These kinds of subtleties vanish in the face of an act as provocative as a foreign power annexing territory a country considers its own. If Ukrainians considered Crimea theirs in 2014, there would be no handwringing about the supposed illegality of overthrowing Yanukovych. It would be seen as a grotesque Russian violation of Ukrainian sovereignty no matter the circumstances that brought it about.
I find it much more likely that the Ukrainian government in 2014 recognized that it was in no shape to fight Russia and could not count on Western support. Do you have any data that indicates Ukrainians felt as you describe in 2014?
You completely misunderstand the nature of the conflict and how the perception of it changed over time. I'm assuming you probably started paying attention to it only after Russia invaded in 2022 so everything that you know about the conflict comes with hindsight forcibly included in every commentary on the war. Everything is obvious now but nothing was obvious as the events unfolded.
Ukraine was engulfed by a political conflict between pro-western and pro-Russian parties effectively representing two competitors in energy markets (US/UK and Russia) which began in 2004 when Yanukovych attempted to steal the presidential election and Yushchenko almost died from poisoning. That was highly controversial event in which both sides began to accuse each other of foreign interference. Yanukovych then won the election in 2010 against less popular Tymoshenko but the disastrous mishandling of Maidan protests in winter of 2013-2014 led to his removal from power. He was removed on 22nd of February.
Before that pro-Russian protests have taken place in Simferpol and Sevastopol in response to the fighting in Kiyv. Russian military operation began in the evening of 26th February but Russian troops were unmarked and assisted openly by SBU and Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel in Crimea which remained loyal to Yanukovych. New government in Kiyv was only approved on the 27th and the process of purging of the ministries took time.
The takeover of Crimea resembled an armed uprising rather than overt Russian military intervention. It took place exactly at the time of extreme volatility in Kiyv as new and unstable government acting under 2012 election results and thus without genuine majority attempted to wrestle control out of the hands of Yanukovych's people. Russian "green men" worked hand-in-hand with pro-Yanukovych forces.
Let's not forget that what took place in Kiyv was a regular battle between government and opposition which ended in a peace agreement. It was a civil war per definition.
A crucial factor was also the legal status of Crimea as an Autonomous Republic - the only administrative region of Republic of Ukraine with legitimate political sovereignty. The problem was the manner in which those rights were exercised. And between that, the physical control over Crimea by pro-Yanukovych/pro-Russian militants and successful blockade of Ukrainian military forces on the peninsula it was simply too much for an unstable government in Kiyv that struggled to prevent instability, protests and attempt to instigate secession over the entirety of the east. They had to choose between losing Crimea or losing half of the country. They chose correctly.
Let's also not forget that the government would not function without the support of Svoboda and other moderate nationalists many of whom might have made the calculation that losing the pro-Russian parts of the country will shift the balance of power in their favour. It's quite obvious that Svoboda was doing everything it could to deepen the conflict rather than seek compromise because they stood to gain most from further instability. The mess around language laws is great example of that. Some pushed, some resisted.
Russian military intervention took place at the same time as a war of secession was happening in south and east of Ukraine and while it was obvious that Russia would provide political support to the pro-Russian factions it wasn't obvious that Russian military was directly involved in the fighting until August when AFU almost managed to neutralise separatist forces only to be pushed back by unmarked Russian combined arms formations.
Until that moment it was almost impossible to tell whether government forces were fighting Russian-speaking pro-Russian Ukrainians, Russians from Ukraine or volunteers from Russia because it was a chaotic and highly irregular conflict fought over by small armed groups on both sides. Because majority of early fighting for the Ukrainian side was done by volunteer formations like Azov or Donbas it was also impossible to tell who the pro-Russian forces were fighting: the government in Kiyv or the anti-Russian volunteers.
It was a complete mess and I remember the confusion very well.
At the time most people interpreted these events as evidence of Russian extreme skill in "hybrid warfare" but I think Russians got extremely lucky. Internal instability in Ukraine was decisive and also ensured the limited scope of economic sanctions. I'm of the opinion that had Russia invaded in 2014 it would have been an even greater disaster than the current invasion. There's an argument to be made here but I'm out of characters.
Very interesting and insightful. Do you think this culture has fundamentally changed over the past eight years? Is the AFU now a professional military (by NATO standards) with a competent NCO staff that can maintain discipline and give it a decisive edge over the Russian military? Is it still the antiquated Soviet institution it was in 2014? Or is it somewhere in between, and if so, where between these extremes would you put it?
That depends on the formation. Special Operations Forces and Air Assault Forces received most training and support and they are most professional but they still are not NATO standard. They are absolutely most motivated and get the best selection of personnel. Ground Forces received less training and they're a somewhat modernized post-Soviet formation. National Guard received some training but their roles are different and Territorial Defense is just a militia. AFU is a conscript force which limited initial potential. NATO forces are professional so there's no direct comparison force-on-force.
There are new units that have been formed during the war and some of them are receiving NATO training and will be equipped with NATO weapons but they will not be the equivalent of experienced professional force. I don't think training and discipline will be an advantage for Ukraine. Morale is definitely on their side, particularly those fighting in those new units. There will be some advantage stemming from the new tactics that were taught but it is difficult to tell how much of that can come together into a coherent whole. We'll have to wait and see.
I'd like to ask you what you think the reasons for Ukraine's relative success have been. If you were to break it down into factors, how much weight would you give to:
1. Direct NATO support through providing arms, ammunition, and intelligence.
2. Reforms and battlefield experience gained through fighting pro-Russian separatists from 2014-2022.
3. Ideological indoctrination and radicalization of the population in general and the military specifically since 2014.
4. Indirect NATO assistance through training over 2014-2022.
5. Russian underestimation of Ukraine and general incompetence.
Feel free to suggest any relevant factors I've missed.
In order of relevance:
5a. Without Russian failures NATO support would be not forthcoming. Washington planned for collapse and insurgency.
5b. Militarily Russia could only achieve success in a limited campaign. Their choice of operation was self-defeating.
1a. NATO material support - both military and non-military, including accepting millions of refugees - is what keeps Ukraine at war. Without it they'd be out of supplies and forced to surrender in late spring/early summer at the latest.
1b. NATO ISR is fundamental to equating the field on a strategic level and the information warfare is waged
by NATO for Ukraine.
2. Provided for a trained pool of reservists numbering approx. 0,8 million. Tactical experience helpful but not decisive.
4. Training was not as important as support for purges and institutional reform that ensured that AFU is relatively coherent as a formation. AFU proved resistant to training on higher levels due to cultural and institutional inertia.
Not relevant:
3. There was no indoctrination or radicalisation. The radical element and divisions remained stable since 2012. Russia and Ukraine are not China and Taiwan but Britain and Ireland. You will not understand anything about this conflict until you cut yourself off from Russian narratives about it because Russian narratives are the very reason why Russia committed all the errors.
How do you see the war shaping up over the spring?
I don't have enough information to make any prediction. I developed a scenario for how I would conduct a push toward Crimea but it's a theoretical exercise. It is viable on paper, it may not be viable in reality at all because the data necessary is kept secret.
