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Lethe

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by Michael Vlahos, who taught war and strategy at Johns Hopkins University and the Naval War College, provides a readable somewhat bitter historically-grounded analysis.
In World War II, the U.S. Navy was saved only by America’s titanic industrial power, which in 1941 was building two backup fleets: A "two ocean" armada, to be followed by and an even bigger one. That second force, 5000+ ships, was built de novo — as though out of nothing — in just four years. The Navy was saved, not by its adaptable resilience, but by American Captains of Industry.

In tragic contrast, the Imperial Japanese Navy — the most powerful fleet in the world in 1941 — had no backup. When faced with a U.S. shipbuilding monster, it was literally ground down by those 5,000 brand spanking new American hulls. In this sense, the Nihon Kaigun is very much like the U.S. Navy today. War came, and it simply could not replace ships lost.

Industrial capacity has long been sidelined under the assumption that a major conflict is likely to escalate to a nuclear conflict, conditions that would preclude making much of anything. The idea is that what you have on Day 1 is most of what you're ever going to have.

The nuclear angle should not be casually dismissed. Nonetheless, even allowing for the prospect of sustained high-intensity conventional conflict, the complexity of modern platforms (especially ships, submarines and manned aircraft) creates endless opportunities to disrupt them while under construction, while their high cost and correspondingly limited quantities make the return on investment from doing so very high indeed.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict provides many illustrative lessons here. Despite tactical successes, Ukraine's ability to disrupt Russia's military-industrial machine is limited. Yet where they have been most spectacularly successful is in targeting infrastructure and platforms that Russia is not able to regenerate on the scale of months, most notably ships and strategic aviation assets. Conversely, despite prolonged bombardment, Ukrainian defence industries remain very active, but they are mostly producing small-scale items such as drones, with more complex systems overwhelmingly drawn from either existing stocks, or abroad (from existing foreign stocks). In Russia, too, use of existing equipment stocks still predominates over the construction of new equipment.

In the modern context, it seems to me that privileging the ability to sustain and regenerate over maximizing the mass of the standing force is a roundabout way of arguing for the deprecation of those large, complex platforms that are unlikely to be successfully regenerated under war-time conditions.

P.S. A major factor behind the success of the American war industrial machine was its geographic isolation and self-sufficiency. To a considerable extent, those advantages still hold, with China having little ability to deliver meaningful and sustained effects in CONUS without resorting to nuclear arms.
 
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JimmyMcFoob

New Member
Registered Member
The Russian Navy has more ships today than they had when they invaded Ukraine in 2022.
Don't believe the propaganda.
Russia has lost a significant portion of their Black Seas Fleet, which is the only one that's relevant to the war. Obviously, Ukraine can't do much of anything to the Northern, Baltic, and Pacific Fleets. So yes, Russia has demonstrated their incapability of regenerating their ship count in times of war.
 

4Tran

New Member
Registered Member
The US Navy lost two decades with the Zumwalt and LCS. I still think it is possible to convert the Zumwalt into a missile cruiser. But the LCS should just be scrapped.
The US is also behind China with the drone carrier ships. After spending a lot of time developing naval drones, they just froze the program. And now China is poised to surpass the US Navy in this area with the Type 076.

The US supercarriers are also vulnerable due to the lack of long range fleet aviation after the retirement of the F-14. So some sort of naval F-47 is required.
Constellation and Ford haven't exactly covered themselves in glory either. The Navy has the most dysfunctional procurement system within the US military. It is nowhere near finished with the decline, and it's not going to get any better until they purge the officer corps. What kind of military would go and let the guy in charge of the LCS disaster go on to ruin the Constellation as well?

In the modern context, it seems to me that privileging the ability to sustain and regenerate over maximizing the mass of the standing force is a roundabout way of arguing for the deprecation of those large, complex platforms that are unlikely to be successfully regenerated under war-time conditions.
The biggest factor in the sustainablity question is about advanced munitions. Most militaries keep very small stockpiles of these weapons, and the amount they keep on hand tends to be entirely inadequate for even extended periods of low intensity war. I remember reading that NATO ran low on weapon stocks in Libya 2011; which should be pretty indicative of how serious this problem is. Most countries simply don't have the ability to replenish their weapon stocks quickly, and this is where industrial capability would make the biggest difference.
 

jiajia99

Junior Member
Registered Member
Russia has lost a significant portion of their Black Seas Fleet, which is the only one that's relevant to the war. Obviously, Ukraine can't do much of anything to the Northern, Baltic, and Pacific Fleets. So yes, Russia has demonstrated their incapability of regenerating their ship count in times of war.
Any figures to justify your statement?
 

gelgoog

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
Russia has lost a significant portion of their Black Seas Fleet, which is the only one that's relevant to the war. Obviously, Ukraine can't do much of anything to the Northern, Baltic, and Pacific Fleets. So yes, Russia has demonstrated their incapability of regenerating their ship count in times of war.
One Karakurt corvette entered service in the Black Sea fleet another is in trials. One Steregushchiy corvette was put into service and another was launched. One Vasily Bykov corvette is in trials and another is close to launch. The Karakurt can be moved from the Caspian, where it is currently located, into the Black Sea whenever they want to. The other Karakurt and the Vasily Bykov corvettes will also be able to be moved into the Black Sea when complete. Russia controls the Azov Sea. They can move small ships and diesel submarines out into the Black Sea whenever they want. And they can build large ships at the Zaliv Shipyard in Crimea if necessary.
 
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SlothmanAllen

Junior Member
Registered Member
Seems like the AGM-183A will be coming back in the FY2026 budget. The wording around this programs cancellation always seemed a little …vague to me. We know they had some intitial test failures, but then it was reported that the final set of tests had been a success. This would be (as far as I am aware) the first US Armed Forces wave riding hypersonic boost-glide weapon.

 
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