitations of the last two decades (post cold war and post GFC), I think the pursuit of the F-35 was very much one of the best, if not the best procurement plans the US made in pursuit of its national strategy and in pursuit of its goal in attaining air superiority.

Bltizo said:

However, whatever alternative "non-F-35" program we consider, we cannot ignore the fact that the F-35 is a replacement for many types of existing US aircraft in the USAF, USN and USMC, as well as key lynchpins for multiple major air forces in the world -- which by keeping them under the F-35 umbrella, the US essentially secures them even more as geopolitical client states which further strengthens their alliance system and is a geopolitical benefit that cannot be measured only in terms of the capabilities of the aircraft alone.

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And this is, perhaps, its main mistake from a historical perspective: the scale of the program was far too grand.
It tried to make too much, in too many fields, and to cover an overly long timespan, assuming that everything somehow is going to stay the same.

The situation where the original JSF program [at its scale] made sense will be gone by the time it'll start actually doing what it is supposed to, i.e. by the mid-2020s.

And here we come to the crux of the problem: the JSF program was marketed as a replacement to everything(thus justifying costs), yet ultimately has produced a very nice heavy tactical strike fighter.

For US it means that costs were far higher than necessary, and they won't get to unify fleet around 1 universal type in return(as of now, the only victim of F-35 in American service seems to be Harrier II, and even that comes at a cost of a severe reduction of number of active squadrons).
For others, it means that they won't operate what they need, yet will pay more than they'd like to afford.

Bltizo said:

Further, related to that, I think calling the Virginia class a "pork barrel" project or a profit driven project is absolutely insane given how capable the Virginia class is today in general.

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We honestly don't know, they haven't fought. Right now they're magnificent and are a true example of a success story.
But If, for example, practice will show that modern TDS may actually reliably counter 3-torpedo salvo (weakest in class!) - the whole decades-long program may become a liability overnight.
Because, again, program from the 1990s assumed "eternal" 2000s, and continues to produce a product optimised for 2000s in 2020s.
But you can't disinvest from fleet of nuclear subs overnight; it literally takes decade(s).

Bltizo said:

Replying to your post here.

You are close to what I'm thinking, but I think you give the F-35 insufficient credit.

When we talk about "numerical superiority," we often think that there is some form of inherent qualitative disadvantage in the numerically superior side.
However, the F-35 will boast world leading stealth, sensors, networking, payload flexibility, and range as well.
Sure, the F-35 may not have the supersonic performance or kinematic performance of J-20s (especially J-20s with WS-15s when they arrive), but the sheer number of the F-35s produced, as well as the inherent quality of their stealth/sensors/networking/payload/range, should lead one to question just how much of an advantage having marginally superior kinematic performance will be at the system of systems level.... this is especially the case, if the J-20s (and future J-XYs) are less capable in terms of key domains like stealth, sensors, networking and payload. For the purposes of discussion, let's assume J-20s and J-XYs are at rough parity in those domains.

Also, keeping in mind both sides will be striking at the other's air bases and trying to defend their own air bases, it is likely that the F-35s will still enjoy a significant numerical advantage in terms of 5th gen fighters available.

Therefore, we have to ask the question -- assuming that the J-20s (and future J-XYs) do have a marginal degree of kinematic superiority to the F-35 on an individual platform level.... and assuming the J-20s and J-XYs are not inferior in key domains like stealth/sensors/networking/payload.... just how many J-20s and future J-XYs will the PLA have to procure to allow them to even start to leverage said kinematic superiority to achieve a system of systems level of A2A parity, let alone trying to achieve air superiority, when we keep in mind the number of F-35s that the US will likely field???

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I think a lot of criticism on F-35 program are valid, from the procurement process and the initial design thinking, to the evolved circumstance and the scenarios where F-35 will be operating in. As a result, F-35 falls short of the expectations of what was supposedly the most ambitious and single largest military procurement program in US history. The cutdown in the planned acquisition numbers reflect that.

That said, the US was so much ahead of everybody else and still is in many areas of military aircraft, the resulting F-35 still leads the world in many cutting-ledge technologies as you correctly noted. Plus, the US has such a large defense budget it will still end up acquiring thousands of F-35s even after cutdown in acquisition.

So within the context of potential US-China conflict in the Western Pacific, some of the Chinese commentaries on the supposed flaws and failures of F-35 parroting those from the US are really not very appropriate. F-35's deployed by the US and its allies around China still have the upper-hand in the foreseeable future, considering there are maybe only around 60 J-20s now and availability of WS-15 is still some years away. Even the optimistic projection of number of J-20 in service by 2027 would still be around 300, much less that that of F-35 they would be facing.

But I think China still has options and time to respond. J-20 has a lot of upgrade potentials from sensor/network package to engine and stealth. The number of acquisition can be increased given the pressure. With its built-in advantage in range, payload and kinetic performance, I just think J-20 has more potentials than F-35 while F-35's numerical advantage can be addressed and countered. F-35's potential, meanwhile, is constrained by its inherent limitations.

weig2000 said:

I think a lot of criticism on F-35 program are valid, from the procurement process and the initial design thinking, to the evolved circumstance and the scenarios where F-35 will be operating in. As a result, F-35 falls short of the expectations of what was supposedly the most ambitious and single largest military procurement program in US history. The cutdown in the planned acquisition numbers reflect that.

That said, the US was so much ahead of everybody else and still is in many areas of military aircraft, the resulting F-35 still leads the world in many cutting-ledge technologies as you correctly noted. Plus, the US has such a large defense budget it will still end up acquiring thousands of F-35s even after cutdown in acquisition.

So within the context of potential US-China conflict in the Western Pacific, some of the Chinese commentaries on the supposed flaws and failures of F-35 parroting those from the US are really not very appropriate. F-35's deployed by the US and its allies around China still have the upper-hand in the foreseeable future, considering there are maybe only around 60 J-20s now and availability of WS-15 is still some years away. Even the optimistic projection of number of J-20 in service by 2027 would still be around 300, much less that that of F-35 they would be facing.

But I think China still has options and time to respond. J-20 has a lot of upgrade potentials from sensor/network package to engine and stealth. The number of acquisition can be increased given the pressure. With its built-in advantage in range, payload and kinetic performance, I just think J-20 has more potentials than F-35 while F-35's numerical advantage can be addressed and countered. F-35's potential, meanwhile, is constrained by its inherent limitations.

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The F-35 is not immune to criticism, certainly.
The delays and cost overruns it suffered, and perhaps some aspects of the initial partnership model it had was over ambitious.

However, I think the criticisms of the F-35's role in air superiority and being "not maneuverable" or lacking the blistering kinematic performance of aircraft like the F-22, are overexaggerated and place unjustifiably great weight on the relevance of blistering edge kinematic performance for the air superiority role, while ignoring massive strengths of the F-35 in terms of stealth, sensors, networking, payload, range -- and quantity.


Sure, the F-35 would be a slightly better air superiority platform if it could pull the impressive acceleration, maneuvering and supercruise that the F-22 could, but the costs of achieving that would also be significant and likely cause the aircraft to have to either suffer in other aforementioned domains, or significantly increase the cost of the aircraft.

Instead, I think the F-35 achieves a very fine balance for having sufficiently capable kinematic performance to allow it to massively exploit its stealth, sensors, networking, payload, range and quantity to outmatch virtually any opposing force that could emerge on the planet, in a contest for air superiority.


The F-35 certainly can be "countered" by an opposing aircraft with a greater focus on kinematic performance and slightly better range -- but it would require an opposing aircraft to at least have parity or near parity in stealth, sensors, networking, payload, range, and also be close enough in quantity to enable its superior kinematic performance to be relevant in the first place.

Gloire_bb said:

And this is, perhaps, its main mistake from a historical perspective: the scale of the program was far too grand.
It tried to make too much, in too many fields, and to cover an overly long timespan, assuming that everything somehow is going to stay the same.

The situation where the original JSF program [at its scale] made sense will be gone by the time it'll start actually doing what it is supposed to, i.e. by the mid-2020s.

And here we come to the crux of the problem: the JSF program was marketed as a replacement to everything(thus justifying costs), yet ultimately has produced a very nice heavy tactical strike fighter.

For US it means that costs were far higher than necessary, and they won't get to unify fleet around 1 universal type in return(as of now, the only victim of F-35 in American service seems to be Harrier II, and even that comes at a cost of a severe reduction of number of active squadrons).
For others, it means that they won't operate what they need, yet will pay more than they'd like to afford.

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Nowhere in my previous posts did I say that the F-35 was a perfect program.
The F-35 program as a whole has its fair share of criticisms, and the overambitious partnerships and the delays and cost overruns it suffered are all fair critiques.

But this doesn't take away from my overall conclusion which I derived from my 4 premise points that I described in my reply to plawolf, with the conclusion being:
"my position is that the F-35 as an individual platform is a very capable multirole aircraft, and in terms of its air superiority role, its advantages and world leading qualitative capabilities in stealth+sensors+networking+payload flexibility+range coupled with the sheer number of the aircraft that will be procured (as a result of its lower procurement and operating cost), far outweighs the compromises in blistering kinematic performance, and that when comparing the overall F-35 fleet and program with the likely 5th generation fleets that can be procured by opposing nations, the F-35 fleet at a system of systems level will prove to be a superior (or at least, a massively challenging) force that can be fielded to attain air superiority, even if an opfor is able to field opposing aircraft that might have slightly superior kinematic capabilities.
The multinational structure of the F-35 program also enables the US to pursue much greater geopolitical sway over its client states in a manner that an alternative, more limited/domestic procurement program may not have allowed, while also allowing the F-35 fleets of its partners/client states to operate as a "technical fleet reserve" that the US will likely be able to repatriate in a very quick manner to replace/augment any wartime losses it suffers.
In context of the realities of the US budget limitations of the last two decades (post cold war and post GFC), I think the pursuit of the F-35 was very much one of the best, if not the best procurement plans the US made in pursuit of its national strategy and in pursuit of its goal in attaining air superiority."

Gloire_bb said:

We honestly don't know, they haven't fought. Right now they're magnificent and are a true example of a success story.
But If, for example, practice will show that modern TDS may actually reliably counter 3-torpedo salvo (weakest in class!) - the whole decades-long program may become a liability overnight.
Because, again, program from the 1990s assumed "eternal" 2000s, and continues to produce a product optimised for 2000s in 2020s.
But you can't disinvest from fleet of nuclear subs overnight; it literally takes decade(s).

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So, how does this counter my argument that it is excessive and flawed to called the Virginia class a "pork barrel"/profit driven project?

Because if I read this reply in context of what you quoted, it seems like you're arguing that the Virginia class is a "pork barrel"/profit driven project because the Virginia class has four torpedo tubes as opposed to say, eight torpedo tubes of the Seawolf class.

I'll reiterate my position once more, because I don't think it's an unreasonable one -- the Seawolf class of course does some things better than the Virginia class as a reflection of the greater size, greater number of torpedo tubes, of the Seawolf class compared to the smaller Virginia, however the Virginia class itself is also a very capable, stealthy, affordable submarine that takes many aspects of the successful Seawolf class and in successive blocks have also added various capabilities that the original Seawolf class lacked, and the Virginia class and the scale of its procurement at the scale of strategic naval procurement and in terms of national strategy, should be considered as a formidable and deadly submarine class that is worthy of respect and would be far too arrogant to call a "pork barrel" project or a "profit driven" project.

I truly don't think my above position is unreasonable at all and I'd be genuinely surprised where you would have issue with it.

Range, and to a lesser extent cruising speed and payload do help offset a quantative disadvantage. They facilitate concentration of force from across a much wider theater, enabling local quantative superiority which would result in much more favorable attrition ratios, provided other capabilities being equal.

Bltizo said:

"my position is that the F-35 as an individual platform is a very capable multirole aircraft, and in terms of its air superiority role, its advantages and world leading qualitative capabilities in stealth+sensors+networking+payload flexibility+range coupled with the sheer number of the aircraft that will be procured (as a result of its lower procurement and operating cost), far outweighs the compromises in blistering kinematic performance, and that when comparing the overall F-35 fleet and program with the likely 5th generation fleets that can be procured by opposing nations, the F-35 fleet at a system of systems level will prove to be a superior (or at least, a massively challenging) force that can be fielded to attain air superiority, even if an opfor is able to field opposing aircraft that might have slightly superior kinematic capabilities.

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IMHO, as far as I understand, here you're basically arguing that big airforce is good because it's big - especially when only 1 of these advantages is really tied to the F-35, and 1 (payload flexibility) basically is its disadvantage, not an advantage, and is the major reason behind the survival of non-stealth platforms.
It's an understandable argument, but it only works when US reliably outnumbers any foe - both o/l and on theater. Otherwise, it becomes a liability, a liability, which you can't extract yourself from. Or, to be precise, you can, your allies can't.

And this is the downside, not some "pork" assumptions: at the highest level of discussion, it doesn't really matter if it's pork or not pork; conceptually right program may very well be just as beefy.

Bltizo said:

Because if I read this reply in context of what you quoted, it seems like you're arguing that the Virginia class is a "pork barrel"/profit driven project because the Virginia class has four torpedo tubes as opposed to say, eight torpedo tubes of the Seawolf class.

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Oddly enough, before this post I haven't used "pork barrel" even once, because ultimately it doesn't even matter. You work with what you have. If you planned "world policing" programs, and got with them into competitive age - well, it's not an insurmountable problem, but it is a miscalculation.

Bltizo said:

however the Virginia class itself is also a very capable, stealthy, affordable submarine that takes many aspects of the successful Seawolf class and in successive blocks have also added various capabilities that the original Seawolf class lacked, and the Virginia class and the scale of its procurement at the scale of strategic naval procurement and in terms of national strategy, should be considered as a formidable and deadly submarine class that is worthy of respect and would be far too arrogant to call a "pork barrel" project or a "profit driven" project.

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"But it's also good!"
There are many also good things in this world. Advanced as they are, majority of manned US subs in fleet till the 2040s(!) will be with a heavy emphasis on secondary tasks, at the expense of primary ones. Good performance in shallow waters, increasing land strike capability, special operations, at the expense of torpedo room, torpedo tubes, and speed. And - affordable.

Yes, it's also formidable and deadly. But yes, list of its advantages is more suitable for scaring Iran than for engaging Chinese CSGs or Chinese/Russian Bastions. Because ultimately, in some of its parameters, it's inferior even to the good old imp. LA class. Not because of a bad design, but because of different specialization.
It doesn't matter as much as long as Chinese nuclear subs are few and average(and new Russian nuclear subs are simply few), but we're talking about program which will produce ships till the late 2030s, and which will serve into the 2070s.

To give some perspective, when Virginia was formulated in the late 1990s, check the world 70 years in other direction(i.e. late 1920s).
The world was quite different, isn't it?

And then you're planning to have a professional Iran bully as a core of your fleet for 50-odd years.
And this, IMHO, is the main lesson of both:
if you build programs for your current needs, you don't plan to settle on them for half a century.
If you build programs for half a century, you don't focus them on your current needs.

Gloire_bb said:

IMHO, as far as I understand, here you're basically arguing that big airforce is good because it's big - especially when only 1 of these advantages is really tied to the F-35, and 1 (payload flexibility) basically is its disadvantage, not an advantage, and is the major reason behind the survival of non-stealth platforms.
It's an understandable argument, but it only works when US reliably outnumbers any foe - both o/l and on theater. Otherwise, it becomes a liability, a liability, which you can't extract yourself from. Or, to be precise, you can, your allies can't.

And this is the downside, not some "pork" assumptions: at the highest level of discussion, it doesn't really matter if it's pork or not pork; conceptually right program may very well be just as beefy.


Oddly enough, before this post I haven't used "pork barrel" even once, because ultimately it doesn't even matter. You work with what you have. If you planned "world policing" programs, and got with them into competitive age - well, it's not an insurmountable problem, but it is a miscalculation.


"But it's also good!"
There are many also good things in this world. Advanced as they are, majority of manned US subs in fleet till the 2040s(!) will be with a heavy emphasis on secondary tasks, at the expense of primary ones. Good performance in shallow waters, increasing land strike capability, special operations, at the expense of torpedo room, torpedo tubes, and speed. And - affordable.

Yes, it's also formidable and deadly. But yes, list of its advantages is more suitable for scaring Iran than for engaging Chinese CSGs or Chinese/Russian Bastions. Because ultimately, in some of its parameters, it's inferior even to the good old imp. LA class. Not because of a bad design, but because of different specialization.
It doesn't matter as much as long as Chinese nuclear subs are few and average(and new Russian nuclear subs are simply few), but we're talking about program which will produce ships till the late 2030s, and which will serve into the 2070s.

To give some perspective, when Virginia was formulated in the late 1990s, check the world 70 years in other direction(i.e. late 1920s).
The world was quite different, isn't it?

And then you're planning to have a professional Iran bully as a core of your fleet for 50-odd years.
And this, IMHO, is the main lesson of both:
if you build programs for your current needs, you don't plan to settle on them for half a century.
If you build programs for half a century, you don't focus them on your current needs.

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I've used this "pork barrel" term and "profit driven" term because that was the original words plawolf used, who is the one I replied to in #2.
The whole basis of my argument is that particular framing of the projects he listed -- specifically F-35 and Virginia class -- were unfair and poor representations of their true competitive capabilities.


Your replies to me in post #3 onwards, have been about whether the projects like F-35 and Virginia class were of sufficient qualitative capability versus potential hypothetical alternatives (either if the US had been able to predict China as a military peer, or if the US had more military budget, etc) -- which is not something I necessarily disagree with, but it is an entirely separate topic to the basis of my original reply in #2 that you replied to in #3... and frankly it is one which I'm not interested in.


You've written "but it's also good," in relation to F-35 and Virginia class.
And yes, that is basically my point. I'm saying those are very capable platforms and the way in which plawolf described them was an excessively negative and trivialization of the capabilities they present. Whether there could have been slightly more capable alternatives for a great power competition with China, that could have been pursued had the US had more military budget, or if they had more accurate projections of the PLA's military advancement, is irrelevant to my argument.

Interesting discussion but everyone is missing a lot of important context. That context is too important - if you lose it you can often draw incorrect conclusions. I won't be able to address everything so I will focus on the few main points made by @Bltizo to provide some of the background and perhaps shift your attention to some of that lost context.

Bltizo said:

Certainly, comparing the F-35 and Virginia in an unfavourable way to the F-22 and Seawolf, is very very confusing, considering the F-35 and Virginia very much arguably offer similar if not superior capabilities to the F-22 and Seawolf (respectively) at significantly lower cost, which was a reflection of the budgeting realities of the US at the time.

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Seawolf was a completely different type of sub than Virginia. Virginia was a Los Angeles replacement. Seawolf was a new type of sub - a dedicated hunter-killer vessel intended for aggressive offensive operations inside the Soviet "Bastion". It was not just newer and quieter. It also dove deeper, it cruised faster, it held more torpedoes and the tubes were 660mm allowing for larger torpedoes to be developed Seawolf could do things that other subs couldn't and even today Virginia can't do some of them. Seawolf was designed to counter Akulas which were slightly louder than Improved Los Angeles and in particular Improved Akulas which were quieter. Since there's only one such ship and the overall number of Russian subs went to single digits in the late 90s and early 00s there was no need for more ships - hence cheaper Virginias. But there's a reason why USN wants the new SSN(X) to be Seawolf-like.

F-35 is a strike plane with 15km ceiling, 1.6 Ma and no supercruise. It's main air superiority mission is OCA (offensive counter-air) which means airfield bombing. F-22 is an air superiority plane with 20km ceiling and 1.6 Ma supercruise. It is the best air superiority plane all-around - potentially excluding J-20 in some specific missions. F-22 also has better LO characteristics in the overall RCS reduction meaning the reduction from 1m2 to 0.1m2 which puts it well inside the effective missile range before its detected even from the wrong angles. From there it can use its flight parameters to maneuver against the missiles - something the F-35 can't do well.

Here's the main misconception:

Besides the ability to see the enemy air combat is all about energy to reach the target. Missiles have maximum ranges calculated by measuring how far they can hit a non-maneuvering target that is coming straight at it. Then they are launched from mid-to-high altitude while the target is mid-to-low altitude for maximum energy gain. A "no escape zone" for the same missile is about 1/3 to 1/4 of its maximum range for a closing target. Once the target is running both the maximum range and "no escape zone" are further reduced to about 1/3 of the resulting figure. So you can have an AMRAAM missile hitting targets at 120km but its "no escape zone" is 30km and if you chase the target it's 40km and about 15km respectively.

Missiles have total energy and that energy can be increased if they are launched from an aircraft flying at high altitude and at a transsonic speed - say 20km altitude and 0.95Ma which are possible for a supercruising F-22 but not for F-35 which can do at best 15km and will work much harder to retain that speed without afterburner while launching a missile from its bay. That difference in energy means additional range which means additional distance from the target that might be firing a long-range IR missile like the Russian ER series if you get within effective IRST range.

Having a fighter designed with air superiority kinematics means you can engage and disengage the enemy at that boundary and maneuver to gain a better shot. Position matters at extreme ranges and whoever has better kinematics gets better position. You can also out maneuver missiles on the far side of their kinematic envelope. It doesn't matter how good your stealth is if you don't have a weapon that can reach the enemy before you enter enemy detection range.


None of the rumors are official for obvious reasons but I've read about tests in Italy where Typhoons were successful against F-35s on a regular basis as long as F-35 doesn't use optimized tactics for air superiority. When they do operation takes more time, and that means that key assets like AEW or tankers are more exposed.

The F-35 was designed to be a stealthy F-16 that would have its stealthy F-15 (F-22) to provide air cover. It was never meant to operate on its own. Then F-22 was cut and the Pentagon said "it's end of history, nobody can catch up to us, we don't need air superiority". The rest is LockMart PR bullshit to protect their biggest revenue stream that keeps their ridiculously leveraged company afloat. How do we know it's bullshit? Because of the evidence on just how ridiculous the lies about F-117 were in Desert Storm.



Gulf War Air Power survey and GAO report on the air campaign prove that stealth aircraft didn't play nearly the key role that was claimed, weren't particularly effective and always used support of EW aircraft and air superiority fighters. In other words there were no savings to be found because Desert Storm was won by numbers, preparation and situational awareness. USAF could have exactly zero F-117s and it would win just the same with barely any losses.

Below - categories of targets from air campaign. FS and NFS means "fully successful" and "not fully successful". Compare the ratios for F-117 and F-16.


F-16 won the war but the billions were to be made from Lockheed's contracts for ATF and JSF and that meant that every crook in uniform lied to get their paycheck for services rendered. It doesn't mean stealth doesn't work. It means it doesn't work the way it was sold to get to tax dollars.

Bltizo said:

In particular, the F-35 program as a whole -- F-35B included -- has proven to be massively successful, and will be the defining 5th generation fighter of its era, through a combination of the sheer scale of its production, the inherent capability of the individual platform and the synergies they will have with fellow F-35s as well as their friendly enabling sensor/shooters.

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Here's just one aspect of that massive success:

The F-35 was intended as a single platform with minimal differences between the variants to drastically reduce operating costs. The actual F-35 is three different planes with minimal commonality under a single proprietary architecture that increases operating costs (by design - according to GAO).

Bltizo said:

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the F-35 fleet will be the most serious air superiority challenge in the world and the pacing threat for the PLA to have to contend with, not only in terms of sophistication and stealth, but also in terms of scale.

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F-35 has a maximum combat radius of 1200km with a standard air-to-air loadout which is 4 AIM-120 and 2 AIM-9 in the bays. Anything externally loses it the LO which already is not that great from sides or above. To preserve LO it needs to use tankers extensively and MQ-25 is not yet available in sufficient numbers. Furthermore F-35A can only operate from land airfields which limits it to a number of viable locations which then limits its practical range and reach. This limitation affects 1760 aircraft.

F-35B and F-35C can operate from carriers but there's only 264 F-35C - 24 per CAW - and only 160 F-35Bs in active squadrons due to the recent reductions in the USMC. F-35B has also smaller radius and worse flight characteristics than either F-35A or C, and its maintenance is more problematic and time-consuming.

Bltizo said:

For the PLA, I imagine they would be many times more concerned at the fleet of F-35s that they will have to contend with than the F-22s that the US fields.

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Yes, but only because there are only 148 (6 sqns) F-22s which are equipped for combat. They are also affected by very low mission capable rate (around 65%) which is not sustainable because of lack of logistical support. They also need to be retained for key locations like Alaska (1 sqn) and DC (1 sqn), as well as remain available for deployment to Europe (1 sqn). That leaves 72 F-22s with low MCR for deployment to the Pacific.

In FY22 USAF wants to retire 48 F-15C due to structural failures but is only buying 12 F-15EX. More F-15C will be retired in the upcoming years due to the age of the airframes and F-22 itself will be retired from 2030 onward. That means that increasingly dedicated air superiority fighters (ceiling, speed) are not available giving PLA the advantage in those areas which means they can plan operations with those parameters.

You need 400 airframes or so at minimum to credibly present a threat whether it is stealthy or not.

MarKoz81 said:

Interesting discussion but everyone is missing a lot of important context. That context is too important - if you lose it you can often draw incorrect conclusions. I won't be able to address everything so I will focus on the few main points made by @Bltizo to provide some of the background and perhaps shift your attention to some of that lost context.

edited for brevity

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I've read everything you've written, and again, similar to Gloire BB, you seem to have misunderstood the entire argument I've made.

Nowhere did I suggest that the Virginia class was a "better" submarine at countering opposing high performance submarines than the Seawolf class, and nowhere did I say that the Virginia class was a "perfect" SSN for great power competition or that a "better" SSN couldn't be developed than Virginia class
Similarly, nowhere did I suggest that the F-35 had "better" kinematic performance than the F-22, and nowhere did I say that the F-35 was a "perfect" fighter for great power competition or that a "better" fighter than F-35 couldn't be developed.

What I said was that it is entirely inappropriate and unreasonable to call the Virginia class or the F-35 as "pork barrel" or "profit driven" projects given the capabilities they are able to bring to bear in comparison with the competing capabilities and platforms that US adversaries were and are able to put out.



As for the matter of the important "aspects/domains" of submarine performance for submarine versus submarine combat, and the important "aspects/domains" of fighter performance for contesting air superiority....

For submarines, obviously things like having more torpedo tubes, larger diameter, greater speed, greater depth, all matter, and are desirable traits.
However, for all of those things to matter, you need acoustic stealth that is sufficiently competitive against what the opponent can field, you need active and passive sensors of sufficient requirements, you need your individual payloads (including torpedoes themselves) to be advanced enough, you need your combat management system to be capable of doing the mission you want. Not to mention you also need to have a sufficiently capable number of submarines in service in the first place.
All of those are arguably more important than seeking greater than average torpedo tube count, speed or depth, and frankly if you lacked sufficient minimum capability in those "soft" domains (acoustic stealth, sensors, CMS, payloads, quantity), then seeking to attain greater than average torpedo tube count, speed or depth would be a waste of time.


I think a similar principle exists for fighters.
For fighters, sure, things like greater top speed and supercruise matters, as does greater ceiling, and maneuvrability all matter, and are desirable traits.
However, for all of those things to matter, you need a sufficient level of RF VLO, a sufficiently capable sensor suite and avionics suite and networking capability, you need sufficiently competitive weapons/payloads, and you need a sufficient quantity of fighter aircraft in service as well. I would argue all of those things are more important than seeking greater than average top speed, supercruise, greater ceiling, and excessive maneuvrability.
Again -- without having a minimum capability in those "soft" domains (RF VLO, sensor and avionics and networking, competitive weapons/payloads, fleet quantity), then trying to attain greater than average top speed, supercruise, ceiling, or maneuverability is a waste of time.


Sure, in a perfect world you would want to have a fleet of submarines that manages to have cutting edge acoustic stealth sensors, weapons, CMS, in large quantities, that also has a large torpedo tube count, large diameter, greater speed and depth.
Similarly, in a perfect world you would want to have a fleet of fighters that manages to have cutting edge VLO, sensors-avionics-networking, weapons, in large quantities, that was also able to achieve bleeding edge kinematic performance in speed, supercruise, ceiling and manevrability.

But in the real world the military forces have to pick and choose which aspects of a new submarine or a new fighter they want to invest more in, and which aspects of a new submarine or a new fighter they are satisfied with meeting their average/minimum requirements.

And relating to the Virginia class and the F-35, the aspects that the US chose to focus on for those respective projects IMO produced the biggest bang for buck -- because for submarines, it goes without saying that over the last 3 decades the greatest combat relevant advancements for submarine vs submarine combat have been made in acoustic silencing, sensors, CMS, advanced payloads and cost reduction, while things like achieving greater torpedo tube numbers, greater top speed and top depth have produced much smaller degrees of gains of combat relevancy.
For fighters, it also goes without saying that over the past 3 decades the greatest combat relevant advancements for air superiority fighters have been made in VLO/stealth, sensors/avionics/networking, advanced payloads, and cost reduction, while things like achieving greater top speed, greater maneuvrability, greater ceiling, have produced much smaller degrees of gains of combat relevancy.

In a world with finite resources, naturally it only makes sense to put more money and more resources into aspects of your submarines and your fighters that will produce the greater extent of effective gains for combat, while other less combat relevant aspects of your submarines and your fighters are prioritized less.



It doesn't matter if your 4th or 4.5 generation air superiority fighter can fly faster, turn better or fly higher than a 5th generation multirole "strike" fighter -- if your 4th generation or 4.5 generation fighter doesn't have a minimal level of competitive VLO, a sufficiently capable sensor/avionics/networking suite, with sufficiently capable payloads and in sufficient quantities, your 4/4.5 gen fighter will not be able to come out ahead of 5th gen adversaries in a system of systems combat environment where each side will be fielding dozens of fighters in the air simultaneously with multiple AEW&C and jammers on each side all operating and supporting in the same battlespace.

In terms of priority, if your nation has the money for it, sure you can focus on achieving bleeding edge greater kinematic performance and ceiling performance and maneuverability -- but only after your own fighter is of sufficient comparable (or ideally superior) capability in those aforementioned "soft" domains of VLO, sensor/avionics/networking, payload advancement, and quantity.
But if I had to choose what to prioritize my finite resources in terms of selecting certain aspects of a fighter to be "bleeding edge" versus "average" -- for the foreseeable future, I would absolutely design my fighter and put more money into achieving bleeding edge VLO, sensor/avionics/networking, payload advancement, quantity, and be happy with achieving average top speed, ceiling, and maneuvrability.