Taiwan Military News, Reports, Data, etc.

Gloire_bb said:

Submarines, as instruments of guerre de course, are an asymmetric counter. They're specifically bought to remain relevant even when a direct counter is impossible/counterproductive(wasted resources).

Larger numbers of ASW forces won't deny submarine force its ability to produce impact. Because in the end, it's up to the submarine commander(and command) to decide where to engage, how to engage, and wherever to engage at all.

Until and unless ASW force can proactively hunt down submarines(and this isn't something current PLAN and PLANAF is aimed at, at least not "behind the corner" of Taiwan island itself) - they're going to matter anyway. In some cases, they can matter even after a conclusive military defeat(ww2 cases).

Click to expand...

The discussion isn't about whether submarines are better than "nothing" or whether they're better than a "direct counter" (I assume you mean surface naval forces for example).

The discussion was about whether the ROCN's procurement of 8 submarines of their specified size/displacement is the best procurement choice considering other plausible alternatives -- e.g.: if they went for 16-24 smaller SSKs of under 1000 tons instead.

The discussion was also about whether procuring submarines in general was a wise use of opportunity cost in general as a strategy against the PLA specifically and the expected political resolve and military capabilities the PLA will be seeking to bring to the table, and whether alternative procurement/doctrines might be a wiser and more cost effective choice than submarines.

This impressive list won't keep MG nest on an unknown hill(bamboo grove, slit in a cliff, you name it) suppressed. Even drones in Karabakh were doing an impressive, but different job.
I.e. until and unless there are beachheads of sufficient depth, and even assuming all these fires can be freely used at Taiwan w/o reserve - with all those capabilities, the attacker is still going to be at a massive disadvantage.

This isn't about China specifically, other than China and US, no other country is capable of doing this anyway.
This is about strategic landings against prepared position being difficult, no matter whom we're talking about.

Click to expand...

I agree in principle that of course amphibious landings and developing beach heads as a matter of principle is difficult, "in general".

The stages of an operation are basically all the same:
1. Softening up of a beach head and its immediate vicinity through use of fires
2. Landing of forces to seize and clear the immediate beach, setting up a perimeter
3. Preventing reinforcements from other areas to come and reinforce the beach/prevention of counter attack (aka isolation of the beach)
4. Simultaneously with the above, establishment of a beach head to land heavier forces and logistics to allow you to move in deeper

There are also other stages not mentioned but which are implied:
0. Massive bombardment and destruction of the air force, navy, command/control, air defenses, artillery systems, logistics, sensors etc
3.5. Locating and destroying any remaining artillery or fires systems that are still able to present a threat to your landed forces from indirect fire.


But the seizing of a beach head and reinforcement of a beach head is dependent on a case by case basis, the question is whether we think the array of air, naval, missile, and amphibious forces on the respective sides are capable of enabling or preventing the above from happening in this specific case and scenario.

Bltizo said:

The discussion was about whether the ROCN's procurement of 8 submarines of their specified size/displacement is the best procurement choice considering other plausible alternatives -- e.g.: if they went for 16-24 smaller SSKs of under 1000 tons instead.

Click to expand...

Small submarines have obvious problems with the length and range of patrol, as well as the number of torpedoes and other munitions onboard. If they ruled out using subs in the strait itself, there are clear merits in this choice.

On top of that, we have to take into account the relevant experience available to them. There are quite a few examples when a distinguished producer of large submarines tried to make a small one and made it seriously bad. American pool of technology and experience isn't omnipotent.

Bltizo said:

The stages of an operation are basically all the same:
1. Softening up of a beach head and its immediate vicinity through use of fires
2. Landing of forces to seize and clear the immediate beach, setting up a perimeter
3. Preventing reinforcements from other areas to come and reinforce the beach/prevention of counter attack (aka isolation of the beach)
4. Simultaneously with the above, establishment of a beach head to land heavier forces and logistics to allow you to move in deeper

There are also other stages not mentioned but which are implied:
0. Massive bombardment and destruction of the air force, navy, command/control, air defenses, artillery systems, logistics, sensors etc
3.5. Locating and destroying any remaining artillery or fires systems that are still able to present a threat to your landed forces from indirect fire.

Click to expand...

Yep, pretty much it. But it's seriously complicated by fortifications and the sheer size of the military sitting on what ultimately isn't that much of an Island.

And at a very optimistic pace and assuming complete and utter surprise, the whole process is likely to take some significant amount of time. The number of forces involved, geographical, meteorological, logistical, and other complications are seriously high.
Rushing a schedule at an operation of this scale...may in the end be unavoidable(due to obvious external complications), but overdoing it is simply opportunistic.

Bltizo said:

Basically everything that Skywatcher mentioned in #3778 as well as procuring a larger number of smaller (under 1000 ton) SSKs instead of a smaller number (eight) of the current SSKs.

Click to expand...

The only criticism I have about small submarines is that there's no particular reason in my mind why the PLAN would struggle to find them if they could detect the class currently being built on the high seas. Sure Taiwan would have more, but the PLAN would also be able to concentrate it's ASW ships and use land-based MPAs. I think Taiwan would need a number of small submarines it realistically couldn't produce before the 2030s/2040s to get around that. Plus the smaller ones would be limited to no AShMs and fewer torpedoes.

As for what Skywatcher said (sorry for not replying to you directly, Skywatcher), I know Taiwan's ordered CM-34s which have the Bushmaster II. Not sure if that classifies as a HIFV or not in your book.

I know Taiwan's had plans to build mobile SAMs for a decade or more, but on numbers built/planned I can't find data on units completed or planned.

The road mobile harpoons are in the right direction as well.

Click to expand...

That's good to know.

Nothing in particular the US is likely to sell you think Taiwan should go for next year?

One thing I would certainly advise against is pursuing their new destroyers and frigates the ROCN has been publicly thinking about... but who knows.

Click to expand...

I hadn't actually realised Taiwan has even talked about large destroyers since the US option was ruled out, but it does look like a pipedream for now. As for the frigates, I know they're designing a new class, but it's not clear how much priority is going to the project. I can imagine why you think they should be avoided, but at the same time much of the current surface fleet is pretty old (e.g. the ex-Knoxes). Not replacing them would really reduce Taiwan's ASW capabilites, although there's obviously the risk of any surface ship being vulnerable to the PLAAF.

Bltizo said:

.... on another note, the current relative lack of emphasis PLA fixed wing CAS capability (direct attack PGMs especially), is something which the ROC military can probably try to exploit through more effective ground warfare. The PLA hasn't paid much attention to this because the PLA likely recognizes CAS/PGM interdiction requires air superiority first and the PLA is more focused on achieving air superiority against more capable foes than the ROCAF.
But I wouldn't be surprised if in coming years the PLA starts to have some money put aside to actually implement a fixed wing CAS capability... which will really begin to seal the last domains for effective asymmetric warfare that the ROC military has unless significant advances in other domains of technology emerge.

Click to expand...

The 2017 release of the L-15B, which is a fighter-trainer with good ground attack capability, plus the usage of JF-17s by the Pakistani air force against militants in the Hindu Kush indicate that the PLAAF already has the technical capabilities to perform fixed wing CAS.

I'm not really sure what you mean when you say the PLA doesn't already have fixed wing CAS capabilities.

Gloire_bb said:

Small submarines have obvious problems with the length and range of patrol, as well as the number of torpedoes and other munitions onboard. If they ruled out using subs in the strait itself, there are clear merits in this choice.

On top of that, we have to take into account the relevant experience available to them. There are quite a few examples when a distinguished producer of large submarines tried to make a small one and made it seriously bad. American pool of technology and experience isn't omnipotent.

Click to expand...

And building a larger submarine is easier?
This is also a discussion about having less eggs in one basket. At the end of the day if the ROCN seeks to operate these submarines with greater endurance and at greater distances perhaps outside of the strait, it might make sense.

But at the same time if they're developing SSKs without the intention to operate them to try to target PLA amphibious assault ships and surface combatants operating in the strait then I'm not sure what other mission is of greater priority or cost effectiveness.

Yep, pretty much it. But it's seriously complicated by fortifications and the sheer size of the military sitting on what ultimately isn't that much of an Island.

And at a very optimistic pace and assuming complete and utter surprise, the whole process is likely to take some significant amount of time. The number of forces involved, geographical, meteorological, logistical, and other complications are seriously high.
Rushing a schedule at an operation of this scale...may in the end be unavoidable(due to obvious external complications), but overdoing it is simply opportunistic.

Click to expand...

None of this is unique to the Taiwan contingency.

Heck, if anything, I would argue that for the scale of the operation that we are talking for a Taiwan contingency, the PLA is arguably the most well placed to do something like this given the geographical proximity and sheer disparity in air and naval forces at present.

PUFF_DRAGON said:

The 2017 release of the L-15B, which is a fighter-trainer with good ground attack capability, plus the usage of JF-17s by the Pakistani air force against militants in the Hindu Kush indicate that the PLAAF already has the technical capabilities to perform fixed wing CAS.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

I'm not really sure what you mean when you say the PLA doesn't already have fixed wing CAS capabilities.

Click to expand...

Well yes, I said the "relative lack of emphasis of PLA fixed wing CAS capability".

Obviously they have fixed wing aircraft in service that can deploy PGMs (mostly 500kg LGBs in service at present), but the variety and scale of those PGMs and the variety of aircraft that routinely train in this role and integration and training alongside ground forces is what I'm talking about.

I'm talking about having PGMs of smaller weight classes on multi-ejector racks with combined satellite and laser and/or EO or even MMW guidance, as well as Brimstone type weapons, with greater proliferation of targeting pods, as well as tactical surveillance SAR pods mounted for tactical fighter aircraft, all operating in conjunction with a more mature JTAC force, in a regular way.
That capability is not present in the PLA at present, but it's also understandable given their focus on higher end A2A and stand off strike at present vs more capable enemies where CAS is not a priority.

Mr T said:

The only criticism I have about small submarines is that there's no particular reason in my mind why the PLAN would struggle to find them if they could detect the class currently being built on the high seas. Sure Taiwan would have more, but the PLAN would also be able to concentrate it's ASW ships and use land-based MPAs. I think Taiwan would need a number of small submarines it realistically couldn't produce before the 2030s/2040s to get around that. Plus the smaller ones would be limited to no AShMs and fewer torpedoes.

As for what Skywatcher said (sorry for not replying to you directly, Skywatcher), I know Taiwan's ordered CM-34s which have the Bushmaster II. Not sure if that classifies as a HIFV or not in your book.

I know Taiwan's had plans to build mobile SAMs for a decade or more, but on numbers built/planned I can't find data on units completed or planned.

Click to expand...

The benefit of smaller submarines is that there are more of them and they're arguably easier to hide in the littorals than larger submarines. More eggs in the basket so to speak.
Of course the cost of smaller submarines is they have shorter endurance and smaller magazine than larger submarines.
If the goal is to interdict and sink PLAN amphibious assault ships and escorts in the strait, I feel like a numerically larger fleet of individually smaller submarines makes more sense. If the ROCN is wanting to operate beyond the strait at greater distances from the island itself, then larger submarines certainly makes more sense.
But between the two strategies I feel like the latter is more risky with less of a guarantee that they're able to successfully sink more ships, though I understand its appeal as well.

The CM-34s are fine as 8x8 standard weight IFVs. Not exactly a HIFV like Boxer, but there aren't many wheeled HIFVs in the world like Boxer.

That's good to know.

Nothing in particular the US is likely to sell you think Taiwan should go for next year?

Click to expand...

Basically what Skywatcher wrote before.

I hadn't actually realised Taiwan has even talked about large destroyers since the US option was ruled out, but it does look like a pipedream for now. As for the frigates, I know they're designing a new class, but it's not clear how much priority is going to the project. I can imagine why you think they should be avoided, but at the same time much of the current surface fleet is pretty old (e.g. the ex-Knoxes). Not replacing them would really reduce Taiwan's ASW capabilites, although there's obviously the risk of any surface ship being vulnerable to the PLAAF.

Click to expand...

At the end of the day, Taiwan will procure what weapons the leadership thinks is necessary, based on military requirements and a combination of political/PR/public factors.

I will just say that based on my observation over the last couple of decades, the easier, low hanging fruit procurements are looking increasingly tenuous and there will be some hard decisions to make going forwards.
What I mean by "easier" procurement are weapons systems that enable a strategy to be fought on a basis of superior or comparable technology, at distances away from or outside of the soil of Taiwan island proper, with minimal exposure of the public to the conflict. Basically, weapons that seek to achieve or contest air control and sea control.
As the avenues for contesting air and sea control look to grow slimmer over the next few decades, the ROC military and political leadership will have to start considering just how tenable it is to continue operating and procuring weapons systems that directly confront established areas of strengths that the PLA already have, and how much political resolve and understanding the public have for a potential conflict that very well might be on their doorstep and in their neighbourhoods and if there's the resolve to fight and suffer for their goals, potentially under conditions of conventional firepower and ISR inferiority.

If those more difficult questions can't be asked, then I expect procurement and operation of "conventional" systems like fighters, larger submarines, and surface combatants to continue.

Bltizo said:

Well yes, I said the "relative lack of emphasis of PLA fixed wing CAS capability".

Obviously they have fixed wing aircraft in service that can deploy PGMs (mostly 500kg LGBs in service at present), but the variety and scale of those PGMs and the variety of aircraft that routinely train in this role and integration and training alongside ground forces is what I'm talking about.

I'm talking about having PGMs of smaller weight classes on multi-ejector racks with combined satellite and laser and/or EO or even MMW guidance, as well as Brimstone type weapons, with greater proliferation of targeting pods, as well as tactical surveillance SAR pods mounted for tactical fighter aircraft, all operating in conjunction with a more mature JTAC force, in a regular way.
That capability is not present in the PLA at present, but it's also understandable given their focus on higher end A2A and stand off strike at present vs more capable enemies where CAS is not a priority.

Click to expand...

That's a fair assessment, but I disagree that the PLAAF lacks these capabilities in sufficient quantity to dumpster the ROC even with US intervention. I'll quote some stuff verbatim from this UK military think tank sent to Whitehall to make my point.

As with the Su-27/J-11A, China has now developed its own, improved Su-30 derivative – the J-16. The J-16 features an AESA radar, increased use of composite materials for reduced weight, a fully digital ‘glass’ cockpit for both crew, compatibility with the full range of Chinese PGMs and a new targeting pod called YINGS-III which is roughly comparable to the US Sniper Pod.109 Following its entry to service in 2015, the J-16 is expected to replace the Su-30MKK and MK2 fleets over the coming decade in both PLAAF and eventually PLANAF service, and is currently China’s most capable multirole and strike aircraft.

Click to expand...

The J-10A featured a modern cockpit and avionics, with intake mounts for simultaneous carriage of a K/RKL700A ECM pod and K/JDC01A targeting and a laser-designator pod to aid in the delivery of a range of PGMs.113

Click to expand...

It seems to me that all of the current gen 4th gen air frames the PLA can field do have most of the PGM capabilities that you list off as standard factory defaults.

The other thing is that even if the PLAAF can't provide top of the line fixed wing CAS to its amphibious assault troops, I am skeptical this would be something the ROCA could take advantage of given the deployment of ultra long range MLRS systems that can tap the beaches of Taiwan from across the straits and the overwhelming advantage the PLA posesses in terms of rotary attack aviation.

In the absolute worst case, the massive fleet of brown water vessels the PLAN possesses can simply sail into the straits and start unloading naval gun and rocket fire.

PUFF_DRAGON said:

That's a fair assessment, but I disagree that the PLAAF lacks these capabilities in sufficient quantity to dumpster the ROC even with US intervention. I'll quote some stuff verbatim from this UK military think tank sent to Whitehall to make my point.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

It seems to me that all of the current gen 4th gen air frames the PLA can field do have most of the PGM capabilities that you list off as standard factory defaults.

Click to expand...

I'm very aware of the extent of PLA fixed wing strike and CAS capabilities in service right now.
Yes, the J-10 family, J-16s and JH-7/As all have the potential to do the precision strike and CAS role.
And yes, J-10s, J-16s and JH-7/As are technically compatible with the "full range of PGMs" in PLA service right now. Unfortunately that "full range of PGMs" in PLA service is only limited to the 500kg LGB (LT-2/LS-500J) and various stand off guided weapons like KD-88, YJ-91, YJ-83K.

However, as I said before, they lack the wider variety of PGMs and mature air-ground air control and tactical airborne surveillance system for the sort of CAS and direct attack PGM strike that I would expect if the PLA was interested in more comprehensive CAS/strike overmatch.
Merely being "compatible" with PGMs if the PLA chooses to procure them isn't enough to say that they have a robust CAS/strike capability in service.
The reason I'm harping on about the words "in service" is because yes, the PRC aerospace industry has developed a wide variety of PGMs, and yes, many of those PGMs have been flight tested on PLAAF aircraft as part of their development, and yes, many of those PGMs are quite advanced.
But at present, we have no evidence that many if any of those PGMs have been procured and inducted into PLA service and operated routinely by the PLA's aircraft as a normal munitions loadout.

Key capabilities I would personally define as having a more robust CAS/strike capability that is in service and combat ready:
- Smaller weight class PGMs (250kg and 100kg weight category) in service
- Satellite guidance as standard as well as composite guidance (satellite + supplementary laser and/or EO and/or MMW) in the aforementioned PGMs, in service
- Large magazine capacity of the aforementioned PGMs per aircraft (likely will need multi-ejector racks)
- Routine and mature air-ground training of CAS and strike capabilities in the form of a combat ready JTAC type role with systems like ROVER
- Widespread proliferation of advanced targeting pods (K/JDC01/A is in service among J-10s and JH-7/As, and J-16 should have a targeting pod in service as well, but we don't know how widely used they are. To be fair to the PLA this is at least one category that they seem to be closest to meeting)
- Widespread proliferation of advanced tactical SAR pods to allow all weather, dynamic, ground surveillance via SAR imaging and GMTI to support the targeting loop.


Those capabilities have not yet to be demonstrated to be in service or mature, because we have no evidence the PLA has purchased and integrated the requisite systems and trained pilots, crew and ground forces extensively in that type of operation.
Now, as I've repeatedly said, choosing to not pursue this domain of robust CAS/direct attack strike is reasonable given the PLA's other many focuses, but it also means we have to recognize that they currently don't have a robust CAS/direct attack strike capability that is operational that is similar to what western air forces have.

The other thing is that even if the PLAAF can't provide top of the line fixed wing CAS to its amphibious assault troops, I am skeptical this would be something the ROCA could take advantage of given the deployment of ultra long range MLRS systems that can tap the beaches of Taiwan from across the straits and the overwhelming advantage the PLA posesses in terms of rotary attack aviation.

In the absolute worst case, the massive fleet of brown water vessels the PLAN possesses can simply sail into the straits and start unloading naval gun and rocket fire.

Click to expand...

The specific way I was thinking about the ROC military trying to "exploit" a gap in robust CAS/strike was in the form of more urban/closer ranged fighting, where firepower support would have to be via precision guided munitions and naval gunfire support and long range MLRS won't be appropriate.
But this is obviously far from a decisive "condition for victory" that the ROC military would prefer, and more of a "try to exact more casualties than we otherwise might be able to before we have to retreat" tactic.

Bltizo said:

And building a larger submarine is easier?
This is also a discussion about having less eggs in one basket. At the end of the day if the ROCN seeks to operate these submarines with greater endurance and at greater distances perhaps outside of the strait, it might make sense.

But at the same time if they're developing SSKs without the intention to operate them to try to target PLA amphibious assault ships and surface combatants operating in the strait then I'm not sure what other mission is of greater priority or cost effectiveness.

Click to expand...

When your "advisor"'s practical experience is likely about Virginia class SSN - well, yes.

8 units is a fairly reasonable fleet. It's more (multipurpose) units than most countries; more than even European powers with nuclear submarine fleets. Conventional sub obviously isn't the same as nuclear, but we're talking about mathematical ability to absorb losses.

Taiwan:
(1)has a lot of other means to attack ships(or deny water) within strait;
(2)submarines actually have loosy experience in counter-landing operations. They did inflict losses, but iirc never as much as was hoped for, and often did it too late;
(3)going right into concentrated and vigilant asw of main landing operation is counterproductive(read - suicidal);
(4)same program has very clear counter-landing capabilities clearly intended for strait.
(5)cross-strait operation gives good opportunity to perform underwater warfare even without sinkable platforms.

Bltizo said:

the PLA is arguably the most well placed to do something like this given the geographical proximity and sheer disparity in air and naval forces at present.

Click to expand...

You're comparing forces in a strait up match up. But, weaker opponent's intention isn't to fight for superiority (and honorably let himself get undone), but to survive, while taking favourable engagements and performing delaying/harrassing action till the point when it may matter.

Right thing in this case is to compare it with force matchups in historical strategic landing operations. Taiwan actually looks way stronger to usual ratios, and geography is at least as bad and/or worse than in typical historical examples for hotly contested landings.
Furthermore, Chinese ORBAT is limited by needs of other theaters.

Summing up, taking Taiwan is absolutely key due to Chinese maritime geography. But "fortress Taiwan" is still a really difficult target to crack. And if China can look at the map, so can others...

How much CAS does China realistically need? Most of Taiwan is located on the coast, within range of the 130mm naval guns.