The War in the Ukraine

T

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
muddie said:
This has been discussed at other forums outside of SDF. Ukraine essentially pulls resources from other parts of the front to launch these counterattacks. These attacks do often capture some ground but at the loss of territory in other regions, not to mention personnel losses.

Russia does attack Ukrainian infrastructure but similar to the other conflict in Middle East, eventually there aren't that many viable targets after the main ones have already been bombed. Forgot who the Russian blogger (might have been Rybar) but essentially, the strategic issue facing Russia is that it's fighting a failed state, so naturally, the relative economic costs will always be higher for Russia than Ukraine.
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It should be added that the Ukrainian counteroffensives lack the manpower to 'cleanup' the bypassed territories, which in contrast to the Russians spent a great deal of time and manpower cleaning the territory, sapping mines, consolidating and capturing Ukrainian leftovers and so on. The Ukrainian counteroffensives leave pockets of Russians behind which get resupplied by aerial drones, such as six rotor types like Mangals and captured R18s and Baba Yagas. These pockets would haunt the Ukrainians later as we are now seeing how the counteroffensives in Kupyansk and Dnipro pretty much have petered out. Ukrainian lack of consolidation is the reason why Ukrainian counteroffensives look fast but peter out while Russian offensives appear slow but methodically thorough.

During the Russian offensive at Pokrovsk and Myrnograd, Ukrainian counteroffensive northeast of Myrnograd turned the Russian 'rabbit ear' salient into a massive grey zone. The Ukrainian rush left Russians behind the lines and in particular left one Russian soldier who stayed behind, literally for months, behind enemy lines. He got resupplied daily by drones while continuing to report on Ukrainian movements behind the rear. The locations of Russian rear pockets are kept secret through a social media blackout, which added to a sense that the Russians are not doing anything when they are.

Eventually the soldier was rescued. Frostbite took a leg but he got awarded Hero of Russia. Only then it was revealed this was happening but the damage was already done, the two cities fell to the Russians and Russians regained initiative. the entire area.

Ukrainians pulled troops from Sumy for the Kupyansk counteroffensive, where the Ukrainians regained much of the west side of the city but still left pockets of Russians behind in the buildings. However, Russians took advantage of the absence by seizing the territories the Ukrainians recaptured from the Russians during the counteroffensive there. As a result Volchansk fell to the Russians and the Russians expanded the salient there. Now it appears the Ukrainians lost much more territory in the Kharkhiv and Sumy regions than they ever regained in Kupyansk. As spring rolled and the foliage returned, the Russians have launched a full scale counteroffensive infiltrating the forests and green regions, which are difficult for drones to get through. The Ukrainians pulled back units from Kupyansk just as the Russians were closing Ukrainian pockets east of the Oskol River. The problem with OSINT bloggers is that they keep mapping anticipated Russian offensives in Zaporhyzhia, Donetsk, Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, and failed to anticipate the large Russian moves in Sumy and Kharkhiv regions. Ironically the moves in the north may have been triggered by Ukrainian drone attacks towards Belgorod regions and Russian infrastructure, and now the Russians will look to sanitize the area and turn it into a huge buffer zone.

At the south both sides aren't doing that great due to the lack of bad weather and foliage to hide troops and armor. As a result movements from both sides get savaged by drones. However the Russians continue to move east of Hulialpolye because the Ukrainian attention was concentrated in Dnipro where 40 percent of all Ukrainian drone forces are concentrated there. While the drone density appears to be suppressing Russian artillery in that area, it is leaving gaps in many areas such as east of Hulialpolye and in Konstantinovka. The Russians were also in operational pause during Rasputista, when there's no foliage and no bad weather, but during this time, they moved all their airborne divisions to the south, including the 76th Division from Kursk and 98th VDV Division from Chasiv Yar. The area already has the 7th, 106th and the newly formed 44th Divisions, along with the 108th and 247th VDV Regiments. The commander of the Group Dniepr is Teplensky, who partly led the defense of Zaporhyzhia during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023, as well as the landings in Kherson and the eventual pullback and fighting withdrawal over there, succeeding Surovikin as the head of the VDV. So we will assume the Russians are also up to no good in these areas when the time is right, possibly a landing across the Dnipr to Kherson.
 
M

MortyandRick

Senior Member
Registered Member
Tam said:
It should be added that the Ukrainian counteroffensives lack the manpower to 'cleanup' the bypassed territories, which in contrast to the Russians spent a great deal of time and manpower cleaning the territory, sapping mines, consolidating and capturing Ukrainian leftovers and so on. The Ukrainian counteroffensives leave pockets of Russians behind which get resupplied by aerial drones, such as six rotor types like Mangals and captured R18s and Baba Yagas. These pockets would haunt the Ukrainians later as we are now seeing how the counteroffensives in Kupyansk and Dnipro pretty much have petered out. Ukrainian lack of consolidation is the reason why Ukrainian counteroffensives look fast but peter out while Russian offensives appear slow but methodically thorough.

During the Russian offensive at Pokrovsk and Myrnograd, Ukrainian counteroffensive northeast of Myrnograd turned the Russian 'rabbit ear' salient into a massive grey zone. The Ukrainian rush left Russians behind the lines and in particular left one Russian soldier who stayed behind, literally for months, behind enemy lines. He got resupplied daily by drones while continuing to report on Ukrainian movements behind the rear. The locations of Russian rear pockets are kept secret through a social media blackout, which added to a sense that the Russians are not doing anything when they are.

Eventually the soldier was rescued. Frostbite took a leg but he got awarded Hero of Russia. Only then it was revealed this was happening but the damage was already done, the two cities fell to the Russians and Russians regained initiative. the entire area.

Ukrainians pulled troops from Sumy for the Kupyansk counteroffensive, where the Ukrainians regained much of the west side of the city but still left pockets of Russians behind in the buildings. However, Russians took advantage of the absence by seizing the territories the Ukrainians recaptured from the Russians during the counteroffensive there. As a result Volchansk fell to the Russians and the Russians expanded the salient there. Now it appears the Ukrainians lost much more territory in the Kharkhiv and Sumy regions than they ever regained in Kupyansk. As spring rolled and the foliage returned, the Russians have launched a full scale counteroffensive infiltrating the forests and green regions, which are difficult for drones to get through. The Ukrainians pulled back units from Kupyansk just as the Russians were closing Ukrainian pockets east of the Oskol River. The problem with OSINT bloggers is that they keep mapping anticipated Russian offensives in Zaporhyzhia, Donetsk, Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, and failed to anticipate the large Russian moves in Sumy and Kharkhiv regions. Ironically the moves in the north may have been triggered by Ukrainian drone attacks towards Belgorod regions and Russian infrastructure, and now the Russians will look to sanitize the area and turn it into a huge buffer zone.

At the south both sides aren't doing that great due to the lack of bad weather and foliage to hide troops and armor. As a result movements from both sides get savaged by drones. However the Russians continue to move east of Hulialpolye because the Ukrainian attention was concentrated in Dnipro where 40 percent of all Ukrainian drone forces are concentrated there. While the drone density appears to be suppressing Russian artillery in that area, it is leaving gaps in many areas such as east of Hulialpolye and in Konstantinovka. The Russians were also in operational pause during Rasputista, when there's no foliage and no bad weather, but during this time, they moved all their airborne divisions to the south, including the 76th Division from Kursk and 98th VDV Division from Chasiv Yar. The area already has the 7th, 106th and the newly formed 44th Divisions, along with the 108th and 247th VDV Regiments. The commander of the Group Dniepr is Teplensky, who partly led the defense of Zaporhyzhia during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023, as well as the landings in Kherson and the eventual pullback and fighting withdrawal over there, succeeding Surovikin as the head of the VDV. So we will assume the Russians are also up to no good in these areas when the time is right, possibly a landing across the Dnipr to Kherson.
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I hope you're right and it's not just cope. Russia has sustained damage to many of their refineries in the west.

This is now a war of economic attrition. This is the engine of a country's war machine.

Can Russia take advantage of the higher oil and LNG prices? Or has the Ukrainian strikes on refineries and oil storage continue to degrade Russian output?
 
T

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
MortyandRick said:
I hope you're right and it's not just cope. Russia has sustained damage to many of their refineries in the west.

This is now a war of economic attrition. This is the engine of a country's war machine.

Can Russia take advantage of the higher oil and LNG prices? Or has the Ukrainian strikes on refineries and oil storage continue to degrade Russian output?
Click to expand...

What China buys from Russia is crude and natural gas. What it buys is located in Arctic and Siberia. China also has a direct pipeline to Russia and is making another with more to follow. Russia gas supplies are using Arc7 LNG tankers (guess which shipyards builds them) with ice breaker capability and they are intended to go down the Bering Straits from the Arctic to the Far East.

Russia and China is in a position to supplies countries in Asia and the Pacific by routing gas flow overland to ports and refineries in China, then ship them to countries across the SCS and Yellow Seas.

Russian gasoline prices are up. About 11 percent. How does that compare to the rest of the world.

90$-120$ a barrel is catastrophic to EU economies and worst for Ukraine. Ukraine has to get it's energy from Hungary and Slovakia which are both land locked and ironically fed by a Russian pipeline. Cut this pipeline and you have a Domino effect across Central Europe. Peter Magyar is now doing Orbanesque demands to the EU and Ukraine about this pipeline and Bulgaria might be looking at Orban the sequel with its change of government.

Ukraine has been hitting Russian refineries since 2025, and Russia has been hitting Ukraine energy infrastructure with an greater intensity. It seems both infrastructure are quite resilient and is shown to be repairable but Ukraine needs money from the EU to do so.

The bulk of Russian MIC is located deep past the Urals. It's why the tank manufacturer starts with the name "Ural...". The reason why they were there was to put Soviet factories beyond the range of Luftwaffe bombers.

While some Russians are balking at the "Chinese invasion", the Russian Far East is growing to become the new bread basket for China, so the economic opportunities goes well beyond oil to agriculture, rare earths and minerals.
 
M

MortyandRick

Senior Member
Registered Member
Tam said:
What China buys from Russia is crude and natural gas. What it buys is located in Arctic and Siberia. China also has a direct pipeline to Russia and is making another with more to follow. Russia gas supplies are using Arc7 LNG tankers (guess which shipyards builds them) with ice breaker capability and they are intended to go down the Bering Straits from the Arctic to the Far East.

Russia and China is in a position to supplies countries in Asia and the Pacific by routing gas flow overland to ports and refineries in China, then ship them to countries across the SCS and Yellow Seas.

Russian gasoline prices are up. About 11 percent. How does that compare to the rest of the world.

90$-120$ a barrel is catastrophic to EU economies and worst for Ukraine. Ukraine has to get it's energy from Hungary and Slovakia which are both land locked and ironically fed by a Russian pipeline. Cut this pipeline and you have a Domino effect across Central Europe. Peter Magyar is now doing Orbanesque demands to the EU and Ukraine about this pipeline and Bulgaria might be looking at Orban the sequel with its change of government.

Ukraine has been hitting Russian refineries since 2025, and Russia has been hitting Ukraine energy infrastructure with an greater intensity. It seems both infrastructure are quite resilient and is shown to be repairable but Ukraine needs money from the EU to do so.

The bulk of Russian MIC is located deep past the Urals. It's why the tank manufacturer starts with the name "Ural...". The reason why they were there was to put Soviet factories beyond the range of Luftwaffe bombers.

While some Russians are balking at the "Chinese invasion", the Russian Far East is growing to become the new bread basket for China, so the economic opportunities goes well beyond oil to agriculture, rare earths and minerals.
Click to expand...
Didn't Reuters report Russian oil export decrease by 40%? Is there any truth to that?

And you may know more than most here, is Russia truly behind Ukraine in done technology and production?
 
T

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
MortyandRick said:
Didn't Reuters report Russian oil export decrease by 40%? Is there any truth to that?
Click to expand...

Google Gemini response:

As of April 2026, Russia’s crude oil exports are showing resilience, hovering around 3.22 million barrels per day despite Ukrainian drone attacks on infrastructure and Western sanctions. While some port facilities were hit, overall exports remained high, largely driven by demand from China and India.
Nikkei Asia
Nikkei Asia
+4
Key Aspects of Russian Oil Exports (April 2026):
Export Volumes: Russia is maintaining significant crude flows, with marine terminal exports exceeding 8.5 million barrels per day at times, even with port disruptions.
Key Markets: China is the top buyer of Russian crude (51%), followed by India (38%), and Turkey (6%).
Revenue & Pricing: Russian Urals crude has seen a price surge, reaching roughly
per barrel, which is 70% higher than late February levels. Revenue in March 2026 increased to roughly $19 billion.

And you may know more than most here, is Russia truly behind Ukraine in done technology and production?
Click to expand...

Don't think so.

In terms of airframe design, flight control systems and engines, the Russians enjoy the benefits of having an MIC aviation industry.

The Geran for example, is a much better airframe than anything that looks like a Cessna or a twin boom Bayraktar. The delta wing offers superior rigidity than a wide straight wing and can store greater quantities of fuel with a greater lift area in relation to the weight. The angled wing edge lowers radar cross section while offering lower wind resistance. However this type of airframe is also harder to control with elevons instead of seperated elevators and ailerons. Your FCS will need to have more homework.

The Geran flies higher beyond MANPADS and AA gun range, then makes a steep dive at the target. In contrast the Lyuty is forced to fly low on the ground to avoid radar detection with its high RCS airframe. Low enough that Zu-23-2 machine guns on a truck can shoot it down and often do so.

I can talk more about the other drones but to keep it short, we can talk about those later as it can get too long.

If I remember, Zelensky was complaining that the Russians were building as many as 700 Gerans a day, though the Russians will not officially admit to anything.
 
T

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
Here's info on the Power of Siberia pipeline. This has the potential to totally upend Middle East dependence. The pipeline ends as far south as Shanghai, so tankers can load from there.

Copied of from Google Gemini:

+8
The Power of Siberia pipeline is a major energy corridor transporting natural gas from Russia to China, with the first line operational since 2019 and reaching full 38 bcm annual capacity in 2025. The planned Power of Siberia 2, crossing Mongolia, aims to add 50 bcm/year, securing Russian energy exports while boosting China's energy security.
East Asia Forum
East Asia Forum
+3
Power of Siberia 1 (Existing)
Capacity: 38 billion cubic meters (BCM) per year, with plans for further expansion.
Route: Connects Russia’s Chayanda and Kovykta gas fields to China's northeast border, running over 1,400 miles to connect with Chinese infrastructure down to Shanghai.
Status: Operational since December 2019, reached full capacity in 2025.
Significance: Provides a critical pivot for Russian energy exports towards Asia following western sanctions.
一般財団法人 日本エネルギー経済研究所
一般財団法人 日本エネルギー経済研究所
+3
Power of Siberia 2 (Planned)
Projected Capacity: 50 BCM annually.
Route: Extends from Western Siberia through Mongolia to China.
Status: A legally binding memorandum was signed, but the project has faced delays regarding construction costs and pricing, though it is viewed as a key strategic move for both nations.
Key Issues: Experts note that Russia needs to finalize this deal due to loss of European markets, while China is negotiating favorable prices and potentially funding a large portion of construction.
East Asia Forum
East Asia Forum
+3
Far Eastern Route
Status: Expected to start operations by 2027, increasing total delivery capacity.
Impact: Together with other deals, this ensures a massive expansion of energy supply to China.
一般財団法人 日本エネルギー経済研究所
一般財団法人 日本エネルギー経済研究所
+1
Strategic Context
The pipelines allow China to diversify its energy supply, reducing reliance on maritime imports that are vulnerable to geopolitical tensions. For Russia, they are crucial for reallocating gas sales from European markets. The massive, capital-intensive infrastructure includes advanced, durable materials designed for extreme temperatures.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
+3
 
S

Soldier30

Captain
Registered Member
Footage of Russian Geran-2 drone strikes on Dnipropetrovsk on April 25. The attack lasted over 10 hours. The drones struck Ukrainian military-industrial facilities in the Dnipropetrovsk region, including an oil depot, a gas station, and an ammunition depot. An Iskander missile also struck. It's worth noting that many videos of drone strikes are missing, as publishing such information is prohibited in Ukraine.

 
T

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
The third China-Russia pipeline is the Far East pipeline that goes from Sakhalin region to Heliojiang, China.

From Google Gemini.

The Russia-China Far East gas pipeline project is a strategic infrastructure development scheduled to begin operations in 2027, linking Russia's Sakhalin region to China. This project, aimed at increasing Russian gas exports to China (10–12 billion cubic meters annually), is a crucial step for Moscow to pivot energy sales toward Asia following reduced European demand.

Project Details & Status
Capacity & Timing: Initial exports of are expected to rise to annually, with operations starting in 2027.
Route: The pipeline connects the existing Sakhalin–Khabarovsk–Vladivostok system to China's network, starting at the border city of Hulin.
Construction: Gazprom is developing the Russian segment, while PipeChina and PetroChina manage the Chinese section.
Key Partners: The project was finalized by agreements between Gazprom and CNPC.

Significance
For Russia: This route is vital for diversifying exports away from European markets, which were reduced following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
For China: It strengthens energy security through diversified, overland supply sources, decreasing reliance on maritime routes.
Strategic Ties: The project highlights the strengthening economic partnership between Russia and China in energy.


Next we have the Northern Sea Route. Forget about the Suez Canal. Sea trade between China and Russia will route directly from the Arctic to the Pacific. This has implications for trade with other Eastern regions all the way to India.

From Google Gemini.

Russia and China are rapidly developing the Northern Sea Route (NSR)—or "Arctic Route"—and strengthening Far East land-sea links to secure energy supplies, reduce dependence on the Malacca Strait, and slash shipping times by up to 40%. On October 14, 2025, they signed a major agreement to operationalize the NSR, aiming for 20 million tons of cargo annually by 2030 through shared icebreaker fleets and port investments.

Key Aspects of the China-Russia Route Partnership
Northern Sea Route (NSR): Russia is using its Arctic infrastructure, assisted by Rosatom's nuclear icebreakers, to build a "Polar Silk Road" with China. It acts as a shorter alternative to the Suez Canal, saving significantly on fuel.
Strategic Importance: This route provides China with a safer alternative to the Malacca Strait, reducing vulnerability to geopolitical conflict.
Far East Land-Sea Corridors: Joint efforts focus on improving infrastructure in Primorsky Krai (Vladivostok, Zarubino ports) to connect landlocked Northeastern China to the sea, utilizing "No. 1 and No. 2 Coastal Corridors".
Infrastructure Investment: China is investing in Russian Arctic ports, and the two countries are expanding railways like the Trans-Siberian Railway to boost logistics.
Energy Transport: The route is heavily used for transporting oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), coal, and iron ore from Russia to China.
Challenges: The route is only fully navigable 5–7 months a year, requiring expensive icebreaker escort for year-round service.

This cooperation is part of a broader, long-term strategic partnership, including regional infrastructure development like bridges across the Amur River and the planned expansion of the Khasan district's transportation network
 
M

MortyandRick

Senior Member
Registered Member
Those pipelines are not yet operational. Difficult to know how much Russia can take advantage of the harmuz closure given attacks on their energy infrastructure. Btw Ukraine has attacked all the way to Urals

My concern is the front line drone tech gap, or supposed drone gap which can inflict casualties on Russian front line troops, halting their advance.

From Gemini and Kimi. Although take it with a grain of salt because it's heavily biased toward western and Ukrainian sources

As of late April 2026, the situation on the front is characterized by a high-intensity "tug-of-war" where massive Russian strikes are being met with significant Ukrainian drone and tactical advantages.
The Kremlin has launched what they call their **"Spring-Summer 2026 Offensive"** (officially starting around mid-March), but independent assessments suggest it has largely stalled due to staggering equipment and personnel losses.
### **1. Territory and Operations (Current Status)**
* **Stalled Momentum:** In the last four weeks, Russia actually suffered a **net loss** of territory (about 2–4 square miles).
* **Key Sectors:** * **Pokrovsk Direction:** Russia has made minor tactical advances here, though at an extreme human cost.
* **Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka:** Ukrainian forces have successfully pushed back and advanced in this tactical area.
* **Kharkiv/Northeast:** Russian recruitment rates are falling while casualty rates are increasing, leading to a visible slowdown in their ability to conduct high-intensity "wave" assaults.
### **2. The Aerial War (The "666" Strike)**
One of the most notable events occurred just yesterday (**April 25, 2026**). Russia launched a massive, coordinated strike involving **666 drones and missiles**—the fourth such strike of over 500 vehicles in April alone.
* **Primary Target:** Dnipro City was the main focus, enduring over 20 hours of bombardment.
* **Interception Success:** Ukraine’s air defense has evolved significantly. In March 2026, they intercepted **92%** of Russian drones, a massive leap from the 50-60% rates seen in early 2025. However, Russian ballistic missiles remain a major threat, with zero interceptions of the 12 launched in March.
### **3. The "Drone Gap"**
There is a growing consensus that Ukraine has achieved a **technological advantage** in drone warfare.
* **Hungarian/Druzhba Incident:** Ukraine recently blew up a pump station on the Druzhba pipeline, disrupting oil deliveries to Hungary, shortly after restoring the line.
* **Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI):** Ukrainian "Unmanned Systems Forces" (USF) are now performing over **11,000 combat missions per day**.
* **Internal Russian Friction:** Reports suggest Russian Defense Minister Belousov privately informed Putin that the situation is "critical" due to Ukraine's drone superiority.

**The Bottom Line:** Russia is throwing its weight behind a massive spring push, but they are currently trading enormous quantities of men and machines for negligible territorial gains. The front is moving from a war of maneuver to a war of **technological attrition**, and currently, the Kremlin is scrambling to bridge the "drone gap."
 
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